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SENATE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 63

From WEDNESDAY, April 30, 1986  
To THURSDAY, June 26, 1986

**Joint Chairmen:**

Senator Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, M.P.

SÉNAT  
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 63

Du MERCREDI 30 avril 1986  
Au JEUDI 26 juin 1986

**Coprésidents:**

Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, député

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence  
of the Special Joint Committee of the  
Senate and of the House of Commons on*

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages  
du Comité mixte spécial du Sénat  
et de la Chambre des communes sur les*

# Canada's International Relations extérieures Relations du Canada

**RESPECTING:**

Order of Reference pertaining to Canada's  
International Relations

**CONCERNANT:**

Ordre de renvoi relatif aux Relations extérieures  
du Canada

**INCLUDING:**

The Final Report to Parliament

**Y COMPRIS:**

Le rapport final au Parlement

First Session of the  
Thirty-third Parliament, 1985-1986

Première session de la  
trente-troisième législature, 1985-1986







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SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE  
SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
ON CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Joint Chairmen:*

Senator Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, M.P.

*Representing the Senate:*

COMITÉ MIXTE SPÉCIAL DU SÉNAT ET  
DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES SUR LES  
RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU CANADA

*Coprésidents:*

Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, député

*Représentant le Sénat:*

Senators—Les sénateurs

Richard J. Doyle  
Philippe D. Gigantès

Jerahmiel S. Grafstein

Jean-Maurice Simard

Peter Stollery — 5

*Representing the House of Commons:*

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:*

Members—Les députés

Lloyd Axworthy  
Patrick Crofton  
Suzanne Duplessis

André Harvey  
Tom Hockin  
W. R. Bud Jardine

Pauline Jewett  
Donald Johnston  
Bill Kempling

Steven W. Langdon  
Bob Porter  
Reginald Stackhouse

(Quorum 7)

*Les cogreffiers du Comité*

Doreen Lebrun

Donald G. Reid

*Joint Clerks of the Committee*

Pursuant to Standing Order 94 of the House of Commons

Conformément à l'article 94 du Règlement de la Chambre des communes

On Monday, April 28, 1986:

Le lundi 28 avril 1986:

Pauline Jewett replaced Bill Blaikie.

Pauline Jewett remplace Bill Blaikie.

On Tuesday, April 29, 1986:

Le mardi 29 avril 1986:

Suzanne Duplessis replaced Aurèle Gervais.

Suzanne Duplessis remplace Aurèle Gervais.

On Wednesday, May 14, 1986:

Le mercredi 14 mai 1986:

Jim Manly replaced Steven Langdon.

Jim Manly remplace Steven Langdon.

On Thursday, May 15, 1986:

Le jeudi 15 mai 1986:

Steven Langdon replaced Jim Manly.

Steven Langon remplace Jim Manly.

On Wednesday, June 4, 1986:

Le mercredi 4 juin 1986:

Ken James replaced André Harvey;

Ken James remplace André Harvey;

Jim Caldwell replaced Reginald Stackhouse.

Jim Caldwell remplace Reginald Stackhouse.

On Thursday, June 5, 1986:

Le jeudi 5 juin 1986:

André Harvey replaced Ken James;

André Harvey remplace Ken James;

Reginald Stackhouse replaced Jim Caldwell.

Reginald Stackhouse remplace Jim Caldwell.

On Tuesday, June 10, 1986:

Aurèle Gervais replaced Suzanne Duplessis;  
Robert A. Corbett replaced André Harvey;  
Scott Fennell replaced Bob Porter;  
Don Ravis replaced W. R. Bud Jardine;  
Clément Côté replaced Don Ravis.

On Thursday, June 12, 1986:

Suzanne Duplessis replaced Aurèle Gervais;  
André Harvey replaced Robert A. Corbett;  
Bob Porter replaced Scott Fennell;  
W. R. Bud Jardine replaced Clément Côté;  
Jim Caldwell replaced Patrick Crofton;  
John Reimer replaced Suzanne Duplessis.

On Thursday, June 19, 1986:

Patrick Crofton replaced Jim Caldwell;  
Suzanne Duplessis replaced John Reimer.

Pursuant to Rule 66(4) of the Senate

On Tuesday, April 29, 1986:

Philippe D. Gigantès replaced Douglas Everett.

On Tuesday, May 6, 1986:

Heath Macquarrie replaced Richard J. Doyle.

On Wednesday, May 7, 1986:

Richard J. Doyle replaced Heath Macquarrie.

On Tuesday, May 20, 1986:

C. William Doody replaced Richard J. Doyle.

On Friday, May 23, 1986:

Richard J. Doyle replaced C. William Doody.

Le mardi 10 juin 1986:

Aurèle Gervais remplace Suzanne Duplessis;  
Robert A. Corbett remplace André Harvey;  
Scott Fennell remplace Bob Porter;  
Don Ravis remplace W. R. Bud Jardine;  
Clément Côté remplace Don Ravis.

Le jeudi 12 juin 1986:

Suzanne Duplessis remplace Aurèle Gervais;  
André Harvey remplace Robert A. Corbett;  
Bob Porter remplace Scott Fennell;  
W. R. Bud Jardine remplace Clément Côté;  
Jim Caldwell remplace Patrick Crofton;  
John Reimer remplace Suzanne Duplessis.

Le jeudi 19 juin 1986:

Patrick Crofton remplace Jim Caldwell;  
Suzanne Duplessis remplace John Reimer.

Conformément à l'article 66(4) du Règlement du Sénat

Le mardi 29 avril 1986:

Philippe D. Gigantès remplace Douglas Everett.

Le mardi 6 mai 1986:

Heath Macquarrie remplace Richard J. Doyle.

Le mercredi 7 mai 1986:


Richard J. Doyle remplace Heath Macquarrie.

Le mardi 20 mai 1986:

C. William Doody remplace Richard J. Doyle.

Le vendredi 23 mai 1986:

Richard J. Doyle remplace C. William Doody.





## ERRATUM

### *Issue No. 55*

On page 55:71, in both the English and French texts:

In the third paragraph of the remarks made by the Acting Joint Chairman (*Senator Stollery*), "Mr. Saleh" should read "Mr. Hadawi"; and

The heading "Mr. Rashad Saleh (*President, Canadian Arab Federation*)" should read "Mr. Sami Hadawi (*Member, Canadian Arab Federation*)".

On pages 55:72 and 55:79, in both the English and French texts:

The heading "Mr. Saleh" should read "Mr. Hadawi".

On page 55:75, in both the English and French texts:

The heading "Mr. Sami Hadawi (*Member, Canadian Arab Federation*)" should read "Mr. Hadawi".

On page 55:78, in both the English and French texts:

The second heading "Mr. Saleh" should read "Mr. Hadawi".

### *Issue No. 63: Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations*

On page 37, in the English text:

The words "Cabinet Committee on External Affairs," should be deleted on the 45th line and the words "Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy" should be entered in its place.

On page 40, in the French text:

The words : "Comité du Cabinet chargé des affaires extérieures" should be deleted on the 12th line and the words "Comité du Cabinet chargé de la politique étrangère et de la défense" should be entered in its place.

On pages 93 et 94, in the French text:

The words "Fonds monétaire international" should be deleted on the last line on page 93 and on the first line on page 94 and the words "Banque mondiale" should be entered in its place.

Note: This report, which here appears in Issue 63, was also released separately under Special cover following the tabling of the Report in Parliament.

## ORDERS OF REFERENCE

### FROM THE SENATE

#### MOTION

BY the Honourable Senator Doody, seconded by the Honourable Senator Phillips

With leave of the Senate and notwithstanding Rule 45(1)(e),

THAT notwithstanding the Order of the Senate adopted on Tuesday, May 27, 1986, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its report no later than Thursday, June 26, 1986; and

That a Message be sent to the House of Commons to acquaint that House that the Senate do unite with that House for the above purpose.

Tabled in Senate

Date June 19, 1986

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*Clerk Assistant*

### FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1986

*ORDERED*,—That, notwithstanding the Order of the House made on Tuesday, May 27, 1986, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its report not later than Thursday, June 26, 1986; and

That a message be sent to the Senate to request that the Senate unite with this House for the above purpose.

*ATTEST*

MICHAEL B. KIRBY  
*for The Clerk of the House of Commons.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1986  
(114)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:44 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Jerahmiel S. Grafstein and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett and Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Roger Hill, Bob Miller, Carol Seaborn, Gregory Wirick, Research Officers, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); Christiane Kaisin, Reviser (French); Margot Maguire, Media Relations Representative; Peggy Dillman, Luc Rainville, Chris Walker, Research Staff; Susan Bigelow, Bruce Campbell, Staff Representatives, New Democratic Party; Judy Lawrence, Staff Representative, Progressive Conservative Party;

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee proceeded to the consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 6:10 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1986  
(115)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:21 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Luc Rainville, Research Staff; Chris Walker, Research Staff; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 12:45 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.



AFTERNOON SITTING  
(116)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:45 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Luc Rainville, Research Staff; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); David Humphreys, Media Co-ordinator; Margot Maguire, Media Representative; Barbara Arneil, Staff Representative, Liberal Party; Jackie McIntyre, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Chris Walker, Research Assistant.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 4:25 o'clock p.m. Senator Jean-Maurice Simard took the Chair.

At 4:50 o'clock p.m. the sitting was suspended.

At 4:59 o'clock p.m. the sitting resumed.

At 5:00 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

MONDAY, MAY 5, 1986

(117)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:35 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Roger Hill, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

**ORDERED**, —That the expenses incurred by the Joint Chairman in entertaining the Committee and invited guests at dinner in London, Ontario on Tuesday, April 8, 1986, be borne by the Committee as a hospitality expense, upon certification by the Joint Clerk (House of Commons) of the list of those attending.

At 5:45 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1986  
(118)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:30 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Jean-Maurice Simard and Heath Macquarrie.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 12:40 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.



AFTERNOON SITTING  
(119)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:48 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Roger Hill, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 5:48 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 1986  
(120)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:45 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Jerahmiel S. Grafstein and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Barbara Arneil, Staff Representative, Liberal Party; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 5:00 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 7:45 o'clock p.m. this day.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

EVENING SITTING  
(121)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 8:00 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven Langdon.

*In attendance:* Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Barbara Arneil, Staff Representative, Liberal Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 10:33 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*



THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1986  
(122)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:23 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That pursuant to the authority granted in its Order of Reference dated Thursday, June 27, 1985 from the Senate and Wednesday, June 12, 1985 from the House of Commons, the Committee retain the services of Mr. Georges Royer as Editor/Reviser (French) of the Committee's report on Phase II of its inquiry, according to the terms of a contract to be negotiated with the Joint Chairmen.

At 12:12 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

MONDAY, MAY 12, 1986  
(123)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 7:18 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, the Honourable Senator Jean-Maurice Simard, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Judy Lawrence, Staff Representative, Progressive Conservative Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 9:42 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1986  
(124)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:33 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 12:33 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*



AFTERNOON SITTING  
(125)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:53 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*Other Member Present:* Jim Fulton.

*In attendance:* Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 5:45 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 1986  
(126)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:44 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Jim Manly, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Margot Maguire, Media Representative, Humphreys Public Affairs Group; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee took under consideration a revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

The revised draft Foreword was considered.

It was agreed, —That the Committee take under consideration the revised draft of its Report to Parliament as distributed by the Joint Clerks, and that it consider the Foreword, each chapter and the appendices severally, and that the Joint Chairmen be empowered at their discretion to defer putting the question on each motion for adoption.

It was agreed, —That pursuant to the authority granted in its Order of Reference dated Thursday, June 27, 1985 from the Senate and Wednesday, June 12, 1985 from the House of Commons, the Committee extend the existing contract for the services of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade to permit continuing work in preparation and revision of the Report, by an amount not to exceed \$18,000; and that for this purpose funds be transferred, to a maximum of \$18,000, from the unexpended portion of the existing travel budget.

**ORDERED,** —That a suitable design for the cover of the Committee's Report to Parliament be commissioned by the Humphreys Public Affairs Group, the costs of graphic work and preparation for printing, including the collection of appropriate photographs and payment of applicable royalties thereon, to be borne by the Committee from the amount budgeted in relation to the Report; and that the Joint Chairmen be empowered to approve the design in consultation with the principal spokesman for each Party.

The Committee considered Chapter 1 of the revised draft Report.

At 6:00 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 7:45 o'clock p.m. this day.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

EVENING SITTING  
(127)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 8:00 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Jim Manly, Bob Porter.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Greg Wirick, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The committee considered Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 9:36 o'clock p.m. the sitting was suspended.

At 9:40 o'clock p.m. the sitting resumed.

At 11:10 o'clock p.m. the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*



TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1986  
(128)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:55 o'clock a.m. this day, the Acting Chairman, Bill Kempling, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Chris Walker, Committee Staff; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

By unanimous consent of the Members present, the Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 7.

At 10:46 o'clock a.m., the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, assumed the Chair.

At 12:35 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

## AFTERNOON SITTING

(129)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:45 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; David Humphreys, Margot Maguire, Press Relations Consultants, Humphreys Public Affairs Group.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

**ORDERED**, —That the Joint Clerks be charged with preparing, verifying and sending to the Canadian Government Printing Bureau the following appendices to the Report, according to the normal procedures for such appendices:

- (1) List of public meetings on Phase II of the Committee's inquiry;
- (2) List of witnesses who appeared at the Committee's meetings during Phase II;
- (3) List of names of those from whom written submissions were received.

**ORDERED**, —That the Humphreys Public Affairs Group be instructed to prepare a suitable press information kit based on the Committee's Report on Phase II of its inquiry, once that report has been finalized, and that the Joint Chairmen be authorized to approve the contents of that press kit on behalf of the Committee in consultation with the representative of each Party prior to its final preparation for release following the tabling of the Report.

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 5 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament, which had been allowed to stand.

At 6:04 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 7:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING  
(130)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 8:15 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 5 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 10:35 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1986  
(131)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:45 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators C. William Doody, Philippe D. Gigantès and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Roger Hill, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Sue Bigelow, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kim Pollock, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 6 of the revised draft of its report to Parliament, which had been allowed to stand.

The sitting was suspended at 4:45 o'clock p.m.

The sitting resumed at 5:20 o'clock p.m.

At 6:00 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 7:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*



EVENING SITTING  
(132)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 7:57 o'clock p.m. this day, the Acting Chairman, Patrick Crofton, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Philippe D. Gigantès.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling.

*In attendance:* Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Roger Hill, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 6 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 8:20 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair for lack of quorum.

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1986  
(133)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 11:18 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Philippe D. Gigantès.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 6 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 1:03 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

MONDAY, MAY 26, 1986

(134)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 7:43 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bob Porter.

*In attendance:* Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 6 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 10:29 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

TUESDAY, MAY 27, 1986  
(135)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:41 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 6 and proceeded to consider Chapter 8 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That the Committee complete its examination of its draft Report and adopt its Report to Parliament no later than Wednesday, June 4, 1986.

At 12:35 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*



AFTERNOON SITTING  
(136)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:54 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 9 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 6:02 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 7:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

## EVENING SITTING

(137)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 7:51 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1*)

The following Order of the House of Commons having been read, —

*ORDERED*, —That, notwithstanding the Order of the House made on Wednesday, June 12, 1985, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its final report not later than Wednesday, June 25, 1986; and

That a message be sent to the Senate to request that the Senate unite with this House for the above purpose.

And the following Order of the Senate being read, —

*ORDERED*, —That, notwithstanding the Order of the Senate adopted on Thursday, June 27, 1985, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its final report no later than Wednesday, June 25, 1986; and

That a Message be sent to the House of Commons to acquaint that House that the Senate do unite with that House for the above purpose.

*ORDERED*, —That the Joint Chairmen be authorized to extend existing contracts with the staff of the Committee up to any date preceeding July 1, 1986, according to their discretion and on the advice of the Joint Clerks, provided that in no case the said extensions cause the Committee's total existing approved budget to be exceeded.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 9 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 9:49 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1986  
(138)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:40 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee considered Chapters 10 and 11 of the revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 6:09 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1986  
(139)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:50 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senator Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament and Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee proceeded to consider the final revised text of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That the Foreword, Chapter I, Annex A to Chapter 1, and Chapter 2, as amended, stand part of the Report.

At 12:37 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.



AFTERNOON SITTING  
(140)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:38 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament and Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That Chapters 3 and 4, as amended, stand part of the Report.

By unanimous consent, the Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 7 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 5:13 o'clock p.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 5:50 o'clock p.m., the sitting resumed.

It was agreed, — That the five introductory paragraphs to the summary of recommendations and conclusions, as amended, stand part of the Report.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 7 of the final revised draft.

At 7:02 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1986  
(141)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:57 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Donald G. Reid, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); Judy Lawrence, Staff Representative, Progressive Conservative Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 7 and proceeded to consider Chapter 8 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 6:41 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Doreen Lebrun  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1986  
(142)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:37 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); Judy Lawrence, Staff Representative, Progressive Conservative Party; Bruce Campbell, Staff Representative, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 5 of the revised final draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 11:00 o'clock a.m. , the sitting was suspended.

At 12:10 o'clock p.m., the sitting resumed.

At 12:11 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING  
(143)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:44 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

It was agreed, —That the motion of Tuesday, May 27, 1986 respecting the adoption of the Report be rescinded and that the following schedule of meetings and subjects be concurred in in order to complete adoption of the Report as outlined in the said schedule.

Tuesday, June 3, afternoon — consider Chapter 7  
— commence Chapter 8

Wednesday, June 4, afternoon — complete Chapter 8  
— consider Chapters 10 and 11

Wednesday, June 4, evening — consider Chapter 9  
— consider Chapter 5

Tuesday, June 10, morning — commence Chapter 6

Tuesday, June 10, afternoon — complete Chapter 6

Tuesday, June 10, evening — reserved for any remaining business

*ORDERED*, —That notwithstanding the motion of Thursday, April 24, 1986 concerning the printing of the Committee's report, the Joint Clerks be instructed to prepare and insert in the preliminary pages of the report pictures only of those Members who participated in meetings of the Committee during the consideration of drafts of the said report.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 7 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 7, as amended, stand part of the Report.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 8 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 5:40 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m. on Wednesday, June 4, 1986.



WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1986  
(144)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:33 o'clock p.m. this day, the Acting Chairman, Bill Kempling, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Jim Caldwell, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee considered Chapter 10 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 10, as amended, stand part of the Report.

The Committee considered Chapter 11 of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 11, as amended, stand part of the report.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 8 of the final revised draft.

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 9 of the final revised draft.

At 4:46 o'clock p.m., the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, assumed the Chair.

It was agreed, —That the Committee's Report to Parliament on Phase II of its inquiry be entitled "Independence and Internationalism" and that this title appear on the cover and on the title page of the Report.

At 5:52 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

EVENING SITTING  
(145)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 7:40 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Jim Caldwell, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee considered various matters related to the elements of its final Report and took decisions related to the inclusion, the titling, and the ordering of these elements.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 9 of the final revised draft.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 9, as amended, stand part of the Report.

It was agreed, —That the order of Chapters 5 and 6 of the final revised draft of the Report be reversed.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 8 of the final revised draft of the Report.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 5 (now renumbered as Chapter 6) of the final revised draft of the Report.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 6, formerly Chapter 5, as amended, stand part of the Report.

At 10:30 o'clock p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1986  
(146)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:22 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Patrick Crofton, Aurèle Gervais, Tom Hockin, Clément Côté, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Reginald Stackhouse.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); Georges Royer, Editor/Reviser (French); Chris Walker, Staff; Luc Rainville, Staff.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee proceeded to consider Chapter 5 (formerly Chapter 6) of the final revised draft of its Report to Parliament.

At 12:44 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

AFTERNOON SITTING  
(147)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 3:45 o'clock p.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Richard J. Doyle and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Lloyd Axworthy, Clément Côté, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Other Member present:* Jim Caldwell.

*In attendance:* Doreen Lebrun, Joint Clerk of the Committee; Gerald Wright, Study Director; Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bob Miller, Research Officer, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English); David Humphreys, Media Co-ordinator; Margot Maguire, Media Representative, Sue Bigelow, Bruce Campbell, Kim Nossal, Staff Representatives, New Democratic Party.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 8 of the revised final draft of its Report to Parliament.

The Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 5 (formerly Chapter 6) of the revised final draft of its Report to Parliament.

It was agreed, — That Chapter 5 (formerly Chapter 6), as amended, stand part of the Report.

By unanimous consent Chapter 6 (formerly Chapter 5), which had previously been agreed to and made part of the Report, was reconsidered and amended.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 6 (formerly Chapter 5), as further amended, stand part of the Report.

It was agreed, —That Chapter 8, as amended, stand part of the Report.

At 6:32 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerk of the Committee*

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1986  
(148)

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations met *in camera* at 9:45 o'clock a.m. this day, the Joint Chairman, Tom Hockin, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:*

*Representing the Senate:* The Honourable Senators Philippe D. Gigantès and Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Representing the House of Commons:* Jim Caldwell, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, John Reimer, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Other Member Present:* Clément M. Côté.

*In attendance:* Peter Dobell, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Bill Neil, Research Officer, Library of Parliament; Kathryn Randle, Editor/Reviser (English), Margot Maguire, Humphreys Public Affairs Group.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985, and its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 as amended by orders of the Senate and of the House of Commons dated May 27, 1986. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Friday, June 28, 1985, Issue No. 1 and of Tuesday, May 27, 1986, Issue No. 63*).

The Committee considered peripheral material related to its final report and other matters related to adoption, publishing and presentation of that report.

It was agreed, —That the Acknowledgements section stand part of the Report.

It was agreed, —That the Editor, in conjunction with the research staff, be authorized to edit the summary of the Committee's recommendations and conclusions which follows Chapter 11 and, subject to the review of the Joint Clerks, to plan the grouping, arrangement and presentation of the material according to the following criteria:

- all recommendations and conclusions appearing in the text in boldface type are to be included;
- no additional recommendations and conclusions are to be added, nor additional text to be put in boldface type within the report;
- existing recommendations and conclusions may be amplified to the extent only of clarifying references and indicating subject where this is not clear;
- the recommendations and conclusions may be grouped thematically under sub-headings reflective of the themes of the report;
- connective and explanatory introductory material in normal typeface may be included to preface each thematic grouping, each such preface not to exceed one paragraph in length.

It was agreed, —That the summary of Recommendations and Conclusions stand part of the Report.

*ORDERED*, —That photographs reflecting the participation of active members of the Committee during the Committee's hearings be included in the preliminary pages of the Report.



**RESOLVED**, —That in conformity with the expressed wishes of the Joint Chairman (House of Commons) the motion of May 5, 1986 respecting payment by the Committee of hospitality expenses incurred by the Chairman at London, Ontario on Tuesday, April 8, 1986, be rescinded.

**ORDERED**, —That the motion of Tuesday, June 3, 1986, respecting the insertion of pictures of Members of the Committee be rescinded; and

—That the Joint Clerks be instructed to prepare and insert in the preliminary pages of the Report pictures only of those Members who participated in the work of the Committee during Phase II by attending at least 10 meetings.

**ORDERED**, —That the final revised draft report, as amended, be the Committee's Report to the Senate and House of Commons on Phase II of its inquiry and that it be the Final Report of the Committee; and

—That the Joint Chairmen be instructed each to present the Report in his respective House of Parliament on or before June 25, 1986 or, if that House be not sitting, to present it to the Clerk of that House.

**RESOLVED**, —That the Committee express special thanks to the witnesses who appeared and to those who made written submissions, and to the staff of the Committee for their able devotion to the task of the Committee.

**ORDERED**, —That custody of the Committee's documents be given to the Committees and Private Legislation Directorate of the House of Commons following the expiry of the Committee's mandate;

—That access to the *in camera* transcripts of the Committee's meetings and to draft material related to its reports be restricted to the following classes of persons meeting the conditions hereafter described until June 25, 1996:

- a) University researchers who present evidence of their affiliation with a recognized Canadian university to the Principal Clerk, Committees and Private Legislation Directorate, who receive his written authorization to have access to the material described, and who undertake in writing not to publish the material in question;
- b) Senators and Members of Parliament, or former Senators and former Members of Parliament, who undertake not to publish any of the material in question during the term of the embargo, or to cause or permit its being published;
- c) other persons authorized by letter of the Speaker of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Commons to have access to the said material and who undertake to abide by the publishing restrictions described in (a) above.

**ORDERED**, —That the Joint Clerks be responsible for the distribution of those copies of the report ordered by the Committee according to the following criteria:

—distribution of one copy to each witness who appeared before the Committee;

—distribution of one copy to each organization or individual who made a written submission before May 7, 1986;

—distribution of no more than 5 additional copies to organizations which submitted briefs or appeared before the Committee, at the discretion of the Clerks;

- no more than eighty copies of the report for distribution by any individual Member of the Committee;
- no more than ten copies for one department agency of government, unless otherwise authorized by one of the Joint Chairmen;
- no more than two copies to any organization not listed in the appendices of the Report;
- two hundred and fifty complimentary copies to be distributed at the discretion of the Clerks to individuals who request them;
- no more than 1,000 copies for distribution to Members of each House of Parliament and Parliamentary officials;
- no more than 500 copies to be distributed to the Press Gallery of Parliament and other members of the press;
- these guidelines to remain in force for thirty days following the tabling of the Report, at which time the remaining stock of the Report shall be administered by the Joint Clerks or their successors in the respective Committees directorate of each House.

The Committee expressed its thanks to the Joint Chairmen for their guidance of the Committee.

At 11:55 o'clock a.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Doreen Lebrun  
Donald G. Reid  
*Joint Clerks of the Committee*

# **Independence and Internationalism**

**Report of the Special Joint Committee  
of the Senate  
and  
of the House of Commons  
on**

**Canada's International Relations**

**June 1986**

**Joint Chairmen:  
Senator Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, M.P.**

NOTE: The Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Committee, Issues Nos. 19 to 62 and 63 which contains this Report, document the Committee's work in relation to this Report.



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
The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations has the honour to present its

### FINAL REPORT

In accordance with its Orders of Reference from the Senate dated June 27, 1985 and May 27, 1986, and from the House of Commons dated June 12, 1985 and May 27, 1986, your Committee has considered the issues discussed in the document entitled *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations* and has agreed to make the following report concerning the objectives and conduct of Canada's international relations.



**Members of the  
Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations**



Tom Hockin, M.P.  
**JOINT CHAIRMAN**  
Progressive Conservative  
London West (Ontario)




Jean-Maurice Simard, Senator  
**JOINT CHAIRMAN**  
Progressive Conservative  
New Brunswick



Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P.  
Liberal  
Winnipeg—Fort Garry (Manitoba)



Jim Caldwell, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Essex-Kent (Ontario)



Jean Chrétien, P.C., M.P.  
Liberal  
Saint-Maurice (Quebec)



Patrick Crofton, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Esquimalt—Saanich (B.C.)



Richard Doyle, Senator  
Progressive Conservative  
Ontario



Suzanne Duplessis, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Louis-Hébert (Quebec)



Jacques Flynn, P.C., Senator  
Progressive Conservative  
Québec

Philippe D. Gigantès, Senator  
Liberal  
Québec



Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Senator  
Liberal  
Ontario



André Harvey, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Chicoutimi (Quebec)



W.R. Bud Jardine, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Northumberland—Miramichi (N.B.)



Pauline Jewett, M.P.  
New Democrat  
New Westminster—Coquitlam (B.C.)



Bill Kemping, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Burlington (Ontario)




Steven W. Langdon, M.P.  
New Democrat  
Essex-Windsor (Ontario)



Jim Manly, M.P.  
New Democrat  
Cowichan—Malahat—The Islands (B.C.)



Bob Porter, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Medicine Hat (Alberta)



Reginald Stackhouse, M.P.  
Progressive Conservative  
Scarborough West (Ontario)



Peter Stollery, Senator  
Liberal  
Ontario

**Other Senators participating:**

C. William Doody  
Douglas D. Everett  
Heath Macquarrie

**Other Members of the House of Commons participating:**

Bill Blaikie  
Aurèle Gervais  
Dan Heap  
Ken James  
John Parry  
Clément Côté  
John Reimer

## Order of Reference from the House of Commons

Wednesday, June 12, 1985

*ORDERED*, — That a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons be appointed to consider Canada's International Relations;

That the document entitled "Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations", Tabled on May 14, 1985 (Sessional Paper No. 331-4/10), be referred to the Committee;

That the Committee consider and report upon the issues discussed in the above-mentioned document and make recommendations in their report concerning the objectives and conduct of Canada's International relations;

That the following 12 Members of the House of Commons to act on behalf of the House as members of the said Committee be: Messrs. Axworthy, Chrétien, Crofton, Mrs. Duplessis, Messrs. Harvey, Hockin, Jardine, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Kempling, Langdon, Porter and Stackhouse;

That the Committee have the power to sit during sittings and adjournments of the House;

That the Committee have the power to report from time to time, to send for persons, papers and records, and to print such papers and evidence from time to time as may be ordered by the Committee;

That the Committee have the power to retain the services of expert, professional, technical and clerical staff;

That the Committee have the power to adjourn from place to place inside Canada and that, when deemed necessary, the required staff accompany the Committee;

That a quorum of the Committee be seven members, whenever a vote, resolution or other decision is taken, so long as both Houses are represented and that the Joint Chairmen be authorized to hold meetings, to receive evidence and authorize the printing thereof, whenever 4 members are present, so long as both Houses are represented;

That the Committee submit an interim report on Canada's participation in research on the Strategic Defence Initiative and on Bilateral Trade with the United States no later than August 23, 1985;

That notwithstanding the usual practices of this House, if the House is not sitting when an interim or final report of the Committee is completed, that the Committee shall report with the Clerk of the House and that it shall thereupon be deemed to have been laid upon the Table;

That the Committee present its final report no later than May 31, 1986; and

That a message be sent to the Senate requesting that House to unite with this House for the above purpose, and to select, if the Senate deems it advisable, members to act on the proposed Special Joint Committee.

*ATTEST*

*The Clerk of the House of Commons*



## Order of Reference from the Senate

Thursday, June 27, 1985

*ORDERED*, — That a Message be sent to the House of Commons to inform that House that the Senate do unite with the House of Commons in the appointment of a Special Joint Committee to consider Canada's International Relations;

That the document entitled "Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations", tabled in the Senate on May 15, 1985 (Sessional Paper No. 331-383), be referred to the Committee;

That the Committee consider and report upon the issues discussed in the above-mentioned document and make recommendations in their report concerning the objectives and conduct of Canada's international relations;

That five Members of the Senate, to be designated at a later date, act on behalf of the Senate as members of the said Committee;

That the Committee have the power to sit during sittings and adjournments of the Senate;

That the Committee have the power to report from time to time, to send for persons, papers and records, and to print such papers and evidence from time to time as may be ordered by the Committee;

That the Committee have the power to retain the services of expert, professional, technical and clerical staff;

That the Committee have the power to adjourn from place to place inside Canada and that, when deemed necessary, the required staff accompany the Committee;

That a quorum of the Committee be seven members, whenever a vote, resolution or other decision is taken, so long as both Houses are represented and that the Joint Chairmen be authorized to hold meetings, to receive evidence and authorize the printing thereof, whenever 4 members are present, so long as both Houses are represented;

That the Committee submit an interim report on Canada's participation in research on the Strategic Defence Initiative and on Bilateral Trade with the United States no later than August 23, 1985;

That notwithstanding the usual practices of this House, if the Senate is not sitting when an interim or final report of the Committee is completed, that the Committee shall report its findings by depositing its report with the Clerk of the Senate and that it shall thereupon be deemed to have been laid upon the Table; and

That the Committee present its final report no later than May 31, 1986.

*ATTEST*

*The Clerk of the Senate*



Tuesday, May 27, 1986

*ORDERED*, — That, notwithstanding the Order of the House made on Wednesday, June 12, 1985, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its final report not later than Wednesday, June 25, 1986; and

That a message be sent to the Senate to request that the Senate unite with this House for the above purpose.

*ATTEST*

*The Clerk of the House of Commons*


Tuesday, 27th May, 1986

*ORDERED*, — That, notwithstanding the Order of the Senate adopted on Thursday, June 27, 1985, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations be empowered to present its final report no later than Wednesday, June 25, 1985; and

That a Message be sent to the House of Commons to acquaint that House that the Senate do unite with that House for the above purpose.

*ATTEST*

*The Clerk of the Senate*



1. The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations held hearings in every province and territory. Here a witness makes a presentation in Vancouver.



2. Members Lloyd Axworthy (Lib.—Winnipeg-Fort Garry) and Senator Richard Doyle (Ontario) chat with Sunday School children from Fort Garry United Church in Winnipeg. The children made several presentations to the committee on issues raised by the Green Paper.



3. Quebec witness Claude Morin chats with co-chairmen Tom Hockin (PC—London West) and Senator Jean-Maurice Simard (New Brunswick) and members Suzanne Duplessis (PC—Louis Hébert) and Steven Langdon (NDP—Essex-Windsor ).



4. Co-chairman Tom Hockin (PC—London West) explains a point at a news conference following the release of the committee's interim report. Members from left to right: Pauline Jewett (NDP—New Westminster-Coquitlam), Jacques Flynn (Québec), Tom Hockin, Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Lib.—Winnipeg-Fort Garry).



5. Committee members: From top left to right, André Harvey (PC—Chicoutimi), Bob Porter (PC—Medicine Hat), Reginald Satchhouse (PC—Scarborough West), bottom left to right, Bud Jardine (PC—Northumberland-Miramichi), Bill Kempling (PC—Burlington), Patrick Crofton (PC—Esquimalt-Saanich).





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## Acknowledgements

This report and the interim report that the committee presented on August 23, 1985 are the product of dedicated work, during an intensive 11-month period, of many Senators and Members of the House of Commons who participated in the work of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. The Foreword to this report describes the committee's work program. It remains for us to express our thanks to the members of all parties and both Houses whose hard work and efforts to understand each other's point of view have made this a better document than it would otherwise have been.

The committee's task has been challenging. Apart from the vast scale of the undertaking, the process of reaching agreement on a common text required extensive debate among Members and a will to seek accommodations. This is never easy in the political environment of Parliament. Although Canada's international policies have enjoyed broad all-party support during the post-war years, there are some subjects where the political parties are committed to different positions. For this reason, trying to reach consensus has involved all Members in making compromises. On those few occasions when it has been impossible to find a common position and differences have been important, we have chosen to record and briefly describe our divergences.

The result is a document that truly represents a committee perspective; it does not reflect precisely the views of any one Member.

In addition to the hard work of the members of the committee, we would like to recognize and acknowledge the excellent service provided to the committee by its staff. The five Joint Clerks who served the committee for various lengths of time — Mr. Paul Belisle, Miss Paulette Nadeau and Miss Doreen Lebrun from the Senate; Miss Jean Macpherson and Mr. Donald Reid from the House of Commons — not only acted with professionalism and competence in all aspects of the committee's work, but worked extended hours week after week with good humour and without complaint. The office staff working with them through the life of the committee, and the professional and untiring research team assembled under Mr. Peter Dobell of the Parliamentary Centre to work with Study Director Dr. Gerald Wright and Mr. Bill Neil of the Library of Parliament, all contributed to the realization of the committee's report on its nearly year-long enterprise. To all of them, we express our appreciation. Nor would we wish to overlook the meticulous, prompt and proudly professional service rendered — often under very tight deadlines — by the team of translators assembled under Mr. Dominique Soudet of the Translation Service of the Secretary of State and by our editors, Kathryn Randle and Georges Royer, who strove with them to bring our report to articulate expression in both official languages.

We also express our deep gratitude to the many witnesses who appeared and those who wrote to us, who have followed the committee's deliberations with care and have continued to send us their views and to provide counsel.

The satisfaction we take at having reached the point of presenting this report to Parliament is augmented by our recognition of these contributions. We hope that our colleagues in Parliament, the government of Canada to whose attention we direct many of our recommendations, and the interested public by whose participation our thinking

has been aided, will find here the basis for further reflection on a vast subject that is of great and increasing importance to Canada in the years ahead.

In a fast-moving world, events continually create new situations that require changes in policy. Over time, specific comments and recommendations will inevitably be overtaken by new developments. Our report should be read with this caution in mind.

# FOREWORD

## The Work of the Committee

---

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations was established in June 1985 expressly to "make recommendations ... concerning the objectives and conduct of Canada's international relations". We were directed by Parliament to complete our report by May 31, 1986, a limit later extended to June 25. This was a huge task whose accomplishment required hard work and dedication by all the members of the committee.

The government first announced its intention to ask the Senate and the House of Commons to establish a special joint committee to consult the Canadian people on the full range of Canada's international relations in the speech from the throne opening the first session of the thirty-third parliament. Some six months later the Secretary of State for External Affairs took the next step and released the government's Green Paper, *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*. On some issues the Green Paper stated positions, while on others it asked questions. In both cases, its function was to give focus to the proposed parliamentary review. In his foreword to the Green Paper, the Right Honourable Joe Clark made this clear with his description of the paper as an aid to the review and his encouragement to "all Canadians with an interest in the future of their country and the contributions Canada can make to a safer, more prosperous and humane world to come to the parliamentary hearings ... and make their views known".

The review of Canada's international relations that the Special Joint Committee conducted during the past ten months is wholly unprecedented in Canada and rare, if not unique, within the international community. The only comparable attempt by government was the preparation of *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, which was published in 1970 in six small booklets. While the scope of that exercise was similarly broad, it differed in two major respects: it was undertaken by the bureaucracy rather than by a parliamentary committee, and it lacked the vital element of public participation that has made the work of our committee both rewarding and unique. Never before in Canadian history has a committee of Parliament had the opportunity and the challenge to review the entire scope of Canada's external relations. Our inquiry was conducted in the full light of public scrutiny, and we deliberately solicited the widest possible range of Canadian views by holding hearings across the country and by inviting the public from every province and territory to give us their perceptions of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the entire Special Joint Committee process can be seen as an exercise in participatory democracy.



The work of the committee was divided into two phases. Our first task began on the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, June 28, 1985. Parliament had requested that we present an interim report by August 23 on two specific issues: whether to enter intensive discussions on comprehensive new trade arrangements with the United States and whether to accept the invitation of the United States to join in the research phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). That part of the committee's work, undertaken during the summer and clearly with no time to lose, was duly completed by the date assigned—this despite a veritable flood of material requiring immediate consideration: almost 700 individuals and organizations filed written briefs, while well over 300 witnesses appeared at the public hearings held in Halifax, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary and Winnipeg.

In the autumn we began the second phase and the central part of our work—the broad review of Canada's international relations. Although our primary goal was the elaboration of a framework within which Canadian external policy should operate, we decided we should also be on the lookout for specific and concrete proposals for action that we could recommend.

In October advertisements were placed in 157 newspapers, both dailies and weeklies, in every part of Canada. They described the work program of the committee and invited submissions from Canadians by November 29. The submissions were a valuable source of information and ideas, and we continued to receive them even as we were drafting this report. By May 7, 1986 we had received communications from 287 organizations and 245 individuals. Every submission was read and its recommendations considered. Annex A, which appears at the end of Chapter 1, contains an analysis of the subject matter and geographical origin of these submissions.

While the public were preparing their submissions during the autumn, the committee organized a series of panel discussions with recognized experts on a variety of topics. The subjects we chose ranged from the influence of the media on foreign policy perceptions, through arms control issues and international debt problems, to Canadian foreign policy in the Arctic. This was the first time a Canadian parliamentary committee had systematically used this technique. In fact, we found it so effective as a means of highlighting differing perspectives and bringing out the options faced by Canada, that we decided to continue the practice when the committee travelled across Canada during the winter months. In each city where we held hearings, in addition to hearing witnesses invited from among those who had responded to our advertisements, we also arranged a panel discussion on a topic with special relevance to the region. For example, in Halifax we had a panel on ocean management issues, while in Edmonton the discussion was on international energy perspectives.

In January, the committee began to travel across the country. Every second week until the end of April we visited successively each province and territory. In addition to the panels, we heard briefs from organizations and individuals selected from among those who had made written submissions. The committee also left time at the end of each day's hearings for brief statements by concerned citizens who came to our meetings and wanted to be heard. In all, during the six months of our public meetings, we organized 30 panel discussions and heard 161 briefs from organizations or individuals and 131 short statements.

In an effort to encourage maximum public involvement, considerable attention was also paid to the news media before and during our visit to each community. Press conferences were organized and interviews arranged for members of the committee, and members of the media were encouraged to take time with the various witnesses who gave us their views.



With a subject so large, we had to make choices. We could not possibly have discussed, even superficially, the entire range of issues coming within our mandate. We have not dealt with enhanced trade negotiations with the United States or with the Strategic Defense Initiative because they were covered in our interim report. Knowing that the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade was undertaking a major examination of official development assistance, we decided to concentrate on the broad thrust of Canadian development policy and suggest to the Standing Committee issues that we considered merited further study. Similarly, since a white paper on defence policy is in preparation, we limited our efforts to an overview of defence issues. Finally, we were not in a position to make a cost-benefit analysis of administrative practices. This would have required a detailed internal examination of the operations of the Department of External Affairs and the embassies abroad as well as of relations with other departments and agencies concerned with defence, foreign aid and immigration.

With limited time available—six months for public hearings—we decided to devote our time to listening to concerned citizens rather than government officials. Furthermore, our reference from Parliament did not authorize foreign travel. We were pleased that so many Canadians came forward and hope that our report reflects their views.

Although we did not examine the operations of the Department of External Affairs, the committee had some opportunity to consider the importance of having competent public officials capable of contributing to the wise formulation and efficient execution of Canadian foreign policy. We believe that Canada is well served by those that have chosen the career of representing the country abroad. We note that this career has become more dangerous on account of increasing instances of terrorism directed against diplomats. We were also impressed by the burden borne by families of officials serving abroad. Foreign language training, for example, should be made available in the same manner to both officials and their spouses, who also carry the responsibility of representing Canada. We also urge the government to give priority to negotiating reciprocal agreements with foreign governments, so that spouses who want to work abroad can do so. In this and similar ways, the government must recognize that a highly professional public service is a valuable national asset, strengthening Canada's hand in its international dealings.

Given the enormous diversity of issues that fell within the committee's mandate and the limited time available, we decided to concentrate on elaborating principles and goals for Canadian foreign policy. We have attempted to comment on many of the major concerns of our witnesses and have made specific proposals for action when we found them topical or when a particularly good idea was brought to our attention. But there was neither time nor space to take positions on every issue raised in testimony. Our approach has been broadly functional rather than regional. By its very nature, foreign policy must adapt constantly to shifting circumstances, and a foreign policy review that lays down specific directions in every area is simply not possible.

Our report was constructed with a view to making the most of limited resources. We could have recommended far more in the way of public expenditures, but we recognized that it would be unrealistic to depart from the financial constraints that bind the government. We did not, however, take the need for frugality as an excuse for inaction. Instead we looked for ways to render government activities more efficient. Several recommendations—that resource centres be established abroad to serve the emphasis on a particular region (Chapter 3), that there be closer federal-provincial co-operation in export development (Chapter 6), that there be a study of long-term

defence requirements to close the gap between Canada's commitments and its capabilities (Chapter 5)—reflect our desire to achieve greater efficiency. We have even sought to extend this principle into the multilateral arena by suggesting the streamlining of international institutions (Chapter 4) and advocating closer co-operation among aid donors (Chapter 7).

Our report takes the following form. We report on our soundings among the Canadian public in Chapter 1, *How Canadians Approach Their Foreign Policy*. We assess the capabilities and resources that Canadians bring to the pursuit of their international objectives in Chapter 2, *Canada's Capabilities*. Eight chapters with recommendations follow, each dealing with a major area of policy. The last chapter, *The Case for Constructive Internationalism*, sets out the positive thrust that we advocate for Canadian foreign policy.

The continuing work of assessing specific elements of Canada's external relations should and will be undertaken regularly in the future by Parliament's standing committees, which can now, for the first time, select the subject matter of their investigations. Indeed, in a number of instances we refer to the findings of several enquiries undertaken by committees of the Senate and the House of Commons. We found them useful, and our hearings persuaded us of the value of a more active role for Parliament. There must be continuous, not episodic, dialogue between governments, Parliament and the public. The occasional general reviews of foreign policy or of specialized areas within it are no substitute for such dialogue. The capacity of Parliament, and particularly parliamentary committees, to serve as a forum for dialogue should be enhanced significantly by the reforms introduced recently. It is now up to the committees of Parliament to demonstrate they can become a focus of ongoing policy debate and a valuable source of advice.

# CHAPTER ONE

## How Canadians Approach Their Foreign Policy

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We want to begin this report by challenging the myth of Canadian insularity. Basing his comments on an international CBC survey of viewers, Mark Starowicz, producer of *The Journal* and a participant in the committee's panel on the media and foreign policy, told us: "Canadians are interested in international affairs. They are more interested in international affairs than most people in the world." (20:7\*) Issues of war and peace, trade, development and human rights are no longer the exclusive preserve of a small elite: they engage the hearts and minds of Canadians.

The evidence is all around us, in the size and intensity of the disarmament debate, in the extraordinary response of Canadians to the Indo-Chinese boat people and to the African famine. Our experience on this committee revealed that the foreign policy constituency in our country is larger, better organized and far more active than ever before. Hundreds of Canadians took the time and trouble to make submissions to the committee. During our hearings across the country we were able to meet only a few of the many Canadians who wrote to us.

Why the growing interest? Part of the explanation lies in the changing experience of Canadians. They are better educated than their parents and travel far more. Thousands of Canadians have served overseas in the armed forces and as development workers. Business people now have well established international connections and commute around the globe. Canadian students abroad and foreign students in Canada have widened their own and others' horizons. Direct experience of this kind has been amplified enormously by the power of television to reach out into the world for images and place them before people in their homes. All of this has radically, if gradually, reduced the sense of remoteness that used to attach to international affairs. The world is now always on the threshold of our consciousness.

The multicultural character of Canada has also affected the foreign policy agenda. In the years since the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, unhappy developments in that part of the world have been of particular concern to Canadians of Eastern European origin who have pressed the government to support the reunification of

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\* Throughout the report, references to testimony are cited as follows: the number before the colon indicates the issue number of the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* of the Committee. The number after the colon is the page number in that issue. Thus, 20:7 refers to page 7 of issue number 20. Where there is only one number cited, it refers to the page number in the witness's brief.



families and work for more freedom in those countries. New waves of immigration during the past 20 years from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean have led to the establishment in Canada of communities with deep personal concerns about problems in parts of the world that previous Canadian governments paid little attention to. These developments were reflected in testimony about the problems of Sikhs in India, Baha'is in Iran and Armenians in Turkey, and about the dispute between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Though Canada has not had the colonial connections that have influenced many Western European countries, immigration has enlarged the perspective of Canadians and increased their awareness of the suffering of people in other countries.

At the same time growing interdependence has prompted a relentless internationalization of the national agenda. Fiscal and monetary policy may still be formulated by the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance, but they have to adjust to what occurs on the floor of the recently established Chicago foreign exchange market. The oil trail that begins in Calgary's Petroleum Club now leads to the skyscrapers of Houston and the royal palaces of Saudi Arabia. And, no less, the moral imperative that draws people from church halls into the struggle against injustice in Canada leads them from there to concern for the peoples of Central America and South Africa.

As domestic affairs have been internationalized, foreign policy has been brought home and opened up for debate. Formerly private and corporate dealings have acquired a public and political character. The comfortable tradition that external affairs is the prerogative of the Crown (in Canada of ministers and mandarins) is now being rudely disturbed by the pressures of participatory democracy. Canadians are knocking on the door of this country's foreign policy with more than messages to deliver: they want in.

The combination of global awareness, interdependence and participation are transforming the very nature of foreign policy—and nowhere faster than in Canada. Our hearings made us aware of just how much international relations has ceased to be the preserve of government. For example, the attempts of two post-war governments to increase the proportion of Canadian exports going to markets other than the United States have been overtaken by the sales success achieved by Canadian businesses in the United States. Witness, too, the Canadian missionary teaching in Haïti whose decision to close down his school to protest government interference may have contributed to the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier. Hundreds of voluntary organizations engaged in Third World development now constitute a community in partnership, sometimes uneasy partnership, with the Canadian International Development Agency. Their activities in scores of Third World countries have become part of the expression of Canada abroad.

The foreign policy agenda has always been shaped by influences and events occurring beyond national borders and over which governments often have little control. The new dimension is an active and concerned public, prodded by the mass media, that reacts to international events quite independently of government. The single most important illustration of this phenomenon is the extraordinary extent to which Canadians' perception of what Canada's foreign policy should be are penetrated and shaped by the foreign policy debate in the United States. Canadians spend a great deal of time watching and reacting to Americans in the world. The reasons for this are apparent. The United States is a superpower. As a major actor on the world stage and the leader of the Western Alliance, it is inevitably the focus of international attention. The open nature of the U.S. foreign policy debate, which comes to English-speaking Canadians as part of their evening entertainment, invites the vicarious participation of concerned next door neighbours.

The participation is more than vicarious. Some of the foreign policy demands directed at Ottawa are in fact demands directed through Ottawa at Washington. The intense interest of many Canadians in Central America, for example, transcends any direct role that Canada plays in the region. Much of the interest is in having the Canadian government openly, and directly, pressure the U.S. government to change its policies. The reluctance of successive Canadian governments to play this kind of role in Washington has been a source of considerable frustration for those Canadians especially concerned with Central America.

This unique focus on Washington stands out by comparison with how Canadians approach Moscow. Even though concern for the suffering of the Afghan people at the hands of Soviet troops is strongly felt, Canadians can not relate to the domestic Soviet debate, and the issue is treated strictly as a problem of external relations.

The committee devoted considerable attention to the role of the media in shaping the way Canadians think about international affairs. We arranged two panels devoted entirely to discussing this theme. The paradox revealed by the panels is that during the same period when the interest of Canadians in the external world grew dramatically, Canada became more dependent on foreign communications media. In this respect, Canada is no different from other countries not represented among the large media organizations now competing in the world communications market. More important, representatives of Canadian radio and television networks and newspapers told us they are a long way from possessing a satisfactory capacity for gathering foreign news. For example, not one Canadian television correspondent is based in Central and South America, Africa or the Middle East. With the growing cost of news gathering and satellite transmission, this situation is likely to deteriorate. To be sure, some Canadian media organizations deserve credit for maintaining foreign bureaux and for recent increases in the number of bureaux. Nevertheless, Canadians depend heavily on foreign news agencies for their foreign news. In consequence, they are treated to news and analysis viewed in a perspective different than would be the case were the reporters and analysts Canadian.

This is a problem of critical importance. The way Canadians and their government assess international developments and the way Canada acts in the world are at stake. We believe that our task is to focus public attention on the absence of a sufficient national capacity for foreign news gathering. Without such a capacity, Canadians cannot be expected to perceive clearly the international dimensions of their own interests. This leaves both the country and its citizens less effective on the international stage.

Heightened public interest has major implications for Canadian foreign policy. Over three-quarters of all the written submissions and letters we received from the public dealt with three broad concerns: human rights in South Africa and Central America, peace and arms control, and development assistance. (See Annex A at the end of this chapter.) Whatever the previously perceived national interest in these matters, the government must take careful note of such indications of intense and pervasive public interest because its effect is to place these concerns on the national agenda.

At the same time, we were surprised that we received only one brief devoted to Canadian relations with Western Europe, none relating to the Commonwealth or *La Francophonie*, and very few dealing with relations with South America, South Asia, China or Eastern Europe. When we asked specialists in each of these areas why we were receiving so little comment from them, their response was to express general satisfaction with the state of Canadian policy in their fields of interest. In the circumstances, they did not feel the need to put forward their opinions.



The absence of comment and criticism, therefore, should not be mistaken for indifference or dissatisfaction. Rather it is an indication that the policies on which we did not receive comment are widely supported or, at a minimum, do not arouse substantial concern among any segment of the population. Similarly, frequent comment and criticism directed at some areas of policy show that a considerable number of Canadians want a change of policy, but they do not demonstrate that the majority of Canadians want that policy to be changed. Such concern should, however, be interpreted by the government as cause for reflection.

In the age of participatory democracy, a government must know what the people are thinking. On some issues it is our impression that the public has become a major source of information and even policy guidance. In areas of external policy where we detected little public concern, the government may have to proceed without the benefit of much public input. But ultimately a foreign policy concocted in isolation in Ottawa poses inherent political risks.

## **Major Concerns of Canadians**

The oral testimony and written briefs we received were as varied in outlook as Canadians themselves. Some were highly focused and pointed in their concerns, while others adopted a broad and reflective posture. We received some briefs that obviously represented a group consensus, carefully and slowly formulated after extensive discussions and compromise. Others just as clearly were spontaneous and highly personal reactions written and mailed within hours of seeing our advertisement. Some organizations with branches across the country seemed to have encouraged those branches to respond separately and even guided them on how to do so, while other groups co-ordinated their reply in a single national brief. Committee members were the object of one national postcard campaign on Central America. Written submissions varied in length from half-page handwritten letters to 40-page essays from the Interchurch Committee on Corporate Responsibility on South Africa or the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Oral testimony encompassed everything from passionate five-minute statements to two-hour panel discussions. Rarely did all interventions reflect consensus; points of view were often in sharp contradiction with each other.

Our experience of travelling twice across Canada and holding hearings in all provinces and territories made us particularly aware of the extent to which issues of concern to Canadians have a regional or even a local dimension. During our hearings in Newfoundland we received complaints about low-level, high-speed training flights by military aircraft based at Goose Bay. The witnesses objected to the possibility that the base might become a NATO training facility, a development that others in the community supported strongly. Witnesses in Quebec expressed concern about plans by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to ban future imports of asbestos. Manitobans were alarmed about U.S. plans to build the Garrison Dam. Residents of Quebec and Manitoba shared a worry that the United States might decide to bury nuclear waste in areas close to the provinces' southern borders. Western Canadians were preoccupied with the collapse of world oil prices. In the Atlantic provinces a major concern during our hearings was whether the U.S. countervail duty on groundfish exports would be maintained. Residents of Yukon were paying considerable attention to their unsettled maritime boundary with Alaska, an interest they shared with British Columbians who have similar problems over their maritime boundaries with the states of Alaska and Washington. In the Northwest Territories a matter of widespread concern was the trend, especially strong in Europe, to embargo the importation of

certain animal furs, a development as threatening to the local economy as the earlier decision by the European Communities to embargo the sale of seal pup pelts—a step that earlier aroused intense reactions in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island.

Following careful review and reflection on this large and varied public response, we identified five broad concerns that seem to underlie and characterize a high proportion of the testimony, briefs and letters.

### *A Pronounced Concern for International Security*

In a disquieting world, almost all Canadians share a strong concern about international peace and security. They are worried about East-West relations, about nuclear weapons, about international terrorism, and about the other manifestations of bitterness and division that abound.

The policies of the superpowers are a major source of uncertainty. The accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev gave some of our witnesses grounds for hope that positive changes may eventually occur in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, but military expenditures have not been curbed and it is only recently that signs have emerged of a possible settlement of the Afghanistan problem or a readiness to curb military expenditures. Even though Ronald Reagan suggested “deep cuts” in nuclear arsenals last year, many Canadians are uneasy about Mr. Reagan’s foreign policies: SDI has revolutionized the strategic debate in ways that have created a good deal of trepidation, and President Reagan himself occasionally displays a readiness to use military power around the world in ways that are foreign to traditional Canadian conceptions of international behaviour. Recent events have increased the degree of unease felt by Canadians concerned about U.S. policies in such areas as Central America and the Middle East.

The message we heard is that many Canadians are growing increasingly concerned about the security of their own country, which is being affected directly by new developments in the world strategic balance. Canadian territory is no longer out of the limelight in the way it was a decade ago, when Canada’s main military task on this continent was to guard against an aging and declining Soviet bomber force that seemed to have only marginal importance. In addition to precision-targeted SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), new U.S. and Soviet long-range bombers and cruise missiles are under development and may soon lead to a great upsurge in the stocks of weapons that would be flown or fired across Canadian territory in the event of a major conflict. As a result, Canadians are having to reconsider the possible effects of missile attacks or nuclear fall-out on this country, to give renewed attention to proposals for counter-measures in the form of early-warning systems and anti-bomber and anti-cruise missile defences based on Canadian territory, and generally to think about strategic developments in the Arctic.

Many witnesses argued that the difficulties of Canada’s strategic situation are likely to become increasingly acute if President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative moves forward successfully towards the deployment phase. As John Lamb, executive director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, remarked,

Concrete developments in the strategic environment will increasingly press in on Canada... The change I am referring to, of course, is the re-emergence of Canadian territory as a key link in Western, and particularly American, strategic planning.  
(37:6)

Ballistic missile defences as envisaged by the SDI proposal would have to be complemented by effective air defence, he argued, and this would involve the use of Canadian territory. The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence reported on similar expressions of concern stated during its recent hearings on NORAD:

The fear is that Canada will have to accommodate greatly increased air defences if effective ballistic missile defences are deployed and that Canada will be asked to deploy ground-based BMD systems on its territory because these weapons will only be effective if they can be placed closer to the Soviet Union than U.S. territory would allow. (*NORAD 1986*, p. 75)

Although concern about security is general, we were offered many views and ideas on the best ways of dealing with it. Broadly speaking, our witnesses reflected two schools of thought: one approach, representing the majority, favoured working through Canada's existing alliance relationships; the other group of witnesses distrusted Canada's present alliances and advocated a strong focus on peace and development.

Among the former group, several witnesses spoke in favour of an expanded defence effort—probably to twice the present level of expenditures—as a means of strengthening deterrence and enhancing Canada's voice in world affairs. George Bell, president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, argued that in addition to current commitments Canada should take on a much larger role in such activities as protecting sea lines of communication in the Pacific. Douglas Ross of the University of British Columbia recommended large increases in Canada's forces in Europe and consideration of a greater effort in air defence, though outside NORAD. The Council of Canadians favoured a stronger defence effort in both North America and Europe, so as to avert the need for a stronger U.S. presence in Canada while at the same time develop a higher profile in NATO and thus a better chance to pursue world peace and security in association with other middle powers.

Other testimony that generally favoured working through Canada's existing alliances placed more emphasis on the urgency of pursuing arms control and disarmament. These witnesses evidently believed that Canada should live up to defence commitments—as they are now or as they might be renegotiated with the allies—but felt that this should be combined with the active pursuit of peace. They favoured NATO, or at least accepted the likelihood of Canadian membership in it for the foreseeable future, but sometimes expressed concern about NORAD, especially if they believed that Canada's membership might lead to involvement in SDI.

Exponents of this kind of view ranged from former ambassadors and retired naval officers to academics, representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress, former United Nations officials, and some representatives of the peace movement, such as the Veterans for Nuclear Disarmament. The views of these witnesses, some of whom favoured the development of strong and autonomous Canadian positions on arms control, were part of the same broad stream as those put forward by two government representatives appearing before the committee, Stephen Lewis, Ambassador to the United Nations, and Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament.

The other school of thought to emerge from our hearings was more inclined towards withdrawing from alliance commitments. Some of these witnesses advocated unilateral disarmament. They expressed dismay and alarm at what they saw as a spiralling, uncontrolled arms race and the danger that nuclear war could lead to man's extinction. They tended to doubt the value of NATO, distrusted the United States, and called for a crusade to dismantle nuclear arsenals and shift world resources from



weapons to development. Dr. John Ross, of Physicians for Social Responsibility, argued in St. John's that nuclear war threatens human extinction and recommended that the world's wealth be shifted from armaments to development assistance. Some spoke simply as parents of children who were worried about their futures. Gwynne Dyer evidently shared many of these concerns; having argued on earlier occasions that we are now living in the Indian summer of human history and must change if humankind is to survive, he questioned the utility of continued Canadian participation in NORAD and NATO and argued that it might be better to adopt a neutral stance similar to that of Finland.

The points of view we heard were not clearly divided one from another, as was generally the case five years ago. For example, a surprising amount of opinion among peace activists was more sceptical about NATO than actively opposed to it, while the World Federalists were deeply committed to world order but not so keen on disarmament until new international structures had been put in place. The most striking feature of the whole body of testimony was not the divisions but rather the very widespread concern about the situation. Prescriptions varied depending on the approach of the witness, but the reaction was invariably activist and positive, never passive or defeatist.

The general sense of most of the testimony was that Canada should do everything possible to maintain its sovereignty and independence, despite pressures likely to result from development and deployment of new strategic weapons. A large proportion of witnesses asserted that Canada should remain outside SDI, even if this involved a crisis in relations with the United States. Many recognized the possible eventual link between NORAD and SDI but nonetheless felt that Canada should continue to participate in NORAD until SDI was actually deployed. However, many doubted that SDI would ever be deployed. Others worried about what would happen if the U.S. timetable were to be advanced, argued that the renewal of the NORAD agreement should have been limited to a two-year period, and also pressed for reinsertion of the ABM clause in that agreement. Canada should also remain in NATO, they thought, so as to preserve links with other middle powers and contribute to deterrence, and should work through NATO consultative mechanisms to push for renewed western efforts in the fields of arms control and disarmament. Canada should also strengthen its disarmament effort in the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and elsewhere and do everything possible to promote worldwide stability. Canada should continue to do what it can to help mediate or resolve regional disputes, such as those in the Middle East, and to combat such plagues as international terrorism.

At the regional level, Canada has long experience with peacekeeping. A number of witnesses commented on this activity and recommended that Canada make an effort to provide training systems or military contingents in appropriate circumstances. Even though the role is not glamorous and rarely produces speedy and decisive results, peacekeeping was seen as an appropriate and constructive way for Canada to contribute to maintaining peace in the world.

In sum, most witnesses were asking that Canada live up to its international responsibilities and look for opportunities outside traditional alliances or similar frameworks to contribute imaginatively to solving disputes. Membership in NATO, *per se*, was not a major issue. People wanted to use that organization to best advantage, or at least avoid being sidetracked on the question as they advocated greater efforts to bolster international stability and bring about world peace and disarmament.

## *The State of the Economy*

The world economy is at a crossroads was the message conveyed in much of the testimony on this theme. We were told that the transformation taking place in the world economy may turn out to be comparable to the Industrial Revolution of an earlier age. The traditional economic forces that shaped the post-war period are being modified or supplanted by new events and processes. In this new international economic environment, as Gerald Helleiner told the committee,

The first priority for a country like Canada, so dependent on the stability and predictability of the international economic system, must surely be, overwhelmingly, the stability and order of the international system. This is not of course simply in the sphere of trade, but trade is now in any case inextricably interlinked with financial questions; with money and finance; the entire Bretton Woods system and its capacity to get us through the next recession or to get us through to the year 2000 without major breakdown. There can be no higher priority for Canadian foreign policy. (22:42-43)

The most notable feature of the last 25 years has been the growing interdependence of the world economy. This has important implications for Canada's foreign economic policies. There is no longer a distinct boundary between domestic policy and international policy. Witnesses suggested that the calculation of domestic objectives and priorities must be made with an eye to Canada's international obligations and the constraints imposed by the global economic environment. Domestic policies relating to taxes, agriculture, regional development or investment can have as large an impact on trade as tariffs or quotas. Moreover, attempts by other governments to deal with the external effects of domestic policies are often viewed as infringements of sovereignty and thus become quickly politicized. Witnesses cited the debate surrounding the National Energy Program and efforts to liberalize world trade in agricultural products as examples of this point.

A distinctive feature of the Green Paper on Canada's international relations is the importance it attaches to the competitiveness of the Canadian economy. Its title, *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*, highlights this approach. Despite this emphasis, relatively few of the submissions volunteered by the public during the second phase of our deliberations addressed the state of the economy and its implications for Canada's international relations. During the first phase of the committee's work we received numerous briefs on the question of freer trade negotiations with the United States; some of the people who prepared them may have felt they had said all they had to say.

Most of those who did make submissions on trade policy and Canada's place in the international economy did not address other external issues. It was as if they regarded trade relations as something separate and distinct from foreign relations. Although a number of witnesses criticized the Green Paper for its failure to attach sufficient importance to the pursuit by Canada of responsible, active and idealistic external policies, others commended the integration of trade and external policy and asserted that the Green Paper is correct in attaching significance to the international competitiveness of the Canadian economy.

The witnesses and submissions that did deal with trade prospects and the state of the Canadian economy emphasized the extremely competitive nature of the world economy. The Business Council on National Issues identified as twin goals for Canada in the field of international economic policy "achieving improved competitiveness and a strengthened multilateral economic system." (44:5) But the Council went on to warn that



improved access to foreign markets [and] a better functioning international trading system will be of little benefit to Canada if our industrial cost structures are significantly out of line with those of our principal industrial competitors. (44:6)

Even witnesses who pointed towards the opportunities in Japan and some countries on the Pacific, whose economies have been growing rapidly and generating a demand for imports, were careful to point out that other exporting countries were also competing vigorously for this business. Their main message was that the world has become a buyer's market, and success comes to those who are able to keep down prices, maintain quality and meet deadlines. Nevertheless, they did stress the importance of training Canadians in some of the major languages and cultures of the Pacific nations so that they could become more effective in selling Canadian products in those countries.

A number of submissions commented on the growth of protectionist forces in the world, a development they considered threatening because of Canada's heavy reliance on export markets. We were impressed, however, that during the second phase of our hearings no one proposed that Canada itself adopt a protectionist stance with regard to merchandise trade. On the contrary, those presenting views on the subject argued for vigorous efforts by Canada to promote a freer and more open multilateral trading system. This consistent approach appears to reflect a broad recognition that Canada represents too small a market to survive on its own and that Canada prospers during periods of expanding world trade. Witnesses frequently made a distinction, however, with respect to cultural goods, which were regarded as falling into a separate category. Even though Americans often cannot understand the distinction, witnesses felt that protection was justified as a way of preserving Canada's cultural identity.

Two current developments affecting world trade dramatized the extent to which Canada's prosperity is increasingly dependent on events beyond the country's control. The second phase of our hearings coincided with troubling developments abroad affecting two commodities of particular concern to Canada—oil and wheat. Prospects for these commodities were discussed at two panel sessions organized by the committee. The collapse of the OPEC cartel has led to a sharp fall in the world price for oil. This development may bring some benefits to Canadian consumers and manufacturers, but it is already beginning to have depressive effects on the economies of western oil- and gas-producing provinces and will slow the development of undersea oil and gas fields off the east coast of Canada. Equally serious for Canadian grain producers is the subsidization battle the United States has joined with the European Communities. The new U.S. farm bill passed by Congress in December 1985 is expected to drive down the world price of wheat below the cost of production for most Canadian farmers. Without government intervention Canada's share of the international wheat market may drop sharply, and the number of farm bankruptcies will increase.

The committee noted that a number of witnesses shared a general concern. Canada is entering an era when it will no longer be possible to rely on its natural resources to assure its prosperity. Throughout its history Canada has drawn on its abundant storehouse of natural resources for economic growth and employment. However, raw material producers in Canada are currently facing depressed prices because of excess global supply, weak demand and competition from other producers. In addition, many of Canada's resources are declining in quality and are increasingly costly to mine, cut or harvest. The optimism of the early 1970s, based on strong demand for commodities and the prospect of a steady series of mega-projects to open up vast storehouses of rich but inaccessible reserves, has passed.

Witnesses were generally aware of how rapidly Canada's trade with the United States has grown as a proportion of exports during the last two generations, from 31 per cent of exports in 1939 to 58 per cent in 1962 to 78 per cent in 1985. Most also recognized that this shift had occurred despite two unsuccessful efforts by governments to expand trade with one or other region of the world.

The reaction of witnesses to this situation varied sharply. For some, dependency on the U.S. market was a source of concern. Their prescriptions for diversifying trade ranged from renewed efforts to sell more Canadian products in other parts of the world to an appeal to develop an industrial strategy. Opposed to this view were those who accepted growth in the share of Canadian exports going to the United States as a natural development. It is part of a worldwide movement towards regional economic integration, they held, resulting from lower trade barriers combined with developments in the field of transportation and the possibilities for specialization that they have opened up. These witnesses considered that the government's efforts were correctly directed at finding ways to avoid being shut out of Canada's most important foreign market by protectionist forces in the United States and even to gain increased access to it.

### *Living Next to the United States*

We received a good deal of evidence that Canadians, though they may differ on whether their country's involvement with the United States should be moderated or controlled, want to continue receiving the benefits of that relationship. Hyman Soloman told the committee, "...there is no option to the U.S. web. We are not going to disentangle ourselves and have no intention of disentangling ourselves." (28:17)

None of our witnesses showed the slightest fear of a U.S. attack on Canada, a frequent concern of smaller states in other parts of the world. Although experience leads Canadians to be wary of actions by the U.S. government to defend its interests, the testimony showed that Canadians like and admire Americans and expect and want to continue to co-operate and trade with them.

Nevertheless, repeatedly during the hearings witnesses commenting on a given policy area raised a related concern that Canada's independence would be jeopardized. Most of these witnesses were worried that U.S. influence of one kind or another would undermine the country's independence. This concern showed itself in several policy contexts.

U.S. questioning of Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage was a matter of special concern during our hearings, which followed soon after the voyage of the *Polar Sea*. No one suggested that the United States wanted the Passage for itself, but U.S. insistence that it was an international strait was regarded as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty.

Defence was another context where witnesses had concerns. It was generally agreed that the need to protect the deterrent force based in the United States from possible attack across the North Pole and over Canada caused a difficult situation. However, responses to this situation varied greatly. A number of witnesses considered that co-operation with the United States on northern air defence contributed to the defence of the Western Alliance, as well as putting Canada in a position to control and circumscribe U.S. activities over Canada's territory and, in particular, in the North. As the Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of

International Affairs (CHIA) warned, particularly with reference to “the strategically important Arctic, ...if Canada does not take such basic security measures itself, the United States will do so in its own way.” (5) On the other hand, witnesses especially concerned about the danger of nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States argued that Canada should withdraw from NORAD either to escape a possible conflict or to convey a message of disapproval to one or both of the superpowers.

Very few of the advocates of withdrawal from NORAD addressed the issue that Canada would then confront if it had to protect its sovereignty entirely from its own resources, namely the need to develop an all-Canadian warning and interception capability sufficient to satisfy U.S. concerns that its extended northern border—and the shortest route from the Soviet Union—was adequately defended from attack by air.

Other manifestations of concern for Canadian sovereignty focused on the trade dimension. Several witnesses took the position that increasing economic relationships with the United States might lead eventually to economic integration and ultimately to the political absorption of Canada, regardless of the outcome of enhanced trade negotiations. Other witnesses concentrated their observations on threats to Canadian culture. They were worried that U.S. cultural materials—television, radio, books and films—flooding across the border could eventually drown any manifestations of distinctive Canadian culture. To some degree balancing these gloomy perceptions was the more confident message conveyed by, among others, the CHIA working group: “In the last two decades Canada has achieved a new degree of unity, a sense of identity and self-confidence...”. (2)

### ***Promoting Human Rights and Development***

Many witnesses called for a more significant human rights component in Canadian foreign policy. Several groups advocating this point of view, such as the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, criticized the passing reference to human rights in the Green Paper and proceeded to argue that

human rights [should] be, and appear to be, one of the main principles and co-determinants of Canada foreign policy, if not also the soul and substance of that policy. (47:69)

A few submissions supported the appointment of one or more officers or groups within the federal government to promote human rights abroad. Others advocated review by a parliamentary committee of human rights performance abroad.

Much more frequently, however, witnesses with human rights concerns argued for specific Canadian policies with regard to South Africa and Central America. In both situations the primary justification for Canadian intervention was that the governments involved were systematically, consistently and grossly violating human rights. With regard to South Africa, a sizable minority of the submissions maintained that developments in South Africa were an internal affair and should be of no concern to Canada. Most submissions on Central America, by contrast, had common characteristics: criticism of U.S. policy in the region and advocacy of a larger role by the Canadian government including, frequently, opening an embassy in Nicaragua. A few witnesses expressed concern about the policies of the Nicaraguan government and its treatment of the Miskito Indians.



We were impressed by the growth in public support for a human rights dimension to Canadian foreign policy, a trend that is likely to persist. We see this evolution in public attitudes as part of a worldwide recognition that human rights are now a concern of the world community, symbolized most concretely by acceptance of the Helsinki Final Act at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. For Canadians an additional impetus has been the entrenchment in the Constitution of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

In discussions with witnesses and panelists, differences of opinion emerged over how best to promote respect for human rights in other countries. On South Africa there was wide support for a range of sanctions extending as far as breaking diplomatic relations and all trade and cultural contacts. Most advocates of sanctions directed at South Africa shared Professor Linda Freeman's opinion that "the best policy...is slow, co-ordinated pressure by the West, step-by-step pressure...of course, not on our own, but moving forward, not marking time". (24:14) A few witnesses expressed particular concern about the record of the Soviet Union on human rights, including the denial to Soviet Jews of the right to emigrate and the imprisonment of peace activists. More generally, a large number of witnesses wanted to see Canadian trade, investment and aid denied to countries that abuse the human rights of their citizens. In the words of Edward Ratushny of the University of Ottawa Law School, "I do not see how we can separate the conditional performance of recipient countries [in the matter of human rights] from their right to receive foreign aid." (25:40) A few witnesses placed greater emphasis on persuasion, noting that abuses of human rights may be exacerbated by poverty; moreover, national pride in the face of foreign criticism might cause a counter-reaction and actually have effects opposite to those intended. As John Holmes warned,

You cannot simply order countries to behave. ...You have to cajole, persuade, do all sorts of things and quite often you have to try to save their faces. (25:45)

We were especially impressed by the number of witnesses expressing the heartfelt belief that Canada should act generously abroad to attack poverty and underdevelopment. The Saskatchewan Council for International Co-operation told us that "In...an interdependent world it is unrealistic to think Canada can be an oasis of prosperity in the impoverished world." (40:22-23)

We received a similar message in Halifax from the Interchurch Committee for World Development Education:

Canada has had some success in mediation, negotiation and peacekeeping ventures. As a result, we have been able to approach other countries, in particular developing countries, with greater credibility. While not completely outside the East-West power breakdown, Canadians have promoted a North-South view of development and international relations. We should continue along this approach while we seek to help less fortunate people develop with pride in their own culture, human dignity in their internal politics and control over their own resources and economic development. (33:85)

Not surprisingly, the preferred area for this kind of activity was the broad field of development assistance. Many witnesses, moved by the deprivation and suffering of people in other countries and grateful for the relative prosperity and well-being of Canadians, were ready to contribute from this base to international efforts to help others.

Members of the Fort Garry United Church Sunday School in Winnipeg showed their concern with a presentation involving 15 young people and their teacher. Said Tracy Kozar,

We have been learning about international aid. We are concerned that Canadian commercial interests, rather than Third World needs, are most important in Canada's aid program. Therefore we ask you that, first, you assign a high priority in our bilateral aid program to small-scale agriculture projects, which build the confidence, skills, and material resources needed to overcome hunger; (62:56-57)

Kristin Martin continued,

That, second, you commit yourselves to gradual and steady steps to unite bilateral aid programs. Foreign aid should benefit those for whom it is intended, the poor of the Third World. (62:57)

A large number of briefs spoke in favour of a generous Canadian aid policy. Specifically, many witnesses called for the government to increase the amount of aid it is giving. Typical of these was the Social Action Commission of the Diocese of Charlottetown, which advocated "an increase in Canadian aid. We believe that the figure of 0.6% of our gross national product is too small." (32:41) There were references to the desirability of reaching the 0.7-per cent target sooner than is now proposed by the government. Among supporters of a more active Canadian role in international development, some placed primary emphasis on increased funding for the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Third World countries. These witnesses claimed that there were numerous benefits to citizen involvement. CUSO Saskatoon expressed this approach with particular clarity.

In CUSO's experience, small-scale and local projects that are planned by the people who will use them are most effective in the long term....From our experience in working with NGOs, we know they have the ability and the experience to administer small projects. Small projects are one of the few ways that the poorest can be reached. Small projects are also less likely to create dependency relationships because of the small amounts of money involved. Further, because NGOs are community based, a better opportunity exists for the development of equal partnerships benefiting both Canadians and overseas groups. (40:32-34)

Apart from concerns that Canada's aid program be as generous as possible and directed to helping the poor, the committee saw evidence of a growing appreciation that relations between developed and developing countries are now at the centre of international economic management. Submissions on North-South issues emphasized the seriousness of the debt problems facing many Third World countries and the critical importance of dealing with them in such a way as to encourage their recovery and development. Increased access for Third World exports to markets in industrialized countries was seen as an essential requirement for the ultimate resolution of this critical situation.

## **A Responsible and Active Role for Canada**

Canadians addressing the committee were rarely cynical or selfish. In spite of their concerns about international security, their attitude was optimistic. They exhibited a belief that international co-operation could lead to a better ordered and more equitable world. In pursuing this broad objective, they wanted Canada to work responsibly and actively, and they were ready in greater numbers than ever before to contribute to this goal.

Their prevailing approach to the world was idealism tempered by realism. Witnesses recognized that Soviet military force continues to dominate Eastern Europe



and three times in the post-war years—in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland—has been used to stamp out local efforts to change their governments. They criticized the Soviet Union itself for failing to accord adequate respect to human rights as called for under the Helsinki Final Act. They deplored the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the continuing violence and loss of life it has brought. They supported continued Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Alliance and the assignment of Canadian forces to NATO commands. At the same time, however, they argued strongly that the Canadian government should vigorously promote arms control in order to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

The sense of responsibility that underlay so much of the testimony represents the contemporary expression—in a much different strategic environment—of a persisting Canadian approach to the world, an approach that saw Canadian men and women volunteer in large numbers during two world wars to fight against tyranny. Canada emerged from the Second World War with a strengthened economy, increased self-assurance and a determination to contribute to the development of the political and economic structures that became the foundation of the post-war world. This generous and optimistic approach to the world has been encouraged by Canada's relative prosperity and the fact that the country is unlikely to be the primary object of attack.

Canadians we heard from were especially concerned to see that the United Nations exercised a larger and more effective role in the world. The Canadian Labour Congress told us that "the need for a strong United Nations system is as pronounced as ever." (36:15) Corrie Stepan, a Regina high school student, wrote that "it can only be beneficial for Canada to try and rebuild the UN." At a time when many other countries, including some of Canada's closest allies, have experienced a loss of faith in the United Nations, Canadians appear to continue to believe that the United Nations remains the best hope for a better organized, fairer and more secure world. Moreover, the message we received is that the Canadian government should be working to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations. Despite its deficiencies—and several witnesses acknowledged their existence and called for determined efforts to achieve reform—Canadians believe that the United Nations remains a necessary foundation for international order.

Another manifestation of this belief that Canadians should make a responsible contribution to limiting regional conflicts was support for continuing Canadian involvement in peacekeeping activities. It was understood that the role was not glamorous and that it rarely produced speedy and decisive results; nevertheless, peacekeeping was seen as a constructive and appropriate contribution and one in which Canadians could take considerable pride.

It was particularly noteworthy that the tone of the testimony rarely reflected an arrogant approach to other nations. Witnesses did not advocate the use of force against other countries even when they are not friendly. Nevertheless, they did argue strongly for international standards of human rights and they consistently demonstrated the simple human desire to help others, a response that came naturally to those who think of the world as an extended family.

This voluntarist desire to contribute personally to the well-being of others has been a persisting Canadian impulse. In the past, much of this effort was channelled through the Canadian churches, whose missionaries in their thousands cared for the sick and educated the young in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The testimony showed us that the desire to help others abroad is as strong as ever and the need greater than ever before. A Canadian government ignores these instincts and aspirations at its peril in the

conduct of foreign policy. To cut itself off from the voluntarist instinct of the population would be to lose significant potential for a more effective Canadian contribution in the world. The government must not ignore the concerns of its citizens, even as it must take account intelligently and imaginatively of the international constraints on Canada's role. It is to an examination of Canada's strengths and weaknesses in the international area that we now turn.



## Analysis of Submissions

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The committee received communications from the public mainly in the form of briefs and letters. We have grouped the communications received in the second phase of the inquiry in two tables showing distribution according to province of origin and topic.

The topic breakdown is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. A number of briefs and letters dealt with several topics; in such instances we assigned them to the general category. No communication is recorded under more than one heading. This means that the number of briefs received on each topic is, in some cases, understated.

The topics are listed under broad themes that correspond to the chapters in our report.

## Responses by Province and Territory

	Organizations	Individuals	Total
British Columbia	42	35	77
Alberta	11	22	33
Saskatchewan	12	17	29
Manitoba	10	13	23
Ontario (except Ottawa)	99	88	197
Ottawa	52	21	73
Quebec	28	28	56
New Brunswick	6	4	10
Nova Scotia	20	10	30
Prince Edward Island	1	2	3
Newfoundland	4	4	8
Yukon	0	1	1
Northwest Territories	3	0	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>532</b>



## Responses by Subject

	Subject	Organizations	Individuals	Total
A.	<i>General</i> • General statement with no specific recommendations • Statements covering wide range of topics	7 44	27 34	34 78
B.	<i>International Order</i> • United Nations • International law concerns • Environmental issues	3 1 5	5 2 1	8 3 6
C.	<i>Peace and Security</i> • General • Disarmament • Comments on defence policy — general — increased defence expenditures — reduced defence expenditures • Peacekeeping • NATO • NORAD	28 21 1 3 1 0 2 6	23 12 3 2 2 1 2 2	51 33 4 5 3 1 4 8
D.	<i>Economic Relations</i> • Competitiveness • Trade relationships	7 1	4 4	11 5
E.	<i>International Development</i> • General • Role of non-governmental organizations • Development education • International students	30 2 0 22	16 1 2 0	46 3 2 22

# Responses by Subject

	Subject	Organizations	Individuals	Total
F.	<i>Human Rights</i>			
	• General	6	8	14
	• USSR	4	1	5
	• Central America	31	26	57
	• South Africa — complicated problem	2	18	20
	— an internal matter	0	8	8
	— support for sanctions	11	7	18
	• Other specific problems, e.g., Tamils in Sri Lanka, Sikhs, Baha'is, Armenians	9	3	12
	• Propose ambassador for human rights	0	8	8
G.	<i>Regional focus</i>			
	• United States	1	6	7
	• Middle East — general	4	2	6
	— pro-Israel	2	0	2
	— pro-Palestinian	6	3	9
	• South America	1	1	2
	• Caribbean	1	0	1
	• Africa (except South Africa)	3	3	6
	• Pacific Rim	0	2	2
H.	Northern Questions	10	4	14
I.	Other	6	4	10

# CHAPTER TWO

## Canada's Capabilities

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The picture of the international environment that emerged from the testimony is one of a complex, changing and unstable world. Gone are the relative certainties of the 1950s and 1960s, when the way ahead towards better East-West relations, decolonization and economic growth seemed predictable. It is even a long way from the early 1970s, with their hopes of detente and a new international economic order. The certitude and reassuring slogans of the past have been undermined, and witnesses showed uncertainty and uneasiness about the future.

Uneasiness with the existing state of international affairs and worry about relations among nations characterized the vision of a high proportion of the Canadians we heard. In certain areas the international fabric has become frayed and is threatening to unravel, and the spirit of internationalism is flagging. It might be premature to describe this state of affairs as a crisis, witnesses thought, but the contemporary world is at best more uncertain and at worst more dangerous than before.

In such a world, the constraints faced by a state of Canada's international standing were described by Kim Nossal in a recently published book, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*.

All foreign policy-makers, even those who make foreign policy for the superpowers, operate in an environment that remains intractably beyond their control ... Foreign policy decision-makers, particularly those of small states, are destined to be forever reactive, responding to the rivalries of the dominant powers, ... to the persistent threat to systemic peace ... Most states without either the desire or the capacity to use the... tools of statecraft—force, non-violent sanctions, coercion—have to rely on persuasion—or diplomacy ... (pp.xi-xii)

To operate effectively in this difficult world, Canadians must assess carefully how far the country is capable of pursuing its interests and concerns abroad. That is why we thought it necessary to take stock realistically of Canada's capabilities. Self-knowledge can help avoid the temptation to embark on foolishly ambitious ventures or to succumb to an overdose of caution. Measuring national capabilities is an imprecise exercise, but it must be undertaken if Canadians are to grasp the possibilities and limits of their international role.

National power is made up of a large number of ingredients, including size of population, geographic factors, military might, economic strength, the national

endowment of resources, the effectiveness of governmental institutions, and the ability of people to agree on collective goals and work towards achieving them. We sensed some variation in the views of our witnesses about where Canada would rank in comparison with other states on an index of national power. We think it is safe to conclude that Canada comes far ahead of the vast majority and is a strong candidate for inclusion among the leading countries standing just below the level of superpower. In any case, the rank order of states does not matter so much as the extent to which Canada can make its own imprint on the world and how it should go about doing so.

## **The Determinants of Influence**

Canada has the capacity as well as the inclination to work actively to promote international peace and well-being. Its national interest is best advanced by a positive approach to the world, and Canada can make a difference on many international issues. Other countries share this perception; as a result, Canada has been asked to sit in many international forums, ranging from multilateral arms control discussions to the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, grouping governments from the North and the South, and the annual economic summits of the seven leading powers of the industrialized world. Canada is thereby distinguished from all but a handful of states, a fact that is often obscured by the inevitable comparisons that are made with the enormous power of its southern neighbour.

Canada has a capacity to act purposefully when it chooses to do so. Its society is cohesive and its political institutions workable. The necessity of bringing along the provincial governments in respect of their areas of competence presents a problem, but one that until now, and despite some embarrassments, has proven manageable. The recent moderation of internal conflict has unquestionably made Canada a more effective international actor.

Canada's power varies depending on how it is measured. With limited military power, it does not occur to Canadians to support diplomacy by coercion. Nevertheless, its professional forces, combined with its economic potential and its increasingly important geographic location between the superpowers, are sufficient to enable it to be recognized as having a legitimate role in several areas of international security, including arms control.

It is the economic dimension of Canada's power that stands out. The country does not wield the economic clout of the United States, Japan or the European Communities, but it is able to generate a sufficient surplus of exportable goods and services to be a major international trading nation and aid-giver. In spite of some weaknesses, the Canadian economy is strong enough to pay for a large number of activities at home, including education, science and technology, social development, arts, leisure and sport, that tend of their own accord to generate international links.

Power is a term most appropriately applied to a country's major assets that provide the underpinning for its diplomacy. The currency of day-to-day dealings between governments is influence—the ability to change another government's opinions or actions. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in a recent address, "Power and influence are the two poles of a country's activities. The exercise of one depends on the presence of the other."

It is nevertheless true that, within limits, a powerful country can squander influence and a weak country can magnify it. Maximizing Canadian influence should,



in fact, be a continuing and vital objective for foreign policy. Canada has used three particularly noteworthy kinds of influence in international affairs in the past, usually with beneficial results, but there may still be unexploited potential.

### ***Influence Based on Image and Reputation***

Canadians are fortunate that the way they have been viewed abroad often works to their advantage. One witness, Peyton Lyon, lent substance to this point in reporting the results of 200 interviews conducted in 1982 at the United Nations with diplomats from over 100 delegations and members of the secretariat. Among developed countries, Canada was perceived within the United Nations to rank second only to Sweden in influence and ranked slightly ahead in respect. These findings reflect a reputation for professionalism and integrity and represent assets to be cultivated.

The Green Paper drew attention to a number of aspects of Canada's international record—its participation in peacekeeping forces, its advocacy of human rights, its unflagging support of the United Nations system—that have favourably influenced how the country is regarded abroad. What Canada's missionaries, military personnel, diplomats, business people and development assistance workers have accomplished in the world has also added to its reputation.

Canada is often called upon by the international community to play a moderating role. This is at least partly a consequence of historical circumstance and is no excuse for self-righteousness. Having achieved the fullest exercise of foreign policy independence only since the Second World War, the country is neither saddled with old rivalries nor the object of deeply ingrained resentments. In the post-war period, Canada has been able to keep both geographic and emotional distance between itself and a number of international disputes. Thus its efforts to cool off such disputes have enjoyed greater acceptability in the eyes of the protagonists, who often look on Canada as disinterested. There remains a substantial measure of confidence abroad that the country has no special axes to grind.

Some witnesses feared that Canada diminishes its usefulness by aligning itself with the United States and the other western democracies. Other witnesses, however, despite opposing specific U.S. policies, contended that a close relationship with the United States was a resource that gave Canada a greater capacity to influence U.S. policies. The majority of committee members considers that on the fundamental questions dividing East and West, Canada cannot be dispassionate, and the vast majority of Canadians would not want it to be. To adopt the stance of a non-aligned power, far from entrenching a reputation for moderation, would blur that reputation irreparably. Indeed, Canada's usefulness is greater in the eyes of many countries, including many of the non-aligned, because of its government's access to the decision-making councils of the Western Alliance and of the United States. As the Atlantic Council of Canada argued in its submission, "We are asked to join peacekeeping missions, not in spite of our NATO membership, but because we are an acceptable member of the Alliance." (7-8)

### ***Influence Based on Expertise and Aptitude***

Peyton Lyon advised the committee that Canada's official representatives abroad should "carry a bulging briefcase of bright ideas". (45:54) There are times when Canadian expertise allows for distinctive contributions. Apart from its usefulness, this



kind of contribution justifies more attention being paid to Canada's views, as well as Canadian participation in intergovernmental bodies. The fact that Canadian scientists and engineers were pioneers in the field of atomic energy, for example, provided Canada's ticket of admission to various multilateral bodies concerned with nuclear arms control. Today, the utility of Canadian expertise in arms verification could expand Canadian influence should this become the major sticking point in arms control negotiations between the superpowers.

In Canada's dealings with more powerful countries, depth of knowledge and competence in organizing facts can compensate, to a considerable extent, for lack of material resources. Canada cannot, however, afford to spread its intellectual and technical resources too thin. In deciding how to exploit this source of influence, the government must determine where to deploy its expertise so as to maximize the impact.

Building influence on the basis of expertise is not simply a matter for governments. There are opportunities for Canadians in many walks of life—private enterprise, science and technology, law, international development—to hone their skills and contribute to the pool of talent available for international activity. They should be given every encouragement to do so.

### *Influence Based on Political Commitments*

A third form of influence derives from membership in a wide range of institutions and mechanisms set up to regulate activities that spill over national borders or to tackle international problems. At the very least, membership offers access to information and the chance to sway the thinking of other governments; in a not inconsiderable number of cases, it also provides a seat at tables where important decisions are made. An example raised by the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs is Canada's participation, through membership in NATO, in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Along with the United States, Canada is the only non-European state to be included in this forum.

These negotiations, involving as they do not only NATO and Warsaw Pact members, but also the non-aligned nations of Europe, afford Canada an important opportunity to influence developments in such matters as CBMs [confidence-building measures], scientific and cultural relations, freer movement of people and ideas, and human rights. (7-8)

The other side of such influence is obligation. In NATO, as the same submission also stated, "the perception of whether Canada is carrying its fair share of the burden is critical to the weight given Canada's voice". The same rule applies to Canada's other international commitments, though the nature of the obligation varies.

Some have argued that the influence gained through participation does not justify the loss of independence that may result and have used NATO to make their point. In their view, Canada should get out of the Alliance in order to make its own decisions. Others emphasize that NATO is by no means a straitjacket for Canadian policy. The contractual commitments contained in the North Atlantic Treaty are fairly general in nature and leave it up to national governments to decide what form of action they will take in the event of aggression against one of the members. Canada's membership in NATO does make concrete its moral obligation to its western partners, but again it is up to the government to decide how it intends to fulfil that obligation. Although the benefits of membership are considerable, we recognize that the government's decision

to accept certain obligations may run counter to other foreign policy objectives. Despite these difficulties, the majority of the committee considers that NATO is a remarkably effective instrument through which Canada can contribute to the conduct of deterrence at strategic and tactical levels, to arms control negotiations between the superpowers, and to the development of political relations between the East and the West.

## **The Need for Consultation**

The influence Canada acquires by making commitments depends, of course, on the government correctly assessing the direction of private interests and concerns and not working at cross-purposes with individuals and organizations outside government. Denis Stairs reminded us of this danger:

Within limits, for example, we can alter the distribution of our diplomatic missions abroad...We can construct framework agreements...We can reallocate our development assistance budgets, and so on. But it also happens that these instruments of foreign policy produce little result, it seems to me, unless they build on self-generating non-governmental relationships and processes which are already securely in place. It is tempting to call these conditions 'forces of history', but most of them are probably forces of economics. In any case, they are extremely powerful. (30:13)

John Halstead, a retired senior diplomat, illustrated the point by referring to the signing of the contractual link with the European Communities in the mid-1970s, which came to naught because it was not backed by private sector actions. In our view, this experience proves the case for close consultation with concerned members of the public in developing Canada's foreign policy.

## **Influence is Variable**

Canada's influence varies with the resources it brings to bear. Because the country is not a major force in international finance, a Canadian government is not in a good position to influence, for example, agreements between the major powers about exchange rates or the co-ordination of economic policies. The decision not to possess nuclear weapons affects the hearing Canada gets in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

On other issues, by contrast, Canada does indeed exert a very considerable influence. It is evident that Canada's capability depends on the specific situation. Power is not readily transferable from one field to another. This point was well put by Denis Stairs during the panel discussion on this issue:

...power in these matters varies enormously from one type of issue to the next....For example, in matters having to deal with food production and distribution, around the world, obviously we are a great power in that field. We are a very substantial power in areas like aviation and technology of communications ...(30:25)

Just as influence varies from one field of activity to another, so it varies regionally. In the Caribbean, Canada is a major actor, with a combination of historical trade links, a large aid program, geographical proximity, and a modest naval capability. Canada has potential influence in *La Francophonie* as an industrialized nation with a large development assistance program and the possibility of acting as a counterweight to France. But in other disputes, for example between Chad and Libya, Morocco and Algeria or Vietnam and Kampuchea, Canada's means of contributing are very limited.

Many witnesses clearly believe that competent and energetic diplomacy, coupled with the leverage provided by development assistance and peacekeeping expertise, qualify Canada for a role in helping to settle regional disputes in all parts of the world. John Sigler, for example, another panelist, termed the argument that Canada has only limited resources for such activity "a formula for retreat which, if followed by others, would mean inevitable disaster." (30:6) For our part, because the country's resources are limited and it clearly counts for more in some regions than in others, we think it is important to have a clear understanding of what Canada's assets are in each particular case. We do not believe that it is sensible to ignore Canada's limitations in regard to resources, personnel and the other attributes of power. The government should carefully assess both the force engaged in any specific conflict and Canada's capacities to contribute to its resolution. Otherwise, Canada risks squandering one of the principal attributes it brings to the settlement of international disputes—its credibility.

## The Case for Multilateralism

Depending on the circumstances, it is appropriate for Canada to act unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. In most major international pursuits, however, Canada's influence will be greatest when it works together with other countries. The necessity of co-operating with others holds true in every sphere of important international activity. Canada needs allies, both military and economic. For major challenges like preserving collective security and turning back threats to the international system of trade and payments on which its economic health depends, Canada has no alternative to working with other countries.

This view of factors that determine Canada's influence abroad leads us to the broad conclusion that **Canada has considerable capabilities enabling it to sustain a substantial involvement in international affairs and shoulder a considerable degree of responsibility for finding solutions to many international problems.** Naturally, the capability Canada brings to bear varies greatly, depending on the issue at hand. **In most international pursuits, Canada can maximize its impact and make the best use of its resources by working in concert with other countries.** Canada is, however, strong enough to act on its own in some instances and to be able to exercise leadership in the formation of coalitions. Because the country's means are limited, the government must assess Canada's capacity to make an effective contribution in each situation and concentrate its efforts on situations where it can be most helpful—instead of dissipating its resources by spreading them too thin in areas where it cannot expect to be as useful.

# CHAPTER THREE

## Foreign Policy Goals

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Just as capabilities determine what a country can do abroad, goals are necessary to facilitate choices in foreign policy. Though often stated in fairly general terms, they do provide a basis for comparing various courses of action and deciding between them. They are also needed to maintain consistency in policy. There are so many internal and external pressures on governments at all times that it is easy to lose sight of the national interest in responding to them. Moreover, at a time when mobilizing popular support behind what a government wants to do has become more necessary and more difficult, it is imperative to formulate goals so as to be able to communicate them to interest groups and to the public.

*Foreign Policy for Canadians*, which was issued in 1970, set out six policy themes:

- fostering economic growth
- safeguarding sovereignty and independence
- working for peace and security
- promoting social justice
- enhancing the quality of life
- assuring a harmonious natural environment

Fifteen years later, the Green Paper identified six basic objectives that bore a close similarity to those themes:

- unity
- sovereignty and independence
- peace and security
- justice and democracy
- economic prosperity
- the integrity of our natural environment



Taken together and defined in contemporary terms, these objectives make up a framework that, in our opinion, gives Canada's foreign policy a sense of direction and a measure of continuity.

We have had to keep in mind, of course, that these goals are not at all mutually exclusive and that there will be times when the government will have to trade off one against the other. Moreover, the identification of a Canadian interest does not mean that immediate action can or should be taken to secure it. That will depend on how the government matches Canada's capabilities with the objectives to which it gives highest priority.

What strikes us most forcibly about these foreign policy goals is that each has an important international dimension. It is not simply a question of maintaining consistency between what Canada wants abroad and what it wants at home. How the international community evolves will have a direct effect on what Canada has to do to safeguard its national interests.

## National Unity

National unity has a grip on the souls of Canadians that goes beyond rational calculation. It stands at the head of Canada's objectives as the *sine qua non* for all the other collective goals that Canadians may decide to pursue. Canadians recognize, of course, that whether they can retain the ability and will to pull together is largely up to themselves. Since the world acts as a mirror for Canadians, however, they have recently been directing foreign policy to the achievement of national unity.

We enthusiastically reaffirm the importance of external policies that reflect Canada's bilingual and bicultural character. Canada has to be able to present an image abroad that Canadians recognize as their own. It must also offer an outlet for the interests and energies of Canadians from the country's two founding peoples. As a secondary but nevertheless important concern, the Canadian government should also look for ways to express Canada's multicultural make-up on the international scene. We should emphasize, however, that it is definitely not in the national interest to allow ethnic communities to draw Canada into taking sides on rivalries and disputes in their countries of origin.

Canada's bilingual and multicultural heritage represents an asset, offering a capacity to relate naturally and with understanding to almost every country of the world. It can be especially valuable in developing trade links. At the same time it opens the country to attempts from abroad to promote mischief. Canada must be wary of foreign governments that may be tempted for one reason or another to take steps that could damage Canada's national cohesion.

Provincial governments work on behalf of the regional interests and aspirations of Canadians, and it is certainly in the national interest that they play an important part in Canada's foreign relations. Representing provincial interests abroad without allowing Canadian foreign policy to degenerate into a babble of different voices presents a considerable challenge to political leadership. Dr. J. Peter Meekison, former Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in Alberta, expressed a high degree of confidence that this could, in fact, be accomplished. "From my perspective, Canada can only have one foreign policy. But in many instances it can be enhanced by provincial input and participation." (38:112)

Even if Canadians can work out solutions to constitutional challenges at home, it may be difficult to convey to governments of countries with different political systems the need to be understanding and even sympathetic towards a federal state that behaves in international affairs not quite like any other.

## **Sovereignty and Independence**

We could not help but notice that the term 'sovereignty' arouses considerable emotion. As for independence, Loring Christie, one of the early scholars of Canadian foreign policy, called it "strange to our ears, smoking of a past age" at a time when interdependence had not progressed remotely as far as it has today. How can these two concepts serve as goals of foreign policy?

The idea of sovereignty is that there is a final and absolute authority in the community. The concept belongs to international law, and the possession of sovereignty is properly determined by a court. Independence is most usefully defined as freedom of action. Though Canada does not always get what it wants, meaning that its independence is constrained, this normally has no effect on its sovereignty. A Canadian foreign policy maker must be mindful, however, of the possibility of a challenge to the state's authority, for example, by another country denying Canada's right to impose regulations on vessels plying its inland waters. Hence there is a need to exercise sovereignty from time to time so that the claim can be sustained in court if necessary. How the government should assert Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is discussed in Chapter 10.

A Canadian government must pursue independence within a context of considerable interdependence. A high proportion of this interdependence has been accepted freely by Canadians and confers undoubted benefits on them. Foreign investment, for example, which we consider in Chapter 6, has been welcomed by many as a source of jobs. At the same time, Canadian governments are perennially involved in delicately balancing the benefits of interdependence with the value they place on such expressions of independence as control of the energy sector or an indigenous book publishing industry.

Canadians of every generation must, in their turn, similarly engage in balancing independence with interdependence. The circumstances confronting the present generation differ, however, from those faced by their predecessors. On one hand, the revolution in communications technology is rendering Canada more vulnerable to foreign, particularly American, culture. On the other hand, Canadians are demonstrating a greater determination than ever before to preserve their cultural distinctiveness and with it a substantial measure of national independence. These conflicting pulls make more difficult the skilful management of Canada's relations with the United States, a subject we explore in Chapter 9.

Though the maintenance of Canada's sovereignty rests primarily in its own hands, that sovereignty is validated by the respect shown it by other countries. Canadian independence, too, must be demonstrated to the international community. Yet Canada needs the rest of the world in order to be able to exercise its freedom of action. The importance of international links is all the greater when it comes to preserving a society and culture distinct from those of the United States.

## Peace and Security

The close connection between Canada's security and the prevention of conflict between East and West, particularly the prevention of nuclear war, is uncontested. We see practically no point in thinking of national security as distinct from international security. We start from the assumption that the threat to Canada is one and the same with the threat to international stability and peace. As Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, told the committee, building the conditions for peace in the world "is absolutely essential in the self-interest of Canada, in terms of our security ...". (36:7)

Although there is little disagreement on the objective, the choice of means to promote it produces some cleavage. Most accept the basic proposition that in a nuclear world, international stability and peace are best preserved by deterrence. Many argue, however, that the enormous build-up of nuclear weapons goes far beyond the real needs of deterrence. They want Canada to impress more forcefully upon both superpowers the absolute necessity of reaching agreements for the massive reduction of nuclear weapons and for an immediate comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, to mention only two examples. Some would argue that Canada can do this most effectively outside all military alliances. Others, who are in the majority, want Canada to remain in its alliances, arguing that if security is to be enduring, it should encompass an active defence of democratic values held in common with other western nations. They feel, however, that membership in the Western Alliance should not prevent Canada from taking independent initiatives to strengthen the safety and security of the world.

Regional conflicts, physically remote from Canada's shores, present another problem. We do not believe that Canada's interest is engaged as directly here as at the global level. There is always a danger of regional strife triggering a wider conflict. Canada should also want to see the suffocation of international terrorism, which is frequently spawned by regional disputes. Canada's interest in peace and security therefore leads to an emphasis on containing and, if possible, settling disputes peacefully and on a much wider scope for the rule of law. In Chapter 5 we set out the general directions Canada should follow to achieve these ends.

## Justice and Democracy

One witness, Edward Ratushny, said of human rights, "How can they not form a part of our foreign policy? They are part of the total context, part of the reality and they cannot be carved off and ignored in some way." (25:37) Canadians have been accustomed to recognizing a moral link between the preservation of human rights and democratic values at home and their preservation abroad. This link is now becoming a political one as well. This is partly because of pressure from within the country—witness the number of Canadians who championed the cause of Anatoly Sharansky. At the same time, the international community is equipping itself with a battery of standards, such as those contained in the Helsinki Final Act, that it can apply to the condition of human rights in a particular state. Moreover, the basis of the claim that this constitutes undue interference in a state's internal affairs is crumbling rapidly.

We were profoundly impressed by the internationalization of human rights, a trend that will affect Canada as well as the rest of the world. Given the speed of modern communications, the moral issues being fought out in places far away have an almost immediate impact on Canadians' own values. Moreover, Canada has already come



under the gaze of international human rights agencies, and there is every reason to expect that international standards will play a part in the redefinition of human rights and democratic liberties at home as well as abroad. These issues are dealt with in Chapter 8.

## **Economic Prosperity**

Economic prosperity is in the national interest, not only as an end in itself, but because without it a large number of other national goals could never be achieved. Chapter 6 sets out our view of what Canada can do to increase its prosperity through international trade. We were impressed once again with the extent to which Canada's prosperity is dependent on the international economy. As an international trader, investor, and recipient of investment capital, Canada must be exceedingly sensitive to the economic and financial health of other nations.

The international debt crisis has made Canadians realize the extent of their interdependence with African, Asian and Latin American countries of the developing world. John Halstead emphasized this point:

Canada has an interest in contributing to the economic and social development and thus to the political stability of these regions. This is not only a moral imperative, given the human misery involved, but also a piece of enlightened self-interest, given the fact that prosperity and security in one part of the world cannot be bought at the expense of massive indebtedness and instability in other parts. (30:11)

We would go further to say that the economic crisis in the Third World should be viewed not as a problem of the poorer countries but as a global problem. It is a problem that links international debts with the banking system, exchange rates, trade, the upsurge of protectionism, and prospects for employment at home. The manner in which all these influence one another, often with dramatic suddenness, adds considerably to the uncertainty of the international economy. Governments are constrained in what they want to do, and international institutions are unable to cope with instability. In endeavouring to assure economic prosperity, Canada and the world confront a partial disintegration of the international financial order. Our views on this subject are outlined in Chapter 7.

## **The Natural Environment**

Environmentalism begins at home. In the past two decades Canadians have learned to place a high value on preserving nature, on conserving natural resources, on clean air and clean water. The reason the environmental movement has made such inroads is that almost every citizen wants to make his or her own surroundings as liveable and attractive and healthy as possible. When these surroundings are threatened, the problem usually, though not always, has a local origin. The aspiration to safeguard and improve the environment normally starts as a parochial one.

There is, however, an obvious international dimension to Canada's environmental interests in the border it shares with the United States. Bilateral co-operation in the environmental field is literally forced upon Canada and the United States by the cross-border transport of the airborne pollutants that cause acid rain, the flow of water across the boundary, and the need to regulate industrial developments in one country that will affect the other.



We were reminded, moreover, by David Munro of the Canadian Wildlife Federation that the conservation of the natural resources of the world is closely related to Canada's interest in international development. Economic development must be sustainable. Resources have to be exploited rationally with due regard for maintaining essential ecological processes and life-support systems. Otherwise, economic development will assuredly grind to a halt when the available resources have been consumed. The degradation of resources, such as has occurred recently in the Sahel, is closely bound up with the spread of poverty and disease and even with regional instability. As Dr. Munro put it,

... the linking of conservation and development is really essential to the well-being of all peoples of the world. In fact, if a better balance, a better linkage, between conservation and development is not achieved, there will be [more] serious problems than there are now. (42:58)

Again, we were impressed by how a problem that was once conceived in local or regional terms must be regarded as global. Towards the end of our deliberations, the way in which the interests of every nation and individual are bound up with environmental issues was driven home forcefully by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union and the resulting worldwide airborne radiation. Our recommendations for a Canadian response to the problems raised by Chernobyl are found in Chapter 4.

## **The Committee's Perspective**

Canada's approach to specific international problems and regions is affected by the goals the country chooses to pursue. Although goals do not in themselves establish priorities among specific policy options, they do establish a basis for determining the orientation of policy. Policy must also be related to capabilities, however, as well as to problems that arise or opportunities that present themselves.

For example, the countries of the Pacific region and Southeast Asia have evolved rapidly over the last two decades, and they represent, after the United States, Canada's fastest growing export market. Canada's interests in expanding trade justify increased emphasis on trade promotion in this market. When it comes to security considerations, however, Canada's military resources are insufficient to consider a direct contribution to maintaining security in that region. Europe, by contrast, remains the main focus of East-West confrontation, and Canada continues to make a significant military contribution in Central Europe. While trade has grown less than with the countries across the Pacific, Europe remains a substantial market for a variety of Canadian exports. The Third World, Africa in particular, is the focus for Canada's development assistance activities, but compared to the industrialized countries, it provides as yet a small outlet for Canadian trade. South Africa used to be an important outlet for Canadian goods but is now a focus for the goal of social justice. The Middle East for a number of years offered exceptional opportunities to those who, unlike Canada, were well placed to export, as well as representing an area of tension and often of conflict, with Canada's contribution to regional security being mainly to provide peacekeeping forces.

In the following chapters we set out seven major directions that we believe Canadian foreign policy should follow. Our aim has been to identify the important tasks that need to be performed. For the most part, this meant taking a functional approach. We did, however, address Canada's relations with two geographic regions: the United States because it is such a pre-eminent focus of Canada's international

activity, and the Arctic, because we concluded that that dimension of Canadian external policy had been neglected in the past and is emerging inescapably as a focus of the future.

Though we do not focus primarily on Canadian policy towards various regions of the world, we are firmly in favour of detailed country and regional strategies. Canada's resources are too limited to permit ad hoc initiatives that do not fit into an overall plan. Canadian trade and investment activities, cultural, scientific and academic relations, and even ministerial visits abroad, have to be governed by a set of strategic objectives.

The Department of External Affairs must adjust its missions abroad constantly to take account of shifts in world markets and changes in Canada's external interests, so as to avoid duplication and unnecessary expenditures. There is currently an extensive country planning process within the Department of External Affairs, and the committee was informed of decisions to open four new trade offices in Asia and of an interesting plan to attach investment counsellors to Canadian embassies in major financial centres. This is encouraging evidence that the country planning process is now working well.

We acknowledge that this process is never easy; there is always the danger of bureaucratic inertia. Accordingly, the committee considered the possibility of reducing the number of missions in Africa so as to make resources available to open more trade offices in the Asia-Pacific region at no additional cost. In discussions among ourselves we came to appreciate that doing this would have disadvantages: at a time when we think Canada should be trying to expand its relations with the countries of *La Francophonie* and maintain those with the Commonwealth, a decision to close an embassy in an African country that was a member of either organization would be perceived unfavourably and undermine those efforts. Then we considered whether to propose replacing an embassy with a 'development office', a concept we recommend in Chapter 7. We decided that such a change would still be perceived unfavourably, would save little money, if any, and would increase the risks faced by Canada's foreign service officers abroad, who would no longer have diplomatic immunity. Moreover, if it were decided to assign trade promotion responsibilities to the development office, Canadian officials would be at a disadvantage in carrying out this task in a protocol-conscious country.

This exercise made us aware of the difficulties presented by closing an embassy. An alternative approach that avoids some of these disadvantages would be for the Department of External Affairs to try to economize by establishing larger regional missions to provide co-ordination and support functions. This would make it possible to reduce the staffs of several missions, which could still be reinforced if necessary by personnel from adjacent posts. Bringing reinforcements from nearby posts instead of from Ottawa would be faster and less costly, and the personnel involved could be expected to be informed on local conditions. **We recommend that the Department of External Affairs consider adopting the concept of regional resource and service centres to serve diplomatic posts within specific geographic areas.**

To ensure that the country planning process does not become routine and stifled by bureaucratic resistance, **we propose that the government, particularly through the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs, and Parliament, through the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, keep the country planning process under regular review. We think it is particularly important that the views and co-operation of provincial governments and the business, NGO and academic communities be solicited in the formulation and review of strategic objectives.**



## CHAPTER FOUR

### Strengthening International Order: Amplifying Canada's Influence

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International co-operation is the most important phenomenon of the post-war world. Realism in the late twentieth century requires strengthening the international order as the most effective way to deal with problems that transcend national jurisdictions. This process—the gradual accretion of international institutions, collaborative arrangements and régimes—has been under way for some time. The phenomenal cross-fertilization of culture and ideas stimulated by the communications revolution has been abetted by the increasing globalization of issues, whether they be demographic patterns or questions of nuclear safety, drug trafficking or the supply of energy. Although dissension has not abated noticeably and conflict dominates the headlines, the response by governments to these post-war trends has been a degree of international co-operation unimaginable in previous eras.

Moreover, after 40 years of experimentation, the practical results of international co-operation have been encouraging. The eradication of smallpox and the control of other communicable diseases, the adoption of standards for international air travel, the allocation of telecommunications frequencies, disaster relief efforts, even the international exchange of information about the weather, are among the innumerable benefits wrought by international agreements. Only by continuing to pool their efforts and resolve their differences will nations be able to come to grips with the manifold problems besetting contemporary society. Yet despite these self-evident truths, there are increasing signs that the international order is suffering from neglect and is in urgent need of repair. Canada's capacity for mediation and consensus building within the international community is more needed than ever before.

Canadians feel very much at home in the area of international co-operation. Here is where Canada's traditions, efforts, and experience reside. Here is where Canadian opinion, insofar as our committee was able to survey it, first inclines. And here is where, as a middle power, Canada's national interest inevitably leads. Peyton Lyon of Carleton University observed, "Clearly Canada is not considered a heavy in the summit league. In the Commonwealth and many UN committees ... the story is different; Canada is a heavy". (5-6) Indeed, one of the ways that Canadians define themselves in the world community is by their commitment to an international ideal that is at once pragmatic and altruistic—in short, to international co-operation.

Canada's commitment to international co-operation leads directly to its support of multilateral organizations. As Denis Stairs observed, they offer "a means of amplifying



our influence and expanding our diplomatic room for manoeuvre." Second, vigorous participation permits Canadians "to play a useful role in the maintenance of a peaceful as well as a constructive international order." (30:15) The committee heartily endorses these observations. We seek the continuity of Canadian foreign policy in this respect, not as an end in itself, but precisely because Canadians can take pride in building on an impressive foundation.

The United Nations offers cogent illustration of the utility of international organizations and the need for renewed action. Apart from the achievements of the various specialized agencies in organizing practical co-operation in support of nation states, the neutral ground that the United Nations offers may be critical in times of dangerous confrontation, as it was during the Cuban missile crisis, making it possible for the superpowers to back down and find accommodation. For these reasons, Canadians have always been among the strongest supporters of an active and dynamic United Nations. Nothing the committee heard during our proceedings leads us to believe that they have changed their minds. In virtually every instance where the issue was raised, the government was urged to pledge anew its commitment to the United Nations system and, if possible, to champion it even more dramatically.

Yet the United Nations no longer generates the hopes and praise characteristic of its early days. There is a tendency to hedge commentary about the United Nations with qualifications, as well as widespread agreement that it has not lived up to expectations. Some of the disillusionment has been inevitable, given the soaring optimism and inflated rhetoric of the immediate post-war period and, for many emerging nations, the heady days of decolonization. For some western nations it has also been difficult to adjust to the fact that, in the space of a single generation, the United Nations has been transformed from its originally restricted base into a genuinely worldwide organization in which the West's sway is no longer predominant.

To such problems of adjustment must be added growing doubts about the effectiveness of many United Nations organizations. In a recent interview with British journalist Jonathan Power, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar lamented that the member governments are "always creating new bureaucracies and new expenses ... I don't even know how many bodies the UN has." A recent report by the UN's own joint inspection unit observes that the quality of staff is poor and there is widespread "indifference shown toward standards of work and competence". Yet "the type of tasks entrusted to the United Nations— peace, protection of human rights and development—are some of the most difficult imaginable."

The clear result of these factors has been a crisis of multilateralism. In his 1984 report, the Secretary General noted:

It is paradoxical that while contemporary realities have strengthened the need for the use of multilateral means for dealing with our problems and enlarged the scope for growth and development through multilateralism, there is an increasing questioning of the rules, instruments and modalities of multilateral co-operation.

The fundamental difficulty is the increasing fragmentation of interests that has beset the world community over the last couple of decades. Unfortunately, unless a greater commonality of purpose can be re-established at the United Nations, it is in danger of atrophying from lack of use. The basic commitment of Canadians to multilateralism, which they embrace, in the words of Stephen Lewis, Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, "almost intuitively", demands that Canada take this challenge very seriously indeed. (22:10)

In part as a consequence of concerns about effectiveness, there is a disturbing disparity between the organization's present programs and the realities of its budget. In starkest terms, the United Nations is simply running out of cash. This is the result of several factors, not least of which is the practice of some member states of selectively withholding their duly assessed contributions. The problem was recently brought to a head, however, by two events in the United States, which has long been the UN's principal financial supporter by far. The first, as Ambassador Lewis testified, was Senator Nancy Kassebaum's amendment to a State Department appropriation which, effective October 1, 1986, will reduce the U.S. contribution from 25 per cent of the UN's total budget to 20 per cent. The amendment also requires the promotion of a system of weighted voting on budget matters, based on the level of financial contribution rather than, as today, a complex formula based essentially on capacity to pay. The Kassebaum amendment was supported by a large majority in both houses of Congress.

The second event was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment of December 1985, which decrees automatic cutbacks in U.S. spending unless Congress and the executive branch can agree on a timetable to eliminate the federal deficit. This resulted in a budget proposal from the President that pares a considerable sum from the funds normally appropriated for international organizations. The President's proposal has yet to emerge from the congressional budget process, but it is estimated that the 1986 U.S. contribution to the United Nations system could be slashed by as much as \$80 million (U.S.)—almost ten per cent of the total UN budget.

This latest emergency, which only became clear in January 1986, cannot be divorced from the related problem of the debt load the United Nations has been carrying because of member states whose payments are in arrears. The Soviet Union, for example, is currently over \$200 million in arrears for regular assessed contributions and for contributions to peacekeeping operations that it refuses to recognize. Yet that country shrewdly maintains its debt just below the trigger point beyond which voting privileges would be revoked under Article 19 of the United Nations Charter. In short, as Ambassador Lewis noted, "one of the issues which is now central to the UN is its future financial solvency." (22:9)

The difficulty is that financial responsibility at the United Nations is skewed; the majority that makes decisions about what the United Nations does contributes very little of the budget. There is a desperate need for some balance to be restored to this arrangement. Otherwise, the disparity between the majority's voting power and the willingness of the major donors to continue contributing will critically endanger the United Nations itself.

The Council of Canadians proposed that Canada lead the way "both financially and politically in fulfilling any responsibilities vacated by the United States within the United Nations family." (43:41) On the other hand, Robert Reford, president of the United Nations Association in Canada, pointed out that Canada's record of contribution has been extremely good. He suggested that more Third World countries could bear somewhat more of the cost.

The developing countries regard the UN very much as their organization, they pay a great deal of attention to it. They often send their best men to the UN rather than to other diplomatic posts ... I realize there are financial problems but it seems to me that perhaps they should pay a little more than the .01 per cent which a great many of them pay. (58:30)

There is an obvious danger in both political and financial terms, the consequences of which are rapidly becoming apparent, for the United Nations to rely too heavily on any one member state. Currently, the collective contributions of 147 of the 159 UN members amount to less than the United States pays alone. Under the circumstances, **we recommend that Canada support the work of the High Level Group of experts that has been established by the Secretary General to study the financial problems of the United Nations. In the longer term, in concert with other middle powers, Canada should explore the possibility of a new financial arrangement for the United Nations whereby no single nation would contribute more than an amount set so as to ensure that the organization is not unduly dependent on any one member.**

At the same time, Canada has an important function to fulfil in encouraging the United States—a founder of the United Nations—to continue to participate in it. Full and whole-hearted involvement by the United States is essential for an organization intended to encompass and, more important, to engage all the nations of the world. Those who bemoan the increasing irrelevance of the United Nations surely do not suggest that the progressive disengagement of the United States is any remedy.

Reform of the United Nations is a prerequisite for renewed consensus, which is the desire of all its supporters. Priorities must be examined and programs reconsidered to assure their maximum effectiveness. International mechanisms must be streamlined to eliminate any unnecessary duplication of activities. Currently, for example, ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council) and various committees of the General Assembly consider virtually the same agendas each year—a duplication that was originally intentional but that has since outlived its usefulness. To help pursue the objective of reform, proposals offered to the committee by David Pollock and by Charles Nobbe bear further consideration. Both called for a review of various multilateral organizations such as the UN Environment Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO. In Charles Nobbe's estimation, "there is...a great deal of duplication and over-centralization." (32:89) David Pollock's suggestion is to ask two simple questions: first, is the specific organization under study relevant today as opposed to when it was created and, second, is it effective? (22:15) We think this idea is worth exploring with countries that share Canada's commitment to the United Nations to see how far it is possible to take this principle of external review.

As a minimum objective, we need to discover a better means of co-ordinating the various development programs of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. David Pollock drew attention to the inadequacy of co-ordination within the multilateral development system, despite various attempts to create some sort of mechanism. (22:14) The UN's joint inspection unit report, for example, recommended dismantling the New York, Washington and Rome offices of the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, the development, population and food aid programs, and even the World Bank. The report suggested they should be reconstituted as one unified organization with regional headquarters in Africa, the Caribbean, South Asia and other areas of the Third World. Overseeing these integrated regional development agencies at UN headquarters in New York would be a tightly structured economic counterpart to the Security Council. At the very least, these proposals merit careful study. **We recommend that Canada seek international agreement on an appropriate agency or committee to help streamline operations within the multilateral development system as a whole. We support all efforts to reduce the duplication and over-centralization that exist within the United Nations system. The United Nations should be willing to explore possibilities for new kinds of institutions and jettison those that have outlived their usefulness.**



The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea provided for just such a new institution—the Sea Bed Authority. Canada was deeply involved in that conference and in the negotiations that led up to it. Canada's role as a mediator between the developing and the industrialized countries in these extended negotiations was in the finest tradition of bridge building—a role where Canada, according to Elizabeth Mann Borghese, “has a distinct comparative advantage. It is really cut out for this job.” (33:6)

Canada is now engaged, along with the rest of the international community, in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea. The Law of the Sea Treaty did not fully elaborate the rules and regulations for the mining of the sea bed, and the Preparatory Commission is charged with this task. Canada has a major interest in the outcome of this negotiation, which will also have to sort out the claims of pioneer investors, including Noranda and Inco, in the mining of the sea bed.

**We believe the government should press for early completion of the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea, so as to end the uncertainty surrounding the deep sea bed régime. Then, the government should begin a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Although it has not yet come into force, the Treaty has already brought Canada significant benefit, and the committee believes Canada should ratify it.**

An area where Canada might usefully concentrate its energies in terms of developing new international legal constraints and instruments is the environment. Paul Painchaud of Laval University made an impressive case for giving greater priority to international environmental issues, arguing that global environmental problems “represent as serious a hazard as the nuclear threat.” (49:42) David Munro of the Canadian Wildlife Federation also drew attention to the fact that unless a better linkage between conservation and development is achieved, there will be even more drastic problems afflicting significant areas of the globe: “environmental degradation, loss of resources and loss of the basic support for economic development in the future.” (42:58) The famine in the Sahel could be a grim herald of things to come unless careful preparations are made. Nor can Canadians be wholly sanguine about their own situation. Mr. Munro's comments are telling:

We are all aware of the fact that the emissions of sulphur dioxide from power plants in the United States are contributing to the acidification of lakes and the destruction of forests in southeastern Canada. Similar phenomena occur in Europe. Pollution from all around the northern hemisphere is causing an arctic haze to form during the winter in polar Canada. We do not know what long-term effects this will have. (42:59)

Canadian governments—both federal and provincial—have taken strong steps to combat the domestic sources of acid rain. They have also reflected the concerns of their electors by placing great emphasis on the value of concerted international efforts to protect the environment. Canada's involvement in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment and in the subsequent creation of the UN Environment Program (UNEP), in part through the participation of Maurice Strong as secretary general of the conference and as the first executive director of UNEP, were early examples of the national commitment. UNEP is unusual among UN agencies in that it is funded strictly through voluntary contributions, with Canada consistently among its principal supporters. The Canadian permanent representative to UNEP, David Miller, had the honour to be chosen as the first chairman of the newly formed Resident Representatives Group, which has considerable influence because it acts as the liaison between the agency's secretariat and the member states between meetings of the Governing Council



(of which Canada is also a member). Charles Caccia, a former Minister of the Environment, has suggested, however, that UNEP would be more effective if it were set up in the office of the UN Secretary General. "Here it would initiate policy, play an advocacy role, and promote and advance long-term thinking and research." (58:65) **The committee recommends that the government of Canada investigate the possibility of bringing the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) into the mainstream of regularly funded UN specialized agencies and, in general, do everything possible to enhance the effectiveness of UNEP. The government should also continue to take a lead internationally in arousing concern about deterioration in the environment and co-operate with other like-minded states in pressing for preventive and remedial action.**

The recent disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union has heightened fears throughout the world about the potential dangers of nuclear energy. There are currently 361 nuclear power reactors in operation around the world, with another 144 under construction or on order. At the same time, a number of questions about nuclear power remain unresolved. These include the fate of nuclear plants once their useful life of 25 to 30 years is over, as well as effective means of disposing of the highly dangerous radioactive waste products that are steadily accumulating and inviting some future catastrophe.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental organization under the aegis of the United Nations, has as its main objectives (a) to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity around the world, and (b) to safeguard nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful use within a country in order to prevent their diversion for military purposes. Inspections within countries depend entirely on their permission and relate exclusively to nuclear proliferation. The IAEA has devised extensive safety criteria for nuclear power reactors and for the management of radioactive wastes. Yet international consensus remains inadequate in this area, and inspection of civilian facilities for safety and environmental standards is non-existent. The committee recognizes the difficulties of obtaining international agreement. However, the Chernobyl incident has demonstrated that nuclear reactor accidents are extremely likely to cause international contamination. In these circumstances **we consider that the Canadian government has an obligation to press for international agreement, preferably through the International Atomic Energy Agency, on safety measures relating to nuclear power. These should include a comprehensive review of safety standards for civilian atomic energy plants, development of an international inspection system, elaboration of radioactive waste disposal methods, and an international agreement covering prompt warnings about nuclear accidents and the provision of immediate assistance.**

International law can also assist in the achievement of important Canadian foreign policy goals, particularly in the multilateral area. Given the vast range of international organizations within and outside the UN system, we believe that it is in Canada's best interests to strive to develop the current body of international law and, concurrently, to seek to assure its optimum use.

In this spirit, we are encouraged by the government's recent withdrawal of the reservations made in 1970 with respect to the arctic and coastal fisheries zone. Edward McWhinney has observed:

The challenge for Western political leaders and their jurists is to join the international law-making process and actively participate in the rewriting of the 'old' rules and the making of 'new' ones, ensuring a substantial Western flavour and content in the process. One will discover...that the Third World...is not in any way a monolithic bloc

with a rigid orthodoxy...but plural in organization and philosophy and characterized, in consequence...by widespread differences in interests and outlook and expectations. (*International Journal* XL/3 (1985):422.)

The only Canadian ever a member of the International Court of Justice was John Read who served from 1946 to 1958. **We recommend that Canada put forward candidates for positions on the International Court of Justice and other major international law-making institutions such as the International Law Commission and the UN Commission on International Trade Law. We also believe that Canada should encourage states to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, with minimal or no reservations in adopting the optional clause.**

**Canada should promote, by its own statements and policies, the general concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes. This demands a willingness to use its mediation skills and to promote the active intervention of other third parties including institutions such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth at the earliest possible juncture in a given dispute. We should encourage a wider and earlier use of fact finding and observation on a regular basis by the United Nations Secretary General and his nominees.** There is also a need for the Secretary General, in concert with the Security Council, to survey more regularly and systematically the worldwide state of international peace and security.

The committee's support for international organizations naturally extends beyond the United Nations family. We regard Canadian ties with the Commonwealth to be of the utmost importance and recognize that the relationships we develop there serve us in countless and often unexpected ways, both bilaterally and in other multilateral forums. We also welcome the more recently created *La Francophonie* and are certain that in time it will assume as significant a role on the world stage as the Commonwealth. This dual membership affords Canada a unique opportunity to listen to the views of developing countries from both language groups. No fewer than 44 of the Commonwealth's 49 member nations and 34 of the 39 *Francophonie* states are developing countries. Our commitment to both these institutions is vital to our collective sense of Canadian identity. It is also important to the image we have of ourselves in the world community that we be willing to take a leadership role in these organizations should circumstances require it.

What is fundamental is that Canada's long-standing commitment to international co-operation must not flag, especially during this period when multilateralism itself is seen to be in crisis. Canada must continue its efforts to find pragmatic solutions to new political realities. The aim should be two-fold: (a) institutional reform with a view to maximizing efficiency by reducing duplication and waste, and (b) encouraging dialogue between North and South by drawing the emerging nations of the Third World into the policy-making centres of multilateral institutions. By these methods, it will be possible to create a renewed consensus behind international organizations.

There is no alternative to multilateral co-operation through such institutions as the United Nations in a world that by every palpable measure grows smaller and more interdependent every day. Moreover, despite the immediate difficulties, there is considerable room for hope even in the short term. Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, concluded his testimony on this optimistic note:

I am one of those...who think the United Nations, with all its deficiencies...is still very, very much worth having and adhering to, and as it moved into its 40th anniversary with the inundation of heads of state and government one sensed a slight psychological turning point—internal to the UN, a sense that it was worth doing; external to the UN, a slightly more sympathetic public perception. (22:10)



## CHAPTER FIVE

### Safeguarding International Peace and Security

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Canada needs to make fully independent judgements on the major issues of international security. As we pointed out in our interim report, Canadians both inside and outside government rely too much on information and analysis generated by sources in the United States. Canadian governments have not been accustomed to formulating detailed positions on strategic options confronting either NATO or the Warsaw Pact or on the positions the West should advance in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead of taking a prominent role in the security policy debate, they have tended to acquiesce in the positions taken by the government of the United States, possibly diverging slightly on minor points, but rarely coming to grips with the central issues.

In our view, an informed policy debate at home is needed to back up a more active role abroad. Lacking detailed government elaborations about, for example, how much deterrence is enough, Canadians have had difficulty in the nuclear age identifying the standards by which weapons purchases are assessed or arms control proposals are developed. The House of Commons discusses these subjects more often than it once did, but detailed positions, supported by argument relative to Canadian perspectives, are needed. The absence of such positions has contributed to the mood of unease that we detected among the interested public. Without a clear indication of government policy, it is hard for the public to be confident that Canada's national interests are being taken into account or that Canada is making the contribution it is capable of making at the international level.

We acknowledge that Canada has recorded some solid accomplishments in the pursuit of international peace and security. Canada has been exceedingly active in multilateral organizations devoted to this purpose, and a number of Canadian officials have become highly proficient in the field. Canada is fulfilling several useful tasks, such as the development of arms control verification techniques, that correspond to Canadian skills. This approach is tailored to Canada's particular attributes as a member of the Western Alliance that nevertheless retains a degree of objectivity about the superpower conflict. At the same time, however, Canada is skirting the edges of important issues of strategic policy. We think that Canada should combine its traditional approach of working through multilateral organizations with a sustained effort to influence the most significant decisions bearing on international security.



We believe that a priority for the government in security policy should be to elaborate a Canadian perspective on strategic, arms control and disarmament issues. In the first place, this means recruiting and developing the kind of analytical expertise on which a more active Canadian role in this field must be based. The committee is encouraged by the recent establishment of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and by the growth of other university and non-university research centres. They can be expected to raise the level of expertise in this field. Second, the government must formulate its own judgements on the central questions of strategy and arms control. Third, with this background the government could be more effective in pressing its views with other governments and in international forums. Finally, the government should engage the public in a continuing dialogue on security policy, beginning by making public its own views together with the arguments behind them.

Canada's security policy should be aimed at preserving international stability and promoting world peace. International stability demands defence forces that deter but do not provoke an adversary. It requires mutually agreed controls on arms that assure each side that the other is not considering a pre-emptive attack. Finally, it necessitates continuous diplomatic communication between the two sides to guard against misperception of intentions or any possibility that the world might blunder into war by accident.

The need for an independent capability to develop security policy is all the greater because of possible factors of instability that are apparent in the strategic environment. In particular, as we were told by Admiral R.H. Falls, a former chief of the defence staff and chairman of NATO's Military Committee, "Both the superpowers are in the process of equipping themselves with weapons of multiple warheads and selectable yields with such accuracy as to have a discrete targeting capability." In Admiral Falls' opinion, "...this gives each country the capability of pre-empting the other with a first strike at the hardened silos of its adversary. It is this feature that creates uncertainty and instability." (21:38)

We also recognize a change in the strategic environment that affects Canada directly. Canadian territory is acquiring greater strategic value, partly as a result of the importance the United States is now placing on ballistic missile defence and partly because of the development of new offensive systems, including long-range bombers, cruise missiles and precision-targeted SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). As a result, Canada could be confronted in future by requests to place ballistic missile defence installations on its territory. Moreover, the addition of cruise missiles to the Soviet arsenal probably increases the risk that any attack on North America would include the targeting of installations on Canadian territory. We were impressed by the statement of John Lamb, executive director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, who argued that Canada has an opportunity to use its newly enhanced strategic importance to take a lead in shaping the strategic environment for the benefit of both Canadian and international security.

## **Defence Policy**

As we see it, the fundamental issue in defence policy is that of reconciling Canada's capabilities with Canada's commitments. At the moment, Canada's armed forces are spread thinly over a remarkably large number of roles. They suffer from shortages of personnel and obsolescence of equipment, caused by neglect during the 1970s and continuing financial stringency. Numbering approximately 84,000 primary

regular force personnel and 25,500 primary reserves, they are expected to carry out the following tasks:

1. The protection of Canada and Canadian national interests at home and abroad; this includes surveillance of the North and of the coastlines on east and west, aid to the civil power, search and rescue and other domestic tasks.
2. Assistance in the protection of the strategic deterrent through NORAD, in co-operation with the United States.
3. The fulfilment of NATO commitments, including the commitment of land and air forces to the defence of central Europe, the protection of Atlantic sea routes for resupply and reinforcement, and the reinforcement of northern Norway in the event of an international crisis.
4. Peacekeeping missions.

This is a greater number of commitments than Canada can reasonably expect to fulfil with its present military resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that we heard suggestions, such as those offered by Cynthia Cannizzo and others, for a rationalization of Canada's defence commitments that would permit a greater degree of specialization. These suggestions have much to commend them.

To take one example, a more pronounced role for the armed forces in the North, building on the ideas set forth in our discussion of a northern dimension for Canada's foreign policy (Chapter 10), might evoke a good deal of enthusiasm from Canadians and could, at the same time, be a useful service for the NATO Alliance. There are other ways Canada's commitments could be restructured—by, for example, pulling the airforce contingent back from Europe to strengthen the surveillance and detection capability in North America or putting more emphasis on maritime forces, which also carry out tasks beneficial to both Canada and the Alliance. Almost all such rearrangements would have the result of reducing the number of jobs carried out by the Canadian forces but enabling them to do those jobs much more effectively than they can possibly hope to do them at present.

We recognize, however, that reordering Canada's defence commitments would be a tortuous and difficult exercise, and it is uncertain what economies, if any, could be achieved. Moreover, because Canadian forces are limited in size and spread out over a number of tasks, there is a risk that any major change could damage or weaken their overall viability. In addition, the 6,700 Canadians currently stationed in a reserve role on the central front in Europe fulfil a vitally important political function in addition to their military role. They are the visible sign of Canada's commitment to the defence of Europe. The reaction of members of the Alliance to the reduction of Canada's forces in Europe in 1969 suggests that a complete withdrawal at this time would be resisted for fear that it would weaken the resolve of the United States to keep its own, much larger, forces in Europe. In the eyes of Europeans, the Canadian forces in Europe have a value that goes far beyond their numbers.

Another argument for an increased Canadian contribution to European defence is that a stronger conventional posture would be a means of getting NATO to abandon possible first use of nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe, thereby reducing the risk that a minor conflict would escalate into a devastating nuclear exchange. This point of view arouses considerable controversy and is one of a number of strategic policy issues that should be examined by a parliamentary committee.

We are sceptical of the proposal by Douglas Ross that Canada increase its European ground forces from one brigade group to about two divisions, although a few of us agree that NORAD should be allowed to wither away, with Canada assuming responsibility for peacetime control of Canadian air space and providing early warning to the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC). A majority of committee members believes that Canada should continue to play a significant role in NORAD because the early warning arrangements now provided for SAC, which contribute to deterrence, could not be provided at close to current costs by Canada on its own. If in the future, however, the United States decided to deploy SDI, Canada should reconsider its position on how to contribute to North American air defence.

If Canada is not going to alter its agreed defence commitments, a second option would be to enable the forces properly to fulfil these commitments. This was the approach taken by Vice-Admiral H.A. Porter of the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada. "If Canada expects to be listened to where defence matters are being discussed," Admiral Porter told the committee, "then Canada must take a number of measures to improve our defence posture so that we can demonstrate to our allies in the world that we can meet the commitments we have made to collective security and protection of our sovereignty." (46:89-90) Admiral Porter and Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Evans, vice-chairman of the Atlantic Conference of Defence Associations, also emphasized the need for more trained military personnel and, especially, the importance of developing a large and effective reserve force.

The government has maintained defence spending above the rate of inflation in exceedingly difficult financial circumstances. The effectiveness of a defence force also depends, however, on spending the defence dollar wisely, which means that future procurement decisions should not be governed primarily by pressures to spread the economic benefits across the country. Moreover, the Senate Special Committee on National Defence has calculated that, to meet all its present commitments, Canada will have to increase defence spending from approximately 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent or 3 per cent of the gross national product.

**In our opinion, the government must confront the commitment-capability gap.** There are grave dangers in leaving the gap unattended. For example, it is difficult to see how the Canadian forces could fulfil the commitment to reinforce the brigade on the central front and at the same time send the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Combat Group to Norway. **We therefore propose an immediate study of long-term defence requirements designed specifically to ascertain how much additional expenditure would be necessary to complete the task of re-equipping the armed forces over the next 10 years. If this level of spending is not considered attainable, then the government should attempt, in consultation with its allies, to renegotiate or restructure some of Canada's defence commitments so as to close the gap between commitments and capabilities and ensure that Canada's armed forces can carry out properly the roles they are assigned.**

We also heard proposals that Canada broaden and strengthen its military effort to be able to play a greater role in the defence of western interests in other parts of the world. George Bell of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies argued that, in view of the development of trade with the Pacific Rim and the growth of Soviet forces in Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, Canada should adjust its defence posture to accept security responsibilities beyond the immediate coastal areas of the Pacific. (45:36-40) He also drew the committee's attention to Canada's interest in the Caribbean and Central American region and implied that Canada should make some military contribution in that area as well.



We agree that these situations bear close watching. Because Canada's forces are already overextended, however, we do not think it desirable to go looking for wholly new responsibilities. In any event, we do not agree that embracing wider defence commitments in the Pacific and the Caribbean is the right way for Canada to contribute to the pursuit of international peace and security. The only role we could envisage for Canadian forces in Central America would be as part of a peacekeeping force.

Gwynne Dyer presented another perspective on the defence debate, arguing that Canada should be prepared to surrender its NATO and NORAD commitments and adopt a posture patterned after that of Finland, which combines neutrality with commitments to ensure that its territory will not be used to threaten the security of its powerful neighbour. Most of us do not agree with this prescription. Finland does not stand in the way of a direct attack on the Soviet Union, whereas we do not believe that effective protection of the northern part of North America could be provided without close defence arrangements between Canada and the United States. Moreover, unlike Finland and the Soviet Union, Canada shares a way of life and a belief in democracy with its powerful neighbour. Finally, most of us believe that Canada's participation in alliances promotes its own long-term interests, including the defence of freedom and of international order. New Democrats on the committee question the value of military alliances in reaching the goal of international peace and security and believe the subject should be examined more thoroughly than has been possible here.

## Arms Control and Disarmament

We sensed an enormous degree of impatience with the slow progress of arms control. As Joanna Miller told us in Saskatoon, "Arms control negotiations tread water as innovative technologies outstrip efforts to control them." (39:34) As indicated in the testimony, some members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control of the Department of External Affairs challenge Canada's fundamental orientation, asking,

...in the light of the inability to manage the arms race for the past 40 years through existing structures...[is] it not time for a radical new approach? What do we mean by security? What are Canada's security needs? Are they best served in existing structures and alliances? (36:5)

Arms control and disarmament issues are often complex, covering a range of political, military and technical factors, and it is necessary to build confidence at each stage as the search for reductions proceeds. We note that most groups within the peace movement are committed to mutual reductions rather than unilateralism and many are ready to work through NATO, as well as the United Nations, provided they see reasonably good prospects of progress soon.

We share the impatience of those who perceive the growing seriousness of the strategic environment, which demands a renewed effort to curb the dangerous build-up of weapons. **We believe that it is necessary to enhance strategic stability by pursuing arms control and that the best path forward is one that includes mutual agreements, balanced and deep reductions, and adequate means of verification.** We commend the government for taking a lead in the area of arms control verification. Canada was the sponsor of the resolution on verification that was approved by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in the autumn of 1985. As a practical measure, the government recently agreed to upgrade the Yellowknife seismic array as a



contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive test ban. There is substantial potential in Canada's research and high technology sectors for making further contributions to the effective control of arms.

Canada is an active participant in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Canada is also, by virtue of having forces in Central Europe, working alongside other members of the Alliance in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna. These talks have the objective of negotiating reductions in, and limitations of, conventional ground forces in Europe.

**We recommend that Canada intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures. These measures, which have been enunciated by the government, are as follows:**

- 1. A mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.**
- 2. The maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.**
- 3. The negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons.**
- 4. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable.**
- 5. The prevention of an arms race in outer space.**
- 6. Agreement on confidence-building measures sufficient to permit the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere.**

**We are attracted by proposals for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions as one means of controlling the expanded trade in conventional weapons and we believe that Canada should seek international support for this concept.**

One intriguing idea, presented to the committee by Douglas Ross, was to establish sanctuaries for each side's sea-based nuclear deterrent, intended to keep it as far as possible from its adversary's territory and thereby increase warning time and reduce the risk of inadvertent war. (27:21, 29-30) The committee is not in a position to comment knowledgeably on the feasibility of this idea, but we think it worthy of careful examination. If it is found to have practical merit, it could be the subject of a multilateral initiative, because Canada would probably not have much success going ahead on its own with such a proposal.

Our attention is naturally fixed on the arms control proposals that were exchanged in the autumn of 1985 by the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva. The two sets of proposals are far apart in many respects, but they do converge in holding out the possibility of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals through cuts in both launchers and warheads. We find worthy of attention the proposals Secretary General Gorbachev made in a statement on January 15, 1986, for a three-phase reduction of nuclear arms leading to their elimination by the turn of the century. In the committee's view, the proposals must be more than just a beginning. In view of the importance of making progress in arms control, **we urge the government to make every effort to encourage the**

**superpowers to engage in productive negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.**

We realize how difficult it is for a country of modest military capability to get a hearing in security policy discussions, especially in Washington. Unless Canada is equipped to develop new ideas and approaches, it cannot expect to be able to exert influence in Washington or in other capitals. This will require a greatly increased technical capacity to analyze issues relating to arms control. Canada's representatives will have to be sufficiently well briefed that they can deal with U.S. policy makers on equal terms, and when making representations they will have to be firm in asserting Canada's vital interest in these discussions.

In addition to holding bilateral discussions with the United States, we see advantage in pressing for more extensive discussion with all Canada's allies. We heard several proposals for enhancing NATO's importance as a forum not just for consulting on arms control, but also for formulating detailed negotiating positions. One such proposal was made by Malcolm Bow, a former Canadian diplomat, who argued that arms control should be made a basic ingredient of all NATO's strategic planning and decision making. Canada's delegation to NATO, he proposed, should be instructed "to insist on every appropriate occasion that arms control arrangements be incorporated in all strategic plans or decisions, especially when new or revised deployment of forces or weapon systems are contemplated." (50:109)

An effective arms control and disarmament policy that enjoys the desired degree of support within government has to be the joint product of foreign policy planners and defence policy planners. We perceive a gap, however, between the thinking of the Department of External Affairs and that of the Department of National Defence on this subject. We are concerned that arms control initiatives might not be pushed with sufficient energy and might lack co-ordination because of this gap. In our view, **decisions about defence policy, including the military decisions in which Canada participates as a NATO member, should not be taken without due regard to their consequences for arms control. Arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy, on the other, should move in tandem.**

**We have concluded that the government's capacity for formulating policy on arms control and disarmament needs improvement. We are not in a position to specify the manner in which this capacity could be improved, but one essential requirement would be a new policy development mechanism designed to reconcile the views received from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. We also believe that foreign policy is conducted in a more co-ordinated and energetic manner if it is exposed regularly to public examination. For this reason, the new mechanism should be directed to report periodically to Parliament.**

## **East-West Relations**

We believe Canada has a part to play in the political management of East-West relations. As John Halstead told the committee, "East-West relations are too important to be left to the superpowers alone." (30:10) This should involve both multilateral contacts with allies and bilateral exchanges with the governments of the Soviet Bloc. Multilaterally, Canada should work with its allies towards a common understanding of the limits of acceptable behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union, as well as agreement on the incentives and deterrents to be used to gain respect for those limits. The scope of these consultations should cover the full range of Soviet actions and policies. However,

the varied response within the Alliance to the declaration of martial law in Poland and to the decision to build a pipeline linking Western Europe with the Soviet Union suggests that particular attention should be devoted to reconciling differences within the Alliance. The Canadian approach should be to encourage an Alliance posture towards the Soviet Union that is united, firm, unprovocative and open to reasonable accommodation.

There are points at which the West can hope to exert some leverage over Soviet behaviour. By the same token, there are points at which the Soviet Union can hope to drive a wedge into the Western Alliance. This confronts the western governments with the need to concert their policies on such different matters as trade and the terms on which to supply export credits, the transfer of technology, particularly technology with military potential, and how to respond to Soviet support of revolutionary movements in developing countries. Not only is it difficult to get western governments to think and act alike on these matters, but there are differences of opinion over what motivates Soviet behaviour and how best to influence that behaviour.

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev brought about a substantial change of personnel in the Soviet leadership and, given that leadership, a more contemporary style. The new leader strikes us as more capable than his predecessors, more alert, more calculating, more flexible and better able to move fast when he sees the chance. Western governments should make a constructive response to what appears to be a concerted attempt on the part of the new Soviet leadership to lessen East-West tensions. We were impressed with Secretary General Gorbachev's decision to extend the self-denying ordinance on underground nuclear testing in the Soviet Union, a decision that has raised hopes following the disappointment occasioned by the Soviet Union's vote against establishment of an international seismic monitoring network at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe the Soviet moratorium offers an opportunity to develop a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement. In particular, we think the government should encourage the U.S. government to undertake a similar moratorium for a period long enough to determine whether agreement could be reached on a comprehensive test ban, including mutually acceptable verification arrangements.

Canada can also contribute to the development of East-West relations by exerting an influence on the United States. This can be done bilaterally as well as by working to gain the support of like-minded states that together can affect U.S. thinking. There is special value in exchanging views with the other NATO powers. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has long had its attention fixed on Moscow, often has views on international issues similar to Canada's—a fact illustrated by the similarity of their voting records in the United Nations—and carries great weight with the United States.

The future of Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations. Canada has a major interest in European security, trades with the countries of the Soviet Bloc, and energetically involves itself with humanitarian issues, particularly the reunification of families and the freer movement of people. Owing partly to the personal links that many Canadians have with Eastern Europe, Canada is deeply concerned about the behaviour of those governments with respect to human rights. As a participant in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and in the wide range of meetings and consultations generated by the CSCE, Canada has a good opportunity to work towards establishing effective confidence-building measures that create the environment for regional arms control.



Although superpower relations and European affairs are central manifestations of the East-West struggle, there are other issues that divide the two sides, particularly the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan and its attempt to extend its influence in other parts of the Third World. At the same time, there are interests that both sides hold in common, such as the development of trading ties and even a joint interest in international stability, manifested by their co-operation in efforts to halt nuclear proliferation.

In Canada's case, there are good reasons for seeking to develop a better bilateral relationship with the USSR. Since Canada is physically located between the USSR and the United States, it is natural for it to try to serve as a bridge and to diminish East-West tensions. The growing militarization of the arctic region gives Canada a special interest in seeking to manage the military balance in that region. Canada also has a range of economic, scientific and other bilateral relations with the Soviet Union that are important to both countries. In addition, both Canada and the Soviet Union have interests and involvements that justify frequent exchanges of political views.

The economic relationship, though impressive in statistical terms, stands on a rather tenuous footing because it is heavily slanted in the direction of Canadian grain exports to the Soviet Union. Two-way trade has, as yet, failed to develop. The Soviet Union is by far the largest market for Canadian grain, but Canada imports very little in return. Moreover, the Soviet Union is known to be bending every effort to reduce its dependence on imported grain.

There is potential for an increase in exchanges of expertise between the two countries. They confront many situations in common: the challenges posed by a northern climate, the problems of running far-flung transportation and communication systems, and the difficulties of growing grains in a cold and arid climate. A program of bilateral exchanges on a wide variety of subjects was agreed to in 1971 but was suspended by Canada in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Official Canadian exchanges in regard to the Arctic, agricultural science and sport have been resumed, but scientific, academic, professional and cultural exchanges have not recommenced. Nothing stands in the way of their resumption under the bilateral agreement already in place, except that the needed funds are not, at the moment, available on the Canadian side.

Canada's resumption of exchanges would serve Canadian purposes and, without in any way mitigating Canada's disapproval of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, would convey Canada's recognition that the change in the Soviet leadership creates new opportunities and that Canada has an interest in encouraging some moderation of East-West tension. We recognize that funds for this purpose are extremely difficult to find. **We endorse the principle of exchanges with the Soviet Union and recommend that provision be made in forward expenditure planning for an increase in such exchanges.**

Exchanges are important as a means of building Canada's knowledge base. We believe there is a need for a greater community of expertise on the Soviet Union, to serve as the foundation for a more confident and understanding approach to that country. Canada lacks individuals who combine expertise in an area of public policy with a strong knowledge of the Soviet Union. There is also a need to strengthen programs for teaching the Russian language. The federal government, the universities, and public and private funding agencies must be kept reminded of how important it is that Canadians view and assess the Soviet Union through Canadian eyes.



Canada also has important bilateral relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe. These are going to require careful handling because of Soviet suspicions of efforts by the Eastern European governments to forge links that will give them slightly more margin for independent action with respect to the USSR. Canada should certainly take the opportunity to carry on a dialogue with them. Indeed, such a dialogue is already under way, and the nuclear accident at Chernobyl has created a shared concern between Canada and these countries. Having complained publicly that they were not notified in a timely manner by the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe appear to support development of internationally agreed rules for quickly notifying other countries of nuclear accidents or incidents involving the release of radioactive materials. The committee's further proposals on this subject are presented in Chapter 4. Discussions on this and other topics could even bring a fresh perspective on questions of international security. Through the Eastern Europeans, Canada might also learn a good deal about how the Soviet Union approaches security issues. The government should manage these contacts wisely, however, making sure that the NATO allies are fully informed of developments.

## Regional Conflict

Although the confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe involves a greater concentration of armed might than can be found elsewhere, there has been no war between the nations of Europe for over 40 years. During this same period, as John Gellner of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* told us, there have been about 160 wars in other areas of the world, none of them formally declared but many of great severity. He drew the committee's attention to the Iran-Iraq war, in which it is estimated that one million people have already been killed. (22:11) Based on varying definitions, others claim there have been more or fewer wars, but no one disputes that, outside Europe and North America, there have been numerous attacks by one state on another during the post-war years.

The regional conflict most frequently raised in testimony was that in Central America. Security issues are an important element in the Central American crisis, but Canadian concerns and involvement are based primarily on humanitarian and human rights grounds. For this reason the committee reserves its comments on Central America for Chapter 8, Promoting Human Rights. By comparison, the Middle East, another scene of continual bloodshed and human misery, threatens to involve the superpowers much more than Central America. Accordingly, it engages Canada's primary security interests.

The Middle East is actually the scene of a number of continuing conflicts, not just one. The bloodiest battles and the greatest loss of life have occurred in the bitter five-year fight between Iran and Iraq. The conflict with widest ramifications, and the one in which many Canadians are most personally engaged, is the ongoing struggle between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Four times since the fighting that accompanied the birth of the state, there has been war between Israel and one or more adjacent states. The effects of this conflict have been felt far beyond the Middle East and have worsened international tensions immeasurably. Apart from fighting between states, civil conflict in the region has acquired frightening dimensions. For a decade Lebanon has been the site of violent civil war between rival factions based primarily on religious communities. As well, South Yemen recently experienced a struggle between leaders that involved widespread bloodshed.

The conflicting testimony the committee heard, almost all of which related to the Arab-Israeli situation, impressed us with the intractability of many aspects of that conflict. Again, witnesses recommended Canadian initiatives to reinvigorate the peace process by, for example, fostering direct negotiations between the participants and standing ready to contribute peacekeeping forces. There were also demands for actions that would undoubtedly be interpreted as favouring one side over the other.

What should Canada do about conflicts in the Middle East and Central America, as well as those elsewhere that invade the television screen less often, but threaten the lives of millions in Africa and Southeast Asia? The misery in each of these situations tugs at the humanitarian instincts of Canadians. They find it intolerable that families must put up with repeated dislocation and continuous insecurity, punctuated at intervals by invasions, gun battles and car bombs. They are particularly appalled by the devastation and needless loss of life in Central America and want their government to tackle the situation with determination and zeal.

Canada has the advantage of good relations with many countries through its relationship to the Commonwealth and *La Francophonie*. Moreover, Canada has acquired a good deal of experience working in the United Nations and elsewhere with influential regional powers like Mexico, Brazil, India and Nigeria. In situations where Canada is in a position to make a contribution, the most effective approach will be to form informal and ad hoc groupings of such states.

We strongly encourage an active diplomacy on Canada's part but we have no illusions about the prospects. Canada stands too far removed geographically from regional struggles in Africa and Asia to hold significant leverage over them. The superpowers will continue to exert enormous influence, and there are also regional powers whose immediate interests are bound up with those disputes that will carry greater weight than Canada. In such situations, an appropriate role for Canada may be to try to moderate, as far as possible, superpower involvement, such as has occurred in Central America. However, at other times and in other places—for example, the Middle East—Canada's efforts may be directed more fruitfully towards persuading the United States to become more actively engaged in the attempt to resolve a problem.

**We affirm Canada's capacity to serve as a disinterested third party in regional conflicts. When Canada undertakes to be a mediator or go-between, it should carefully assess the sources of that conflict, the potential utility of mediation efforts, and the particular talents and leverage it might have to apply to the situation.** Canada's capacity has to be suited to the task, and there has to be a reasonable chance of moving a dispute closer to resolution. Rushing in instinctively with an offer of good offices may end in harm to Canada's reputation for effective action and may even exacerbate the dispute. **Provided these conditions can be satisfied, we recommend that Canada stand ready to use its good offices, including mediation, fact-finding missions, and the careful commitment of peacekeeping forces, where appropriate and feasible to assist the parties to regional conflicts to resolve their differences and achieve peace.** This is a job that from time to time needs badly to be done, and Canada may well be in a position to do it. Canadians must realize, however, that acting as a third party has more than its share of frustrations. To be acceptable to the protagonists, it may be necessary to have stayed relatively aloof from the conflict. Furthermore, there may be long delays before the parties involved are ready to seek an accommodation.

In regard to the Middle East, where tension and conflict have persistently defied all efforts to find settlements, we believe Canada should continue to make clear its concern for the security of the region and the well-being of its peoples. In our view,

Canada's current policy sets out the basic ingredients of a viable settlement: recognition of the right of the Palestinians to a homeland on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and recognition of the right of the state of Israel to continue to exist behind secure frontiers. We are painfully aware of the difficulties that stand in the way of settlement, particularly with regard to the future of Jerusalem, and we are not in a position to go beyond expressing support for these fundamental prescriptions. However, serious efforts must be made by the countries of the region, the great powers and the United Nations to work towards lasting, peaceful solutions.

While taking the utmost care not to demonstrate a preference for one side or the other, Canada should be ready to participate in these efforts. We support the government's emphasis on furthering discussions between the parties immediately concerned. The intractability of the situation should not bar creative thinking. Moreover, we think Canada should confirm its willingness to offer practical assistance. The long record of Canadian peacekeeping in the area suggests one way that Canada should be ready to make its contribution as the opportunity arises.

## **Peacekeeping**

Multinational peacekeeping operations in the form of observer missions or peacekeeping forces have been used on a number of occasions in the past 30 years to stand between parties to a conflict and thereby restore stability and order to a region. Most have been organized by the United Nations, and all have involved military personnel, but without enforcement powers. A great deal is now known about how to organize such forces and why many of them have worked fairly well and others have not. Peacekeeping has passed severe tests, but each operation is essentially an ad hoc exercise.

Canada has been centrally involved throughout the short but distinguished history of peacekeeping. No other country has participated, at one time or another, in all 13 operations organized under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, Canada has contributed personnel to most of the smaller number of peacekeeping forces that have occasionally been established outside the United Nations framework. Many of these forces have been composed largely of personnel contributed by non-aligned countries. Canada is one of the few developed countries that is considered sufficiently uncommitted in regional conflicts to make it acceptable for inclusion in United Nations peacekeeping forces. Apart from this political factor, Canadian personnel are in demand because of their skills in communications and transportation.

As a result of its experience, Canada's expertise in the field of peacekeeping is second to none. Apart from participating in peacekeeping operations, the government has been willing to share this experience with other countries or organizations exploring the modalities of peacekeeping. Recently, we were told, the Contadora Group of nations asked for and received excellent advice from the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs on how to apply peacekeeping techniques to assure adherence to the terms of whatever peace plan can be devised for Central America.

As a committee we have been disappointed by the reluctance of member states of the United Nations to avail themselves of the benefits of peacekeeping. The Security Council has created such forces only rarely in recent years. As Henry Wiseman observed, "There has been no new United Nations peacekeeping operation established outside of the Middle East since 1965." (54:31) There is a clear need for a greater sense



of responsibility on the part of Security Council members towards the peaceful and timely settlement of disputes.

A promising sign was the April 18, 1986 decision of the Soviet Union to vote—for the first time—in favour of a Security Council resolution renewing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The USSR also indicated that it would contribute to the UNIFIL budget in future. This change may bode well for the possibility of a new appreciation by the superpowers of the value of peacekeeping as an instrument for dampening local and regional disputes.

Canada should explore ways of reviving interest in and support for peacekeeping. One expedient would be to press for the financing of peacekeeping operations from the assessed contributions of the member states to the regular UN budget. Canada might also explore the possibility of co-hosting a conference on the topic, perhaps in concert with such powers as Nigeria, India and the Scandinavian countries, with a view to emphasizing when and how peacekeeping can be relevant to the resolution of regional conflicts. Finally, the Canadian delegation to the United Nations might be directed to examine whether the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations might be reactivated.

A criticism heard in Canada is that peacekeeping operations can go on indefinitely; Canada's involvement since 1964 with the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is usually cited as an example. Although UNFICYP has prevented bloodshed, it has not stopped the practical division of the island into two territories, and there is no sign that the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus have made progress in resolving their differences. The critics complain that the stability provided by the United Nations force has removed any pressure from the warring communities to find an accommodation. This leads them to argue that, rather than being part of the solution, UNFICYP has become part of the problem.

Given the long-standing rivalry between Greece and Turkey and the potential of their dispute over Cyprus to generate major conflict between two NATO allies occupying a critical and extended sector of NATO's front with the Soviet bloc, Canada's contribution through UNFICYP to preserving stability in this part of the world should not be underestimated. Indeed, in terms of the contribution to NATO, the value of Canada's 515 troops in UNFICYP can be compared to that of the brigade group that Canada assigns to NATO's central front. In general terms, Canada's experience in Cyprus illustrates that it is often impossible to close the gap between two sides in an international dispute. As veteran United Nations official George Sherry has observed, "We have to think not so much in terms of solving a dispute 'here and now', because it often cannot be done, but in terms of exercising conflict control. There is a distinction between conflict resolution and conflict control." It is important that Canadians not develop exaggerated expectations of peacekeeping, because this will lead only to disappointment and ultimately to a loss of public support. At best, peacekeeping can contain violence and enable the conflicting parties to look for a settlement. But even if a settlement proves elusive, minimizing violence and bloodshed is surely a valuable achievement.

Canada's peacekeeping resources are clearly stretched to the limit, and, after 22 years, we think it is time for other countries to consider taking Canada's place. Unless such countries come forward, however, **the committee concludes that a continuing Canadian contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus helps to prevent fighting on the island and maintains stability on NATO's southern flank.**



There are now peacekeeping operations in only three areas: Cyprus, the Middle East and Kashmir. It is therefore reasonable for Canada to hold itself in readiness to be called on again to make use of its experience and technical ability. There are a number of actual or potential trouble spots where peacekeeping might be required. They include Central America, several parts of Africa (Namibia, Chad, Morocco, Western Sahara, Togo/Burkina Faso), Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, the island states in the Caribbean, Kampuchea and other states in Southeast Asia. Moreover, should peacekeeping forces be required to stabilize any of these situations, the request will almost certainly come at short notice, and then there will be no time for others to develop the expertise Canada now possesses.

The committee was impressed by the suggestion that Canada might expand the use of reserve forces in peacekeeping operations. Currently, a few selected reservists are sent to participate in the units that Canada contributes to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. Henry Wiseman, a Canadian who served on the staff of the International Peace Academy, suggested that "it would do no harm at all" to use reservists for Canada's contribution to UNFICYP. "It might greatly enlarge the capability for Canada for the future and give the reservists something emphatically creative to do as well." (54:41)

The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) provide an interesting model with their extensive use of reserve forces in various peacekeeping exercises. The four countries agreed in 1964 to the composition of the Nordic Standby Force in United Nations Service (NORDBERFN), a comprehensive joint planning structure for national units organized and equipped independently by each country and drawn largely from their reserves on a voluntary basis. Annual national recruiting campaigns are mounted through the mass media, and the volunteers undergo extensive training. While the Scandinavian model is not wholly applicable to Canada, the combination of a general desire to expand the role of the reserves and the tight manpower situation within the Canadian armed forces makes some variation of the model appear attractive indeed. There is no guarantee, of course, that peacekeeping forces would be called upon during a volunteer's specific tour of duty, but some of the training would be valuable in other situations as well. Disaster relief units organized by Sweden, for example, are available for relief work in connection with earthquakes, floods, famines and the construction of refugee camps. **We recommend that the government consider making significantly greater use of the reserve forces for peacekeeping service, either individually or experimentally in small units.**

Another service Canada can provide is peacekeeping training. John Sigler described Canada as having "the best peacekeeping training program in the military anywhere in the world". (30:34) This is a resource that could be brought into play more frequently in the future. Canada should be prepared to provide support of this kind. **The committee recommends that Canada continue to make its peacekeeping expertise available to the armed forces of other countries. The government should also continue to support training seminars on peacekeeping that are hosted at Canadian universities and should continue to assist the International Peace Academy which, among other services, has developed a Peacekeeper's Handbook that is used as a textbook by the Canadian armed forces.**

Through trial and error, and particularly as a result of frustration over difficulties experienced in Vietnam, in the Congo, and when Canada's contingent was expelled from Egypt in 1967, the government developed criteria for deciding whether to respond to invitations to participate in peacekeeping exercises. The latest version of these criteria was made public in a Senate debate:

- (a) such a force would have to be under the auspices of the United Nations, be neutral and impartial and would have to have a clear and adequate mandate to allow it to fulfil the functions assigned to it;
- (b) the deployment of such a force and its participants would have to be accepted by all the concerned parties;
- (c) the concerned parties would have to agree to maintain a cease-fire and there should be reasonable and serious hope of a reconciliation between different factions after the deployment of such a force;
- (d) the financing of such a force should be assured by all of the countries belonging to the UN rather than through voluntary contributions. (Senate *Debates*, March 6, 1984, p. 293)

During hearings in Toronto, Janice Stein questioned the first of these criteria. “Whether peacekeeping forces are needed inside or outside the framework of the United Nations should not be of the essence. What is crucial, however, is to help those who wish to negotiate rather than fight.” (2) The main merit of an operation under United Nations auspices is that it has the tacit support at least of the great powers and of the parties principally involved. Only in such conditions will Security Council approval be forthcoming. The unhappy experience of the Multinational Force, deployed in the Beirut area without Security Council endorsement to provide support to the government of President Gemayel, shows the risks, although local factors may have doomed the Force from the outset. Canada prudently declined to participate. The Force was drawn increasingly into fighting between Lebanese factions and ultimately had to be withdrawn. However, the experience of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, which also lacks United Nations sponsorship, has been successful because the two principal parties—Egypt and Israel—want it to succeed and can assure conditions for its effective functioning. A Canadian contingent replaced the Australian contingent in this Force on April 1, 1986. **In the committee’s view, the best approach to invitations to become involved in peacekeeping operations is for Canada to apply its criteria on a case-by-case basis, while maintaining its preference for operations under United Nations auspices.**

## Terrorism

Terrorism in recent years has become a scourge that no civilized nation can ignore in its foreign relations. Since the late 1960s the international community has witnessed a disturbing proliferation of terrorist incidents involving increasing levels of violence. This proliferation attests to the inadequacy of conventional methods of prevention and to the intractability of many of the political situations that spawn terrorism. Canada has been fortunate in having experienced only a tiny fraction of one per cent of the total number of incidents perpetrated but is, on that account, less well prepared.

In his evidence to the committee, David Charters of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick defined political terrorism as

the threat or use of violent criminal techniques, in concert with political and psychological actions by a clandestine armed political faction or group, whether government or non-government, with the aim of creating a climate of fear and uncertainty wherein the targeted opposition will be coerced or intimidated into conceding the terrorists some political advantage. (46:6)

Mr. Charters identified three principal categories of terrorism. State terrorism consists of violent repression of domestic or external opposition, and sometimes of selective illegal violence directed at individuals or groups perceived as threats to the state. Non-state terrorism is the weapon of groups that represent a cause rather than a government. Finally, state-sponsored terrorism refers to actions by a government to provide incentive and assistance to non-state terrorists in other countries. The most appalling dimension of most terrorist acts is that their tragic consequences are felt chiefly by private citizens who are, in effect, being used as instruments to publicize the terrorists' cause, to jolt governments, and to provoke shock, outrage, and a fervent desire to be rid of violence at almost any cost.

The challenge for democratic governments is to strike a balance. On one hand, it is important to combat terrorism. On the other hand, it is important to avoid exacerbating the menace by either adding to the spiral of violence or, in the zeal for prevention, threatening the privacy and liberty of their own citizens.

Terrorism emerges from a variety of motivations. Some terrorists are products of social upheaval and the alienation that results from it. These are desperate people who demand the world's attention for their grievances and whose fury will grow stronger if the sole response by governments is force. Others are well paid mercenaries, hired guns who stoke the fires of anarchy for its own sake. Terrorism also serves as the weapon of individuals who have been frustrated in achieving their purposes through democratic processes, or who seek simply to assert their own power and prestige. As one of our Vancouver witnesses, Dr. Alan Cunningham, observed, it is essential to "get past the idea of terrorism as simply a form of violence with nothing lying behind it", and it is important to remember that terrorism is normally rooted in political and social grievances. Such grievances are the reason that terrorists' objectives frequently enjoy widespread popular support and account for much of the difficulty of organizing worldwide resistance to terrorist acts. Terrorism is an abhorrent tactic for obtaining objectives, and no grievance, however valid, can justify its use.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of organizing a comprehensive response, the international community cannot tolerate wanton acts of violence that threaten the very basis of orderly relations between states. The Abu Nidal Palestinian faction offers a potent illustration of the danger. It is committed to creating turmoil in the Middle East precisely to undermine the voices of moderation and sabotage any hope of accommodation. State-sponsored terrorism, such as that practised by Libya, is another particularly insidious threat in that it brazenly flouts the accepted norms of international behaviour.

The committee has no magic solutions. The grievances that give rise to terrorism run too deep for any easy or speedy victories to be likely. We do believe that diplomacy, prevention, bringing terrorists to justice, and strict sanctions against them are essential instruments in the struggle. Canada should work towards an international convention on terrorism in order to gain the broadest possible acceptance of prescribed procedures for determining the source of terrorist attacks and the appropriate multilateral response. There should be criteria for judging the severity of the response and sanctions of various kinds applied according to a graduated scale.

Cutting off diplomatic relations with an offending state would have the combined effect of signalling extreme displeasure and closing the embassy of the state involved, thus ending the abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities that facilitates international terrorism. Economic boycotts (refusing to buy materials) and embargoes (refusing to sell them) of the states that sponsor terrorism are other potential deterrents, as are the reduction or elimination of commercial air service to countries



known to support terrorism as an instrument of state policy. In the latter instance, the government should work towards a wider application of the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1978 which read, in part, as follows:

...in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft... the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

Canada's *Prohibition of International Air Services Act*, which came into force in 1981, allows the Governor in Council to issue an order prohibiting Canadian air carriers from serving a state, and forbidding carriers from that state to fly over or land in Canada, if the secretary of state for external affairs certifies that the state is in default of its obligation to deal with hijackers or others who interfere with civil aviation. The government should seek to apply these penalties in other cases of terrorism. A renewed effort should also be made to gain the widest possible acceptance of these standards by other countries and international bodies.

Preventive measures such as the provision of accurate intelligence, improved physical and procedural security, and contingency planning are obviously also desirable. Though the exchange of intelligence and sharing of technical knowledge appear reasonably satisfactory, Canada needs more trained intelligence analysts. There is also a requirement to pay closer attention to the inflow of refugees. We regard it as essential that innocent refugees, who form the vast majority, be inconvenienced as little as possible. Nevertheless, there is grave danger of terrorist groups taking advantage of the sanctuary provided for legitimate refugees to establish a bridge head for their activities in Canada. Nevertheless, there is a grave danger of terrorist groups taking advantage of the sanctuary provided for legitimate refugees to establish a bridge-head in Canada for their activities. **The committee recommends increased stringency of control at Canadian entry and border points.** Stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures in respect of nationals of states that sponsor or support terrorism are essential.

We also reviewed the question of security at Canadian airports. This task is currently put out for tender by private firms, which generally results in the lowest bidder, often with the least trained personnel, being given the contract. **We recommend that Transport Canada set and rigorously enforce minimum standards for airport security. We recommend further that if, after a trial period, private security firms remain deficient, the government consider accepting direct responsibility for all aspects of airport security, to be carried out by Transport Canada or by the RCMP on contract to Transport Canada.**

Information policy also assumes a vital role because publicity of the wrong kind can actually incite terrorism. We agree, however, that censorship would be neither helpful nor desirable. As Maurice Tugwell of the Centre for Conflict Studies told the committee:

When there is an incident, it simply has to be reported as it is. If it were not, the countries which were not involved in this conspiracy of silence would publish it and, in the world of McLuhan, we would all hear about it anyway and it would then get distorted by the rumour mill and it would be ten times as damaging. (46:24)



Media coverage of terrorists' press conferences frequently plays right into their hands and can encourage further outrages. This point was made in a lecture delivered by Katherine Graham, Chairman of the Board of the Washington Post Company. As she put it, "There is a real danger that terrorists not only hijack airplanes and hostages but hijack the media as well."

Contingency planning for terrorist acts should include thorough discussions between security officials and the media. Leslie Green of the University of Alberta advised the committee that, as soon as an incident occurs, a single point of contact should be established for the media. "Establish something in the nature of a *cordon sanitaire* around an incident to keep the public—and that includes journalists—away from immediate contact," he recommended. (46:26)

When terrorist incidents occur in Canada, there is always the danger of one journalist or one media outlet breaking agreed ground rules, which puts everyone else at a disadvantage. For this reason, what is needed is a voluntary code of self-restraint to be adopted by Canadian journalists and media organizations. At the same time, there should be an undertaking from officials to make as much information available as possible.

The tragedies of the last few months have demonstrated that there is clearly a need for more concerted international action to deal with terrorism. The Tokyo summit of May 1986 decided on a number of specific measures but did not indicate a multilateral forum to organize joint action. **The committee's preferred approach to organizing international action on terrorism is to work through the United Nations and thereby engage the support of the entire world community. Canada could, for example, strive to get support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action.** Failing support for such a resolution—and, most important, support from the superpowers—most committee members believe that a consensus leading to decisive action could be obtained more readily within NATO, though some of us think it is a mistake to work through an exclusively western group of nations. The majority believes that there is merit in the suggestion of a NATO working group to develop international standards to combat terrorism and to co-ordinate responses when Alliance members face specific threats. A permanent mechanism of this kind might encourage those governments that have hitherto been somewhat reluctant to participate in joint multilateral action to keep pace with their NATO partners. At the same time, the prospect of a joint response should reduce the risk of unilateral action on the part of any single NATO country.

## CHAPTER SIX

### Expanding International Trade

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**Conditions that have contributed to the growth of the Canadian economy since the Second World War are changing, and Canada must adapt if it is to maintain current levels of prosperity. Canada has already lost some ground in this respect.** The present incomes of most Canadians are still satisfactory, but there are looming problems that all participants in the economy must understand and tackle together.

One of the highest priorities is to make the Canadian economy more competitive internationally. The committee is concerned about competitiveness not for its own sake but because it is essential to the growth and development of the economy and to increased income and employment. Competitiveness is not just a measure of Canada's ability to sell abroad. Rather, it is a measure of a nation's ability to produce goods and services that can be sold internationally while simultaneously maintaining and improving living standards and employment opportunities. Although discussions of competitiveness often focus on improving the efficiency of manufacturing industries, the need to use resources productively also applies to the raw materials and service industries. Canadian prosperity can be achieved only by maintaining a broad and diverse industrial base, with many industries achieving high levels of productivity.

Canada's economy is unique among those of industrialized countries. This is reflected in the composition of its trade and the direction of its exports. It is a major exporter of both raw materials and manufactured goods. While Canada is a major trading nation, the growth in trade in manufactured goods has taken place largely with the United States, which now takes over 78 per cent of all Canadian exports. A high proportion of trade with other industrial states continues to be in raw materials, semi-processed goods and food products; in Canada's trade with Japan, for example, these categories constitute 96 per cent of the total. Compared to other industrialized countries, which have more than one-third of their trade with Third World countries, less than 10 per cent of Canada's trade is with these countries, and some of this is financed with Canadian aid.

Trade flows have changed significantly in just one generation. Attempts by government to influence the course of developments, notably the effort to restore trade with Britain in the late 1950s and the Third Option of the 1970s, have had little effect; market forces have been a main determinant of change. Moreover, the rapid growth of multinational corporations has made global production more specialized and important internationally, as evidenced by the increasing proportion of trade carried on by

different subsidiaries of the same corporation. This suggests the importance of interpreting future trends correctly and trying to make them work to Canada's advantage.

The traditional economic landscape is undergoing structural changes and shifts, both within and between nations, that have yet to be fully recognized or understood. Many companies, especially in traditional industrial sectors, are establishing new production locations, often in advanced Third World countries that have highly trained, disciplined labour forces and lower wage rates, the latter often as a result of limited workplace safety laws, use of child labour, weak or non-existent trade unions, and other advantages apart from labour costs. In effect, many of these countries enjoy a competitive advantage in producing goods in large volume. At the same time, the industrialized countries have entered what has been called the post-industrial stage of economic development—where information, knowledge and service industries are increasingly important. As Lynn Mytelka of the Carleton University School of International Affairs told us,

In advanced industrial countries, we are moving rapidly toward a knowledge-based production system in which the accumulation and appropriation of knowledge is at the heart of the production process and its profitability. (23:11)

The new technologies emerging from a knowledge-based production system are beginning to have an impact throughout the economy, a point made by the International Business Council of Canada.

We have moved beyond the stage at which microelectronics was limited to a few high-tech industries. The automation of all industries, in the factories and the offices, is very much upon us.(2)

Greater specialization has led to increases in the amount of trade within industry sectors. Further, countries are competing more intensely among themselves in exporting manufactured products. **We believe that the government and its foreign trade officers should be well grounded in the areas where trade is growing rapidly, particularly the high technology and services sectors.**

Canada faces a particular problem. It finds itself no longer able to rely on its natural resource exports to the extent that it has since Confederation. More recently, some of the resource mega-projects that were heralded as engines of growth have lost their economic viability. The combination of several factors—growth in production of raw materials in Third World countries, depletion of the most accessible ore bodies and forests in Canada, greatly increased and highly subsidized agricultural production by the European Communities and the United States, and the depressed state of the world economy—has caused a decline in demand for most of Canada's natural resource exports.

Although Canadian producers have succeeded in lowering their costs and improving their standing in world markets, dramatic improvements in the natural resource sector are difficult to anticipate. Where then should government place its emphasis? One view is that highest priority should go to specialization in trade, the encouragement of technological innovation, more processing of natural resources and more production of machinery and equipment for the natural resource sector, and export development. According to this view Canada can sell successfully in world markets only if it carves out niches based on dominance in the corresponding fields in the domestic market.



Another view is that an open trade policy is of the first importance. The government should start with a three-part program: increased liberalization of international trade, the creation of a domestic environment favourable to competitiveness, and specific measures to promote and develop exports. In any event, government action will have to be combined with a sustained effort of salesmanship on the part of Canadian exporters to enable them to penetrate new international markets.

## Trade Liberalization

Improving Canada's ability to compete effectively in a rapidly changing and increasingly tough world economic environment depends to a large degree on open international trade. In many industries, the domestic market is too small to permit optimum plant size and product specialization, so specialization is accomplished through trade. The post-war pursuit of trade liberalization has had two effects on Canadian competitiveness. Gaining access to larger markets has permitted companies to achieve economies of scale, specialization and other benefits and has stimulated greater efficiency in the Canadian economy by exposing it to foreign competition. Particularly between 1979 and 1984, even before Canada undertook its bilateral initiative with the United States, it was apparent that Canadian companies were reorganizing to make themselves more competitive internationally.

Not all countries share Canada's belief in and commitment to an open world trading system. The recent depression and subsequent uncertain and uneven recovery in the world economy have created fertile ground for protectionism. All governments have found it difficult to resist adopting restrictive import measures, and few have been willing even to consider removing existing barriers to trade. The proliferation of protectionist measures has also created a climate where many countries feel justified in taking aggressive action to promote their exports, further aggravating an already bad situation.

Canada can only lose by introducing retaliatory protectionist measures, but it cannot stand by and do nothing. With a modest and dispersed population, Canada must have access to the markets of the world and be able to sell in these markets if it is to prosper. For this reason, **the committee recommends that the government make strenuous efforts to achieve orderly and balanced trade liberalization.**

The international trading system and the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) have provided a remarkably successful defence against the onslaught of protectionist forces. But human ingenuity is great, and governments, Canada's included, have devised all manner of non-tariff barriers to circumvent the GATT and block imports.

It is difficult, even for the most powerful countries, to fight each protectionist move separately. The only effective way is for the world trading community to get together and work out new rules for their mutual protection. This process is never easy. As world trade has grown in scale and the number of countries participating in international commerce has increased, the task has become progressively more difficult. Since the GATT ministerial meeting of November 1982 first agreed in principle to the idea of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, it has taken four years to get the main trading nations to agree to participate—and their acceptance has been reluctant at best.

One of the reasons for the difficulty in launching a new GATT round has been disagreements about what issues should be included on the agenda for discussion and



negotiation. It is certainly in Canada's interest to focus GATT discussions on agricultural trade and, in particular, on the use of subsidies to promote agricultural exports. Tighter and fairer rules are needed to govern subsidies in general on the one hand and, on the other, countervailing and anti-dumping actions, which are being undertaken with increasing frequency and make long-range planning exceedingly difficult for Canadian exporters. Government procurement policies have proven frequently to be a stumbling block to trade and should be re-examined. Canada would benefit, on balance, from strengthened GATT procedures for settling trade disputes. It should also want to see the more advanced developing countries, which no longer require special treatment, fully integrated into the world trading system. It is evident that the forthcoming GATT round will not be primarily a tariff-cutting exercise but rather will focus on a wide range of non-tariff barriers.

**The committee believes it is important to begin a new round of multilateral trade negotiations as expeditiously as possible.** The GATT has served Canadian interests well for 40 years. Successive Canadian governments have been active participants in the various negotiating rounds conducted under its auspices. The success of the GATT in building a system of rules and regulations to guide the conduct of trade has provided Canada with the certainty and predictability its economy needs. The GATT negotiating process may be slow and tedious, but its advantage is that countries are less likely to institute protectionist measures while negotiations are in progress.

Canada has been a traditional supporter of the GATT. The organization has a good record in furthering trade liberalization, which is in Canada's interest. And Canadians have always felt more at ease negotiating in a multilateral environment, where they can seek out like-minded allies to work with. However, the traditional negotiating process of the GATT is changing, and Canada must take note of its implications. With the development of the enlarged European Communities, now comprising 12 nations, there is a tendency in GATT negotiations for the major trading blocs or powers—the United States, Japan and the European Communities—to work out deals between themselves and offer them to other states on a take it or leave it basis. There is no alternative to the GATT as a forum for multilateral trade policy negotiations, and Canada must be alert to ensure that the opportunities to make common cause with like-minded states do not diminish.

Another difficulty with the GATT process is that it moves slowly. The last GATT round, known as the Tokyo Round, took six years to negotiate and eight years to implement. If the next round, which will be the most complex and difficult yet undertaken, lasts a comparable length of time, the resulting agreement will not be implemented fully until the next century. Nor is it certain that issues of special interest to Canada, such as the use of subsidies in agricultural trade, will even be on the agenda. These considerations worry us, because we do not think Canada can risk such a delay, especially when a successful outcome cannot be taken for granted.

As we discussed in our interim report, these factors persuaded the government that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating freer trade arrangements with the United States. Canada's economic well-being depends on continuing access to the U.S. market, an access that has been increasingly threatened by protectionist forces working through the U.S. Congress. Recent trade actions on the part of the United States have lent substance to this protectionist threat.

The committee cannot anticipate whether it will prove possible for Canadian and U.S. negotiators to arrive at an agreement acceptable to both parties. However, we do think **it is essential that any agreement between Canada and the United States be**

entirely consistent with the obligations of both countries to the GATT. To do this, the GATT should be notified of the terms of any agreement reached, and a GATT working party would be established to examine the consistency of that agreement with GATT obligations.

If these conditions were adhered to, there would be no reason to regard the prospective GATT round and the bilateral discussions with the United States as mutually exclusive. Certain aspects of the discussions, particularly if they broke new ground, might serve as an illustrative model for similar discussions that will occur within the larger GATT context. On the other hand, there are other important issues affecting both countries that can be dealt with only in a multilateral forum. In particular, the special needs and problems of developing countries will require greater attention in the near future. (For example, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement is due for negotiation this year. We discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 7.) **We note that the successful completion of negotiations between Canada and the United States would address only a portion of the international trade issues facing Canada.** For instance, Europe remains a significant market, while the countries of the Pacific region offer attractive new opportunities. It is also important to pursue trade with developing countries.

## Improving Competitiveness

Removing trade barriers is one aspect of improving the competitiveness of the Canadian economy. However, access to foreign markets alone cannot make or keep the economy competitive. How the government directs its monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, investment and competition policies, and transportation and manpower policies is likely to have a much more substantial effect on competitiveness. We believe that it is also important not to lose sight of the role played by the private sector, both management and labour, and to understand what the private sector can do that government cannot.

If Canada is going to compete with the large countries of the West and the vibrant economies of the Pacific, it will have to lead from its strengths. That such strengths exist might be doubted, given the difficulties confronting Canada's resource industries and the well known disabilities of the manufacturing sector. Does the experience of Canadian firms abroad provide any basis for optimism? If so, what kinds of Canadian enterprises appear to have a future internationally? What niches can be developed for future success?

Some Canadian manufacturing companies are making considerable headway in international markets, and it is possible to identify the characteristics that account for this success. According to studies by D.J. Daly and D.C. McCharles, the real dynamism is to be found in small Canadian-owned businesses. These firms, typically with fewer than 400 employees, have identified niches in export markets that match their expertise and that have been overlooked by large companies. The committee heard about two companies that are striking illustrations of this point. One company is successfully exporting kitchen garbage pails to Japan. (54:10) Another example is a Regina company that is manufacturing chopsticks so successfully that it will soon be exporting them to China. (56:79) Such companies have benefited from being alert to new opportunities, and by reaping the rewards of specialization and longer production runs, many of them tended to do well even in the recession of the early 1980s. **We call upon the government to recognize the export potential of Canada's small and medium-**

**sized businesses and to take account of this potential in designing and implementing its export marketing strategies.**

The entrepreneurial instincts of these companies are clearly evident in all aspects of their operations. They have understood that it is necessary not just to master the hardware of new technology but to integrate it successfully into their managerial and manufacturing processes. They are also more actively interested in management and worker training than most Canadian companies. They have often adopted participatory management styles, and their workers exhibit high morale and high motivation.

- The fact that some Canadian manufacturers are enjoying remarkable success in penetrating international markets should be viewed in conjunction with the equally remarkable increase of direct investment by Canadian manufacturing companies abroad. The amount of direct investment by these companies is approaching one-half that of foreign companies in Canada. There are undoubtedly a host of explanations for this, and it can certainly be interpreted as further heartening evidence of the development of the manufacturing sector. More sobering is the finding that a large number of the successful exporters are seriously considering launching their next round of expansion outside Canada to escape what they consider to be an unfavourable environment for investment. The aspects of the environment that concern them include overregulation, high wage rates, hostility between labour and management, and a corporate profits tax system that does not permit the internal cash flow they need. **We recognize that a number of features of the domestic environment hamper Canadian exporters and recommend that these be addressed in any future trade policy.**

Larger Canadian companies could take a leaf from the small firms' book. By comparison with their competitors in other countries, they have tended to adopt new technologies much more slowly, both on the managerial side and in the engineering and science side of the business. In recent years, some companies have been diverted from their main tasks by a preoccupation with large-scale take-overs. Canadian firms must now operate in an environment that is increasingly competitive because of the rapidity of technological progress and successive rounds of trade liberalization. The key to their future success in export markets will be specialization. To achieve it, their management will have to be more responsive and adaptable to the international environment than they have been historically.

The government must also attempt to work with private sector management and labour to plan effective strategies that emphasize the importance of export success and keeping abreast of technological change. Maintaining the appropriate balance between flexibility and detailed planning is one of the most perplexing issues facing governments. The committee discussed several approaches, ranging from allowing the free play of market forces to co-operating closely in setting goals and planning strategies for each sector.

We believe that government has an important task to perform in pursuing competitiveness. While government cannot legislate competitive success, it does have a legitimate role in creating an environment where human, capital and technological resources can be used to the full. This requires helping markets work better so that there are benefits for the whole economy. Another responsibility is to assist the humane and equitable transition of human and financial resources from uncompetitive to competitive industrial sectors. Macro-economic policies must be devised to maintain steadier long-term economic growth with stable inflation rates and lower unemployment. Furthermore, regulatory agencies must be sensitive to the effects of their policies on the competitiveness of companies.



As an example of what the government could do to improve the environment for business enterprise, there is a need for resources to permit the speedier adaptation of new technology. Small businesses could grow and develop and hire more people if they could be helped to buy patents. If past experience is a guide, a number of businesses could be expected to improve upon the ideas and processes thus made available to them. At present government assistance to purchase patents is available under conditions that are defined too narrowly. **We therefore recommend that the government take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the purchase of patents and the marketing of patents abroad can be financed under the *Small Business Loans Act* or that the necessary changes are made in the Industrial and Regional Development Program.**

The government should also consider establishing an export financing institution with a mandate aimed specifically at the needs of small business. The financing offered by the Export Development Corporation is directed to a small number of large corporations; as a result, small businesses have minimal access. **The structure and attitudes of the Export Development Corporation (EDC) are too often remote from those of small business, and this gap is difficult to bridge. To change the corporate culture of EDC to be more responsive to small business would require a significant change in outlook and operations at EDC, and there is no guarantee that it could be accomplished effectively. To develop more fully the export potential of small business, the government should consider establishing a small business export financing agency. The private sector financial institutions should also become more involved in small business export financing and should be closely associated with the new agency.**

Detailed sector-by-sector planning would be unlikely to succeed in a rapidly changing economy. The government can, however, assist in shaping an environment favourable to research and development and technological innovation, the process whereby technology is generated, developed and applied to an actual product. Harold Crookell of the School of Business Administration, University of Western Ontario, gave the committee an indication of what this would involve.

I think Canada could do a great deal to improve the climate for innovation in the country. The kinds of things they could do would include greater respect for patent regulations and stimulating two-way flows of technology from other countries, rather than isolating ourselves from them—a new competition policy that emphasizes international competitiveness rather than worrying excessively about competition within Canada, and allows joint research and development between firms so that they are not subject to anti-trust regulations when they merge their research and development plans. (54:18)

There are other views of how government action can improve Canada's technological performance. One explanation of Canada's problems in this area is that they result in the main from high levels of foreign ownership in the Canadian economy. As the Council of Canadians told the committee,

This single factor of foreign economic control has a massive influence on our capacity for multinational trade outside North America, and it limits our exports, inhibits our entrepreneurial development and reduces R and D and productivity. (43:36)

According to a minority of committee members, it follows from this diagnosis that government should ensure that foreign-controlled subsidiaries locate more research and development in Canada and become more export-oriented; should help develop Canadian-controlled firms in targeted sectors; and should enact tougher legislation to prevent foreign corporate take-overs in strategic high-technology sectors. The majority of the committee, however, favours an alternative diagnosis. This view was stated by the



Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, which examined Canada's technological performance as part of its study of Canada-U.S. relations:

The committee concluded that there is an essential ingredient which such firms look for before they commit money to R and D. Market size is the critical factor. In every instance the committee examined of private firms that engage in significant R and D expenditures, they had access to a market larger than that which Canada alone offers. (*Canada-U.S. Relations*, Volume III, 1982:80)

Most of us believe that trade liberalization, which will allow access to a larger market, offers an attractive instrument for improving Canada's technological performance.

Improving Canada's competitiveness is not only the government's responsibility. Much of what needs to be done rests with the private sector, as productivity is the responsibility of management and labour. Management has been accused of taking a short-term view and not being aggressive enough in foreign markets. These attitudes must be changed if Canada is to be competitive internationally. Management must continue to seek innovation and the application of new technology. Management must also realize that a firm's most important assets are people and strive to enhance the quality of its workers through training. In addition, management will get a greater return by strengthening employee incentives through compensation and equity ownership plans that increase the workers' stake in the firm's success. Labour for its part must be prepared to adopt a new flexibility towards retraining in the face of changes in the economy and technological change. At the same time, labour and management must adopt a more team-oriented approach as a key to improving productivity.

We want to draw particular attention to the importance of acquiring the benefits of technology developed abroad. The relatively small size of the Canadian economy makes adapting technologies developed abroad as important as creating new technologies. In this regard, investment in Canada by foreign companies represents an important conduit for diffusing technologies and innovations developed elsewhere that have export potential. However, the government has to promote the transfer of this information about products and processes to the economy as a whole by encouraging licensing and joint ventures, especially by small and medium-sized businesses. The government can assist the process of technological diffusion by adding to the scientific and technological capabilities of the Department of External Affairs. We think the Department should build on the useful efforts already begun to make embassies abroad better able to assess foreign technological innovations that might be used by Canadian industry.

As we have seen, an important element of competitiveness consists in being quick to take advantage of changing patterns of world trade caused by such developments as changes in consumer preferences, technological innovation or new trading arrangements. This means accelerating the process whereby labour and capital move from decaying sectors of the economy to advancing sectors where they can earn a higher return.

It must be recognized, however, that some jobs that have been lost may never reappear. Some firms may not be able to adapt their products fast enough or completely enough to avoid bankruptcy. Some communities may be particularly hard hit, especially if they are single-industry communities. The workers, firms and communities in the decaying sectors will bear the costs of this process, which in turn will lead them to do everything in their power to slow it down. Most labour

displacement can be handled by normal market forces and the individuals involved; however, when long-term structural shifts in the economy result in the permanent displacement of workers, policies must be devised that will remove barriers to adjustment and ease the transition. We want to emphasize that if government fails to come to terms with the consequences of dislocation it will be contributing to a much greater problem that will sap the energies of the economy.

Canada has had a great deal of experience with adjustment policies but not a great deal of success. Over the years governments have tried a broad range of policies to assist declining firms, industries and regions. Programs have included grants, loans, investment tax credits, early retirement plans, and special unemployment compensation; government has also taken over some of these firms to protect employment. Based on this experience it is possible to outline certain principles that should underlie the next generation of policies.

*First*, adjustment policies must facilitate rather than impede the adjustment process. There is a serious danger that programs intended to modernize and restructure industries become instead a means of keeping them alive and postponing either needed improvements or a decision to close down. It has to be acknowledged that some adjustment strategies have led to a waste of taxpayers' money; it would have been cheaper and less painful for all concerned if the government had not intervened massively. Firms should be given temporary relief only on condition that they improve their competitiveness within a specified period. Some companies, such as Electrohome Ltd., have in fact been motivated to carry out successful restructuring because it was understood clearly that government assistance would be available for only a limited time. A restructuring policy that allows a company to move from one sector to another can also be successful but may often require long-term government assistance. Long-term assistance may also be necessary where the situation is particularly complex or there are few alternatives.

*Second*, transition programs should be directed primarily towards helping workers obtain new employment. Workers should be encouraged to undertake retraining. Assistance should be made available to them because the present educational system is not equipped to handle adults already in the labour force, and individual firms tend to be reluctant to engage in retraining because of its cost. In addition, displaced workers will need income support during the retraining period and possibly help in relocating.

We want to place particular emphasis on how a comprehensive program of adjustment assistance can support trade policy. Policies to smooth the adjustment process must be in place so as to maintain the confidence of all participants in the direction the economy is taking and encourage a willingness to confront change.

## **Export Development and Promotion**

An effective export promotion policy that helps Canadian exporters capitalize on the trading opportunities available to them makes provision for three types of assistance: assistance with regard to market information and opportunities, assistance from the Trade Commissioner Service, and financial assistance.

Canadian business needs information about market opportunities abroad. This is especially true for small and medium-sized businesses that are reluctant to venture beyond a few foreign markets in the United States or Western Europe—whether because of insufficient knowledge of opportunities abroad, a relatively small sales force,

or simple timidity. Just collecting market information is not enough; it is useless unless it is disseminated as widely as possible by such means as seminars, publications and electronic databases that can be accessed easily and are updated continuously. There is no reason why dissemination should be strictly a government responsibility. The private sectors in West Germany and Hong Kong have devised successful ways to spread market opportunity information to potential exporters. Major private sector business organizations like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Export Association and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association have already developed systems for distributing various types of information to their members, and these arrangements could be amplified and extended. If there were more direct agents of Canadian freight forwarding companies abroad, they could serve as a useful network for collecting and disseminating large quantities of market information. **The committee believes the private sector should be encouraged to work with the government in disseminating information about foreign market opportunities.**

The committee is aware that thousands of Canadians who travel abroad see opportunities for enhanced Canadian trade. Business people who travel on trade missions for their own companies or industries have commented that they often see opportunities for enhanced trade in other industries. While they usually do not have the time or the capacity to pursue these ideas, many would like to pass the information on to others who might be able to translate it into sales. To help structure and respond to this hidden potential, the committee suggests a Canadian trade opportunities hotline. A telephone number for the hotline could be included in the customs information pamphlets that are distributed regularly to airline passengers. **The committee recommends establishment of a trade opportunities hotline.**

The Trade Commissioner Service has a well established reputation for helping Canadian companies make sales abroad. The range of its activities includes identifying new market opportunities, introducing Canadian firms to potential buyers, help in finding a local agent, and preparing economic and commercial reports. The business community is concerned that the absorption of the Trade Commissioner Service into the enlarged Department of External Affairs may result in trade commissioners being gradually transformed into foreign service generalists. Although we were given no evidence that this is a major problem, it is a risk, and it will be important to maintain a separate stream of specialized trade commissioners.

A second concern of the private sector relates to the geographical distribution of trade commissioners. **We agree with witnesses who told us that trade commissioners are needed most in countries where there are substantial market opportunities and where their assistance can help exporters overcome cultural and language differences. We therefore recommend that more trade commissioners be allocated to the Asia-Pacific region, if necessary by reducing the number allocated to Europe.** The committee anticipates that the recently announced opening of trade offices in Shanghai, Osaka and Bombay will go some way to meeting the need.

The third area of export development is market assistance. Witnesses from the business community spoke favourably of the Program for Export Market Development (PEMD) which offsets some of the costs of developing new markets. During a time of budgetary restraint, **we believe the Program for Export Market Development should be maintained and that special efforts should be made to extend its coverage to the engineering, consulting, and service industry firms that now find it difficult to qualify for PEMD assistance.**



The most important form of direct export financing is provided by the Export Development Corporation. Direct export financing involves less than five per cent of Canada's exports. It should be pointed out that export financing is only one aspect in winning or losing an export order. Price, quality, ability to deliver, dependability and reputation of the firm, knowledge of the market, willingness to provide service support, and ability to transfer technology through licensing, joint ventures and direct investment are all important considerations and are the responsibility of companies. While export financing is not a major factor in trade among industrialized countries, it is important for projects in the Third World or Eastern Europe where countries are constrained by insufficient domestic savings rates, low foreign exchange reserves, and limited access to private financial markets.

International competition for export markets is increasing. **We believe that if Canada wants to maintain and expand its share of export markets, the government must provide Canadian exporters with export financing programs that are competitive with those offered by other countries.** Canada faces a special difficulty because of its high domestic rates of interest compared to those in other major exporting nations like Japan and West Germany. On top of this, several countries, notably France, support their exports with generous export financing, and subsidized rate wars occur periodically. An effort has been made through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to set limits on the level of subsidization, but witnesses from the Canadian business community told us they are still at a disadvantage internationally. Export financing is a costly undertaking, and Canada is not in a position to match the treasuries of larger nations. However, as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce pointed out,

While we may be unhappy with the expansion of subsidized export financing in the world, if we are going to be in the game, we have to recognize reality and provide competitive financing packages.(12)

A related question is what can be done to increase trade with developing countries. Canada conducts a much lower percentage of its trade with developing countries than do all other industrialized countries. There are historical and structural reasons for this discrepancy. Canada lacks the colonial and trading companies links with developing countries that some European competitors have. As a resource-based economy, Canada is in competition with the developing countries with respect to certain products. Finally, Canada lacks the industrial depth of economies like that of the United States and cannot so easily offer turn-key sales arrangements. Some Canadian firms are moving aggressively to fill this gap.

Before considering what might be done to promote Canadian sales to the Third World, we have to mention the debt burdens of most of these countries (although we discuss this issue in depth in Chapter 7). There is a direct relationship between the debts of Third World countries and Canada's trade. Put simply, they cannot afford to buy Canadian exports when so much of their money is devoted to repaying interest and principal. **One way to ease their foreign exchange problem would be to remove some of the barriers that restrict their exports to Canada. A second way is countertrade.** Also known as bartering, countertrade refers to transactions where the seller of a product receives other products in exchange rather than money. Canadian exporters have not had much experience with countertrade, primarily because of the relatively small volume of trade between Canada and developing countries. However, given that foreign exchange is likely to be scarce in many developing countries for some time into the future, Canadian exporters will need to become more familiar with the practice. The government can assist Canadian companies by serving as a focal point for collecting and disseminating information about countertrade opportunities and developments.



In considering Canadian exports to developing countries, it is also important to remember their diversity in terms of economic development. Countries like South Korea, Singapore, Brazil and Argentina, which are playing a growing role in the world economy, are targets of opportunity. At the other extreme are the world's poorest countries, which cannot do without official development assistance grants.

In the middle, however, are countries like India, China and Algeria, which have considerable economic potential but also face serious and persistent problems. Canada has been at a disadvantage in these markets because competitors are prepared to offer a sufficiently wide range of *crédit-mixte* financing—that is, a mix of commercial and concessional financing—in order to win contracts. The terms are more attractive than Canada can offer, and as a result other countries are awarded the contracts. Canada has never felt at ease mixing trade and aid because development objectives do not always fit well with commercial objectives. For instance, CIDA's mandate requires it to focus on the poorest of the developing countries, while commercial objectives would favour projects in the higher-income developing countries. Currently, CIDA and the Export Development Corporation provide mechanisms through which concessional financing is made available to Canadian exporters. The most recent federal budget cancelled CIDA's aid-trade facility, which would have set aside a certain volume of funds from increases in the aid program to be used to support development projects of interest to Canadian firms in developing countries.

We understand the reasons for trying to ensure that aid funds are not used in ways that reduce their effectiveness, especially during a time of restraint. However, Canada is losing important sales opportunities in major Third World markets because it is not willing to mix commercial and concessional financing to the same degree that many of its competitors do. In this regard, **the committee recommends that the government continue to review concessional export financing to ensure that Canadian exporters are not operating at a competitive disadvantage because of the financing practices of other countries.**

The increasing role of provincial governments in export promotion and development was also evident to the committee. Several provinces have established trade offices abroad, and it is increasingly common for provincial governments to sponsor trade missions as a way of identifying potential export markets. We regard this increased export promotion activity by other levels of government as an important new development that undoubtedly benefits Canadian exports. However, the trade missions being sent abroad are not co-ordinated in any way; this has led to some duplication of efforts. In addition, some confusion is created in the recipient countries because most are unitary states and may not grasp how trade promotion is handled in a federal state. **We believe that federal and provincial governments should co-ordinate their trade promotion activities better. An example of this type of co-operation and co-ordination already exists in an agreement between Quebec and the federal government with respect to immigration whereby the province places its officials in certain embassies on a cost-sharing basis. Provincial activities are co-ordinated with federal interests, although the officials are still responsible to their own government. The committee recommends that similar agreements and arrangements be concluded between federal and provincial governments with respect to trade promotion and development.**

We are enthusiastic about using municipal trade missions, cultural and educational exchanges, and twinning arrangements as building blocks for developing trade relations. Bringing together groups of business people and officials from a Canadian city with their counterparts from a foreign city is an excellent means of triggering intensely practical discussions, partly because the delegates on each side are

accustomed to doing business among themselves and are in a position to join forces in putting together package deals. Important areas of concern, such as municipal transit services and educational services, are opened up, together with opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses, which are not usually represented on higher profile international trade missions.

Twinning has long been regarded as an integral part of the trade strategies of Japanese cities. Canadian municipalities, however, are relative newcomers to export promotion and development and have tended to view twinning as a public relations gesture. There are encouraging signs of a change in attitude. The highly successful trade mission sent recently by the city of Toronto to Chongqing, China, with which Toronto is twinned, has given momentum to the awakening of Canadian cities to intriguing new commercial opportunities. **We are convinced that the most significant trade links are forged at the level where agreements to do business can be concluded. We believe that city-to-city ties are a dimension of international trade relations that offers exciting potential and should be pursued energetically.**

Although the Canadian economy is among the most open in the world and Canadians are successful exporters, there is a need to develop more aggressive traders in order to compete in the future. The level of economic literacy, especially with regard to exporting, is going to have to be increased. One way to accomplish this is to encourage secondary and post-secondary institutions to develop programs to train more young people in the various aspects of international trade. More important, however, is the need for corporations to hire young people and encourage them to develop international business experience by sending them abroad to work in foreign affiliates or subsidiaries. In particular, **companies that are awarded large contracts abroad and have received government assistance should employ a few recent graduates with the aim of building up the companies' and the country's supply of people with international business experience. For its part, the government should facilitate the compilation of a catalogue of opportunities for young Canadians to work abroad. There is an untapped supply of young people interested in such employment. The experience of working in a foreign country might well lead young Canadians to seek careers in international business and trade and help to build the foundation for a more aggressive approach to trade.**

## Trade Diversification

Any discussion of export development policies leads naturally to the question of what markets are most promising. **The committee believes that the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as one area that deserves greater public and private efforts.** In the 15 years since the last foreign policy review, economic growth in the countries of Asia and the Pacific has surpassed the performance of the world as a whole. The region is becoming a major centre of world economic activity. Canada, as a Pacific nation, is slowly beginning to recognize the importance of this region. In the words of one witness, Jan Walls of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada,

the Eurocentric world view held traditionally by Canadians will be expanded into a well-rounded world view by giving Asia and the Pacific a somewhat larger share of their attention. (51:55)

Canadians may not be fully aware of the extent of our links with this region, but a few statistics indicate how these relations have expanded. In 1982, for the first time, Canada's two-way trade over the Pacific Ocean was greater than its trade across the



Atlantic Ocean with Western Europe. A decade ago, immigration from the Pacific region surpassed that from Europe. This trend is unlikely to be reversed. One of the most important changes that has taken place in the international trading system has been the rise of several strong trading countries in the Asia-Pacific region. While the achievements of Japan and South Korea are widely known, it is not generally appreciated that India is now the ninth largest manufacturing country in the world and that Taiwan is Canada's third largest trading partner in the Pacific region.

The committee believes the region deserves greater Canadian recognition and concentration, but export success will depend upon developing different techniques and attitudes than are used in the traditional and more familiar markets of the United States and Western Europe. First, the cultures and languages represent a major challenge to Canadian exporters. In particular, the importance of personal connections cannot be underestimated because businesses in this region expect more personal service than their counterparts in North America. Second, it is costly to develop business contacts because travel is expensive and several trips may be needed to conclude a transaction. Third, Canada is a relative latecomer to recognizing the potential of the region. Combined with Canada's lack of historical ties, this means Canadian companies have to be prepared to face intense competition to win contracts.

**If Canada is to be successful in the Asia-Pacific region it will need to employ a layered approach to market development. One layer will consist of Canadian firms building all-important personal connections with potential Asian-Pacific customers.** To be successful corporations will have to hire people already familiar with the languages and cultures or implement training programs to develop these skills. The increasing number of immigrants coming to Canada from the countries of the region represent an untapped reservoir of skills. They and their children tend to be well educated professionals or experienced business people who maintain their connections with their home countries. For example, several Canadians of Chinese origin participated in the city of Toronto trade mission to Chongqing and proved enormously useful in helping the participants make valuable contacts. In a similar position are the foreign students from these countries attending Canadian universities. **Both groups could be used to promote trading links between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region by combining their first-hand experience of Canadian products and abilities with their connections in the region.**

A second layer will consist of the federal government working closely with Canadian companies to develop trading links with Asia-Pacific countries. This will mean providing competitive export financing as well as government marketing support based on the efforts of trade commissioners, ambassadors and occasional visits by ministers. The recent prime ministerial visit to several countries in the region was beneficial in raising Canada's profile in there. A Canadian trade strategy will have to recognize that the close relationship between business and government in these societies requires more co-operation between Canadian government officials, business leaders and business organizations.

Although it is essential to build an economic and political relationship, a third layer, based on cultural ties will be needed to put the relationship on a solid long-term footing. It is important to increase the mutual awareness of the diverse cultures surrounding the Pacific Ocean. This involves the development of personal contacts through exchange programs for students and adults from different backgrounds. There must also be broader dissemination of knowledge about these societies through educational programs and information services for business, the media and other interested people. The committee heard from the vice-president for academic and

cultural affairs of the newly established Asia Pacific Foundation and believes the Foundation is capable of fulfilling these needs, complementing the activities of other organizations (for example, the even newer Asia Pacific Business Institute and the Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin Economic Council) and stimulating activity in areas as yet untouched. The Foundation will be able to fulfil its objectives in a fashion similar to the Australia-Japan Foundation, which has proven to be a model of how to heighten cultural understanding between nations. We hope, however, that it will put its energy and resources at the service of local initiatives and avoid the pitfalls of programs that are too abstract and general to come to grips with the practical issues in the relations between Canada and Asia.

More native-born Canadians should be familiar with cultures and languages of the Far East. It was suggested to the committee that young Canadians could be sent abroad to teach English in appropriate Asian countries. Japan and other non-English speaking countries in the region are interested in increasing their knowledge of English but face a shortage of teachers. Canadians are in demand to teach English as a second language because they are considered to have a 'neutral' accent. **The committee urges the government to establish a program with Japan and other appropriate Asian countries to enable Canadian university graduate volunteers to teach English there.** A similar program has enabled Canadians to teach English in France since the end of World War II, and this could be a model for the program. The presence of Canadian teachers in these countries would increase awareness of Canada in a part of the world where it is not well known. More important, on their return to Canada, the volunteers should have developed language skills, local knowledge and perhaps even personal connections that would make them attractive employees for companies interested in developing commercial relations.

The absence of connections is not the only obstacle faced by Canadian companies in the Asia-Pacific region. Most of these countries have an impression of Canada as a giant quarry or a massive granary and do not appreciate its industrial and technological achievements. While recognizing the importance of agricultural and mineral resources, the committee believes there is a broad spectrum of opportunities for Canadian companies in the region, ranging from electronic goods to engineering to banking. Improving the visibility of Canadian expertise in the Asia-Pacific region is important and will require greater efforts and co-ordination by governments, companies and business associations.

In the dynamic and rapidly changing Asia-Pacific region there are several targets of opportunity. Japan must head the list, being by far Canada's largest trading partner in the region. There remain hurdles to overcome in selling manufactured exports to Japan, but the newest challenge is for Canadian companies to penetrate the burgeoning Japanese market for services. Korea, Canada's second largest overall trading partner in the region, has scored a great success in the Canadian market with the Hyundai *Pony*, and bilateral investment and trade between the two countries will likely increase in importance. Although the six countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Thailand—have recently suffered some reverses, the potential for expanded trade with them must also be regarded as considerable in the long run. Whether Canada's commercial relations with ASEAN benefit from that region's eventual cyclical upturn will depend, in considerable degree, on the business ties that are established now. Canada would also be well advised to adopt a more receptive attitude towards ASEAN's efforts to enhance market access for its exports—a subject now being studied by the North-South Institute (based in Ottawa) and an ASEAN counterpart, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.



The gradual opening of the Chinese economy to the rest of the world presents an emerging opportunity for Canada. The government of China appears determined to stimulate growth by encouraging the development of an economy that emphasizes a role for private enterprise. The prospect of gaining a foothold in a market of more than a billion people has set off a rush of trade missions to China from all over the developed world. In the intense competition to sell in China, Canada does have a slight advantage. Canadians are regarded favourably by the Chinese people, especially since Canada's recognition preceded, and may well have paved the way for, recognition by the United States.

Since the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1970, relations between Canada and China have expanded on a wide front. There have been numerous exchanges in the arts, science and technology, education, medicine, sports, the media, tourism, agriculture and industry. More than 1,000 Chinese students and scholars are currently attending universities and community colleges throughout Canada. There have also been several official visits in both directions, most notably the Prime Minister's recent trip to Peking, which included a meeting with the architect of China's economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping. A firm base has been constructed for what is expected to be a continuing expansion of economic relations. In particular, after a period of starts and stops, China is moving ahead with its economic development plans in the fields of energy, transport, communications and selective industrial modernization. Canadian companies are well equipped with the skills and experience necessary to contribute significantly to the realization of these plans.

China has given many indications that it is prepared to open its economy and society to the western world. This has been evident in its approach to Hong Kong, which is due to come under Chinese control in 1997. In its negotiations with the United Kingdom on this issue, China was prepared to grant a substantial degree of economic freedom to Hong Kong, maintaining its status as a major entrepôt for trade between China and the rest of the world.

There have also been signs of a slight moderation in China's policy on Taiwan. This provides an occasion to review Canada's relations with Taiwan, which is Canada's fifteenth largest export market in the world. Canada does not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan but, unlike many other countries in the same position, Canada has no mechanism to provide interested exporters with the normal government services such as market information and advice on documentation. Other countries conduct their bilateral relations with Taiwan through private sector trade offices, which are often administered by the national chamber of commerce. Witnesses suggested that the Canadian government, without making any change in its official position with respect to the People's Republic of China, might do the same. William Saywell, an authority on China, told us, "We have been at the extreme end of the cautious spectrum on having informal relationships with Taiwan." (51:73)

**The committee therefore recommends that the government encourage the Canadian private sector to establish an office in Taiwan to assist Canadian companies to develop business relations there. This can and should be done in a way that will not affect Canada's important relationship with the People's Republic of China.**

Among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region that are in danger of being overlooked, the committee believes India merits special consideration. There is a gap between the Canadian public's image of that country, conditioned by poverty and underdevelopment, and its actual accomplishments, abilities and potential. It is not generally known that India has emerged as a net food exporter in recent years. In

addition, it has a modern industrial sector that is the ninth largest in the world and a large sophisticated consumer market. India is perhaps the only major developing country that can afford to undertake major investments because it is not constrained by massive debt repayments, and it is expected to have one of the fastest growing economies over the next decade. By the turn of the century it is possible that Canada's relations with India will be more important than its relations with China. Moreover, Canada is able to draw upon a number of links with India to develop a more substantial relationship. Canada's official aid program has been at work in India for over 40 years, while Canadian missionaries have been active for much longer. India is Canada's fourteenth largest export market overall and is third after Japan and China in the region. Furthermore, India currently is the largest source country for immigrants entering this country. **We believe that the government should move energetically to build upon the connections between Canada and India to promote greater trade and investment between the two countries.**

Europeans first recognized Canada's trading potential, and the demands of the European market left an imprint on patterns of Canadian commercial activity that has still not disappeared. In the post-war period, the economy of the United States spurred the Canadian economy, and the predominance of intra-continental trade links was firmly established. As the century moves to its close, however, Canada may well encounter its most demanding test as a trader in the competitive drive of the peoples of Asia and in their challenging markets.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### Working for International Development

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Development co-operation is an area of foreign policy that draws Canada out into the world and enhances the country's reputation and independence. Canada's financial support and know-how are substantial; as a result, its views carry weight internationally. Development co-operation offers an ideal outlet for Canadians, the opportunity to make practical contributions to improving the lives of others, the chance to act responsibly while expressing themselves personally. We are particularly conscious of the benefits of young Canadians becoming involved in international development and thereby discovering early in their lives the practical utility of idealism.

The impulse of Canadians to co-operate with people in the Third World is long-established and powerful. Since Confederation Canadian churches and voluntary groups have worked to improve the quality of education and medical care in the Caribbean, Africa, India and other parts of the world. Beginning with the first conference on the Colombo Plan in 1950, all Canadian governments have been concerned to promote the economic and social development of the poorest countries in the world. Over the years various reasons have been offered for this activity, but essentially it comes down to this: it is right and it is in Canada's self-interest that all peoples should enjoy well-being and a decent standard of living.

Although the underlying principles of co-operation are simple, the relations between developed and developing countries are increasingly complex. The Third World has changed dramatically over the past 40 years and diversified to the point where no one term ('Third World' included) can convey the reality. The World Bank now differentiates between three categories of developing countries—low, middle and upper income. The latter group, often called the NICs (newly industrializing countries), includes some of the fastest growing, most competitive and dynamic economies in the world.

Important as these changes are, there is another abiding Third World reality: the persistence of mass poverty in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America. Though substantial progress has been made in some areas of development, including nutrition, literacy, and health care, hundreds of millions of people still lack the income to obtain basic food, shelter and clothing. The numbers threaten to grow in the next 20 years and to be concentrated more and more in huge cities of poverty around the world.



The dual reality of rapid Third World development and persistent poverty presents Canadians with a complex challenge. They must meet stiff new competition and participate in managing the world economy in ways that strengthen mutual interests. They must, at the same time, remain highly sensitive to the problem of world poverty and rededicate themselves to helping eliminate it.

## **Debt and Trade**

Nothing so clearly illustrates the growing interdependence of developing and developed countries as the international debt crisis of the 1980s. Substantial portions of the capital surpluses generated in OPEC countries by the sharp rise in energy prices in the 1970s were reinvested by the banks of Europe and North America in a relatively small number of the fastest growing, most credit-worthy developing countries in Asia and Latin America. These countries and their bankers assumed that the servicing and repayment of their rapidly accumulating debt would be financed easily out of earnings from continued economic growth and expanded world trade. Unfortunately the world economy refused to co-operate: the recession of the first half of the 1980s depressed the prices of many Third World products and sharply contracted their markets. Many of the debtors, primarily in Latin America, were left with obligations far exceeding their ability to pay.

The central fact to emerge from the committee's hearings is that the debt situation is not improving. On the contrary, the debts of the developing countries are in most cases continuing to increase. There is a growing realization that many of these debts are unlikely to be serviced in the future, let alone repaid. To avert a major crisis and massive human suffering, concerted action must be taken by all involved—the debtor nations, the creditor banks, the creditor countries and the international financial institutions.

The statistics are alarming. Total Third World debt is almost \$900 billion, about half of which is identified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as problem indebtedness—meaning that countries have had to reschedule their obligations or delay payments. Of the problem indebtedness, almost \$240 billion is owed to the international banking system; more than \$100 billion is held by U.S. banks. In the case of Canadian banks, it is estimated that they hold some \$20 billion of the problem indebtedness, concentrated in about 20 countries, with the major debtors being Latin American countries. To put this exposure in perspective, however, the best available information indicates that only about 10 per cent of total loans made by Canadian banks has been made to developing countries and 7 per cent to the countries of Latin America with problem indebtedness. These figures compare with 60 per cent of total Canadian bank lending being to domestic borrowers and 30 per cent to borrowers in other industrialized countries. Canadian banks, like U.S. banks, have more than their capital base outstanding to the larger debtor countries, and the percentage of loans to high-risk debtors held by Canadian banks is relatively greater than the percentage of high-risk loans held by U.S. banks.

The burden of servicing the debt is onerous. The volume of debt as a proportion of gross domestic product for Latin American debtors is 56 per cent overall, while payments of interest and principal as a proportion of export earnings last year averaged over 60 per cent. These are alarming figures. Although the total amounts owed by the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa are much smaller, the burden of debt they face is relatively greater. Moreover, they depend heavily on income from commodity exports, the demand for which continues to be depressed.

Since 1982, a crisis in the international financial system has been avoided by rescheduling debt payments and interest charges and by providing \$326 billion in new capital. Rescheduling has been accompanied by stringent conditions imposed on debtors by the International Monetary Fund to bring about economic adjustments through restructuring and austerity. John Loxley told the committee that these conditions are harsh and inappropriate and involve a sharp contraction of imports:

This contraction of imports has led to very high rates of unemployment; excess capacity; tremendous austerity, in terms of cut-backs in real wages and consumption; reduced living standards, generally; and a terrible burden of adjustment on certain sections of society in these countries. In particular, there is growing concern with what these kinds of adjustments are doing to the health and welfare of children. (23:43)

To make matters worse, the banks, overcome with 'debt fatigue', have reached pessimistic conclusions about the credit-worthiness of their borrowers. During the past two years lending of new money has dried up almost completely. In many cases this has led to net capital outflows from countries desperately in need of capital for development.

In addition to the capital outflows generated by governments repaying their debts, another form of capital outflow occurs when private individuals transfer personal funds to more secure economies. In countries like Argentina and Mexico, these transferred funds represent an important foreign exchange drain. Military expenditures also add to the debt problems of some countries. Two countries that have experienced the flight of private capital—Argentina and the Philippines—are also facing debts incurred as a result of large purchases of military equipment by former dictatorships.

Whatever the source of their debt problems, many countries see little prospect in the near future of regaining even the levels of national income they enjoyed five or six years ago. The question is how long debtor countries with depressed economies can or will keep paying such large proportions of their export earnings to service their debts. And what will be the costs in human suffering? In political stability?

A 1984 report of the Commonwealth Secretariat group of experts urged an end to premature outflows of resources from developing countries; additional financing; more flexible rescheduling arrangements; a preservation of the domestic and international financial system, but no bail-outs for the banks; and a larger role for direct foreign investment in developing countries. Emphasizing the situation in the low-income developing countries, especially in Africa, the group warned that there was a danger the emergency solutions for the big debtors risked "crowding out the poorest countries from official financing" and that substantial increases in official development assistance were needed. Their report urged the international financial institutions to play a much larger role. In addition the Organization for African Unity, speaking for the sub-Saharan African debtors, is looking for increased forgiveness of loans and grants and reschedulings.

**We are concerned that the often tough measures imposed on many of the debtor countries in order to manage the debt problem cannot long continue without resulting in a major crisis. The economic difficulties facing a number of developing countries place intolerable strains on their people and on democratic governments. We perceive an urgent need for measures designed to promote economic recovery and development in the debtor countries.**

The proposals of U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker in October 1985 are a useful first step. The Baker plan suggests that the World Bank should increase its lending to the

principal debtor countries in the next three years by \$27 billion and that commercial banks should increase their lending to 15 designated debtor countries by about \$20 billion over the same period. The emphasis is on promoting measures in the debtor countries that will lead to growth rather than depression, and the World Bank has been urged to play a new and stronger role in promoting adjustments in Third World economies.

The governments of the industrialized countries and the banking community have supported the Baker plan although, as David Hilton of the Bank of Nova Scotia told the committee,

Some economists ... suggest that the whole plan is underfinanced, that even if the \$40 billion is added to the financial flows to the developing world, these borrowers are not going to be appreciably better off in three years' time than they will today, and they will still be facing large debt service bills, particularly if the new ... policy is to pursue growth related objectives, because that means their import bill will go up. (23:40-41)

The Baker proposals are regarded by developing debtor countries as a positive idea but insufficient. The Cartagena Consensus, the response to the proposals by a group of 11 heavily indebted Latin American countries, called for significant changes in loan agreements, particularly lower interest rates; increased capital flows to the region and the separation of present debt from future debt; a possible ceiling on debt service payments relative to export earnings; a substantial increase in the resources available to the multilateral development agencies with a 'containment' of the conditionality they impose; and elimination of protectionist measures that restrict access for the regions' exports. The beginnings of useful dialogue are under way, but the Baker proposals need to be developed and refined.

Basic to the Baker plan is continuation of the established procedure of dealing with debtor countries on a case-by-case basis. This approach has left debtor countries feeling beleaguered in unproductive adversary relationships with creditors during negotiations. The approach takes into account the fact that every debtor country has its own characteristics, but it has failed to cope with the severity and scale of the debt crisis. As the Commonwealth Secretariat report pointed out,

The message is clear. The present situation is not sustainable. The world's financial safety is on a knife-edge ... There is no room for complacency. We sense rather that a recognition of the gravity of the issues and of the dangers posed by the debt crisis in an interdependent world is growing. (13)

The crisis is not self-correcting, and the banking system is severely strained. General principles governing debt management need to be elaborated. The new techniques of debt relief suggested by the debtor and creditor groups need to be evaluated, including such technical devices as multi-year instead of annual rescheduling, writing down debt, stretching out maturities, abolition of commission fees, linkage between debt repayment schedules and export earnings, lower interest rates, and interest capitalization. To explore these and other proposals, **the committee considers that a conference organized at the intergovernmental level, and including representatives of the debtor and creditor countries, the banks, and the international financial institutions, is urgently required. Recognizing the seriousness of this crisis, which affects developing and developed countries alike, the government of Canada should press member countries in the OECD and elsewhere to support such a conference.**

Increased direct foreign investment in developing countries is another, albeit long-term, measure that could improve the debtor countries' situation. Many Third World



countries have restrictions on foreign investment, fearing that they will lose control of their industry, but they would be wise to recognize that the management know-how and technology transfer usually accompanying such investment can often help their future development. At present, multinational companies in industrialized countries are wary of taking the political and financial risks involved; foreign investment in many countries has therefore decreased. But the World Bank recognizes this and is launching a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency to reverse this trend; its International Finance Corporation is also encouraging equity investment in developing regions.

Regional approaches to debt management are also required. The low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, owe their debts mainly to foreign governments and international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank rather than to commercial banks, as is the case for Latin American countries. Other African countries have added to their borrowings by being the recipients of export credits. Considering the desperate situation arising from the African famine, some degree of debt forgiveness will undoubtedly be required for the poorest African countries. **We urge the government to be especially attentive to the needs of African countries and to support, in the Paris Club and elsewhere, approaches to debt management that will assist in recovery from the famine. We commend the decision of the government, announced at the May 1986 special session of the United Nations General Assembly, to declare a 15-year moratorium on repayment of government loans to poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We also consider it desirable that the government contemplate extending the moratorium to Export Development Corporation loans to the same countries.**

The Baker proposal that the World Bank finance increased structural adjustment efforts by middle-income debtor countries will require larger resources for the World Bank. **The committee notes with approval that the government of Canada has indicated it would consider increased World Bank funding. We also support improved co-ordination between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with the objective of ensuring that short-term adjustment measures are supportive of longer-term economic recovery and development.**

At present, debt management is the single most critical issue in economic relations between developed and developing countries. In the longer run, however, finance is only half of the equation: the other half is trade. If the indebted developing countries are to grow and pay even a portion of their debts, they must greatly expand their export earnings. This requires, above all else, the recovery of economic growth in the industrialized democracies and improved access to their markets.

There is no question that the industrialized countries have an interest in encouraging such trade. Apart from the repayment of debts to their private banks, they now find major markets for their own products in the Third World. Some 39 per cent of Japanese, 36 per cent of U.S. and 46 per cent of European exports go to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Canada is a notable exception, with only about 10 per cent of its exports going to developing countries. Even so, the North-South Institute has concluded that between 1981 and 1983, the effect, in terms of lost jobs, of \$1 billion in lost export markets in just four Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela—was “clearly huge and Canada-wide”. (*Review 84, Outlook 85*, p. 3).

Notwithstanding the mutual interests involved, the expansion of north-south trade faces some formidable obstacles. The main difficulty is protectionism. There has been a long-standing practice in international trade of granting preferential tariffs to developing countries, but their significance has diminished with the general reduction of tariffs and the rise of non-tariff barriers. It is these barriers that impede the exports of



developing countries, particularly in sectors that are vital to them, such as shoes and textiles. Canada's own record in this regard is anything but exemplary. Canadian governments have tolerated sometimes flagrant policy contradictions by promoting industrial development in the Third World through the aid program while at the same time blocking the Third World exports necessary to finance that development.

The current situation seems to be a combination of steps forward and steps backward. The government has removed most shoe import quotas, except for those on women's and children's shoes. This government initiative is a heartening sign of a new approach to encouraging the development of exports from the Third World. On the other hand Canada appears to be acquiescing in a renegotiation of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (governing clothing and textile trade), which will be even more severe than the existing agreement in restricting new entrants. This means, in effect, that the newly industrializing countries, with their stronger economies and established market links, will hold their market shares against much poorer countries like Bangladesh struggling to break into the trade. **We urge the government of Canada to press the case for the poorest developing countries obtaining increased quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. At the same time, it is imperative that Canada develop effective worker retraining, alternative employment opportunities and industrial restructuring and modernization initiatives that would allow it to support a phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in favour of exposing the textile and clothing trade to normal GATT rules.** To the extent that Canada resists trade liberalization, it raises the cost to Canadians of these products and impedes the growth of markets for its own products in the Third World.

The industrialized countries have their own list of legitimate grievances and demands concerning the trading practices of some developing countries. The most important of these is the reluctance of the more successful developing countries to 'graduate' from preferential arrangements to the full, liberalized régime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. One consequence of this refusal, as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement illustrates, is the denial of preferential trading opportunities to the poorest developing countries. **We support the policy of encouraging clearly qualified newly industrializing countries to graduate from preferential arrangements in the GATT designed for lower-income developing countries.**

## Development Assistance

In the 1950s and '60s, international development co-operation was focused on aid programs, while in the 1970s and since, the centre of attention has shifted to international economic relations. One witness before the committee put it bluntly: "For the developing world, in general, our trade and economic policies are vastly more important than our aid programs." (21:7) We think such statements may go too far and run the risk of underestimating the considerable importance of aid, particularly where Canadian policy is concerned.

Altogether, aid or development assistance contributes only 13 per cent of Third World investment, but it is a major contributor to financing the development of some of the world's poorest countries, particularly in Africa. It is also a major source of technical assistance, which remains a vital requirement of many developing countries. In the case of Canada, whose trading relations with developing countries are a comparatively small part of total trade, official development assistance (ODA) is a major element, arguably the major element, in north-south policy. More than that, it is a Canadian vocation.

In travelling across the country we discovered that the desire of Canadians to help others through development co-operation seems stronger and more widespread today than it has ever been in our country's history. The spirit of that co-operation was conveyed by Adrian Van Ekris, chairman of the project committee of Farmers Helping Farmers, in testifying before the committee in Charlottetown. He described the origins of the project in a 1979 farm exchange consultation:

We had delegates on Prince Edward Island from 30 different developing countries and we had a meeting for a whole week with them. In the evenings we as farmers took them all home to our own houses, so that we had a close dialogue with them in the evenings, to get first hand information from these people.

In the meeting I had a big surprise. The people from the third world came to learn from us but we learned from them also. Sometimes I could not even cope with the things that were going on in the world. I was on my farm and I thought: do not bother me, I am getting along all right. If you really look at yourselves, I think you will see that this kind of self interest which I had is in all of us. But I think we have to feel more concern for each other, not only in Canada but also around the globe. (31:15)

Like all vocations, development assistance needs continual renewal and a rediscovered sense of purpose from time to time. What began as the actions of individuals and religious orders has now developed into more than 200 voluntary Canadian organizations providing an enormous variety of assistance to people in the Third World. Aid has grown into official development assistance, a multi-billion dollar system of large national and international bureaucracies. In 1951 Canada contributed \$10 million in food aid to India; in 1986 Canada will spend over \$2 billion on ODA in dozens of countries around the world. With growth have come accomplishments, but also questions, criticisms and self-doubt. Now is a good time to confront the questions.

### ***The Volume of Aid***

As part of the program of reduced government expenditures, the Minister of Finance announced in his February 1986 budget that the ratio of official development assistance to gross national product (the common international measure of a country's commitment to development) would remain at the 0.5 per cent level for the remainder of the decade. This decision involved postponing achievement of the 0.7 per cent target, proposed by the Pearson Commission in 1969, until the year 2000. At the 0.5 per cent level, actual aid expenditures will continue to grow as the Canadian economy grows, but the rate of growth will be substantially lower than it would have been. In dollar terms, and ignoring adjustments for inflation and the growth of the economy, the \$8 billion spent on development assistance during the past five years is likely to rise to more than \$12 billion in the next five years. At current levels, Canada is seventh among donor countries, after the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and France.

In postponing its own previously adopted targets, the government has repeated a decade-old pattern of Canadian aid policy. In 1975, as part of its five-year *Strategy for International Development Co-operation*, the government of the day reaffirmed its "determination to achieve the official UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP and to move towards this target by annual increases in the proportion of ODA to GNP". Despite this undertaking, over the next five years the ratio dropped steadily, from 0.56 per cent in 1975 to 0.42 per cent in 1980. It was not until 1984 that 0.5 per cent was achieved once again.

Committee members reacted to this situation in a variety of ways. A majority thinks that the goal of achieving the 0.7-per cent target by 1990 should be restored. Other members felt that inasmuch as the government has a fiscal plan in place, the government should undertake the restoration of such aid only if government revenues support such action. Some favoured adopting a goal of 1.0 per cent beyond 1990.

Although committee members have different priorities and preferences, all regret the slowing of aid growth because, as Peter Kilburn, a member of the business community, reminded us, "in the end, the best test of our commitment is the volume of assistance we are willing to deliver." (21:11) Bearing in mind Canada's history in meeting aid targets, we conclude that what is required are ambitious but attainable goals, as well as realistic plans to meet them.

Although witnesses raised the question of the quantity of aid, most were more concerned about enhancing its quality. On this point as well, the committee agrees that priority should be given to improving the effectiveness of Canadian aid, and it is to this question that we now turn.

### *The Purpose of Aid*

A substantial number of witnesses voiced the concern that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) lacks a clear sense of direction because it is pushed and pulled by political and commercial pressures. Bernard Wood, director of the North-South Institute, which has conducted detailed studies of the aid program, observed to the committee:

Canadians are not sure what aid programs have been doing and they have been right to wonder. Our studies and others have demonstrated that we and other donors have loaded impossible burdens onto our aid programs. We have made them much less effective than they could be, and sometimes even more harmful than beneficial. (21:8)

The most frequently expressed concern is the fear that the Canadian aid program is being converted into a trade promotion vehicle. Those who express this criticism acknowledge that trade promotion is a vital function, but insist that it is fundamentally different in its aims and methods from development assistance. In his brief to the committee, Michael Lubbock, former director of the Canadian Association for Latin America, distinguished the two according to their time horizons:

If aid is given to the third world in a way which strikes at the extreme destitution of the poorest, bringing them out of their present economic isolation and enabling them to sell, and therefore to buy, new customers for Canadian products will appear... [But] this means accepting that an increase in customers will take time to materialize. Any projects which seek short-term benefits for the Canadian economy must be considered part of 'trade development' and not of aid. (2)

We think it essential to clarify this matter of purpose by relating development assistance to the operations of the international economic system. By and large trade and finance operate in ways that are blind to international economic inequalities and mass poverty. Private bank loans, for example, are extended least often to the poorest countries, which are also the highest risks. Development assistance is one of the few international instruments for counteracting the tendency towards haves and have-nots and for promoting the development of the poorest regions and countries of the world. At a time of Africa's precarious recovery from the massive devastation of famine and painfully slow progress in the worldwide struggle against poverty, it is vital that



development assistance be rededicated to its primary purpose. Accordingly **the committee affirms that meeting the needs of the poorest countries and peoples should remain the primary and overriding objective of the Canadian aid program. Because women are economically vulnerable, we recommend that direct assistance to women in developing countries be given priority.**

### *The Effectiveness of Aid*

Apart from worries about the aid program's uncertainty of purpose, a number of witnesses raised serious questions about its effectiveness. Ed Cayer, who has served in senior capacities at CIDA and for many years as a development consultant, described the durability of underlying problems:

In 1977 when I went to CIDA, I assumed the position of Director General of Bilateral Operations. I was responsible for the follow-up to be given to the Auditor General's observations. At CIDA the systems simply did not work. There was a tremendous blockage simply because everything was done on an ad hoc basis. So I am back at CIDA now, some 10 years later, and what I see is an agency that has far more systems but is not getting ahead very much faster. (31:42)

Peter Kilburn was one of several witnesses who warned that control and accountability systems may themselves be a major source of the bureaucratization and slowing down of aid delivery. To minimize these problems, he suggested that responsibility for design and management of capital projects be transferred when practical from CIDA to developing countries. (21:12) Other witnesses argued that decentralizing people and authority from CIDA headquarters to the field was the single most important step towards a more effective aid program. The committee received still other evidence that a shift to a less project-oriented aid program is called for, particularly in the lowest-income countries, where many projects have failed for want of continuing local support and servicing.

CIDA has made considerable progress in recent years in meeting some of these concerns. For example, the average length of time required to launch a project has been reduced. Some of the constraints that remain are not of CIDA's making. A considerable part of the aid program is tied to the procurement of Canadian goods and services. Although this often results in the provision of first-class assistance, there are cases where tying distorts the purpose and reduces the value and effectiveness of aid. Conversely, there may be types of tying, such as lines of credit, that serve the purposes of aid far better. We think it is important to maintain Canadian content but essential that procurement not be allowed to distort or detract from development.

**The issue of aid effectiveness cannot be addressed properly without discussing the vital role of women in the development process. The development community has only recently begun to understand this crucial issue. Development experts argue that tied aid is a major constraint in meeting the dual goals of aiding the poorest people and integrating women into the development process. Women are often the farmers, the providers of health care, the unofficial heads of households. It is absolutely essential that they be consulted on appropriate development technologies. CIDA has begun to implement a policy framework called Women in Development. The committee recommends that the government provide sufficient funds and staff to allow CIDA to implement the Women in Development policy framework and to achieve its stated targets.**

The question arising from our hearings was what means exist to evaluate the effectiveness of aid. The question has been asked before and answered with an array of



bureaucratic procedures. Christopher Bryant of Canadian University Service Overseas remarked, "We have obviously not yet found the most effective way [to promote international development] but we are learning what works and what does not work." (21:14) We believe that the basic requirement is just that, to open up the possibilities for learning. We received information that CIDA evaluations may sometimes be less independent of Agency control than they should be. As well, Canada is less inclined than a number of other donor countries—in particular, the United States—to make public its evaluations of aid projects. At present, evaluation reports are open to examination by Members of Parliament at CIDA headquarters on a confidential basis. Although we recognize the sensitivity of some of the material in these reports, we believe that CIDA would benefit from greater public access to aid evaluations.

International sharing of the lessons of development and co-operation among aid donor countries are requirements for strengthening the overall performance of aid. **Official development assistance is still hobbled by the sometimes parochial and self-seeking nature of national aid programs. An example of this, which is by now part of development lore, concerns the 15 different and incompatible types of irrigation pumps supplied by aid donors to Kenya. We recommend that Canada press for closer co-operation among aid donors and remain a strong supporter of multilateral approaches and institutions that encourage such co-operation. In general, we affirm the Canadian tradition of treating multilateral and bilateral aid channels as complementary and mutually reinforcing.**

We did not conduct an in-depth evaluation of the Canadian aid program. That task is being carried out by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. As the Committee defines its work program, we urge careful examination of several issues we have identified but not resolved. How can the administrative burden associated with aid be reduced? To what extent and in what ways can people and authority be transferred to the field? How can the costs associated with tied aid be reduced and the benefits to developing countries increased? How can people, from aid experts to the Canadian public, participate more effectively in improving the quality of Canada's development assistance?

### *Partnership*

Canadian development assistance is a partnership between government, volunteers, the private sector and the Canadian people. In 1968 the government established a program to provide support for development work by voluntary organizations (known collectively as NGOs—non-governmental organizations). Over the years, the program has grown dramatically in size and scope; the Special Programs Branch of CIDA now responds to and encourages initiatives by both voluntary and profit-oriented organizations. It supports between 3,500 and 4,000 projects annually, including more than 1,500 private sector initiatives, in over 100 countries. Its total budget approaches \$200 million a year.

There is and should be far more to the partnership than financial support. It is equally important for NGOs to make their expertise available to CIDA and for CIDA, in consultation with the NGOs, to suggest types of activity and geographic areas where the efforts of voluntary organizations are most needed. As envisaged by the 'country focus' plan introduced in the early 1980s, **non-governmental organizations, both voluntary and business, should be involved to the maximum extent possible in the planning and execution of Canada's official development assistance programs. They should, in fact, constitute the heart of expanded and revitalized technical assistance programs.**

To this end new capabilities and mechanisms may well be required. Throughout our hearings we met volunteers, representatives of voluntary organizations and officers of associations grouping members of the NGO community. The message we heard was a blend of enthusiasm and commitment mixed with sober realism and self-criticism. During our meetings in Charlottetown, which were devoted in large part to volunteers in development, Garry Webster summarized the strengths of NGOs: their grass roots base, their concern with full human development not just economic growth, their idealism, expertise and willingness to go beyond ideology in seeking to help people. But he also acknowledged the limitations and weaknesses of some NGOs when he observed:

There are some voluntary agencies whose work overseas I could criticize ... First and foremost, I guess, the characteristic of band aid; that is the characteristic of going in and throwing dollars or food aid or clothing aid or any other number of material benefits at people without taking the careful effort to establish ... that local people are not capable of providing these resources through their own efforts. (31:20)

We were informed that the impulse of CIDA to involve voluntary organizations in development planning has weakened somewhat and that the reason for this lies partly with NGOs themselves. According to one analysis, as fund-raising affiliates of international voluntary organizations, many Canadian NGOs have no field representatives of their own in the Third World. As a consequence they have failed to develop their capacity to gather, analyze and make sense of their development experience. We believe that the Canadian aid program needs the closest collaboration of voluntary organizations. **To encourage partnership in the field it has been suggested that the government and voluntary organizations should establish 'development offices' in developing countries where Canada has aid programs but no embassy or in regions of developing countries remote from the capital and the Canadian embassy. Development offices would offer non-diplomatic functional support bases for both official development assistance and voluntary organizations. We urge the government and voluntary organizations jointly to consider this proposal and other practical measures for strengthening their partnership.**

To finance their development activities around the world, Canadian non-governmental organizations raise substantial amounts of money through voluntary contributions from the public. These funds are in turn the basis for matching grants from CIDA. The vast majority of NGOs fully deserve the trust and confidence placed in them by Canadians. Organizations sometimes pop up, however, to ride waves of public concern and generosity for their own benefit. One or two established organizations have been known to support inappropriate political activities in the Third World. CIDA has the means to monitor these situations for the purpose of awarding grants and has reduced or terminated matching grants when that was clearly warranted. The voluntary community, for its part, is fully aware of the importance of maintaining public confidence. The committee sees an expanded role for NGOs in the future of the Canadian aid program and for that very reason we urge both CIDA and the voluntary organizations to remain alert to the rare violations of public trust, bring them to public attention, and take effective remedial action.

It is equally important to strengthen the private sector side of the development partnership in Canada. Many of the poorest developing countries want and need practical, hands-on business experience, particularly as they turn increasingly towards market-oriented economies. Canada should encourage this trend by facilitating co-operation between its own business community and those gradually emerging in the Third World. We think it particularly important to promote links between small and medium-sized firms, the grass roots of entrepreneurial activity.



Small firms are most likely to be indigenous to developing countries, labour-intensive, and scattered throughout the country, rather than concentrated in major cities. They are the most appropriate vehicles for economic development in many poor countries, but they face major impediments, including lack of access to capital and expertise. They are also far less likely than larger enterprises to have international connections. Canadian non-governmental organizations like CESO (Canadian Executive Service Overseas) are doing important work in this area, but we think it important for Canada to provide additional help.

**The committee received a proposal for establishing a Canadian Industrial Co-operation Agency and we commend it for further consideration by the government and the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. In essence such an agency would provide the means for small and medium-sized Canadian companies to assist their counterparts in the Third World in a variety of ways, including management contracts, technical agreements and joint ventures. An example of the sort of project the agency might support is the 'Industrial Incubator' approach of Fanshawe College in London, Ontario. Designed to provide skills training to small businesses during their first three years of operation, the program has been applied successfully in Ontario and is now reaching out to the eastern Caribbean. The agency proposal, presented by Michael Lubbock in an appendix to his brief, acknowledges that these kinds of projects are supported by CIDA's Industrial Co-operation Division, but goes on to argue that the job demands "not only an examination of facts and figures but an intuitive flair; and this can only come from people who have spent many years dealing with new projects and have long practical experience". (2) The proposed agency would take over the functions of CIDA's Industrial Co-operation Division and be run by experienced business people.**

## **Foreign Students**

The committee was impressed by the volume of submissions it received from the university community on the question of foreign students in Canada. Substantial briefs were submitted by a number of Canadian university presidents, by representatives of university teachers and students, and by education-related organizations.

The focus of their concern is that in recent years seven of the ten provinces have instituted higher fees for foreign students studying at Canadian universities than for Canadian students—in some cases more than 10 times higher. The actions of provincial governments and universities in instituting increased fees for foreign students are not difficult to understand. Faced with rising costs and an influx of foreign students in the mid-1970s, and reacting to the fact that, since 1975, increases in federal per capita educational transfers to the provinces for post-secondary education have made no financial provision for the considerable increases in the numbers of foreign students that have occurred since then, provinces turned to differential fees as a cost-recovery measure in a period of financial restraint.

There is considerable variation in the fees charged. Ontario and Quebec have the highest fees, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan do not charge differential fees for foreign students, and British Columbia exempts graduate students. The case has been made that these fees have caused the current decline in the number of foreign students in Canadian universities (from 36,000 in 1982-83 to 33,500 in 1984-85). This decline has been uneven, however. Ontario, with the largest number of foreign students, had a significant decline (20.5 per cent) in the past two years. One province with no differential fees saw a drop in the registration of foreign students, while another province that does impose fees saw the numbers increase.

Canada's receptivity to foreign students is high by international standards. Throughout the world it is estimated that one million students are on the move, taking part in higher education in a foreign country. Canada is one of the top five destinations and together with France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, takes about 60 per cent of all foreign students.

Foreign students make up about five per cent of Canada's total university enrolment. The concentration of foreign students is particularly high at the doctoral level where they account for over 25 per cent of total enrolment. In a few universities it would be difficult to sustain some graduate courses—such as engineering, where foreign students constitute 50 per cent of enrolment—if these students were to drop out.

Although there are students from many countries of the world in Canadian universities, about 50 per cent come from the United States, Hong Kong and Malaysia. In many of these latter instances, students may be attracted to Canadian universities because the fees are lower than those in their own countries, or because they see attendance at Canadian universities as a first step on the way to emigrating to Canada.

Various scholarship programs are offered by CIDA, the International Development Research Centre and the Department of External Affairs for more than 3,500 non-Canadians to study in Canada. A program for Commonwealth students was recently increased to 500 places, and at the recent summit of leaders of *La Francophonie* the government of Canada announced plans for a new companion scholarship plan for francophone foreign students. In addition a few provinces offer scholarship programs; Quebec's is the most extensive.

In the submissions and testimony, the present policy towards foreign students was described as "confused", "complex", "inequitable" and "educational protectionism". The federal government was urged to take a leadership role in replacing the confusing mix of federal, provincial and institutional policies for foreign students by a coherent national approach. Recommendations to the committee included the elimination of differential fees—or, if the fees are retained, that they be used to give financial assistance to competent foreign students unable to afford the fees; the provision of a scholarship program for full funding for up to 10,000 students from countries identified as important partners in Canada's external relations; or a similar program for students from the 25 (or 40) poorest countries.

The issues surrounding the question of foreign students are not simple. Witnesses advocating proposals for increased support for foreign students in Canadian universities told us that these students bring short- and long-term benefits for Canada and Canadians. Specifically, they suggested that the presence of foreign students enriches Canada culturally; they enhance the quality of university life and contribute to particular courses, such as area studies programs, as well as to university research generally, given the large numbers at the graduate level; their attendance at Canadian universities constitutes a form of assistance to developing countries; their presence in Canadian universities helps repay an education debt incurred by Canadian students who have studied abroad; the knowledge acquired by foreign students of Canada and its products allows them later to act as an unofficial trade sales force for Canada in their own countries; the education of foreign students helps improve Canada's image in the world community and its relationships with particular groups of countries; and foreign university students may contribute substantial amounts to the Canadian economy with their expenditures over and above tuition fees.

These claims are not uncontested. Pointing to the high concentration of foreign students in certain parts of the country, in certain universities and in certain academic



programs, the 1984 Commission on Canadian Studies reported that this imbalance was defeating one of the chief benefits for Canadian students, namely the opportunity to gain an international dimension from their university experience through personal contact with foreign students. Moreover, the mix of foreign students can also cause problems. The Commission report stated that an influx of a substantial number of foreign students from one country to one university can lead to the creation of “academic, psychological and social ghettos”.

It has been pointed out that even with the differential fees, Canadian taxpayers are still carrying a part of the cost of educating foreign students. Some also argue that the high number of foreign students in certain courses and institutions makes it difficult for Canadian students to gain admission. Others, basing their arguments on a detailed Australian government study of foreign students, are sceptical of the claim that foreign students represent a net economic benefit to Canada through their fees and living expenditures.

Finally, the committee was made aware that support for foreign students to come to Canada raises questions abroad. Some developing countries fear that developed countries like Canada are draining off their most promising youth and that such students, if they return home at all, will be culturally alienated. Also, some Third World governments have indicated that they would prefer to have Canada’s assistance in expanding and enriching their own educational facilities; others that have their own universities are dismayed when their students express a preference to pursue their undergraduate studies in Canada or elsewhere abroad.

**We believe that foreign students constitute an important asset for Canada that has not been sufficiently recognized in terms of improving trade opportunities, increasing cultural contacts and more generally for foreign policy.** Foreign students could, on their return to their countries of origin, be hired to represent Canadian firms, bringing advantages to both sides. The committee shares the conclusion of the Ministerial Task Force on Program Review, which recently surveyed the situation of foreign students on scholarship in Canada.

The attendance of significant numbers of foreign students in Canadian universities reinforces the image of Canada as an open and sensitive society and can strengthen its international standing. However, if the conditions imposed upon these students are seen to be intolerable it can become both negative and harmful. (*Education and Research*, p. 260)

We appreciate that the issues are complex and that provincial governments have a large responsibility for post-secondary education. We agree with W.A. Mackay, president of Dalhousie University, who said what is needed is

a uniform national policy regarding foreign student fees and assistance to them [to] be adopted jointly by federal and provincial governments to replace what we...consider to be an inappropriate and confusing array of current policies. (33:33)

We are happy to note that the Council of Ministers of Education recognized, in an unusual step taken at its May 1986 meeting, that the federal government has a role in matters relating to foreign students “in post-secondary educational institutions, ranging from their entry to Canada to their potential importance in foreign relations.” **We recommend that the federal government prepare a statement of national goals and objectives as they relate to foreign students, and we would encourage the provinces to state their goals and objectives in this area. These statements should then be used as the basis for discussion at a First Ministers’ Conference, with the aim of promoting the greatest possible harmony between federal and provincial goals and objectives.**

If Canada's role in providing education to students from developing countries is to be appreciated properly abroad, it should be worked out in concert with them. **We were impressed by arguments that Third World countries need to develop their own institutions of higher education. At the same time, it is not feasible for them to establish a full range of graduate studies. We recommend that Canada's assistance be concentrated in the graduate field.**

An area relevant to foreign students that does fall solidly within federal jurisdiction is immigration procedures. We heard distressing accounts of delays in processing visa applications, strict limitations on foreign students taking summer or part-time jobs and, in cases where they do receive permission to work, requirements that foreign students pay into the unemployment insurance fund and the Canada Pension Plan even though they are not eligible for benefits. As part of the overall review of the foreign student question that is now taking place, we urge that these practices be examined and that those restrictions deemed unnecessary be eliminated.



# CHAPTER EIGHT

## Promoting Human Rights

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**We want to affirm what so many Canadians proclaimed before the committee: that the international promotion of human rights is a fundamental and integral part of Canadian foreign policy.** It is a vital and natural expression of Canadian values. Moreover, the promotion of human rights is in conformity with the international legal rights and obligations that Canada has accepted freely, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The effective promotion of human rights internationally faces many challenges and practical obstacles. It is rejected in some quarters as unacceptable interference in the affairs of sovereign states. We insist, on the contrary, that the behaviour of governments, like that of individuals, is subject to universal values. It is not interference to pass judgement on a government's conduct and to adjust relations with that government accordingly. Actions such as terminating aid or trading relations are exactly the opposite of intervention in the internal affairs of another country.

The promotion of human rights has been attacked by others as a disguised attempt to shift the international agenda away from the problems of poverty and economics. This is certainly not our intention, as the earlier discussion of international development makes clear. We believe with the Canadian Council of Churches that "basic needs—food, water, shelter—[are also] inviolable rights, without which it is impossible for human beings to sustain life." (34) This is why we reaffirmed help to the poorest people and countries as the primary purpose of the Canadian aid program. Of equal importance, we affirm Canada's support for collective as well as individual rights, including the rights of workers and women and of religious and cultural minorities. We strongly endorse the argument of Edward Ratushny that Canada should refuse to choose either individual or collective rights over the other. "We should simply take the position that all rights are important, and there is no reason why individual rights have to be detracted from in order to support collective rights." (25:36)

Apart from the need to clarify its meaning and purpose, human rights policy faces a number of practical obstacles, not least of which is the absence of any agreed-upon enforcement mechanism. It is essential that human rights policy combine an adherence to principle with respect for careful procedure and practical results, the object being actually to relieve injustice. In considering the instruments available to promote human rights internationally, we think it useful to make a distinction between *protecting*



human rights and *developing* human rights. Whereas the former is concerned primarily with identifying, exposing and censuring human rights abuses, the latter attempts to strengthen those institutions and values that provide the only longer-run assurance that human rights will be respected.

## Human Rights Protection

The main tradition in human rights policy is that of seeking to expose and, in one way or other, to end human rights violations. We believe that such an approach remains necessary and, indeed, in the case of Canada, should be made more vigorous. At the same time, we caution that the effectiveness of this approach is limited and that it depends on its international credibility. Among the necessary elements in a human rights protection policy are standards, credible investigation and sanctions.

As witnesses testified before the committee, the international promotion of human rights is exposed to a multitude of dangers, not least of which are frivolousness and politicization. On one hand there is the urge to become the scolds of the world, on the other the temptation to pursue political or ideological goals in the guise of human rights. The first requirement in avoiding these dangers is to establish human rights standards.

**The committee believes that a basic standard is available to trigger and guide Canadian human rights policy, namely the appearance of a pattern of systematic, gross and continuous violations of basic human rights.** In its brief to the committee, the Canadian Council of Churches described those rights.

The churches assume that all people everywhere, regardless of their ideological, cultural, or political system, wish to be free from disappearance, from arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and extra-judicial execution and from state-sponsored racial discrimination. (34)

Where such practices occur and can reasonably be ascribed to state policy, Canada should be actively concerned.

Almost nowhere in the world are gross and systematic violations of human rights proclaimed as state policy or practised in the light of day. As a general rule they are hidden and their existence is vigorously denied. Indeed much of the psychological horror of torture and disappearances arises from this hidden quality. It follows from this that one of the most valuable instruments in preventing or ending human rights violations is the spotlight of international attention. There are three main channels of investigation open or available to Canada.

The first channel is international human rights forums, the most important of which is the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Created by the General Assembly in 1945, the Commission deals with many of the major human rights problems in the world, as well as serving to develop human rights standards and conventions. We received testimony that Canada, as an elected member of the Commission from 1976 to 1984, gained the respect of other countries and was valued by non-governmental organizations, which relied on the Canadian delegation to raise their issues at Commission sessions and to lobby on their behalf. A brief submitted by Philippe LeBlanc, by contrast, expressed concerns that Canada's performance as an observer at the 1985 session was low-key and far less effective. (2) **The committee joins witnesses in recommending that Canada seek re-election to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and, in any case, follow its work actively. Particular attention should be paid to protecting and strengthening the position of the Commission within**

**the United Nations system. We recommend further that Canada work to strengthen the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Native peoples throughout the world have been among the earliest and most cruelly abused victims of the denial of human rights.**

In addition to the United Nations, we are convinced that there are other multilateral opportunities to develop an activist human rights policy. Canada should support and co-operate with the recently established human rights office in the Commonwealth Secretariat. Both inside and outside the Commonwealth, the government should collaborate on human rights issues with democratic middle powers among the developed and developing countries. Middle powers may be less likely to muddy the waters of human rights policy with geopolitical considerations and activities. Through close co-operation with developing countries, Canadian human rights policy will be sensitized to the perspectives and concerns of the Third World.

A second channel open to Canada in investigating and exposing human rights violations is the network of voluntary organizations working in this field. They range from national human rights bodies, whose members in some countries risk their lives to expose human rights violations, to international organizations that specialize in compiling and disseminating this information. In its submission to the committee, the Canadian Section (English-speaking) of Amnesty International—one of the most widely respected of the voluntary organizations—described the value of its partnership with the Canadian government.

We have watched with great satisfaction as the Canadian government has taken an activist approach to promoting human rights and opposing human rights violations in bilateral and multilateral fora. As a result, the Canadian section has often made the statement that we consider the Immigration Commission (dealing with refugees) and the Department of External Affairs our allies in the struggle for the international promotion and protection of human rights. (2)

**The committee recommends strongly that an even closer collaboration with voluntary organizations become a central feature of the government's approach to human rights.** In this regard, Edward Ratushny urged the government to establish a Human Rights Advisory Commission to serve as a regular channel of policy advice to the secretary of state for external affairs. We support this suggestion in principle, but note that there are several approaches to the functioning and composition of such a body. Accordingly **we recommend that the government immediately investigate the most effective means of creating a Human Rights Advisory Commission.**

The committee was pleased to hear testimony that Canadian officials are committed to an effective human rights policy. At the same time, we are aware of the pressures within the Department of External Affairs to attach priority to trade, security or political considerations and, in the process, to downplay support for human rights. To overcome this tendency, **we recommend that the Department of External Affairs follow the example of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs in establishing in-service training and refresher courses in human rights for all its officers.**

International human rights forums and non-governmental organizations are well established channels for Canada's promotion of human rights. There now exists a third channel and the opportunity to develop a more coherent and activist approach. **A House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights has just been created. As it begins to develop the international side of its mandate, we recommend that the Committee examine with particular care alleged international cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights, especially where they involve countries where Canada has**

large development assistance programs or significant trade relations. The Human Rights Committee should work closely with the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. At the same time we urge the external affairs committees of both the Senate and the House of Commons to keep human rights issues on their agendas and to place them in the broader context of Canada's overall foreign policy. The human rights findings and recommendations of these committees could form an important element in cabinet consideration of the eligibility list for official development assistance if the committees requested a comprehensive response to their reports from the government, as House of Commons committees are empowered to do under Standing Order 99(2).

The investigation and exposure of human rights violations has some value in and of itself. Generally speaking, however, a determination that violations are taking place is only the first step towards some further action, or at least demands for further action by the international community.

There are occasions when public criticism is an essential human rights tool. But in general a successful human rights policy is like an iceberg: largely out of sight. In describing what he called the "unfortunate tendency in Canada to talk about quiet or loud diplomacy", John Holmes observed to the committee:

Well, of course, any intelligent country uses whichever one is more effective. There are times when quiet diplomacy is much more likely to get some warm bodies out. If you are trying to get people out of a totalitarian country, it is often better to do some private negotiations and not score points by making speeches. (25:46)

Visits abroad by the prime minister, other cabinet ministers and parliamentarians are among the most promising opportunities for expressing human rights concerns using a judicious blend of public pressure and private persuasion. We expect and encourage the government to take advantage of such opportunities, as indeed the Prime Minister did successfully on a recent trip to China and South Korea, the Secretary of State for External Affairs did on an earlier trip to the Soviet Union, and the Minister of External Relations did on her trip to Central America in the fall of 1985. In blending human rights concerns with trade, diplomatic and aid discussions, Canada can convey the message that human rights are an integral, not a peripheral, part of its international relations.

Apart from strictly diplomatic actions, Canada has a large development assistance program that can be put at the service of human rights. The issue of whether and how to do so attracted a great deal of attention in the briefs and submissions to the committee. Generally we hear Canadians saying that there should be links between development assistance and human rights, but carefully constructed links. That is our own approach; in this regard, we strongly endorse the recommendations of a parliamentary predecessor, the Sub-committee on Canada's Relations With Latin America and the Caribbean, as they appear in its report, *New Directions for Canadian Foreign Policy*, (78:14-15) which was tabled in the House of Commons on November 30, 1982.

- Canadian development assistance should be substantially reduced, terminated, or not commenced in cases where gross and systematic violations of human rights make it impossible to promote the central objective of helping the poor.
- Where countries systematically violate human rights or otherwise do not qualify for official development assistance, Canada should seek through international organizations to extend humanitarian assistance and to support those struggling for human rights.



- Where countries have a poor human rights record but not so extreme as to justify the termination of aid, Canada's development assistance should be channelled mainly through the private sector and particularly through non-governmental organizations that work directly with the poor. In addition, it should be the policy of the Canadian government in such cases to direct a portion of its assistance to organizations that are struggling to maintain and protect civil and political rights.
- Where countries that qualify for Canadian assistance are showing improvement in their respect for human rights this should be encouraged by a substantial increase in assistance.

Apart from bilateral aid programs, Canada is a major supporter of a number of international financial institutions (IFIs)—such as the World Bank and the regional development banks—which are very important sources of development finance for Third World countries. Some submissions to the committee argued that Canada should press the IFIs to establish human rights criteria for the granting of loans and other assistance. This would be a departure from the established IFI principle, defended repeatedly by Canada, of judging applications solely on their technical or developmental merits. The committee is acutely conscious of the dangers of further politicizing the IFIs in the name of promoting human rights. Nevertheless, we recognize that the most extreme violations of human rights destroy the possibility of economic and social development. Accordingly, **we recommend that Canada use its voice and vote at meetings of international financial institutions to protest systematic, gross and continuous violations of human rights.**

Finally we come to the most serious sanctions, short of war, that can be applied in response to persistent and extreme human rights violations—economic sanctions and the breaking of diplomatic relations. In the case of economic sanctions, government goes beyond regulating its own international relations to control private trade and commerce. There was debate before the committee as to whether and under what circumstances such action could be effective. Our general conclusion is that the interdependence of modern economies does indeed make them highly vulnerable to international economic boycotts of trade and investment, but that vulnerability is directly proportional to the extent and duration of the boycott. The basic requirement for effective economic sanctions, then, is that they be supported as universally as possible by the international community. Failing that, a sanctions policy, particularly of a middle power like Canada, can still have symbolic value.

As for breaking diplomatic relations, this runs strongly against the Canadian tradition of accepting the *de facto* government of a country as the authority with which Canada will deal. Moreover we think it self-defeating to terminate relations in any circumstance where there is hope of change for the better or opportunities for Canada to help out. It should be seen as the last card to play, after which one is largely removed from the game.

## Human Rights Development

Thus far we have discussed a human rights protection policy conducted through international law and sanctions. **The committee is convinced that, while strengthening this approach, Canada should move forward and create a positive human rights development program as well. Through co-operative programs of financial support, exchange, research and technical assistance, Canada should contribute to the long-**



**term development of political, civil and cultural rights as it now contributes to long-term economic and social development through the aid program.** By helping to build representative political and other institutions and strengthen processes that serve, directly or indirectly, to protect human rights, Canada can add an element of protection to the carrots and sticks of traditional human rights policy.

The assumption underlying development assistance policy has been that economic growth would enhance other forms of social and political development—including enhanced respect for human rights—more or less automatically. Experience has shown that although creating and distributing wealth is of fundamental importance to developing countries, economic development by itself does not resolve social and political tensions. It often increases them. Many countries in Latin America, for example, achieved rapid economic growth in the 1970s and, at the same time, suffered political polarization, instability and the plague of human rights violations.

The roots of this trouble lie partly in extreme inequalities and concentrations of economic and political power. They lie also in the failure of institutions to defend and promote the rights of the individual, of minority groups and of the community as a whole. Growing numbers of people throughout the world wish to strengthen representative political and other institutions as one means of ending the cycles of repression and instability that have beset them. Without regard to ideology, this struggle for the development of human rights aims to promote the freedom of individuals to organize in labour, academic, religious and political associations, the establishment of an independent judiciary, a free press and effective democratic institutions, and the holding of genuine elections with the broadest spectrum of political expression.

The importance of human rights and democratic development does not mean that international co-operation in this area is easy or always possible. Issues of this sort are often considered off-limits to outsiders, an attitude Canadians can well understand. The principal danger is that what is represented as international co-operation may in fact constitute interference or even intervention. Such interventions have had anti-democratic and repressive consequences in the Third World, whatever the rhetoric that accompanied them.

Experience has shown that these objections amount to a well founded caution about how international programs in human rights and democratic development should be designed and run. They should, in the first place, be co-operative—responding to the requests of others as they identify their own interests and needs.

**Canada is not—and should not be—in the business of exporting its own institutions. It can and should be equipped to share its experience and to co-operate with others as they develop their own institutions. Such programs should enjoy the active support, or at least the acquiescence, of partner country governments and peoples.** The most promising opportunities for co-operation would occur in countries like Argentina or the Philippines, which have embraced democracy after periods of authoritarian rule. Serious human rights offenders would no doubt disqualify themselves and seek to discourage their people from participating in Canadian programs to assist democratic development. In those cases, Canada should try, where possible, to encourage the building of links with non-governmental organizations seeking to promote democratic development.

Such programs should also be practical and primarily technical in nature, careful to avoid advocacy, propaganda and the most sensitive or controversial areas of democratic development. Such matters are for the people of any country to debate and settle themselves. International assistance can be helpful in developing the means to achieve agreed-upon goals. We would offer the following as examples of activities that have already occurred in embryo and could be developed further.

- Strengthening Canada's capacity and effectiveness as an observer in elections abroad and developing programs of technical assistance in building of electoral institutions and procedures. (56:26-27)
- Providing technical and financial assistance in the strengthening of workers' organizations. This work could build on earlier projects such as those undertaken by the Canadian Labour Congress with CIDA support to help set up trade union research institutes in Belize and Jamaica.
- Encouraging partnership between human rights research and advisory bodies in Canada and their counterparts abroad through programs of exchange and joint research.
- Establishing a Latin America-Canada co-operative research program in legislative institutions. In time this might lead to the building of a Latin American legislative research and technical assistance network. (25:41-67)

Other promising areas include the organization of human rights bodies such as offices of ombudsmen, federalism, the strengthening of judicial institutions, the rule of law, local government, and the media. The government and the Parliament of Canada should consider developing direct programs of their own. For example, a program in electoral and representative institutions could be created in CIDA's Institutional Co-operation and Development Services Division, and the Parliamentary Co-operation program run by the Parliamentary Relations Secretariat could be expanded. In general, however, we incline to the view that projects should be developed and managed by non-governmental organizations in co-operation with counterpart organizations in partner countries.

Canada has not previously been particularly active in international efforts to encourage human rights development. It can and should be for a number of compelling and practical reasons. Canada has the ability and, we believe, the credibility to co-operate in this area. Canada's approach to international relations emphasizes co-operation with others rather than imposition of its own values and institutions. Programs to encourage human rights through democratic development would also be a means of opening political channels with other countries. They would serve as a two-way street, allowing Canadians to express their own values and share their experience while learning of the needs and aspirations of others and being reminded of the incompleteness and vulnerability of Canada's own democracy. To these reasons we would add another: such programs could serve as a unifying force in Canadian foreign policy, expressing the Canadian commitment to human rights in a non-ideological and non-partisan manner. To this end, **we recommend that the government consider establishing an International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development with carefully prepared guidelines for supporting activities by non-governmental organizations.** To ensure that the Institute is sensitive to the varying national perspectives on democratic development, particularly in the Third World, we recommend that its board of directors include international representation, on the model of the International Development Research Centre. Funding for the Institute should be provided as a small fraction of official development assistance funds.

## Assisting Refugees

Assisting refugees is a special part of the Canadian concern to relieve the suffering of those whose basic rights have been violated.

Canada has an honourable tradition of providing such assistance. This country has received refugees fleeing civil strife in many parts of the world and has assisted those who have had to leave their homes temporarily. The generous response of the Canadian public was illustrated perhaps most dramatically between 1975 and 1980, when more than 60,000 Indo-Chinese boat people were welcomed to Canada. Over 34,000 of them were resettled with private support from some 7,000 sponsoring groups.

The goals of our refugee policies are consistent with our larger foreign policy objectives—namely, humanitarian assistance to disadvantaged peoples and our interest in a stable and just international order. Canada has the capacity to play a major international role in promoting these goals. Geography insulates us from the immediate problem of refugees. We are also one of the few countries in the world with the economic and social capacity to resettle substantial numbers of refugees, and we will continue to do so. As George Cram of the Anglican Church of Canada described it,

Canada has a unique ability and critically important role to play in the family of nations, to set some standards and be, in some ways, the standard setter for refugee policy areas. (56:19)

The committee considers it especially important to affirm that refugee and immigration policy, though related to one another, are quite distinct. Many refugees have proven to be capable and hard working citizens and have sometimes established themselves more readily here than other immigrants. But refugee policy is not guided by these considerations. It is an aspect of the overall Canadian policy of extending humanitarian assistance to others, while immigration policy is governed to a much greater extent by Canada's economic and social self-interest. It is therefore important that economic cycles, which play a major role in determining immigration flows, not be allowed to dry up the humanitarian impulse that lies behind the welcome Canada extends to refugees.

The danger of confusing refugee and immigration policy is greatly exacerbated by the enormous increase in people claiming refugee status. Refugees are normally defined as people seeking asylum outside their country of origin because of a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Also included are those who cross borders when fleeing from external aggression or the breakdown of public order. Numbers in the latter categories grew alarmingly in the early 1980s, principally as the result of such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the turmoil in Central America. It is estimated that the worldwide population of such refugees is now in excess of 10 million. More recently, deteriorating economic conditions in many developing countries have swelled the number of people seeking refugee status as an escape route from hardship. There has been intense international debate about whether any such people should qualify as refugees.

Worldwide refugee pressures have contributed in turn to a tremendous backlog of refugee claimants in Canada. This problem stems from attempts to differentiate 'legitimate' refugees from those who should be considered part of the normal immigration process. It is clear that the refugee determination process needs reform. The objective should be to establish a system that, first and foremost, embodies our international commitment as a signatory of the United Nations Declaration on Refugees while providing an effective and timely method of identifying legitimate refugees.



The government recently announced a package of reforms to the refugee determination process as well as plans to clear up the present backlog of applicants. The committee has not reviewed or evaluated these measures. We would only reaffirm Canada's traditional commitment to providing immediate sanctuary for those fleeing persecution while the refugee determination process is completed. **We think it particularly important that Canada remain generous in providing sanctuary to Central American refugees that are the victims of repression and violence. We strongly support the government's decision to extend an oral hearing on questions of merit to all claimants.**

In addition to its domestic refugee policy, Canada has been among the strongest supporters of international agencies helping refugees, such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We commend this policy and strongly urge its further development. Despite its strong support for the UNHCR, Canada has no representation in the senior ranks of the organization. **The government should press for Canadians to be appointed as senior officials of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. With adequate representation, Canada should support the UNHCR in updating international refugee programs and coming to grips with outstanding policy questions, such as the definition of 'refugee' under international agreements and the rights and responsibilities of host countries.**

Despite the best efforts of the international community, the provision of refugee assistance has occasionally stalled in a semi-permanent situation of international welfare dependency in huge refugee camps. These camps are, in turn, the breeding grounds for bitterness and resentment among the refugees and objects of intense hostility among the citizens of host countries. A promising initiative to avoid these dangers was brought to the committee's attention. CIDA has made a substantial contribution to a project of the UNHCR and the World Bank to generate income for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The project, involving reforestation and road reconstruction, was designed to benefit the refugees and the host country and to be sensitive to the people of Pakistan. Discussions are currently under way for a second phase of the project. **We strongly urge Canadian support for refugee income generation projects, such as the one for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, to assist refugees to be as self-supporting and productive as possible while seeking their repatriation or permanent resettlement.**

The primary role of this committee is to recommend general policy approaches and principles. It is obviously beyond the ability of any such investigation to consider the many individual circumstances to which those principles apply. But in the area of human rights three cases call out for attention and comment—Afghanistan, South Africa and Central America.

## Afghanistan

In recommending generous Canadian humanitarian and development assistance to the Afghan refugees, we are moved by the extraordinary brutality that has caused their plight. The Helsinki Watch Committee, the United Nations Human Rights Commission and other highly reputable human rights organizations have documented the most extreme gross and massive violations of human rights arising directly from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Commenting on the various reports that reach the international community, Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations has observed:



You have in the...reports, the microcosm of a nation massacred and mutilated. Over one million dead. An equal or greater number physically scarred by the battle for life. Between one and two million uprooted, ravaged and homeless in their own land. Four to five million [out of a total population of 16 million] as wretched refugees in Pakistan and Iran. (Speech to the United States General Assembly, November 12, 1985)

This wholesale destruction of a people is being carried out by the Soviet Union and its puppet régime in Kabul for no other reason than crude geopolitical ambition. The Soviet Union has dispatched over 100,000 of its troops with the immediate aim of violent repression and the longer-term objective of reducing Afghanistan to a Soviet colony. As has happened so often in the history of colonialism, the imperial power failed to reckon with the national spirit and independence of the people. Despite the terrible slaughter, the Afghan people have not been subjugated. They are continuing to fight.

In these circumstances, what can the international community do? Appealing to Soviet public opinion cannot work because the Soviet media do not report on the situation in Afghanistan and there is no opportunity for opponents of Soviet policy to voice their opposition within the country. The only existing leverage arises from the adverse effect on the USSR of international public opinion. It is essential that the spotlight be kept on Afghanistan by the news media of the world and by international organizations. Meetings have taken place in Geneva between Soviet representatives and officials of the United Nations, as well as between the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan. We strongly urge the United Nations to continue to its efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan involving, as a *sine qua non*, the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Such a settlement may take years to achieve, although we are confident that the Soviets will come to accept its inevitability. In the meantime the suffering continues. **The committee recommends that Canada continue to give high priority to providing humanitarian and medical assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that it strongly support the efforts of the International Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in particular. In its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, Canada should take every opportunity to raise the issue of Afghanistan and make clear that Soviet occupation and devastation of that country constitute a serious obstacle to improved relations.** In that connection we recommend the continued use of frank and direct language by Canada's representatives in United Nations forums in New York, Geneva and elsewhere.

## South Africa

Each case of human rights violation is unique. Afghanistan is a case of massive violations arising from foreign occupation. South Africa is a case of institutionalized racism that is reflected in every aspect of life—personal, social, political and economic. Whites are citizens, blacks are sub-citizens, at the mercy of white law. Although condemned for 20 years by the international community, apartheid has remained intact.

During the 1980s the black people of South Africa have shown themselves increasingly prepared to pay any price to claim their human rights. The white government of South Africa, faced with this growing militancy, has replied with a combination of harsh repression and mild reform. The price in blood and suffering has been high: some 1,500 people have been killed in the past 18 months, and countless

more have been injured and imprisoned. The sense of drift towards steadily greater confrontation and massive violence grows daily.

Faced with this situation, the international community has begun to apply concerted pressure on South Africa. The government of Canada, supported by all parties and the overwhelming majority of the Canadian people, has made its opposition to apartheid very clear. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 13, 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs declared that "Canadians are offended by and abhor the practice of institutionalized racism by a society that claims to share our values." He went on to say that "the government of South Africa should have no doubt that we will invoke full sanctions unless there is tangible movement away from apartheid." The question before the government and this committee is whether "tangible movement" is occurring and, if not, how and when to apply sanctions.

These questions were debated extensively before the committee. We are persuaded that severe economic sanctions, if widely supported, would be effective in putting pressure on the South African government. As one witness pointed out, the proof of their effectiveness is that South Africa has made advocacy of international sanctions a treasonable offence. Testimony before the committee persuades us that the best means of using this instrument is through unrelenting and co-ordinated step-by-step pressure by the international community.

Canada is currently seeking to work within the Commonwealth as a channel for international influence. The Commonwealth Accord, agreed to in Nassau in October 1985, imposed a limited set of sanctions and called upon the government of South Africa to take a number of steps "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency":

- (a) Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.
- (b) Terminate the existing state of emergency.
- (c) Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.
- (d) Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.
- (e) Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

The Accord also established a Group of Eminent Persons, including Archbishop Edward Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, to promote dialogue between the black majority and the South African government as well as monitor and report on the pace and direction of change. The Group was to report to a Commonwealth group of seven heads of government, including the Prime Minister of Canada, which is responsible for formulating further Commonwealth action.

The committee wishes to give strong but qualified support to this process. It is our hope that the Group of Eminent Persons will be able to play a useful and constructive role in encouraging South African dialogue. Failing that, they may help build consensus about future action. It must be recognized that there are major obstacles—particularly the resistance of Great Britain—in the way of strong, co-ordinated action by the Commonwealth. It is therefore incumbent upon the government of Canada to prepare careful contingency plans of its own and to play a leadership role in the Commonwealth.

**If the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons had reported that significant but insufficient progress was occurring in dismantling apartheid, the committee had agreed to recommend that Canada take the lead in preparing a further Commonwealth action plan consisting of specific sanctions such as those listed in clause 7 of the Commonwealth Accord of October 1985. These include (a) a ban on air links with South Africa; (b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa; (c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa; (d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa; (e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa; (f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa; (g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies; and (h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. Canada has already implemented three of these measures.**

**Now that the Group of Eminent Persons has reported—as we feared it would—that no significant progress is occurring in dismantling apartheid, Canada should move immediately to impose full economic sanctions, seek their adoption by the greatest possible number of Commonwealth members, and promote similar action by non-Commonwealth countries.**

**In any event, we strongly urge establishment of a black South African human rights and democratic development program. Canada established a scholarship program for black South Africans in 1983 and has since expanded it. We strongly support this approach and encourage further efforts to assist in building black social, economic and political institutions towards the day when black South Africans will exercise their full rights as citizens.**

**We encourage the government to expand direct contacts at the highest levels with black political organizations in South Africa. Bearing in mind that lifting the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and releasing from prison its leader Nelson Mandela are two of the steps called for in the Commonwealth Accord, such high-level contacts should certainly include the ANC.**

**In addition to the situation in South Africa, the committee is deeply concerned about the well-being of the black countries neighbouring on South Africa. Canada should continue to provide generous amounts of direct assistance and support international efforts, such as those of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, to help South Africa's vulnerable neighbours cope with the economic difficulties that international sanctions directed at South Africa will create for them as well as to overcome punitive measures that the South African government might direct against them.**

**We are under no illusions that the situation in South Africa can be transformed without further violence. No matter what the international community does, more bloodshed and racial conflict are bound to occur in South Africa. But we do believe that the route proposed by the Commonwealth Accord offers the best hope for transition towards a basically democratic society. The ending of apartheid, even if offered quickly, is unlikely to end the violence, because the repressive acts of the white minority have created animosity that will not easily be contained. But without international pressure to supplement domestic resistance, change will not occur fast enough to prevent even greater violence and bloodshed. The series of steps we propose is intended to convey a message to white South Africans that they must begin serious dialogue with their black countrymen and is offered in the hope of encouraging genuine reconciliation among the people of South Africa. The spirit that should guide all efforts is captured in the words of Nelson Mandela:**



I want to impress this on the whites of South Africa. Although we will be the majority, that doesn't mean the minority will lose their power, their participation, their economic life. I believe that the whites here, unlike anywhere else in Africa, belong here. This is their home. We want to share that home, and share power with them.

## Central America

The third case of human rights to which we turn our attention—Central America—presents yet another pattern of gross and persistent human rights violations. It is estimated that some 150,000 to 200,000 people have been killed over the past decade through repression and civil war in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In turn, this violence has generated an estimated 1.5 to 2 million refugees, roughly 10 per cent of the population of the region. In addition, there has been widespread economic destruction, which, together with international economic pressures, has pushed Central America to the brink of economic collapse. This suffering has given rise to widespread international concern, a concern that is shared by large numbers of Canadians.

The committee received more submissions on Central America than on any other single subject. A remarkably large number of witnesses had first-hand experience in this area, often as aid workers or members of visiting delegations, and spoke with greater conviction and knowledge as a result. Many of the briefs pointed to Canada's special interest in promoting human rights in Central America, including the concern for refugees, development assistance programs in the region, and the negative effects of regional instability on the western hemisphere. The briefs and submissions expressed the concern—which we share—that human rights violations in Central America arise from the failure of economic development, the frequent absence of political alternatives to dictatorships and military régimes, social upheaval, increasing cycles of violence, and external intervention.

In trying to arrive at a fair and balanced understanding of the crisis in Central America, we were guided by the earlier work of the Sub-committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. The words of its 1982 report are as true today as they were when they were written:

The mounting violence in Central America, which is threatening to engulf the entire region, arises primarily from internal causes. It is, however, reinforced and spread by the injection of outside ideological concerns and by the provision of military assistance to both repressive governments and revolutionary groups. Far from promoting stability, the policies of neighbouring countries tend to perpetuate and intensify instability.

The Sub-committee recognized that Central America and the Caribbean are of vital importance to the United States and to the western alliance. Efforts should be made to protect these regions from superpower rivalries. The independence of all countries should be respected, and outside military involvement from whatever source should cease. (*Final Report*, pp. 11-12)

Since that report was written, the situation has evolved. Many witnesses expressed the view that, in the interval, U.S. policy has contributed to massive militarization of Central America and thereby to widespread and chronic human rights abuses. They advocated a more active role for Canada in criticizing the U.S. administration's support for the Contras, and most briefs included a recommendation that Canada open an embassy in Managua. The witnesses went on to say that, in its search for a military solution to what is essentially a set of social and economic problems, the U.S.



government has armed and helped greatly to expand Central American military forces, which have shown themselves repeatedly to be indifferent to human rights. **A majority of the committee believes that it must be stressed that U.S. policy has been designed, in part, to counter other foreign military intervention in Central America and that Canada should oppose outside intervention in Central America by all countries.**

A few committee members consider that the government should make strong public representations to the government of the United States that it adopt a policy towards Central America based on the need for social, economic and political reform in the place of the current policy, which stresses East-West conflict and militarization.

The same minority would also like Canada to join the initiative of the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Lima Support Group to impress upon Washington the need to try to bring the conflict to an end and to change its policy towards Central America. We are all agreed, however, that Canada should continue to oppose outside intervention in the region, including the funding of such groups as the Contras and the provision of outside forces.

In making these general observations about Central America, the committee wishes to draw attention to the varying situations in the five republics of the region. While the human rights prospects in some of these countries remain uncertain at best, there are also important signs of hope and progress.

*Guatemala* has the worst human rights history in Central America, a history that reached its nadir in the early 1980s in a brutally efficient military search and destroy campaign against guerillas and Guatemala's large Indian population. As a result of human rights violations, Canada ended its official development assistance program. We are encouraged by the fact that politically motivated human rights violations have declined over the past year. The election of a new civilian president in comparatively honest elections is a hopeful sign, though it remains uncertain whether President Cerezo's government can bring the military under control. We welcome the Guatemalan government's proclaimed respect for human rights and support for regional peace. Canada should seek, through non-governmental organizations, to support projects designed to help the poorest people in Guatemala, as well as the process of social and economic reform. Guatemala also presents the opportunity and need for Canadian co-operative programs of human rights and democratic development.

*El Salvador*, Guatemala's neighbour to the south, continues to suffer the ravages of a five-year-old civil war that has brought widespread human rights violations and economic devastation. It is clear that human rights abuses have been committed by both sides in the civil war, although Amnesty International continues to report that the vast majority of violations is being committed by right-wing death squads and security forces under the control of government authorities. The number of politically motivated murders has declined significantly over the past two years, although human rights organizations in San Salvador still report four to six assassinations by death squads every month.

The 1984 election of a civilian president, Napoleon Duarte, was seen at the time as a step in the direction of political reconciliation. Regrettably, the Duarte government's control of human rights violations and ability to promote economic and social reform is limited. We are encouraged, however, by the government's recent offer to resume negotiations with rebel forces and the acceptance of that offer by the rebels. Canada's own role in this situation must be to encourage dialogue and to ensure that the

Canadian aid program is directed very carefully at providing help to refugees and to the rural and urban poor. We think this can best be achieved through experienced, reputable and independent Canadian and Salvadoran non-governmental organizations that extend humanitarian and other assistance on the basis of need and not political considerations.

*Honduras*, like El Salvador and Guatemala, illustrates the individuality of Central American countries. Though it is the poorest country in the region, its domestic human rights history has been less extreme than that of its immediate neighbours. The main problems facing Honduras are the intensifying poverty of many of its people and the dangers that arise from serving as a staging base for the U.S.-directed war against Nicaragua. There are encouraging signs that the civilian government of Honduras has growing misgivings about the activities of the Contras operating out of its territory and is seeking ways to promote dialogue with its neighbour to the south, Nicaragua. Canada's role should be to prevent any of its substantial development assistance being used to contribute to the militarization of the country and, at the same time, to encourage dialogue between Honduras and Nicaragua.

*Nicaragua* is at the centre of the storms that have raged throughout Central America for the past decade. The 1979 revolution toppled a brutal and corrupt political dynasty first established in the early 1930s. At the same time it opened a door on revolutionary change and turmoil in the region.

The Sandinista government has made significant progress in meeting the basic human needs of the poorest Nicaraguans, particularly through its literacy, health care and land reform programs. In the course of implementing these and other reforms, the Sandinistas have been accused by some critics of moving Nicaragua towards a totalitarian state. Internal opposition to the government has been succeeded by a U.S.-supported guerilla war and economic blockade. Human rights organizations have reported widespread and extensive human rights violations by the Contras. These same organizations report that human rights abuses have been committed by the government of Nicaragua, particularly against the Miskito Indians. These reports have been acknowledged and acted upon by the Nicaraguan government. Amnesty International also documents substantial numbers of political detainees and harassment of opposition political figures. It is equally clear, however, that the human rights abuses committed by the government of Nicaragua do not begin to compare in scale or intensity with the violations connected to the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador over the past five years.

Canadian policy towards Nicaragua should consist of three elements: first, continuation of official development assistance programs directed at helping the poorest people; second, staunch support for political pluralism and religious freedom in Nicaragua; and third, support for a negotiated settlement of the differences between Nicaragua and the United States.

Some members of the committee agree with the many witnesses who recommended establishing a Canadian embassy in Managua. Nicaragua is currently looked after by the ambassador in Costa Rica, who is accredited to four states in the region. An embassy in Managua would certainly have practical value in increasing the flow of information on developments in Nicaragua, providing increased support for Canadian development assistance projects in that country, and helping to speed up the processing of immigration applications. The utility of opening a mission in Managua would have to be examined in relation to Canada's overall needs for diplomatic representation in Central America. Despite the evident concerns of a significant number of Canadians,

Canada's commercial and immigration interests in Nicaragua are in fact quite limited, and they appear to be looked after adequately under current arrangements. Unless there is a marked increase in trade, aid, immigration or other ties, an embassy should not be a priority. Accordingly, **a majority of the committee opposes the proposal for immediate establishment of a Canadian embassy in Managua but urges the government to monitor the opportunities that might arise.**

Finally we come to *Costa Rica*, the southern-most of the Central American republics, which continues its tradition of general respect for human rights. There have been worrying signs that Costa Rica was progressively being drawn into regional conflict and would itself fall victim to polarization and violence. We are encouraged, however, that the new government of President Oscar Arias has taken several positive steps to arrest this trend and to strengthen Costa Rica's role as a peace maker in Central America. In particular, the conclusion of a border agreement with Nicaragua is evidence that concrete progress can be made in resolving regional conflicts. Canada should continue to provide generous assistance to Costa Rica and strongly support Costa Rica's efforts as a regional peace maker.

In the course of presenting this brief review of Central America, we have demonstrated repeatedly our conviction that the promotion of human rights in the region depends critically on political and economic reform within the countries, peace between them, and an end to superpower—and particularly U.S.—intervention in the region. Above all, Central America needs breathing room to find its own solutions to its own problems. We are encouraged that the governments of the region are beginning to assert their independence and to expend effort in the search for peace.

Many Canadians believe that Canada can and should be very active in Central America. In addition to supporting the Contadora process and dialogue within and between individual countries, Canada should promote human rights in Central America by maintaining a generous refugee policy for those who are the victims of human rights violations. Some 8,300 Central American refugees came to Canada in 1984 and 1985 alone. **While Canadian influence over the security policies of other countries is limited, Canada has a special opportunity to offer direct, practical and desperately needed help to the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the region. We would urge two Canadian initiatives: establishment of a 'Refugee Watch' program with other countries and non-governmental organizations to provide greater security in the refugee camps; and active support for economic development and self-sufficiency programs for refugees. The government should also strengthen Canada's capacity to monitor human rights situations in Central America, paying particular attention to the circumstances in each country and the views of Canadian NGOs in these countries. Canada should promote co-operative programs of democratic and human rights development and support elements in these countries favouring progress in human rights.**



## CHAPTER NINE

### Improving Canada-U.S. Relations

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A theme running through the testimony and clearly a preoccupation of virtually every witness appearing before the committee was how Canada should relate to the United States. This is the dominant fact of Canada's international relations—just as it is an integral and inescapable element of Canada's economic, financial, agricultural, cultural and environmental policies. Scarcely anything Canada does at home or abroad is not influenced by being the neighbour of the country with the world's most powerful military forces and strongest economy, a country that is also the undisputed leader of the Western Alliance and a centre of dynamic and pervasive cultural activity. Canada's difficulties in adjusting to living next to the United States have two quite different sources. It helps to distinguish between these sources, even though their effects may be closely interrelated and hard to separate. On one hand, Canada is exposed to the pressures that result from being adjacent to the world's largest and most vigorous English-speaking country—without the moderating influence of several other countries sharing the North American continent. On the other hand, Canada also feels the effects of lying along the enormous length of the northern frontier of a superpower whose security preoccupations are focused in a northerly direction.

Our report faces squarely the complications and difficulties these conditions have caused for Canadians. Several chapters have sections dealing specifically with the U.S. dimension of the subject being treated. But the issue is so predominant that we decided the report should have one chapter focused entirely on this practical question: how should Canada manage its relations with its powerful and vibrant neighbour?

The Canadian federation was conceived in part as a response to the challenge posed by the self-confident growth and expansionist instincts of the United States. Paradoxically, this challenge, which has persisted to this day, is the stronger because the peoples of the two countries appear—at least from a distance—to share so much: a common political heritage, a deeply held respect for human rights, a commitment to the market economy, a belief in the benefits of individual entrepreneurship, the same language—except for French-speaking Canadians and Hispanic Americans—a similar cultural tradition, and a generous, idealistic and optimistic approach to the world and its problems. But looked at more closely, and particularly from the perspective of Canadians, many of these similarities hide important, even profound, differences. The common political heritage masks differing views of the state, which Canadians tend to trust more than Americans do; a preference in Canada for 'peace, order and good government' over 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'; and different political



systems. In Canada power and responsibility converge in the fusion of the legislative and executive functions, whereas in the United States power is constitutionally separated into the ceaseless tension between the executive and legislative functions. The commitment to the market economy in Canada has from the earliest days included pragmatically a role for the state to the point where Canada more closely resembles a mixed economy. The United States has relied on anti-trust legislation and the struggle between competing economic units to limit the power of companies, whereas Canada has established state enterprises to compete in the market and to limit the growth of excessive economic power. With an economy that has attracted foreign investment since the early days, Canadians have looked to the state to set limits on the activities of foreign enterprises. The belief that Canadians share in the benefits of individual enterprise is moderated to a far greater extent than in the United States by an extensive network of social support. The cultural world likewise reflects these distinctions, with the Canadian government providing both financial support and a degree of protection from outside competition—mainly from the United States. This approach is quite different from what prevails in the United States and is even strongly resisted by Americans.

Similarity and difference are the watchwords of the relationship. Canadians spend much of their time trying to be something other than American, a goal that challenges them because geography and history have given them a character that the rest of the world identifies as North American—or, more frequently, simply American. So Canadians are locked in a continuing interplay with the American people—the people with whom they share most in the world. The fact that the United States leads the Western Alliance just adds to the complexity of the personal relationship. All of this has given Canadians a unique capacity for detachment and for seeing problems as others see them. This experience has strengthened the internationalist outlook of Canadians and helped them approach the world constructively and with understanding.

For over a century, the two countries have followed their separate but parallel destinies; in the process, each has grown stronger and more self-assured. All the while vast and unprecedented technical changes have modified the way the world works, speeding up and multiplying the links that connect the two countries and their peoples. Space no longer provides the shield it once did. Personal, corporate and institutional linkages are now so intertwined that there are no longer simple solutions to any problems. Almost every public action in one country affects the interests of people in the other.

Two complex and highly democratic federal governments, each responding to public pressures supported by a multitude of non-governmental organizations, are striving constantly to cope with the problems of modern societies and in the process—because the two countries share the continent—bumping into each other. The difficulties both governments experience in making their own federal structures work and in handling the tensions between three levels of government should cause Canadians to appreciate that co-operation between two independent countries is never easy, even with the best will in the world.

As the smaller country, Canada is inevitably more concerned to assert its independence and quicker to perceive challenges to its sovereignty and independence. U.S. challenges can be particularly hard to handle when they are a function of private initiatives rather than actions of government. The annexationist instinct that used to enjoy support in the United States no longer poses a threat. Instead, the pressures Canada faces today often result from the restless energy of Americans acting separately in pursuit of their interests—expressed in such diverse forms as a take-over bid for a

Canadian company by a U.S. corporation, a U.S.-based organization trying to spread ideologically extreme doctrines in Canada, or Exxon sending the *Manhattan* through the Northwest Passage. Moreover, U.S. government action in the domestic arena—for example to deregulate transportation industries or to change their tax depreciation regulations—increasingly impinges directly on Canada. Such initiatives, public or private, especially when taken together, can constitute a challenge to Canada, and specifically to Canadian policies in areas as diverse and fundamental as investment, cultural affairs and energy. But when they flow from the actions of a multitude of private citizens or corporations, their implications are sometimes harder to perceive—indeed their consequences may even be the subject of debate in Canada—and for that reason may be more difficult to resist.

The contacts between Canadians and Americans dwarf those between any two other countries in the world. Apart from those between officials of the respective governments—federal, provincial and state—they encompass trade unions, businesses and their associations, sporting teams, tourists, fraternal and professional associations, to name only some of the most obvious. There are more than 30 million border crossings annually between the two countries, and trans-boundary data flows and telecommunications outstrip those between any other two countries.

Broadly speaking, the challenges Canada faces with respect to the United States arise in two different contexts: situations where the problem is primarily bilateral and situations where U.S. action or policy is multilateral in its thrust. In the former cases Canada must usually act alone to defend its interests; in the latter, the Canadian response would normally be co-ordinated with those of other governments—or at least take account of them.

## Source of Disputes

It is important that Canadians understand that bilateral problems are bound to arise with the United States. They are the unavoidable and natural consequences of two closely interconnected countries with different goals, different interests, different traditions. Although it is difficult to generalize, at the bilateral level problems frequently arise either because the two countries respond differently to something that happens abroad or because domestic pressures in one country or the other cause that government to change the ground rules. Some illustrations will make the point. The Canadian decision to establish the National Energy Policy (NEP) was a response to OPEC's success in raising the price of oil, to the consequence of increased oil revenues for the Alberta and federal treasuries and to the high proportion of oil companies operating in Canada that were foreign-owned. What mattered for the United States, which had been affected differently by higher oil prices, was that they saw in the NEP a retroactive change in Canadian exploration regulations and discriminatory treatment of foreign-owned firms in terms of government grants and company procurement.\* In addition the U.S. government feared that other countries might follow the Canadian example.

Problems can also arise because of the success of an industry in one country or the other in which government may have played no part at all. The troubles now facing the Canadian softwood lumber industry in the United States are a product of the industry's efficiency combined with the low value of the Canadian dollar. In this instance the U.S.

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\* This last complaint was subsequently upheld by a GATT panel.

administration and, even more, the Congress are under pressure from the U.S. lumber industry, which has seen its share of the market fall by over 10 per cent in a few years. More recently, the Canadian shakes and shingles industry was singled out because of its success in almost doubling its sales in three years to gain three-quarters of the U.S. market. In cases such as this, the strength of democratic institutions in the two countries acts to magnify the problem; senators and representatives from lumber-producing states must demonstrate their support of local interests or risk defeat in the next election. In the months preceding congressional elections, the president himself is especially vulnerable to political pressure from industries that are having difficulty competing with imports.

Still other problems are the inescapable consequences of geography. As the United States runs short of natural gas or water in the southwest, the abundance of these resources in Canada will generate increasing pressure on the government of Canada to change its export policies for these commodities. Nor do environmental problems recognize international borders. Technology can also be a source of tensions. New communications technologies are undermining the agreed rules for handling television and radio transmissions between the two countries, in the process challenging essential supports for Canadian culture. Advances in the technologies for catching fish and drilling for oil on the ocean floor have already caused maritime boundary disputes between the two countries where previously none existed.

The variety and sources of problems between Canada and the United States are almost without limit. Canada may sometimes be an unintended victim of a U.S. policy aimed at another target. For example, the United States has become increasingly angered by the European Agricultural Community's subsidization of European agriculture, by the growth in production this has generated, and by the loss of foreign markets to subsidized European grain exports. The Congress finally retaliated with a farm bill designed to confront the Community's agricultural policy. In that process, and almost unnoticed, the other major grain producers—Australia, Argentina and Canada—are likely to suffer grievously. It is no comfort for the victims to know that the damage was not intended. Furthermore, since the real target is elsewhere, it is hard even to get the attention of Americans in this matter.

We have commented at some length on the diversity and origin of the problems between Canada and the United States because we consider it important to demonstrate that they arise naturally from the interplay of social, economic and geographic forces. No matter how good the relations between the two governments and between Canadians and Americans, problems are bound to occur. However, problems are normally more manageable when relations are good. With a constructive approach and a business-like atmosphere, which includes not overreacting to individual concerns, there is usually a greater likelihood of reaching mutually satisfactory accommodations.

It is also important that both Canadians and Americans look ahead and talk frankly about potential problems before they reach the political agenda. But while it may not be difficult to identify emerging issues such as the export of fresh water and the effect of new communications technology on Canadian cultural policy, mutually acceptable solutions are very much more difficult to identify. In facing these new challenges, the many layers of personal communication that exist between the two countries, through universities, professional associations and private sector groups as well as governments, can at times be a priceless asset. Through this array of channels, continuous and multifaceted probing of problems is possible, and the prospects for working towards mutually acceptable solutions are increased. And because some problems may be intractable, at a minimum such communication makes it easier to tolerate and live with them.



One of the unique features of the North American scene is the number of common associations, ranging from international trade unions, such as the Machinists and the Steelworkers, fraternal organizations like the Lions and the Shriners, to professional associations such as heart surgeons and heavy equipment distributors. These associations number in the tens of thousands. The weight and autonomy of the Canadian membership varies in each. A phenomenon of recent years, and a demonstration of increasing Canadian assurance and assertion, has been the withdrawal of the Canadian component from international organizations, with the Canadian Auto Workers being the most publicized recent example. The result has been the development of an increased capacity within Canada for defining and expressing Canadian interests.

## Maintaining Perspective

Problems are unavoidable between close neighbours, and Canadians should not allow their differences with the United States to get out of perspective. These difficulties are often made to appear worse to Canadians by the way they are handled in the U.S. political process. Newspaper accounts of the number of bills pending in the Congress that are potentially hurtful to Canadian interests are a case in point. Thirty thousand bills are introduced in the average two-year congressional session; a large number are drafted solely to gain favour with constituents or a special interest and are never expected to come to a vote. There is, of course, ample reason to be wary of the unexpected turns congressional politics can take, but Canadians should be careful not to overreact to developments within the U.S. political system that amount only to posturing before a domestic audience. At the same time, Canada should take the power of Congress seriously and not place too much reliance on the capacity of a president to 'deliver' the Congress.

There are, of course, inherent differences in the way the two countries approach problems, often reflecting differences in capabilities and, consequently, in the means they choose to employ. The military power of the United States gives it a capacity for unilateral action that Canadians can scarcely conceive of exercising. With the limited means available to the Canadian government, it tends to look instinctively for multilateral solutions and accords greater importance than does the United States to support for the rule of law.

The process of looking for solutions to problems is the more challenging for Canada because of the formidable force wielded by the U.S. government. Stephen Clarkson impressed upon the committee that the United States could henceforth be expected to devote increasing attention to managing its bilateral relations with Canada, emulating an approach adopted by Canada some time earlier.

In the past—let us say two or three decades ago—Canada did not have an American strategy. It simply dealt ad hoc with each issue as it came up. But now there is a much more strategic approach taken on both sides of the border. The United States is now starting to develop a Canadian strategy: how to deal with all the problems on its agenda, how to co-ordinate its agencies. (28:27)

Canada is not without the means to defend itself, however. Ironically, Canada's mutual links with the United States may, in not a few cases, actually enhance Canada's capacity to protect its interests. Though by no means Canada's only weapon, the trade and investment ties that have been forged between the two countries can be used on



occasion to strengthen Canada's ability to get what it wants and limit the leverage the United States can exert. As John Holmes, an experienced observer of Canadian-American relations, has remarked,

It is a mistake to think of massive U.S. military and economic power deployed against poor little Canada. On most issues there is a balance of the kind of strength applicable to the matter at hand. (in *Life with Uncle*)

What matters more than anything else is that Canadians should be able to manage their relations with the United States confidently. In this respect, we were interested to learn that many Latin Americans have regarded Canada's handling of relations with the United States as a model to be emulated. The primary requirement is to seek a balance between competing interests, as the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Working Group suggested to us in their submission.

Situated next to the United States, Canada has to find a balance between the practical advantages of interdependence and the political imperatives of independence. Situated between the United States and the Soviet Union, it has to find a balance between co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America and the protection of Canadian sovereignty. Situated on this continent but with wider commitments and interests, it has to find a balance between its North American vocation, its transatlantic vocation and its global vocation. (4)

## **Consultation and Agreed Rules**

Above all else, good communications are central to a good working relationship. Fortunately, the ease of communication between the two governments should make it possible to assess bilateral issues on their merits and handle them according to procedures laid down in advance. Ground rules that have been set for trade and investment and other private sector activities should be observed. Both government and business are making commitments that extend over a long term and they need to be assured of stability and predictability in the arrangements that will apply to their activities. A relationship so intense, complex and pervasive involves what John Holmes has called "intervulnerability", and it must be reinforced by a substantial degree of mutual trust and confidence. While Canada, as the smaller partner, has perhaps a greater interest in seeing the adoption of agreed procedures for reaching decisions affecting the other country, the United States is likewise vulnerable and shares an interest in mutually acceptable ground rules.

A good working relationship between the two countries requires recognition by the United States that many of its policies and actions affect Canada's interests. Ideally this should be reflected in a determination by the United States to consult Canada prior to undertaking new initiatives. This is an area where Canada has frequently had reason to complain in the past, although it must be recognized, first, that the worldwide interests of the United States enormously complicate the task of consulting any one country and, second, that the complexity of the U.S. system of government and the independent power of Congress mean that specific presidential initiatives may be rejected by Congress. Moreover, in the matter of consultation, Canada itself must set a good example, something it has often failed to do in the past.

**The committee recommends that the government not miss any opportunity to emphasize to the government of the United States the importance of advance consultation. As a corollary, Canada should establish its own high standard for**

consulting the United States. Consultation in both directions should go far beyond simply giving advance information and should provide time for dialogue, reflection and policy adjustment.

## Co-ordinating Canada's Policies and Actions

The management of Canada-U.S. relations offers the best illustration of how consistency serves Canada's interests. Only through co-operative work between responsible agencies of the federal and provincial governments in Canada to promote agreed goals and strategies can Canada's influence in Washington be maximized. The Canadian government must be sure, however, to co-ordinate both the formulation of its objectives and a strategy for achieving them.

One of our panelists, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, drew on his experience as secretary of state for external affairs to illustrate the difficulties of getting individual Canadian ministers to co-ordinate their contacts with Washington. The problem is a familiar one, created by ease of communication and the vast amount of official business transacted. We are not prepared to recommend a central clearing house for bilateral contacts, which would be quite impractical, but we are concerned about the consequences when Canada speaks with contradictory voices to Washington.

A further problem is raised when provincial governments project themselves into the conduct of relations with the United States. This phenomenon reflects the degree to which questions falling under the jurisdiction of provinces—including environmental, regulatory and industrial development policies—have become the subject of external relations, but it also owes something to the activist stances adopted by several provincial governments on the international scene in the last decade or so. Whatever the cause, it carries a risk of confusing the United States as to Canada's objectives.

There is also a problem of co-ordination in regard to the private sector. It is hard for those not involved in Canada-U.S. relations from day to day to grasp their scale and complexity. Canadians have many and varied interests that are in some way dependent on the United States. Interest groups with a claim to press in Washington may view the bilateral relationship in the narrow perspective of that claim and will often insist that the Canadian government has an unexploited reserve of influence that it should expend on their behalf. The most difficult aspect of co-ordinating Canada's position is to get across to each of these interest groups that a good working relationship with the United States requires a degree of compromise and give and take on their part.

There is no single solution for achieving co-ordination on these various fronts, public and private. There have been notable successes: everyone acknowledges that the co-ordination and co-operation achieved in 1983 by the federal government, provincial governments and the private sector in defence of Canada's exports of softwood lumber is a model to be emulated. In our view, **the effective management of relations with the United States is impossible unless there is a consistent effort made to achieve internal co-ordination of Canadian policies by all the parties concerned.**

## Finding Allies in the United States

In the past couple of years Canada has been faced with an extremely protectionist mood in the Congress. The growing U.S. trade deficit, combined with the spectre of

deindustrialization of major sectors of its economy, has given rise to a strongly held view that no trading partner is playing fair with the United States. Canada is not the primary target of this hostility, but its huge trade and current surplus with the United States have made it a frequent candidate for protectionist moves.

How does the government defend Canada's interest in such a situation, where emotions run deep and the potential for irrational action is great? It is important in each situation to find out who Canada's allies are in the United States—or, if necessary, to convert adversaries into allies—and to work with them. During the first phase of our hearings, John D. Allan, chief executive officer of Stelco Inc., described how such a combination of tactics had helped fend off allegations that Canada was subsidizing its steel exports:

I remember the last session I had; it was in the White House with Edwin Meese. The Ambassador had set it up for just the two of us. The important thing was that it was finally recognized in the whole process that it must be a combination. At first we felt maybe the federal government was going to run on its own, but they do not know our industry, they do not know the details of it; they did not know we bring coal from Kentucky; they did not know that one of our main customers was Michelin, which has a plant in South Carolina, and we went in then and saw the appropriate Senators from that state....the best combination of dealing is with the Ambassador or somebody from Ottawa in concert with somebody from the industry; that is vital. (11:15)

**It is important that Canada's case be made at every level of the U.S. system and that imagination be used in the search for allies. A combination of persuasive diplomacy and private sector pressure appears to have the greatest effect. Effective co-ordination, patient persuasion, force of example, and constant reiteration of the problem are the keys to success.**

Even the most strenuous and highly organized lobbying may not, however, produce the desired results. The merits of Canada's arguments may be totally disregarded if U.S. legislators link the issue at hand with other bilateral issues or even with totally extraneous matters, such as disagreements between Congress and the U.S. administration. To the extent possible, therefore, Canada must seek to put constraints on the freedom of action of the United States. In return, of course, Canada will have to accept similar constraints, but the price may well be worth paying. The most binding constraints are imposed by institutionalized arrangements, such as the GATT and the Canada-United States Automotive Trade Agreement. Auto trade has not ceased to be a source of contention since the Agreement was signed in 1964, but it has never been as vulnerable to the erratic behaviour of the political process as, for example, trade in softwood lumber is today.

There is already a tacitly understood principle of reciprocity. Canada is on stronger ground in refuting U.S. charges of unfair behaviour if it can point to similar behaviour on the part of the United States. Canada should, for example, meet accusations of unfair Canadian procurement practices by complaining about 'Buy American' legislation, or challenge support for regional subsidies with complaints about small business or minority group set-asides.

Another potentially useful principle is that of keeping each bilateral issue isolated from the rest. We agree with Stephen Clarkson's recommendation to avoid linking one bilateral issue to another in negotiations whenever possible. Canada has been justifiably concerned that the United States, by its weight and influence and by the fact that it has relatively less at stake, would be able to trade off one issue against another if they were



linked, leaving Canada with a complete loss on some issues. Negotiating each issue separately implies at the least a compromise position. We note, however, that it is not always possible to avoid some linkage.

## **Disagreeing with the United States**

Canada's dealings with the United States encompass a broad range of multilateral questions, such as the conduct of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, the U.S. stance on unrest in Central America, the agenda of the forthcoming GATT round, or the question of support for the United Nations and its agencies. Judging from experience, Canada will not share the views of the United States on at least some of these subjects. We have therefore felt it necessary to review how Canada should handle its disagreements over multilateral questions with the United States and, in particular, whether it should make those differences public or express them quietly behind the scenes.

The committee accepts the view that some of Canada's influence with other countries comes from the perception that it is able to carry weight with the United States. Canada's stature in the world rises if it is thought to be capable of making an impact on thinking in Washington. Apart from the natural desire to be effective, this is an additional reason for giving careful thought to how Canada expresses its opinions in Washington. Influence is an asset to be husbanded and used cautiously.

The more aggressive role now being played by Congress, coupled with the lack of party discipline, has meant that a high proportion of important decisions in the United States emerge from an uninhibited and public contest between conflicting points of view. Sometimes a strong public statement by a respected foreign government may tip the scales in the U.S. debate, but this kind of intervention needs to be thought through carefully. Apart from sometimes contributing to the U.S. debate, Canada has its own interests and agenda. There are many occasions when the government must speak out in Canada and explain its position on major international questions to its own public, especially when the subject is controversial. At the same time, Canadians must have the maturity to accept that the U.S. government has a similar freedom to comment on policies being followed by Canada and other countries.

**We conclude that the government should remain flexible in its choice of means to express disagreement with U.S. policies on international issues. The government can vary the degree of publicity accorded to such disagreement in terms of its language, the forum in which it is expressed and the stature of the spokesman. The choice of tactics should depend on the specific circumstances, keeping in mind not just the point at issue, but also the extent of Canada's interest and the importance attached to it by the U.S. government.**

## **Bilateral Mechanisms**

There have been many proposals for supplementing the multitude of ad hoc contacts between governments of Canada and the United States with institutional innovations or improvements. Recently proposals have come with greater frequency because of some new problems in the bilateral relationship. Foremost among them is the idea of a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment, empowered to undertake fact finding, make recommendations, and alert both sides to disputes that are threatening to emerge in the future.

There is a powerful attraction for Canada in such proposals. Canadian governments have an urgent need for advance warning of initiatives being contemplated within the executive branch of the U.S. government, whether they are new import measures, new investment regulations or new weapons systems. There is also a recurring need to concentrate the minds of senior U.S. decision makers on Canada.

We are not recommending, however, that the government move quickly to establish any new bilateral institution. Each new issue that arises is often quite unlike those that preceded it, involving a different set of players on both sides and requiring a new strategy and approach on Canada's part. A commission made up of appointed members could fall into disuse, as did the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which met for a few years during the late 1950s and early '60s.

One model put forward by advocates of the proposal is the International Joint Commission (IJC), and its experience provides grounds for proceeding cautiously. Useful as it has been in resolving local trans-boundary water disputes and in monitoring environmental conditions in the Great Lakes, the IJC has proved incapable of tackling the acid rain issue, because a political consensus for action does not yet exist. Trade and investment are two particular politically sensitive policy areas, and it can be anticipated that neither government would be prepared to delegate decision-making authority to such a body. It might be a useful mechanism, however, for joint fact finding and for alerting both sides to upcoming problems.

The government should keep an open mind on this suggestion. Great strides have been made in improving Canada's representation in Washington and throughout the United States, and using the diplomatic mechanism, supplemented by direct government-to-government contacts, promises much greater flexibility than new institutions. Nevertheless, should enhanced trading arrangements be negotiated, there will probably be a need for some kind of joint mechanism to adjudicate differences between the two governments within limits spelled out in an agreement. Should any new body be set up, Canada would be well advised to adhere rigorously to the principle of equal representation that has been applied successfully in some instances in the past.

In our view, it is of great importance to Canada to keep the attention of U.S. leaders fixed on the bilateral agenda. New arrangements for doing this at the political level have recently been put in place and are working extremely well. The annual summit meetings inaugurated in 1985 ensure that once a year the Prime Minister and the President survey the principal elements of the relationship. The meetings give the two leaders a chance to discuss and try to resolve the issues they consider most important. The exercise is also useful as a means of concentrating the attention of the vast U.S. bureaucracy on Canadian issues. In addition, in 1982 the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State initiated the practice of holding quarterly meetings, at which they review all the principal irritants affecting relations between the two countries and try in practical terms to resolve their differences. These two levels of meetings appear to complement each other effectively.

There are always going to be a number of bilateral disputes that are not readily negotiable. In at least some instances, these could do damage to the relationship if left unresolved. Canada and the United States have had recourse to third-party settlement on a few occasions in their history, the most recent being the decision to submit the Gulf of Maine boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice. George Alexandrowicz, representing a joint committee of the Canadian and American Bar Associations, recommended to the committee that the two countries should regularly resort to third-party adjudication as a method for settling disputes.

There are now three major maritime boundary disputes with the United States that remain unresolved—the seaward extension of the boundary line inside the Strait of Juan da Fuca, the seaward extension of point A of the AB line inside Dixon Entrance, and the seaward extension of the land boundary between Yukon and Alaska, in each case to the limit of the 200-mile territorial sea. Both countries have a strong interest in handling these differences in a civilized and efficient way. As a first step, **we recommend that the government seek to initiate negotiations with the United States to settle the seaward extension of the three maritime boundaries.** This may be an opportune time to make the attempt because the collapse of oil prices and the slackening of exploration for underwater hydrocarbon reserves may have rendered the disputes a little less sensitive. If the attempt fails, the committee believes that Canada should be prepared to request third-party adjudication so as to remove these sources of dispute, which can only go on to be fought over more keenly at some time in the future.

## Developing Expertise

The management of Canada-U.S. relations should be treated as a specialized task. We believe there are some practical measures needed to increase the expertise and aptitude of both the public and the private sector in handling relations with the United States. Canadians do, of course, pick up a general knowledge of the United States from their education and from the media, but this is insufficient for professionals who must understand fully the complexities of the American political system. Nor is it any longer possible to rely, as was the case a generation ago, on close personal relations between Canadian and American officials at senior levels to smooth over difficulties.

**We recommend that a regular series of seminars be held expressly for middle-rank career officials of the governments of both countries, possibly including officials from state and provincial governments.** These seminars would be intended as a career development tool to deepen awareness and understanding among future policy makers of the many dimensions of the bilateral relationship. The seminars would also afford an opportunity to build personal ties between the Canadian and U.S. bureaucracies that might be valuable later on. We are not troubled by the prospect that participants might not be assigned direct responsibilities for bilateral affairs in their later careers. It is desirable that senior officials in both governments responsible for areas other than foreign policy have some awareness of the extent of the relationship and of how much the two countries affect each other.

In the past decade, the government of Canada has turned its attention to providing financial support to Canadian studies centres in several important U.S. universities. The rationale for the program is to promote a greater knowledge of Canada among U.S. university graduates. The policy is commendable, but its effects are limited to post-secondary students. Equally important are impressions formed earlier in a student's education. The committee was told of spontaneous efforts by a high school in Michigan to promote greater knowledge of Canada among its students. This experiment made us reflect on the desirability of commissioning teaching materials designed for the U.S. primary and secondary school systems that could help students across the United States learn more about their northern neighbour. We think this idea should be explored carefully. If it is found to have merit, Canadian consulates could be asked to promote the use of these materials in local school systems.



## Dealing with Congress

Canada wants to be able to deal with a government that is capable of making commitments and sticking to them. The decentralized decision-making system in the United States and, particularly, the power of Congress complicate bilateral relations enormously. They can be the cause of considerable acrimony, as was the case when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee failed to ratify the 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreements that had been negotiated between the two governments, with the result that the president's request for ratification had to be withdrawn. To reduce the risk of surprise in future, **whenever negotiations are being undertaken with the United States that ultimately require congressional approval, we recommend that the Embassy of Canada in Washington continue to undertake its own independent soundings of the state of congressional opinion.**

The United States is going to change neither its constitution nor its politics. The diffusion of power gives U.S. negotiators an advantage in that they can try to extract concessions from foreign governments by raising the prospect of congressional rejection. In response to the increasing influence of the Congress, the government of Canada has changed its tactics completely in the past few years. The government, through its embassy in Washington, is now actively involved in conveying Canadian views to members of Congress. In addition, the government of Canada and Canadian industries that are in some way threatened have begun in the last few years to retain U.S. advisers to follow and report on developments. This is especially important for issues before Congress and its committees that affect Canadian industries directly and indirectly. In addition, the government should examine the feasibility of assisting Canadian companies facing U.S. subsidy investigations, which are expensive and time consuming and appear to be invoked much more frequently and readily than in the past.

The annual meetings of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Association, as well as the special meetings organized from time to time for urgent discussions of a major current issue, offer an excellent opportunity for Canadian Members of Parliament to reach U.S. Senators and Representatives. With the enhanced role of the Congress, the importance of this regular encounter and of special meetings has increased. The Association also provides an important channel for exchanging information on an 'early-warning' basis. Its meetings constitute an important tool at Canada's disposal. Continuity in the membership of delegations, as well as some means of following up on information gained, would enhance the usefulness of these meetings. The committee also received favourable reports of unofficial visits organized by the Centre for Legislative Exchange for members of the U.S. Congress and their staffs.

We also commend to the Canadian business community the initiative taken by Northern Telecom in assigning a middle-rank executive to participate in the Congressional Assistants Program run by the Conference Board of the United States. This program places about a dozen U.S. business people on the staff of congressional committees each year. It offers participants a means of acquiring invaluable knowledge of the workings of the U.S. legislative process, how Senators and Representatives deal with pressures from their constituencies, and how influence from outside can be applied to greatest effect. The interests of major Canadian businesses are increasingly being affected by what Congress does, and these businesses are having to account for this in decision making and attempt to intervene in the process themselves. They could be much more proficient at this if one of their senior executives had had direct experience of how the Congress works.

In a similar vein, **the government of Canada should consider assigning a couple of junior officials to the Congressional Intern Program each year as part of their training.** A number of foreign governments already do this, apparently with mutual benefit.

### A Northern Dimension for Canadian Foreign Policy

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Pointing to a previous "lack of geopolitical perspective", Paul Painchaud of Laval University put the case for a northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy dramatically:

We have so long neglected the only international and regional system to which we really belong: the circumpolar system. . . . The Arctic. . . is the only region where we are a major geographic power. (49:40-41)

The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Canada) conveyed the same message in political terms in its brief: "In the international north Canada can be a major player." (16)

**The arctic region is rapidly becoming an area of international attention. Canada's huge stake in this region requires the development of a coherent arctic policy, an essential element of which must be a northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy.**

The major problem in treating the Arctic as a region is that, although the physical geography of the area gives it a natural structure, the polar ice cap and the distances between communities have prevented development of the kind of connections that characterize the Atlantic and Pacific basins. No trade routes cross the Arctic Ocean, and even though there is considerable commerce along the northern coast of the Soviet Union, these are waters from which all foreign vessels are excluded. However, aircraft and other modern means of communication are to some extent reducing the barriers of ice and distance. The population of the Arctic is very small and dispersed, with Murmansk the only large city north of the Arctic Circle. Nevertheless, the indigenous Inuit population is culturally and linguistically homogeneous, which greatly helps to create a common regional perspective. So the Arctic is a region, but a region with a difference.

The arctic community, that is, the countries that border on the Arctic Ocean, comprises Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, Norway, and Denmark, through its self-governing province of Greenland. Sweden and Finland have no access to northern waters, but they have territory north of the Arctic Circle and indigenous northern peoples, who are forming links with other northern native peoples. Iceland is sometimes regarded as an arctic country, although it lies south of the Circle.

Historically, none of these countries has had a sense of belonging to a geographically defined region. In every case the main pull has been towards the south or east and

west. However, in varying degrees, they increasingly share an awareness of the challenge of the north as well as a growing realization that there are benefits to be gained from co-operation.

The position of the Inuit is, of course, entirely different. Mark Gordon rightly emphasized in his testimony that, in strengthening Canada's claims in the arctic archipelago, Canada's "only real true allies are the Inuit. . . . It is not a hinterland to us; it is our homeland." (25:13) The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Canada) reminded us that "Canadian Inuit had always used those waters and their ice cover in winter, thereby providing Canada with the case in international law required to secure Canadian rights." (6) For Canada to deal effectively with its arctic citizens, however, Mr. Gordon emphasized that "there should be some social and economic stability created in the north. . . . And one of the vehicles. . . . for doing this is the land claims settlement." (25:13) The Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI) went further, claiming that


The historic and continuing use of arctic waters by Canadian Inuit is certainly more economically viable and environmentally sound than approaches to Canadian sovereignty that advocate use of multi-million-dollar icebreakers and aircraft surveillance of the Northwest Passage. (60:75)

The committee believes Mark Gordon and the ICNI are correct. The Inuit are Canada's most important support in the Arctic, and government policy should reflect this perception. **Canada should give priority to achieving an acceptable land settlement in the North and encourage efforts to find governmental structures that would support Inuit cultural autonomy within the Canadian federation. Support should be given to the development of renewable resources, particularly fishing. Abroad, Canada should make strenuous efforts to reinforce the efforts of Indigenous Survival International, whose Canadian chapter addressed us in Yellowknife, to resist campaigns, especially in Europe, to ban the import of fur products, the trapping of which represents a major source of income for Inuit and Indian peoples in Canada.**

Mark Gordon described the efforts of the Inuit to establish links across national boundaries. He referred particularly to the Inuit Circumpolar Conference joining Inuit in Greenland, Canada and Alaska. He acknowledged, however, that all efforts to link up with Inuit living along the Soviet eastern arctic coast have so far failed. (There are no Inuit in the Soviet western arctic.) However, the invitation extended to the Honourable David Crombie, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to visit the Inuit communities in the Soviet arctic under the new exchange program in May 1986—a first for a Canadian minister—may be an encouraging sign of a new and more open Soviet approach.

The experience recounted by Mark Gordon dramatizes the problem of circumpolar co-operation. The Soviet Union occupies over 50 per cent of the land mass bordering on the Arctic Ocean and it regards that part of its territory as having a special strategic importance. Despite the interests that should be shared by Canada and the USSR, which together occupy more than four-fifths of the arctic land mass, it has taken a long time to work out mutually acceptable exchange arrangements. The 1971 exchange agreement with the USSR and the joint commission set up under it had borne little fruit by 1979 when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led Canada to place a freeze on all organized contacts. In recent years Canada has lifted this prohibition, and since 1984 several northern exchanges have been arranged. The first impressions are that this time the arrangements cover policy areas of interest to Canada. However, there is no assured funding in Canada for this program, which is being financed on an ad hoc and uncertain base. **The committee considers that an arctic exchange program with the**





Map courtesy of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

The solid line shows the anticipated international shipping route through the arctic islands. The dotted line shows the 1985 route of the *Polar Sea*.

**Soviet Union is an effective way to increase Canadian knowledge of the north as well as provide a basis for improving East-West relations. We recommend that the existing exchange program be properly funded.**

**More generally, we recommend a concerted program to develop co-operative arrangements with all northern states.** To date the only international agreement involving all arctic states concerns the protection of the polar bear. Canada should be prepared to collaborate bilaterally or with groups of countries as appropriate. For example, Franklyn Griffiths suggested at our Quebec City panel on arctic security that Canada invite Soviet scientists to join Canadian scientists in a co-operative project based on an ice station in the Arctic Ocean. We think this is a good idea. One area deserving particular attention is developing arctic environmental standards. In seeking to put this principle into effect, it will be necessary to show some imagination.

**We recommend that Canada pay particular attention to developing good relations with Greenland** which, after Alaska, is Canada's closest neighbour in the Arctic. Gwynne Dyer, in a brief submitted to the committee, expressed some concern about future political developments in Greenland, where political parties are divided over whether to press for independence. It is in Canada's interest and in the interest of Canadian Inuit to strengthen connections across the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay. In particular, support should be given to finding opportunities for economic co-operation between Greenland and northern Canada, as suggested by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada in their brief to the committee. The 1983 agreement for marine environmental co-operation in the Davis Strait-Baffin Bay area should be fleshed out.

During the Second World War, Canada appointed a Canadian consul to Greenland, but the office was closed at war's end. The people of Greenland are reaching out for foreign contacts, and Canada is their closest neighbour. **Subject to the agreement of the government of Denmark, we urge the opening of a Canadian consulate in Greenland** at an early date to demonstrate Canada's commitment to special relations with Greenland, to serve as a source of information about developments on the island, and to build links between the two countries.

## **The Question of Sovereignty**

The deficiencies in backing up Canada's claim to sovereignty were highlighted by last summer's voyage through the Northwest Passage by the *Polar Sea*, a U.S. coast guard icebreaker. Whatever the motive—a challenge to Canada's claim to the Passage or, as U.S. authorities maintained, a quick and inexpensive way to get the *Polar Sea* from Greenland to Alaska—the U.S. government was careful not to make a request for permission to make the crossing and thereby imply in any way recognition of Canada's claim to the strait. Instead, the United States made clear that the voyage was without prejudice to the legal position of the other side.

As in 1969, when the *Manhattan* sailed through the Passage, the voyage of the *Polar Sea* caused a rush of popular anxiety in Canada. Pressure built quickly, and on September 10, 1985, the government responded in a statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Clark announced a number of measures intended to strengthen Canada's claim, including notification that Canada was drawing straight baselines around the arctic archipelago to delineate its claim, the removal of the 1970 reservation to the jurisdiction of the International Court

of Justice,\* increased aerial surveillance, naval activities in Canada's eastern arctic waters, and construction of a class 8 polar icebreaker. Taken together these measures have the potential significantly to strengthen Canada's claim to sovereignty over the waters of the arctic archipelago.

Although Canada's claim to sovereignty over the islands of the archipelago is beyond all doubt, the status of the Northwest Passage, which has both symbolic and defensive importance for Canada, is questioned by the United States. In view of recent strategic developments, which are described below, Canada should be able to control the movement of all classes of vessels through the waters between the arctic islands. The spontaneous popular reactions to the voyages of the *Manhattan* and the *Polar Sea* show that Canadians feel strongly about their claims to these waters.

Between the two voyages by the U.S. ships, three other ships, the Polish *Gdynia* and the Swedish *Lindblatt Explorer* and *World Explorer* made full or partial transits of the Northwest Passage. In all cases permission was requested and granted. The *Polar Sea* did not ask permission, although Canadian authorities were informed of the U.S. coast guard's intentions, and the government of Canada ultimately agreed to the passage. The other superpower, the Soviet Union, anxious to establish international recognition of its claim that the Northeast Passage along its northern coast is internal waters, gave cautious support to Canada's claim.

In its supporting brief to the committee, the Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs suggested a three-step approach to resolving questions about Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage: first, an effort to achieve agreement with the United States; second, if this attempt failed, a joint approach with the United States to third-party arbitration; and, third, if the United States were to decline to be associated with such a step, unilateral action to secure a judicial settlement. During our hearings in Vancouver, we had an opportunity to review this advice at some length with Bruce McKinnon of the University of British Columbia.

Professor McKinnon made a persuasive case that Canada should try to secure U.S. recognition of Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage in exchange for a right for U.S. vessels to go through the Passage. He pointed out that such an agreement, confirmed by treaty, would be binding only on the United States and Canada and would not obligate other countries. Nevertheless, McKinnon felt the approach was justified given that the only questioning of Canada's claim has come from the United States and given the ease and certainty of the outcome. Moreover, recognition of Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage by the United States, a major sea power, would greatly strengthen Canada's claim internationally.

Although Professor McKinnon thought a bilateral agreement was the best solution for Canada, he was doubtful that the United States could be persuaded to accept Canada's claim at this time.

I think the U.S. government probably feels that it simply cannot afford, at least publicly, to give way on any one of these disputes involving a strait. It would set a bad precedent for all its other disputes. (51:111)

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\* In response to the 1969 voyage of the *Manhattan*, Parliament passed the *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, proclaiming a 100-mile pollution prevention zone in the area. This was an entirely new legal concept, and at the time the government decided that the new law might not stand up to a challenge in the International Court of Justice. To protect the new Canadian position, the government entered a reservation as to the competence of the Court. The removal of the reservation was made possible by developments in arctic environmental law achieved at the Law of the Sea Conference.



In short, the worldwide maritime and naval interests of the United States make it reluctant to concede that any strait—even one as environmentally unique as the Northwest Passage—could be regarded as something other than an international strait with unlimited access. Part of their reluctance, he thought, was fear of making a commitment now in case technical capabilities changed in the future.

Despite this pessimistic assessment, **we recommend that the government of Canada renew its efforts to secure the agreement of the United States to Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage.** Canada has some leverage. First, concluding an agreement the United States would avoid the uncertainties involved in referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. Second, a resolution of the matter would allow the United States to send its ships through the Passage with no fear of damaging its good relations with Canada. A treaty would be a quick and tidy way of addressing the problem.

In the event that the United States clearly rejected a new Canadian approach to recognize its claim through a bilateral agreement, should Canada then press quickly for third-party arbitration? Delay might work to Canada's advantage, so long as there is no new challenge. If there is, Canada would have to respond quickly, and we believe the best move in that event would be to insist on referring the question to the International Court of Justice. Several expert witnesses—law professors Pharand, Cohen and McKinnon—all thought Canada already had a reasonably strong case. Whatever the outcome, it would resolve a dispute that could otherwise do great damage to relations between Canada and the United States.

Given the difficult choices faced by the U.S. authorities in this matter, the committee surmises that the U.S. government may also see merit at this time in avoiding action that Canada could interpret as a challenge. Until there is a pressing need for a U.S. vessel to transit the Passage, on balance the United States loses least by waiting. If in future the need for a U.S. vessel to use the Passage was sufficiently great, the United States might even decide then that its best course was to ask Canada's permission. Such a step would, it is true, imply recognition of Canada's claim, but it would avoid the uncertainties associated with a reference to the Court.

Accordingly, unless the United States agrees to recognize Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage by way of a bilateral treaty, **the committee's preferred course of action at this time is a deliberate decision to allow time to pass rather than pressing for a decision by the International Court of Justice.** In order that this issue not be allowed to damage relations between the two countries, however, we believe the government should be frank and open with the U.S. government and make clear the course of action it is following.

## Defence Questions

In recent years the strategic dimensions of the Arctic have assumed new importance, owing primarily to developments in missile technology. We believe that the increased military activity in the arctic region justifies greater attention being paid within NATO to the strategic issues arising out of the arctic dimensions of the East-West confrontation.

With regard to the defence of Canada's northern lands, the testimony was categorical. In the words of George Lindsey, Chief of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence,

The impassable surface and the great expanse of the Arctic Ocean provide a valuable protection against invasion from the Soviet Union, to which the nearby uninhabited Canadian archipelago and northern mainland adds further depth. With such a barrier, major land attack is not a serious threat. (49:7)

Apart from a headquarters unit in Yellowknife and a few small detachments at points such as Alert and Inuvik, the only land-based force in the Canadian Arctic is the Rangers. Its 640 members are drawn almost entirely from the indigenous population. They receive some training and minimal equipment. Their primary function, in the words of Mark Gordon, is to be “the eyes and ears of the Canadian armed forces in the north.” (25:14) Mr. Gordon went on to suggest an upgrading of the equipment and training of the Rangers, comparing them unfavourably with the Inuit National Guard in Alaska who are “much better trained and...much better equipped than the Canadian Rangers are.” (25:32) With Soviet territory only 50 miles away, the situation in Alaska is different. Nevertheless, the Canadian Rangers is an intelligence-gathering service, and for this reason we think that improved training and an enhanced communications capability would be desirable. The Rangers are an important expression of Canada’s sovereignty over the land and waters of the Arctic and should be given additional support.

On the air side, the development of cruise missiles, which are hard to locate and destroy once launched, has given new significance to the Soviet bomber threat. The testing of a new Soviet bomber, the *Blackjack*, is seen in some quarters as evidence that the Soviet Union may be placing greater reliance on the cruise missile system. The revived need for an effective bomber identification and air defence system—which is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5 and about which the committee is divided—has been reflected in two decisions of the Canadian and the U.S. governments: the 1985 decision to build the North Warning System and the March 1986 decision to renew the NORAD agreement for five years. Successive Canadian governments have taken the view that NORAD, as well as fulfilling its primary function of North American air defence, also serves to enhance Canadian sovereignty by providing a framework for co-operation with the United States. In Chapter 5, however, we draw attention to impending developments relating to SDI that could present Canadians with a difficult choice in the near future.

Ice in the Arctic Ocean rules out naval operations by surface vessels. In this harsh environment icebreakers have little security value: satellites or aircraft are more effective for reconnaissance, and aircraft can most quickly dispose of any hostile surface vessel. Icebreakers more numerous and powerful than Canada has now would be needed to assist regular commercial traffic through the Northwest Passage, whenever that need should develop.

A decade ago, it was widely anticipated that there would be rapid growth in commercial maritime transport—in the form of ice-strengthened or submersible tankers—through the arctic seas. But the massive oil finds in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska have not yet been repeated in the Beaufort Sea. Now, with the collapse of oil prices and the end of federal grant programs, exploration in the Canadian Arctic is tailing off. As a result, the commercial transport of oil by tankers has been postponed to an indefinite date in the future. Although mining activity is continuing to take place on islands in the eastern Arctic, navigational problems in these waters are much less severe, and for now there is no regular commercial need for heavy icebreakers. The need for effective control remains, however, and a polar class icebreaker has an important role to play in this respect.

In this situation, the main function of the proposed polar icebreaker would be to strengthen Canada's claim to sovereignty. For this reason Donat Pharand advocated installing light armament on the icebreaker so that the ship's presence would have "at least a quasi-military" character. (25:33) Other testimony supported using an icebreaker as a base for scientific work and for mapping the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. However, not all witnesses favoured a polar icebreaker. Admiral R.H. Falls (retired), who submitted a brief on the subject, questioned its value even on sovereignty grounds. He doubted that its presence would deter the United States from sending a ship through the Northwest Passage, should they decide to do so.

The committee did not have time to make the careful study that would be needed to make a decision on a matter as complex and many-sided as whether Canada should acquire a polar icebreaker. An icebreaker of this size and power is extremely costly, and its utility would be limited until commercial traffic begins, which might occur in the 1990s.

The strategic importance of arctic waters has been greatly enhanced by recent developments in submarine missile technology. The increased range and accuracy of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) has made it possible for the USSR to station its newer SLBM submarines in the relative safety of Soviet northern coastal waters. Nonetheless, some of these submarines may be dispersed under the Soviet side of the arctic ice cap for added protection, and there is reason to suspect—although the committee did not receive testimony confirming this assumption—that Soviet and U.S. submarines pass through the Canadian archipelago from time to time.

Knowledgeable witnesses such as Albert Legault and Franklyn Griffiths spoke of sonar systems capable of monitoring submarine movements in the arctic straits, although George Lindsey referred to the technical difficulties caused by moving ice, which creates noise and displaces the sonars. Such systems are purely passive. Under present conditions, if Canada wanted action taken against intruders for any reason, it would have to call on U.S. submarines.

This situation prompted committee members to inquire of witnesses what would happen if Canada were to acquire submarines able to operate under the ice. Witnesses replied that not only would this strengthen Canada's assertion of sovereignty in the region, but it would also put the U.S. navy in a position where it would have to share knowledge with Canada of the movement of U.S. submarines in Canadian waters. The result could be enhanced naval co-operation of the United States with Canada.

The Senate Committee on National Defence proposed in its report on Canada's maritime defence (May 1983) that Canada proceed to acquire a fleet of modern diesel-electric submarines, pointing to their great effectiveness as weapons in anti-submarine warfare. While the report focused mainly on ice-free waters, it expressed the opinion that "adequate surveillance of the Northwest Passage could be provided, for the time being, by conventionally powered submarines stationed at the entry and the exit of the passage". (p. 51) **The committee recommends that the possibility of equipping the Canadian navy with diesel-electric submarines be reviewed in the context of a general examination of the country's naval forces and, more generally, of Canada's defence policy.**

A number of factors must be considered carefully before a decision can be reached that Canada should acquire modern submarines. The cost of standard nuclear-powered submarines is very high. The committee was informed of developments in conventional propulsion systems that could permit non-nuclear-powered submarines to undertake



extensive under-ice operations. Although these systems are considerably cheaper, they have not yet been proven. The cost of even conventional modern submarines would have to be assessed carefully, because, apart from acquisition costs, there are servicing, training, shore establishment and other program costs, all of which are expensive. Finally, if a decision to acquire modern submarines were to involve a transfer of some resources from Canadian forces in Europe, the government would have to take into account the reaction of Canada's NATO allies.

Among the witnesses who addressed arctic security questions, a few proposed that Canada press for making the Arctic Ocean a nuclear-free zone. Sometimes this suggestion was associated with the idea that a legal régime should be promoted for the Arctic region similar to that established in the Antarctic under the treaty of 1959.

We compared the situations in the antarctic and arctic regions from a legal perspective. The continent of Antarctica belongs to no country. To avoid the risk of competing claims, the international community agreed to internationalize the continent a generation ago. By contrast, all the land in the arctic region is part of the territory of one state or another. Moreover, viewed from the North Pole, 44 per cent of the horizon is Russian and 8 per cent is American. The whole region is therefore a major focus of great power rivalry, whereas Antarctica is remote from the strategic confrontation. In our opinion, the situations in the two polar regions are completely different.

We recognize that a major obstacle to establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Arctic is the extent to which the superpowers have already committed nuclear forces in those waters. One-half of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet is based at Murmansk, and Soviet SLBM submarines are now deployed in the Soviet arctic basin, where they enjoy a very large measure of immunity. U.S. nuclear submarines undoubtedly also operate in arctic waters. For both the Soviets and the Americans, the Arctic Ocean has acquired increased strategic significance in recent years. In addition, since nuclear-powered submarines are for the present the only vessels capable of operating under the arctic ice, nuclear-powered submarine tankers may in future be employed to transport oil through the Arctic. Accordingly, although we are concerned about the militarization of the arctic region and would like to see this situation reversed, declaring the Arctic Ocean a nuclear-free zone would need the active support of the Soviet Union and the United States. **We recommend that Canada, in co-operation with other arctic and nordic nations, seek the demilitarization of the arctic region through pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as through a general approach to arms control and disarmament.**



## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### The Case for Constructive Internationalism

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**We conclude that Canada's activities abroad should be guided by an approach based on constructive internationalism. This would impart both a vision and sense of purpose to Canadian foreign policy.**

**Constructive internationalism** recommends itself to us, not because it conjures up nostalgia for an imagined golden age of Canadian foreign policy, but because it **most accurately describes the stance that Canada should take towards a difficult and uncertain international environment.** The essence of constructive internationalism is that, in an interdependent world, international responsibilities should be interwoven with Canada's basic national aims. In practice it is almost instinctive for Canadians to look at the world in this way because geography and history have prepared them to be internationalists. Protected by great oceans from the violence that affects so many regions of the world, Canadians do not have to distinguish between national security and international security. For Canadians they are identical.

All of Canada's major foreign policy goals, particularly the search for security and the pursuit of economic prosperity, as well as the preservation of justice and democracy, are tied to the common interests of the international community. Thus we agree with the many witnesses who rejected a foreign policy governed solely by narrowly defined self-interest. We share their view that foreign policy should amount to much more than a projection of domestic interests abroad. We think that **Canada has a great deal more to gain from a posture of confident idealism than from one that is mean-spirited and ungenerous to the world at large.**

By any sensibly broad definition, Canada's interests are tightly bound up with the effective working of international institutions, with the preservation of a well developed network of norms and rules, with the maintenance of international stability and peace, with accelerated development in the Third World, and with a lessening of the potential for regional conflict.

We believe that those who formulate and seek to influence foreign policy should be guided by a vision of Canada's role in the world. We agree with the CIIA Working Group, who contended that Canada's influence depends partly on the coherence of its foreign policy and that a sense of purpose is needed to provide this coherence. Such a sense of purpose comes with the realization that the international system requires serious overhaul. That the international order is in disarray and in need of renewal is



nowhere contested. **A major objective of Canadian foreign policy should be a broad effort to strengthen the effectiveness of international institutions.**

Canada is not the only country fitted to undertake this task, but it is one of a very small number that could do it. The superpowers are confined, in certain respects, by their own weight and responsibilities, whereas the vast majority of nations may not have sufficient resources to tackle the problem as effectively. No longer preoccupied with the goal of international recognition for itself, Canada now has the maturity and self-confidence to promote a larger international purpose.

The challenges of interdependence necessitate multilateral co-operation. This may be an obvious truism, but it still takes enormous political skill, together with tenacity and strength of purpose, to put it into practice. For Canada this means continuing to develop ties with like-minded states, to seek membership in informal or institutionalized groups of states, to strengthen international institutions, and to help bring countries of emerging importance into the management of the global economy. Regional or international mechanisms are needed to disseminate information, facilitate the sharing of responsibility between states, and co-ordinate national action.

Moreover, from Canada's point of view—and from the perspective of a great many other countries—the attractiveness of multilateral action is that it can be made to produce a greater degree of international order, consisting in a broad framework of international regulations, rules and institutions. Such a framework is particularly important to Canada in managing its international economic relations. If Canada and its major trading partners are formally committed to internationally agreed principles and rules of conduct in world trade, Canada's position is the stronger. Principles and rules enhance the consistency and predictability of the international system. This is to Canada's advantage, because its capacities, however substantial, do not allow it to take many risks if it wants to maintain a diversified and technologically advanced economy. There is thus a compelling argument for directing a good deal of Canada's attention, creativity and effort to the development, repair and renewal of arrangements that strengthen international stability, both political and economic.

Another good reason why Canada should be attached to multilateralism is the prospect that it can bolster the country's influence. In multilateral settings there is an opportunity to establish links with other countries of comparable weight and opinion. Canada is often suited to offer a lead in such settings. Moreover, by making common cause with others, the weight of the views Canada advocates can be increased significantly.

There is strength in numbers. Canada's representatives abroad are at their most effective when they know how to 'work the table', to recruit support for a common position. That position carries more weight in Washington or other capitals when it is known that a coalition of governments has lined up behind it.

Constructive internationalism, as the committee conceives it, by no means precludes taking unilateral initiatives and welding bilateral links. There is no way a country with as complex a set of international objectives as Canada is going to be able to refrain from the kinds of initiatives it has already undertaken, not just with the United States but also with the European Communities, Japan, Mexico and others. The possible consequences of multilateralism, bilateralism and even unilateralism should, however, be channelled and shaped by the kind of setting that constructive internationalism provides.

This is accomplished partly by accelerating multilateral activity and revitalizing multilateral forums, as an alternative to bilateral relations. In some circumstances this may give Canada the option to shift some difficult questions that arise in its relations with the United States from one context to the other. More often, there will be an opportunity to manage the interplay between bilateral and multilateral handling of the same issue. If the two are kept in tandem, it would be a sensible strategy for Canada to try to gain ground in a multilateral negotiation so as to put pressure on the United States to concede the same point in bilateral dealings.

Even more significant is the way an energetic internationalism could balance Canada's necessarily intense relationship with the United States. Apart from many concrete benefits—in the form of new outlets for Canadian talents, new vitality for Canadian culture and alternative trading relationships—there is an important psychological advantage to be gained from this. Both Canadians and observers of Canada outside its borders need to be kept constantly reminded that the country can have a wide range of international involvements and that there are a multitude of ways to manifest its national personality. Internationalism therefore helps preserve both the image and the reality of Canadian independence and distinctiveness.

**Constructive internationalism fulfils twin purposes: orienting Canadians to the external environment in a manner that appears most likely to serve their interests, and responding to the aspirations manifested by the hundreds of Canadians that appeared before the committee for an active and productive international role. A fuller realization of these aspirations depends on the government finding ways to devolve opportunities to the non-governmental sector for international activity by Canadians and encouraging the voluntarist streak that runs so markedly through the Canadian psyche.**

Central to our concept of constructive internationalism is an acceptance that means are limited and that careful and deliberate choices must be made about the timing, the kind and the degree of international action. There is a great deal to be lost by proclaiming stands and launching initiatives that cannot be backed up with commitments of influence or resources. If this happens, Canada risks losing the respect of foreign governments, the future impact of its foreign policy may be diluted, and a sense of disillusionment may be engendered among its own citizens, detracting from popular support for an active foreign policy. Canada's activities abroad must remain firmly grounded in a realistic assessment of what Canada is capable of accomplishing in the international arena. In addition, Canadians must not lose sight of the fact that the country's capacity to undertake internationalist policies requires the support of a strong and competitive economy.

We accept that Canada must be guided in its approach to regional conflicts elsewhere in the world by a sense of proportion and caution, but we would not want the government to ignore John Sigler's strong plea for an activist Canadian policy as an encouragement to others:

We desperately need the example of diplomatic successes in regional conflict resolution, in preventing crisis and confrontations, if we are to sustain any sense of hope for change. Whether the Canadian role is central or marginal in any such effort is not the important point; the point is that the effort must be made if any example is to be set for ourselves and for others. (30:7)

The judicious tailoring of foreign policy initiatives to suit foreign policy resources is characteristic of constructive internationalism. In our view, an understanding of Canada's limitations should serve not as a formula for retreat but as a formula for

effectiveness. It is entirely appropriate that Canada should make part of its contribution to security by specializing in arms controls and peacekeeping and part of its contribution to economic well-being and human rights by concentrating on development assistance. These are areas where Canada has unexampled expertise, undoubted capability, and an international reputation.

By the standard of effectiveness, Canadians are justified in making a whole-hearted commitment to the international arena. Their common experience of building a distinctive social and political order qualifies them to assist in shaping a better international order, where anarchy and violence are replaced by civilized forms of state behaviour. Their membership in a society characterized by justice and abundance has provided Canadians with the moral and material resources to shoulder a major responsibility for bettering international society. At the same time, the collective maturity and self-confidence that Canadians as a people have gained from resolving internal differences and finding ways to keep pulling together serve as a constant reminder of the need for tolerance and understanding of the interests and aspirations of others. In these respects, the strength that Canadians draw from their history provides a similar foundation for a confident and constructive internationalism.



## Conclusions and Recommendations

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The committee's principal conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapters 4 to 11. The purpose of the Foreword and the three opening chapters is to establish a framework for the committee's analysis of specific policy areas.

The committee's conclusions and recommendations were shaped by three factors. Foremost among them was the concerns expressed by Canadians who submitted briefs or presented their views orally. Chapter 1 indicates that our witnesses manifested a pronounced concern for international security; warned us about how the welfare of Canadians might be affected by international economic developments; demonstrated a mix of confidence and caution in approaching the question of living next to the United States; called for more energetic promotion of human rights and international development within Canada's foreign policy; and, in general, advocated a responsible and active role for Canada abroad. Their message combined an ambition to see Canada's reach extended with an awareness of the complexities and challenges posed by the international environment.

A second factor shaping our views was our assessment of what Canada could hope to accomplish in the international arena, which is contained in Chapter 2. We concluded that Canada does possess a significant capacity for international action that goes beyond the defence of its immediate, short-run interests. At the same time, there are limits to what Canada can accomplish. In our view, an understanding of those limits is an integral part of an effective foreign policy.

Finally, we had to balance and temper our specific recommendations with a view to seeking, as far as possible, consistency and coherence in Canadian foreign policy. As a mature actor on the international stage, Canada has many interests and involvements. Some goals inevitably conflict with others. The single-minded pursuit of an overarching objective is an option that is rarely open to Canada.

The seven major directions for Canadian foreign policy that we set out in Chapters 4 to 10 are not meant to be all-inclusive. They represent our assessment of where Canada's attention should be focused in the medium term, and each includes a few specific measures to tackle issues on the current agenda. Even though a number of the problems that Canada must confront are intractable, at least in the short run, we decided it was important to draw attention to them in the belief that awareness can help to make difficulties more manageable.

Internationalism, the focus of the final chapter, is the most prominent theme of the report, but independence is recognized throughout to be the *sine qua non* of international action. Independence and internationalism occasionally lead in different directions, but more often than not they are mutually supportive. At the time when Canada was acquiring the attributes of nationhood, independence was identified with formal recognition as a sovereign entity capable of signing treaties, participating in international conferences and sending diplomats abroad. In the past two decades, many Canadians have to some degree used as a measure of the country's independence its differences with the United States. Although this attitude persists to some extent, it is increasingly important that Canadians identify their independence with policies and initiatives that are at once ambitious and constructive—as indeed we have tried to do in this report. That the international arena affords many opportunities to manifest Canadian independence through constructive accomplishment is reflected in the conclusions and recommendations that follow, and we are satisfied that Canadians have the capacity and the will to seize those opportunities.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Canada's Capabilities**

Canada has considerable capabilities enabling it to sustain a substantial involvement in international affairs and shoulder a considerable degree of responsibility for finding solutions to many international problems. (page 30) \*

In most international pursuits, Canada can maximize its impact and make the best use of its resources by working in concert with other countries. Canada is, however, strong enough to act on its own in some instances and to exercise leadership in the formation of coalitions. Because the country's means are limited, the government must assess Canada's capacity to make an effective contribution in each situation and concentrate its efforts on situations where it can be most helpful—instead of dissipating its resources by spreading them too thin in areas where it cannot expect to be as useful. (page 30)

## **Chapter Three**

### **Foreign Policy Goals**

The countries of the Pacific region and Southeast Asia have evolved rapidly over the last two decades, and they represent, after the United States, Canada's fastest growing export market. Canada's interests in expanding trade justify increased emphasis on trade promotion in this market. When it comes to security considerations, however, Canada's military resources are insufficient to consider a direct contribution to maintaining security in that region. Europe, by contrast, remains the main focus of East-West confrontation, and Canada continues to make a significant military contribution in Central Europe. While trade has grown less than with the countries across the Pacific, Europe remains a substantial market for a variety of Canadian exports. The Third World, Africa in particular, is the focus for Canada's development assistance activities, but compared to the industrialized countries, it provides as yet a small outlet for Canadian trade. South Africa used to be an important

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\*Conclusions and recommendations can be found in the text of the report on the page indicated in parentheses.

outlet for Canadian goods but is now a focus for the goal of social justice. The Middle East for a number of years offered exceptional opportunities to those who, unlike Canada, were well placed to export, as well as representing an area of tension and often of conflict, with Canada's contribution to regional security being mainly to provide peacekeeping forces. (page 36)

We recommend that the Department of External Affairs consider adopting the concept of regional resource and service centres to serve diplomatic posts within specific geographic areas. (page 37)

We propose that the government, particularly through the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs, and Parliament, through the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, keep the country planning process under regular review. We think it is particularly important that the views and co-operation of provincial governments and the business, NGO and academic communities be solicited in the formulation and review of strategic objectives. (page 37)

## **Chapter Four**

### **Strengthening International Order: Amplifying Canada's Influence**

We recommend that Canada support the work of the High Level Group of experts that has been established by the United Nations Secretary General to study the financial problems of the United Nations. In the longer term, in concert with other middle powers, Canada should explore the possibility of a new financial arrangement for the United Nations whereby no single nation would contribute more than an amount set so as to ensure that the organization is not unduly dependent on any one member. (page 42)

We recommend that Canada seek international agreement on an appropriate agency or committee to help streamline operations within the multilateral development system as a whole. We support all efforts to reduce the duplication and over-centralization that exist within the United Nations system. The United Nations should be willing to explore possibilities for new kinds of institutions and jettison those that have outlived their usefulness. (page 42)

We believe the government should press for early completion of the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea, so as to end the uncertainty surrounding the deep sea bed régime. Then, the government should begin a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Although it has not yet come into force, the Treaty has already brought Canada significant benefit, and the committee believes Canada should ratify it. (page 43)

The committee recommends that the government of Canada investigate the possibility of bringing the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) into the mainstream of regularly funded UN specialized agencies and, in general, do everything possible to enhance the effectiveness of UNEP. The government should also continue to take a lead internationally in arousing concern about deterioration in the environment and co-operate with other like-minded states in pressing for preventive and remedial action. (page 44)



We consider that the Canadian government has an obligation to press for international agreement, preferably through the International Atomic Energy Agency, on safety measures relating to nuclear power. These should include a comprehensive review of safety standards for civilian atomic energy plants, development of an international inspection system, elaboration of radioactive waste disposal methods, and an international agreement covering prompt warnings about nuclear accidents and the provision of immediate assistance. (page 44)

We recommend that Canada put forward candidates for positions on the International Court of Justice and other major international law-making institutions such as the International Law Commission and the UN Commission on International Trade Law. We also believe that Canada should encourage states to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, with minimal or no reservations in adopting the optional clause. (page 45)

Canada should promote, by its own statements and policies, the general concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes. This demands a willingness to use its mediation skills and to promote the active intervention of other third parties, including institutions such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth, at the earliest possible juncture in a given dispute. We should encourage a wider and earlier use of fact finding and observation on a regular basis by the United Nations Secretary General and his nominees. (page 45)

## **Chapter Five**

### **Safeguarding International Peace and Security**

We believe that a priority for the government in security policy should be to elaborate a Canadian perspective on strategic, arms control and disarmament issues. In the first place, this means recruiting and developing the kind of analytical expertise on which a more active Canadian role in this field must be based. The committee is encouraged by the recent establishment of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and by the growth of other university and non-university research centres. They can be expected to raise the level of expertise in this field. Second, the government must formulate its own judgements on the central questions of strategy and arms control. Third, with this background the government could be more effective in pressing its views with other governments and in international forums. Finally, the government should engage the public in a continuing dialogue on security policy, beginning by making public its own views together with the arguments behind them. (page 48)

### **Defence Policy**

In our opinion, the government must confront the commitment-capability gap. We therefore propose an immediate study of long-term defence requirements designed specifically to ascertain how much additional expenditure would be necessary to complete the task of re-equipping the armed forces over the next 10 years. If this level of spending is not considered attainable, then the government should attempt, in consultation with its allies, to renegotiate or restructure some of Canada's defence commitments so as to close the gap between commitments and capabilities and ensure that Canada's armed forces can carry out properly the roles they are assigned. (page 50)

## Arms Control and Disarmament

We believe that it is necessary to enhance strategic stability by pursuing arms control and that the best path forward is one that includes mutual agreements, balanced and deep reductions, and adequate means of verification. (page 51)

We recommend that Canada intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures. These measures, which have been enunciated by the government, are as follows:

1. A mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.
2. The maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.
3. The negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons.
4. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable.
5. The prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Agreement on confidence-building measures sufficient to permit the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere. (page 52)

We are attracted by proposals for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions as one means of controlling the expanded trade in conventional weapons and we believe that Canada should seek international support for this concept. (page 52)

We urge the government to make every effort to encourage the superpowers to engage in productive negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. (page 52)

Decisions about defence policy, including the military decisions in which Canada participates as a NATO member, should not be taken without due regard to their consequences for arms control. Arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy, on the other, should move in tandem. (page 53)

We have concluded that the government's capacity for formulating policy on arms control and disarmament needs improvement. We are not in a position to specify the manner in which this capacity could be improved, but one essential requirement would be a new policy development mechanism designed to reconcile the views received from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. We also believe that foreign policy is conducted in a more co-ordinated and energetic manner if it is exposed regularly to public examination. For this reason, the new mechanism should be directed to report periodically to Parliament. (page 53)

We endorse the principle of bilateral exchanges on a wide variety of subjects with the Soviet Union and recommend that provision be made in forward expenditure planning for an increase in such exchanges. (page 55)

## **Regional Conflicts**

We affirm Canada's capacity to serve as a disinterested third party in regional conflicts. When Canada undertakes to be a mediator or go-between, it should carefully assess the sources of that conflict, the potential utility of mediation efforts, and the particular talents and leverage it might have to apply to the situation. (page 57)

Provided Canada's capacity is suited to the task and there is a reasonable chance of moving a dispute closer to resolution, we recommend that Canada stand ready to use its good offices, including mediation, fact-finding missions, and the careful commitment of peacekeeping forces, where appropriate and feasible to assist the parties to regional conflicts to resolve their differences and achieve peace. (page 57)

## **Peacekeeping**

The committee concludes that a continuing Canadian contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus helps to prevent fighting on the island and maintains stability on NATO's southern flank. (page 59)

We recommend that the government consider making significantly greater use of the reserve forces for peacekeeping service, either individually or experimentally in small units. (page 60)

The committee recommends that Canada continue to make its peacekeeping expertise available to the armed forces of other countries. The government should also continue to support training seminars on peacekeeping that are hosted at Canadian universities and should continue to assist the International Peace Academy which, among other services, has developed a Peacekeeper's Handbook that is used as a textbook by the Canadian armed forces. (page 60)

In the committee's view, the best approach to invitations to become involved in peacekeeping operations is for Canada to apply its criteria on a case-by-case basis, while maintaining its preference for operations under United Nations auspices. (page 61)

## **Terrorism**

The committee's preferred approach to organizing international action on terrorism is to work through the United Nations and thereby engage the support of the entire world community. Canada could, for example, strive to get support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action. (page 64)

The committee recommends increased stringency of control at Canadian entry and border points. (page 63)

We recommend that Transport Canada set and rigorously enforce minimum standards for airport security. We recommend further that if, after a trial period, private security firms remain deficient, the government consider accepting direct responsibility for all aspects of airport security, to be carried out by Transport Canada or by the RCMP on contract to Transport Canada. (page 63)



## **Chapter Six**

### **Expanding International Trade**

Conditions that have contributed to the growth of the Canadian economy since the Second World War are changing, and Canada must adapt if it is to maintain current levels of prosperity. Canada has already lost some ground in this respect. (page 65)

We believe that the government and its foreign trade officers should be well grounded in the areas where trade is growing rapidly, particularly the high technology and services sectors. (page 66)

#### **Trade Liberalization**

The committee recommends that the government make strenuous efforts to achieve orderly and balanced trade liberalization. (page 67)

The committee believes it is important to begin a new round of multilateral trade negotiations as expeditiously as possible. (page 68)

It is essential that any agreement between Canada and the United States be entirely consistent with the obligations of both countries to the GATT. To do this, the GATT should be notified of the terms of any agreement reached, and a GATT working party would be established to examine the consistency of that agreement with GATT obligations. (page 68)

We note that the successful completion of negotiations between Canada and the United States would address only a portion of the international trade issues facing Canada. (page 69)

#### **Improving Competitiveness**

We call upon the government to recognize the export potential of Canada's small and medium-sized businesses and to take account of this potential in designing and implementing its export marketing strategies. (page 69)

We recognize that a number of features of the domestic environment hamper Canadian exporters and recommend that these be addressed in any future trade policy. (page 69)

We recommend that the government take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the purchase of patents and the marketing of patents abroad can be financed under the *Small Business Loans Act* or that the necessary changes are made in the Industrial and Regional Development Program. (page 71)

The structure and attitudes of Export Development Corporation are too often remote from those of small business, and this gap is difficult to bridge. To change the corporate culture of EDC to be more responsive to small business would require a significant change in outlook and operations at EDC, and there is no guarantee that it could be accomplished effectively. To develop more fully the export potential of small business, the government should consider establishing a small business export financing agency. The private sector financial institutions should also become more involved in small business export financing and should be closely associated with the new agency. (page 71)

## **Export Development and Promotion**

The committee believes the private sector should be encouraged to work with the government in disseminating information about foreign market opportunities. (page 74)

The committee recommends establishment of a trade opportunities hotline. (page 74)

We agree with witnesses who told us that trade commissioners are needed most in countries where there are substantial market opportunities and where their assistance can help exporters overcome cultural and language differences. We therefore recommend that more trade commissioners be allocated to the Asia-Pacific region, if necessary by reducing the number allocated to Europe. (page 74)

We believe the Program for Export Market Development should be maintained and that special efforts should be made to extend its coverage to the engineering, consulting, and service industry firms that now find it difficult to qualify for PEMD assistance. (page 74)

We believe that if Canada wants to maintain and expand its share of export markets, the government must provide Canadian exporters with export financing programs that are competitive with those offered by other countries. (page 75)

One way to ease the foreign exchange problem of Third World countries would be to remove some of the barriers that restrict their exports to Canada. A second way is countertrade. (page 75)

The committee recommends that the government continue to review concessional export financing to ensure that Canadian exporters are not operating at a competitive disadvantage because of the financing practices of other countries. (page 76)

We believe that federal and provincial governments should co-ordinate their trade promotion activities better. An example of this type of co-operation and co-ordination already exists in an agreement between Quebec and the federal government with respect to immigration whereby the province places its officials in certain embassies on a cost-sharing basis. Provincial activities are co-ordinated with federal interests, although the officials are still responsible to their own government. The committee recommends that similar agreements and arrangements be concluded between federal and provincial governments with respect to trade promotion and development. (page 76)

We are convinced that the most significant trade links are forged at the level where agreements to do business can be concluded. We believe that city-to-city ties are a dimension of international trade relations that offers exciting potential and should be pursued energetically. (page 77)

Companies that are awarded large contracts abroad and have received government assistance should employ a few recent graduates with the aim of building up the companies' and the country's supply of people with international business experience. For its part, the government should facilitate the compilation of a catalogue of opportunities for young Canadians to work abroad. There is an untapped supply of young people interested in such employment. The experience of working in a foreign country might well lead young Canadians to seek careers in international business and trade and help to build the foundation for a more aggressive approach to trade. (page 77)

## **Trade Diversification**

The committee believes that the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as one area that deserves greater public and private efforts. (page 77)

If Canada is to be successful in the Asia-Pacific region it will need to employ a layered approach to market development. One layer will consist of Canadian firms building all-important personal connections with potential Asian-Pacific customers. Both Canadians with roots in those countries and foreign students living in Canada could be used to promote trading links between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region by combining their first-hand experience of Canadian products and abilities with their connections in the region. (page 78)

A second layer will consist of the federal government working closely with Canadian companies to develop trading links with Asia-Pacific countries. This will mean providing competitive export financing as well as government marketing support based on the efforts of trade commissioners, ambassadors and occasional visits by ministers. (page 78)

Although it is essential to build an economic and political relationship, a third layer, based on cultural ties, will be needed to put the relationship on a solid long-term footing. It is important to increase the mutual awareness of the diverse cultures surrounding the Pacific Ocean. (page 78)

The committee urges the government to establish a program with Japan and other appropriate Asian countries to enable Canadian university graduate volunteers to teach English there. (page 79)

The committee recommends that the government encourage the Canadian private sector to establish an office in Taiwan to assist Canadian companies to develop business relations there. This can and should be done in a way that will not affect Canada's important relationship with the People's Republic of China. (page 80)

We believe that the government should move energetically to build upon the connections between Canada and India to promote greater trade and investment between the two countries. (page 81)

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Working for International Development**

#### **Debt and Trade**

We are concerned that the often tough measures imposed on many of the debtor countries in order to manage the debt problem cannot long continue without resulting in a major crisis. The economic difficulties facing a number of developing countries place intolerable strains on their people and on democratic governments. We perceive an urgent need for measures designed to promote economic recovery and development in the debtor countries. (page 85)

The committee considers that a conference organized at the intergovernmental level, and including representatives of the debtor and creditor countries, the banks, and the international financial institutions, is urgently required. Recognizing the seriousness of this crisis, which affects developing and developed countries alike, the government of



Canada should press member countries in the OECD and elsewhere to support such a conference. (page 86)

We urge the government to be especially attentive to the needs of African countries and to support, in the Paris Club and elsewhere, approaches to debt management that will assist in recovery from the famine. We commend the decision of the government, announced at the May 1986 special session of the United Nations General Assembly, to declare a 15-year moratorium on repayment of government loans to poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We also consider it desirable that the government contemplate extending the moratorium to Export Development Corporation loans to the same countries. (page 87)

The committee notes with approval that the government of Canada has indicated it would consider increased World Bank funding. We also support improved co-ordination between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with the objective of ensuring that short-term adjustment measures are supportive of longer-term economic recovery and development. (page 87)

We urge the government of Canada to press the case for the poorest developing countries obtaining increased quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. At the same time, it is imperative that Canada develop effective worker retraining, alternative employment opportunities and industrial restructuring and modernization initiatives that would allow it to support a phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in favour of exposing the textile and clothing trade to normal GATT rules. (page 88)

We support the policy of encouraging clearly qualified newly industrializing countries to graduate from preferential arrangements in the GATT designed for lower-income developing countries to the full GATT régime. (page 88)

### **Development Assistance**

A majority of the committee thinks that the goal of achieving the 0.7-per cent official development assistance target by 1990 should be restored. Other members felt that inasmuch as the government has a fiscal plan in place, the government should undertake the restoration of such aid only if government revenues support such action. Some favoured adopting a goal of 1.0 per cent beyond 1990. (page 90)

The committee affirms that meeting the needs of the poorest countries and peoples should remain the primary and overriding objective of the Canadian aid program. (page 91)

Because women are economically vulnerable, we recommend that direct assistance to women in developing countries be given priority. The issue of aid effectiveness cannot be addressed properly without discussing the vital role of women in the development process. The development community has only recently begun to understand this crucial issue. Development experts argue that tied aid is a major constraint in meeting the dual goals of aiding the poorest people and integrating women into the development process. Women are often the farmers, the providers of health care, the unofficial heads of households. It is absolutely essential that they be consulted on appropriate development technologies. CIDA has begun to implement a policy framework called Women in Development. The committee recommends that the government provide sufficient funds and staff to allow CIDA to implement the Women in Development policy framework and to achieve its stated targets. (page 91)

Official development assistance is still hobbled by the sometimes parochial and self-seeking nature of national aid programs. An example of this, which is by now part of

development lore, concerns the 15 different and incompatible types of irrigation pumps supplied by aid donors to Kenya. We recommend that Canada press for closer co-operation among aid donors and remain a strong supporter of multilateral approaches and institutions that encourage such co-operation. In general, we affirm the Canadian tradition of treating multilateral and bilateral aid channels as complementary and mutually reinforcing. (page 92)

We did not conduct an in-depth evaluation of the Canadian aid program. That task is being carried out by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. As the Committee defines its work program, we urge careful examination of several issues we have identified but not resolved. How can the administrative burden associated with aid be reduced? To what extent and in what ways can people and authority be transferred to the field? How can the costs associated with tied aid be reduced and the benefits to developing countries increased? How can people, from aid experts to the Canadian public, participate more effectively in improving the quality of Canada's development assistance? (page 92)

Non-governmental organizations, both voluntary and business, should be involved to the maximum extent possible in the planning and execution of Canada's official development assistance programs. They should, in fact, constitute the heart of expanded and revitalized technical assistance programs. (page 92)

To encourage partnership in international development it has been suggested that the government and voluntary organizations should establish 'development offices' in developing countries where Canada has aid programs but no embassy or in regions of developing countries remote from the capital and the Canadian embassy. Development offices would offer non-diplomatic functional support bases for both official development assistance and voluntary organizations. We urge the government and voluntary organizations jointly to consider this proposal and other practical measures for strengthening their partnership. (page 93)

The committee received a proposal for establishing a Canadian Industrial Co-operation Agency and we commend it for further consideration by the government and the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. In essence such an agency would provide the means for small and medium-sized Canadian companies to assist their counterparts in the Third World in a variety of ways, including management contracts, technical agreements and joint ventures. An example of the sort of project the agency might support is the 'Industrial Incubator' approach of Fanshawe College in London, Ontario. (page 94)

## **Foreign Students**

We believe that foreign students constitute an important asset for Canada that has not been sufficiently recognized in terms of improving trade opportunities, increasing cultural contacts and more generally for foreign policy. (page 96)

We recommend that the federal government prepare a statement of national goals and objectives as they relate to foreign students, and we would encourage the provinces to state their goals and objectives in this area. These statements should then be used as the basis for discussion at a First Ministers' Conference, with the aim of promoting the greatest possible harmony between federal and provincial goals and objectives. (page 96)

We were impressed by arguments that Third World countries need to develop their own institutions of higher education. At the same time, it is not feasible for them to establish a full range of graduate studies. We recommend that Canada's assistance be concentrated in the graduate field. (page 97)

## **Chapter Eight**

### **Promoting Human Rights**

We want to affirm what so many Canadians proclaimed before the committee: that the international promotion of human rights is a fundamental and integral part of Canadian foreign policy. (page 99)

#### **Human Rights Protection**

The committee believes that a basic standard is available to trigger and guide Canadian human rights policy, namely the appearance of a pattern of systematic, gross and continuous violations of basic human rights. (page 100)

The committee joins witnesses in recommending that Canada seek re-election to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and, in any case, follow its work actively. Particular attention should be paid to protecting and strengthening the position of the Commission within the United Nations system. We recommend further that Canada work to strengthen the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Native peoples throughout the world have been among the earliest and most cruelly abused victims of the denial of human rights. (page 100)

The committee recommends strongly that an even closer collaboration with voluntary organizations become a central feature of the government's approach to human rights. (page 101)

We recommend that the government immediately investigate the most effective means of creating a Human Rights Advisory Commission. (page 101)

We recommend that the Department of External Affairs follow the example of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs in establishing in-service training and refresher courses in human rights for all its officers. (page 101)

A House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights has just been created. As it begins to develop the international side of its mandate, we recommend that the Committee examine with particular care alleged international cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights, especially where they involve countries where Canada has large development assistance programs or significant trade relations. The Human Rights Committee should work closely with the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. At the same time we urge the external affairs committees of both the Senate and the House of Commons to keep human rights issues on their agendas and to place them in the broader context of Canada's overall foreign policy. The human rights findings and recommendations of these committees could form an important element in cabinet consideration of the eligibility list for official development assistance if the committees requested a comprehensive response to their reports from the government, as House of Commons committees are empowered to do under Standing Order 99(2). (page 101)

Visits abroad by the prime minister, other cabinet ministers and parliamentarians are among the most promising opportunities for expressing human rights concerns using a judicious blend of public pressure and private persuasion. We expect and encourage the government to take advantage of such opportunities, as indeed the Prime Minister did successfully on a recent trip to China and South Korea, the Secretary of State for External Affairs did on an earlier trip to the Soviet Union, and the Minister of External



Relations did on her trip to Central America in the fall of 1985. In blending human rights concerns with trade, diplomatic and aid discussions, Canada can convey the message that human rights are an integral, not a peripheral, part of its international relations. (page 102)

We endorse the following recommendations of the 1982 report of the Sub-committee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean:

- Canadian development assistance should be substantially reduced, terminated, or not commenced in cases where gross and systematic violations of human rights make it impossible to promote the central objective of helping the poor.
- Where countries systematically violate human rights or otherwise do not qualify for official development assistance, Canada should seek through international organizations to extend humanitarian assistance and to support those struggling for human rights.
- Where countries have a poor human rights record but not so extreme as to justify the termination of aid, Canada's development assistance should be channelled mainly through the private sector and particularly through non-governmental organizations that work directly with the poor. In addition, it should be the policy of the Canadian government in such cases to direct a portion of its assistance to organizations that are struggling to maintain and protect civil and political rights.
- Where countries that qualify for Canadian assistance are showing improvement in their respect for human rights this should be encouraged by a substantial increase in assistance. (page 102)

We recommend that Canada use its voice and vote at meetings of international financial institutions to protest systematic, gross and continuous violations of human rights. (page 103)

## **Human Rights Development**

The committee is convinced that, while strengthening its approach to human rights protection, Canada should move forward and create a positive human rights development program as well. Through co-operative programs of financial support, exchange, research and technical assistance, Canada should contribute to the long-term development of political, civil and cultural rights as it now contributes to long-term economic and social development through the aid program. (page 103)

Canada is not—and should not be—in the business of exporting its own institutions. It can and should be equipped to share its experience and to co-operate with others as they develop their own institutions. Such programs would enjoy the active support, or at least the acquiescence, of partner country governments and peoples. (page 104)

We recommend that the government consider establishing an International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development with carefully prepared guidelines for supporting activities by non-governmental organizations. To ensure that the Institute is sensitive to the varying national perspectives on democratic development, particularly in the Third World, we recommend that its board of directors include international representation, on the model of the International Development Research Centre. Funding for the Institute should be provided as a small fraction of official development assistance funds. (page 105)

## **Assisting Refugees**

We think it particularly important that Canada remain generous in providing sanctuary to Central American refugees that are the victims of repression and violence. We strongly support the government's decision to extend an oral hearing on questions of merit to all claimants. (page 107)

The government should press for Canadians to be appointed as senior officials of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. With adequate representation, Canada should support the UNHCR in updating international refugee programs and coming to grips with outstanding policy questions, such as the definition of 'refugee' under international agreements and the rights and responsibilities of host countries. (page 107)

We strongly urge Canadian support for refugee income generation projects, such as the one for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, to assist refugees to be as self-supporting and productive as possible while seeking their repatriation or permanent resettlement. (page 107)

## **Afghanistan**

The committee recommends that Canada continue to give high priority to providing humanitarian and medical assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that it strongly support the efforts of the International Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in particular. In its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, Canada should take every opportunity to raise the issue of Afghanistan and make clear that Soviet occupation and devastation of that country constitute a serious obstacle to improved relations. (page 108)

## **South Africa**

If the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons had reported that significant but insufficient progress was occurring in dismantling apartheid, the committee had agreed to recommend that Canada take the lead in preparing a further Commonwealth action plan consisting of specific sanctions such as those listed in clause 7 of the Commonwealth Accord of October 1985. (page 110)

Now that the Group of Eminent Persons has reported—as we feared it would—that no significant progress is occurring in dismantling apartheid, Canada should move immediately to impose full economic sanctions, seek their adoption by the greatest possible number of Commonwealth members, and promote similar action by non-Commonwealth countries. (page 110)

In any event, we strongly urge establishment of a black South African human rights and democratic development program. Canada established a scholarship program for black South Africans in 1983 and has since expanded it. We strongly support this approach and encourage further efforts to assist in building black social, economic and political institutions towards the day when black South Africans will exercise their full rights as citizens. (page 110)

We encourage the government to expand direct contacts at the highest levels with black political organizations in South Africa. Bearing in mind that lifting the ban on the

African National Congress (ANC) and releasing from prison its leader Nelson Mandela are two of the steps called for in the Commonwealth Accord, such high-level contacts should certainly include the ANC. (page 110)

Canada should continue to provide generous amounts of direct assistance and support international efforts, such as those of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, to help South Africa's vulnerable neighbours cope with the economic difficulties that international sanctions directed at South Africa will create for them as well as to overcome punitive measures that the South African government might direct against them. (page 110)

## **Central America**

A majority of the committee believes that it must be stressed that U.S. policy has been designed, in part, to counter other foreign military intervention in Central America and that Canada should oppose outside intervention in Central America by all countries. (page 112)

A majority of the committee opposes the proposal for immediate establishment of a Canadian embassy in Managua but urges the government to monitor the opportunities that might arise. (page 114)

While Canadian influence over the security policies of other countries is limited, Canada has a special opportunity to offer direct, practical and desperately needed help to the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Central America. We would urge two Canadian initiatives: establishment of a 'Refugee Watch' program with other countries and non-governmental organizations to provide greater security in the refugee camps; and active support for economic development and self-sufficiency programs for refugees. The government should also strengthen Canada's capacity to monitor human rights situations in Central America, paying particular attention to the circumstances in each country and the views of Canadian NGOs in these countries. Canada should promote co-operative programs of democratic and human rights development and support elements in these countries favouring progress in human rights. (page 114)

## **Chapter Nine**

### **Improving Canada-U.S. Relations**

The committee recommends that the government not miss any opportunity to emphasize to the government of the United States the importance of advance consultation. As a corollary, Canada should establish its own high standard for consulting the United States. Consultation in both directions should go far beyond simply giving advance information and should provide time for dialogue, reflection and policy adjustment. (page 120)

The effective management of relations with the United States is impossible unless there is a consistent effort made to achieve internal co-ordination of Canadian policies. (page 121)

It is important that Canada's case be made at every level of the U.S. system and that imagination be used in the search for allies in the United States. A combination of persuasive diplomacy and private sector pressure appears to have the greatest effect.



Effective co-ordination, patient persuasion, force of example, and constant reiteration of the problem are the keys to success. (page 122)

We conclude that the government should remain flexible in its choice of means to express disagreement with U.S. policies on international issues. The government can vary the degree of publicity accorded to such disagreement in terms of its language, the forum in which it is expressed and the stature of the spokesman. The choice of tactics should depend on the specific circumstances, keeping in mind not just the point at issue, but also the extent of Canada's interest and the importance attached to it by the U.S. government. (page 123)

We recommend that the government seek to initiate negotiations with the United States to settle the seaward extension of the three major maritime boundaries that remain in dispute. (page 125)

We recommend that a regular series of seminars be held expressly for middle-rank career officials of the governments of both countries, possibly including officials from state and provincial governments. (page 125)

Whenever negotiations are being undertaken with the United States that ultimately require congressional approval, we recommend that the Embassy of Canada in Washington continue to undertake its own independent soundings of the state of congressional opinion. (page 126)

The government of Canada should consider assigning a couple of junior officials to the Congressional Intern Program each year as part of their training. (page 126)

## **Chapter Ten**

### **A Northern Dimension for Canadian Foreign Policy**

The arctic region is rapidly becoming an area of international attention. Canada's huge stake in this region requires the development of a coherent arctic policy, an essential element of which must be a northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy. (page 127)

Canada should give priority to achieving an acceptable land settlement in the North and encourage efforts to find governmental structures that would support Inuit cultural autonomy within the Canadian federation. Support should be given to the development of renewable resources, particularly fishing. Abroad, Canada should make strenuous efforts to resist campaigns, especially in Europe, to ban the import of fur products. (page 128)

The committee considers that an arctic exchange program with the Soviet Union is an effective way to increase Canadian knowledge of the north as well as provide a basis for improving East-West relations. We recommend that the existing exchange program be properly funded. (page 128)

We recommend a concerted program to develop co-operative arrangements with all northern states. (page 130)

We recommend that Canada pay particular attention to developing good relations with Greenland. (page 5) Subject to the agreement of the government of Denmark, we urge the opening of a Canadian consulate in Greenland. (page 130)

## **The Question of Sovereignty**

We recommend that the government of Canada renew its efforts to secure the agreement of the United States to Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage. (page 132)

Unless the United States agrees to recognize Canada's claim, the committee's preferred course of action at this time is a deliberate decision to allow time to pass rather than pressing for a decision by the International Court of Justice. (page 132)

## **Defence Questions**

The committee recommends that the possibility of equipping the Canadian navy with diesel-electric submarines be reviewed in the context of a general examination of the country's naval forces and, more generally, of Canada's defence policy. (page 134)

We recommend that Canada, in co-operation with other arctic and nordic nations, seek the demilitarization of the arctic region through pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as through a general approach to arms control and disarmament. (page 135)

## **Chapter Eleven**

### **The Case for Constructive Internationalism**

We conclude that Canada's activities abroad should be guided by an approach based on constructive internationalism. This would impart both a vision and sense of purpose to Canadian foreign policy. (page 137)

Constructive internationalism recommends itself to us, not because it conjures up nostalgia for an imagined golden age of Canadian foreign policy, but because it most accurately describes the stance that Canada should take towards a difficult and uncertain international environment. (page 137)

Canada has a great deal more to gain from a posture of confident idealism than from one that is mean-spirited and ungenerous to the world at large. (page 137)

A major objective of Canadian foreign policy should be a broad effort to strengthen the effectiveness of international institutions. (page 138)

Constructive internationalism fulfils twin purposes: orienting Canadians to the external environment in a manner that appears most likely to serve their interests, and responding to the aspirations manifested by the hundreds of Canadians that appeared before the committee for an active and productive international role. A fuller realization of these aspirations depends on the government finding ways to devolve opportunities to the non-governmental sector for international activity by Canadians and encouraging the voluntarist streak that runs so markedly through the Canadian psyche. (page 139)





# APPENDIX A

## Public Hearings

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<i>Issue No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>
19	October 9, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
20	November 6, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
21	November 20, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
22	November 27, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
23	December 4, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
24	December 10, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
25	December 11, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
26	December 17, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
27	December 18, 1985	Ottawa, Ontario
28	January 14, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
29	January 15, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
30	January 16, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
31	January 20, 1986	Charlottetown, P.E.I.
32	January 21, 1986	Charlottetown, P.E.I.
32	January 21, 1986	Halifax, Nova Scotia
33	January 22, 1986	Halifax, Nova Scotia
34	January 23, 1986	St. John's, Newfoundland
35	January 24, 1986	St. John's, Newfoundland
36	January 28, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
37	January 29, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
38	February 4, 1986	Edmonton, Alberta
39	February 5, 1986	Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
40	February 6, 1986	Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
41	February 11, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
42	February 12, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
43	February 25, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
44	March 4, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
45	March 5, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
46	March 10, 1986	Fredericton, New Brunswick
47	March 11, 1986	Montreal, Quebec
48	March 12, 1986	Montreal, Quebec
49	March 13, 1986	Quebec City, Quebec
50	March 17, 1986	Vancouver, British Columbia
51	March 18, 1986	Vancouver, British Columbia
52	March 20, 1986	Whitehorse, Yukon

<i>Issue No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>
53	March 25, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
54	April 8, 1986	London, Ontario
55	April 9, 1986	Toronto, Ontario
56	April 10, 1986	Toronto, Ontario
57	April 10, 1986	Toronto, Ontario
58	April 11, 1986	Toronto, Ontario
59	April 15, 1986	Ottawa, Ontario
60	April 23, 1986	Yellowknife, N.W.T.
61	April 24, 1986	Winnipeg, Manitoba
62	April 25, 1986	Winnipeg, Manitoba

### Committee Witnesses

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The committee wishes to express its thanks to the Right Honourable Charles Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs for meeting with its members to discuss issues raised by the Green Paper on *Competitiveness and Security*.

Witnesses who appeared before the Committee are listed in alphabetical order. The issue number of the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* is indicated in parentheses.

Academics for Nuclear Disarmament (Issue 35)  
Acadian Writers Association (Issue 46)  
Adelman, Howard, Professor (Issue 56)  
Alberta Chamber of Commerce (Issue 38)  
Alberta Society of Engineering Technologists (Issue 38)  
Allan, Jim (Issue 57)  
American and Canadian Bar Associations (Issue 47)  
Amnesty International — Canadian Section (Issue 41)  
Andrew, Arthur (Issue 33)  
Antonius, Rashad (Issue 48)  
Archbishop Oscar Romero Central America Refugee Committee (Issue 39)  
Armenian National Committee of Canada (Issue 46)  
Armenian, Atken, Dr. (Issue 55)  
Arusha International Development Resource Centre (Issue 38)  
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Issue 51)  
Association of Atlantic Universities (Issue 33)  
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (Issue 44)  
*Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale* (Issue 47)  
*Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale* and the *Conseil canadien de coopération internationale* (Issue 47)  
Atlantic Council of Canada (Issue 56)  
B'nai Brith Canada (Issue 56)  
B.C. Teachers' Federation (Issue 51)  
Baha'i Community of Canada (Issue 56)  
Bailey, Stuart (Issue 39)  
Baillie, Warren (Issue 56)  
Batty, Linda (Issue 39)  
Baudais, Michelle (Issue 39)  
Bedell, James (Issue 46)  
Benabdallah, Abdelkader (Issue 47)  
Berlinguet, Louis (Issue 48)



Blais, Louis (Issue 52)  
 Blake, Joanne (Issue 50)  
 Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto (Issue 58)  
 Boardman, Robert (Issue 32)  
 Bow, Malcolm N. (Issue 50)  
 Brecher, Irving (Issue 48)  
 Breton, Raymond, Professor (Issue 56)  
 British Columbia Peace Council (Issue 50)  
 Browne, W.J., Honourable, P.C. (Issue 34)  
 Bryant, Christopher (Issue 21)  
 Business Council on National Issues (Issue 44)  
 C.D. Howe Institute (Issue 55)  
 Caccia, Charles, Honourable, P.C., M.P. (Issue 58)  
 Canada-Israel Committee (Issue 53)  
 Canada-Palestine Association (Issue 33)  
 Canada-Taiwan Friendship Association (Issue 62)  
 Canadian Action for Nicaragua (Issue 57)  
 Canadian Arab Federation (Issue 55)  
 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (Issue 60)  
 Canadian Association for Free Expression Inc. (Issue 57)  
 Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (Issue 43)  
 Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (Issue 48)  
 Canadian Association of University Teachers (Issue 44)  
 Canadian Bureau for International Education (Issue 44)  
 Canadian Cable Television Association (Issue 47)  
 Canadian Catholic Organisation for Development and Peace  
 (Issue 45)  
 Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Halifax North Committee  
 (Issue 33)  
 Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Toronto Archdiocesan Council  
 (Issue 57)  
 Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Winnipeg Diocesan Council  
 (Issue 62)  
 Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Yellowknife Chapter (Issue 60)  
 Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (Issue 37)  
 Canadian Chamber of Commerce (Issue 42)  
 Canadian Coalition for Peace Through Strength Inc. (Issue 57)  
 Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (Issue 45)  
 Canadian Council for International Co-operation (Issue 42)  
 Canadian Council of Churches (Issue 56)  
 Canadian Federation of Students (Issue 44)  
 Canadian Foreign Aid Dialogue (Issue 33)  
 Canadian Hispanic Congress (Issue 58)  
 Canadian Human Rights Foundation (Issue 47)  
 Canadian Institute of International Affairs — Working Group of the National Capital Branch  
 (Issue 45)  
 Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Issue 45)  
 Canadian Jewish Congress (Issue 47)  
 Canadian Labour Congress (Issue 36)  
 Canadian Nature Federation (Issues 42 and 57)  
 Canadian Polish Congress (Issue 57)  
 Canadian Wildlife Federation (Issue 42)  
 Canadians for Democracy in Chile (Issue 50)  
 Cannell, Doug (Issue 62)  
 Cannizzo, Cynthia, Professor (Issue 21)  
*Carrefour Tiers-Monde* (Issue 49)  
 Cayer, Ed (Issue 31)  
 Central American Anti-U.S. Intervention Coalition (Issue 32)

Central American Solidarity Network (Issue 57)  
*Centre québécois de relations internationales* (Issue 49)  
 Charbonneau, Robert (Issue 47)  
 Charters, David (Issue 46)  
 Children's Crusade for Peace (Issue 34)  
 Chilean Community Association (Issue 50)  
 Chilean United Front (Issue 39)  
 Chossudovsky, Michel (Issue 43)  
 Christian Task Force on Central America (Issue 51)  
 Church in Society Committee of the United Church of Canada (Issue 61)  
 Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform (Issue 57)  
 Clarkson, Stephen (Issue 28)  
 Clearwater, John (Issue 62)  
 Cloutier, Normand (Issue 47)  
 Coalition for Aid to Nicaragua (Issue 51)  
 Coalition for the Self-Determination of Peoples (Issue 35)  
 Cohn, Theodore (Issue 51)  
 Coleman, William (Issue 26)  
 Comeau, Paul André (Issue 20)  
 Cominco (Issue 40)  
 Confedco (Issue 56)  
*Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux* (Issue 48)  
 Conference of Defence Associations (Issue 46)  
 Cooley, Pamela (Issue 50)  
 Coordinating Committee of Solidarity with Chile (Issue 38)  
 Council of Canadians (Issues 43 and 57)  
 Council of Muslim Communities of Canada (Issues 54 and 57)  
 Counter Terror Study Centre (Issue 62)  
 Cram, George (Issue 56)  
 Crookell, Harold, Professor (Issue 54)  
 Cunningham, Allan (Issue 50)  
 CUSO-Quebec (Issue 47)  
 CUSO-Saskatchewan (Issue 40)  
 Czechoslovak Canadian Association (Issue 50)  
 Dalhousie University (Issue 33)  
 Daly, Don, Professor (Issue 23)  
 Dandelions (Issue 38)  
 Davis, Sally (Issue 35)  
 Department of External Affairs (Issue 20)  
 Department of National Defence (Issue 49)  
 Díaz, A. Marco Antonio (Issue 38)  
 Dosman, Ed, Professor (Issue 29)  
 Ealam Tamil Association of Alberta (Issue 38)  
 El Salvador Information Centre (Issue 57)  
 Elie, Bernard, Professor (Issue 23)  
 End The Arms Race (Issue 50)  
 Energy Probe (Issue 56)  
 Epstein, William (Issue 27)  
 Falls, R.H., Admiral (Retired) (Issue 21)  
 Farmers Helping Farmers (Issue 31)  
*Fédération des associations de professeurs des universités du Québec* (Issue 44)  
 Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada (Issue 46)  
 Fekete, Anthony (Issue 52)  
 Fillo, Larry James (Issue 39)  
 Findlay, Seaton (Issue 43)  
 Flood, Peter (Issue 39)  
 Florence, Goodman (Issue 51)  
 Foley, Monique (Issue 49)

Forbes, Ian (Issue 50)  
 Fort Garry United Church Sunday School, Grades 4, 5 and 6 (Issue 62)  
 Foster, John W. (Issue 24)  
 Freeman, Linda, Professor (Issue 24)  
 Fretz, Judith (Issue 39)  
 Gellner, John (Issue 22)  
 Geltman, Harold (Issue 47)  
 Gertler, Ann (Issue 48)  
 Gordon, Mark R. (Issue 25)  
 Graduate Students Society, University of British Columbia  
 (Issue 50)  
 Green, Leslie, Professor (Issue 46)  
 Greenaway, Keith Rogers, General (Issue 25)  
 Griffiths, Franklyn (Issue 49)  
 Group of 78 (Issue 45)  
 Halstead, John, Professor (Issue 30)  
 Harbron, John (Issue 55)  
 Harris, Joanne (Issue 35)  
 Hay, Keith (Issue 26)  
 Helleiner, Gerald, Professor (Issue 22)  
 Herman, Thomas (Issue 57)  
 Hilton, David (Issue 23)  
 Holmes, John (Issue 25)  
 Human Rights Awareness New Brunswick Inc. (Issue 46)  
 Hume, Michael (Issue 32)  
 Hunter, David (Issue 57)  
*Il Nuovo Mondo* (Issue 38)  
 Indigenous Survival International (Issue 60)  
 Institute for International Development and Co-operation, Inter-American Study Group,  
 University of Ottawa (Issue 37)  
 Inter Pares (Issue 43)  
 Inter-Church Committee for World Development Education  
 (Issue 33)  
 Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America  
 (Issue 55)  
 Inter-Church Uranium Committee (Issue 39)  
 Intercultural Association of Greater Victoria (Issue 50)  
 International Affairs Committee of the United Church of Canada (Issue 47)  
 International Business Council of Canada (Issue 56)  
 International Council for Adult Education (Issue 55)  
 International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Canada) (Issue 37)  
 International Development Education Resource Association  
 (Issue 50)  
 International March for Peace in Central America (Issue 47)  
 International Student Clubs, University of Western Ontario  
 (Issue 54)  
 Inuit Committee on National Issues (Issue 60)  
 Jamieson, Don, Honourable, P.C. (Issue 34)  
 Johnstone, James (Issue 32)  
 Jull, Peter (Issue 25)  
 Kassi, Norma, Member of the Yukon Legislative Assembly (Issue 52)  
 Kendall, Reginald W. (Issue 54)  
 Khattak, John (Issue 50)  
 Kilburn, Peter (Issue 21)  
 Kirk, John (Issue 33)  
*L'entraide missionnaire Inc.* (Issue 45)  
 Lajoie, Maurice (Issue 49)  
 Langford, Michael J., Dr. (Issue 35)



Lanphier, Michael, Professor (Issue 56)  
 Latin America Information Group (Issue 33)  
 Latin American Mission Program of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlottetown (Issue 32)  
 Lauzon, Paul (Issue 46)  
 Lawson, Edward, Senator (Issue 51)  
 Lawyers for Social Responsibility (Issue 50)  
 Lecraw, Donald, Professor (Issue 54)  
 Lewington, Jennifer (Issue 20)  
 Lewis, Stephen (Issue 22)  
 Loncarevic, B.D., Dr. (Issue 33)  
 London Conference of the United Church of Canada (Issue 54)  
 London Cross-Cultural Learner Centre (Issue 54)  
 Loxley, John, Professor (Issue 23)  
 Lubbock, Michael (Issue 37)  
 Luke, David Fashole (Issue 33)  
 Luker, Anne (Issue 57)  
 Lyon, Peyton (Issue 45)  
 Macdonald, David (Issue 20)  
 Mackinnon, Donald L. (Issue 39)  
 Mangalam, J.J. (Issue 32)  
 Manitoba Peace Council (Issue 61)  
 Manly, Eva (Issue 50)  
 Mann Borgese, Elizabeth, Dr. (Issue 33)  
 Martin, Cabot (Issue 34)  
 Martin, Louis (Issue 20)  
 McGinnis, Robert (Issue 62)  
 Mcgrath, Bill, Dr. (Issue 35)  
 Mckinnon, J. Bruce (Issue 51)  
 McMaster University (Issue 54)  
 McPhail, Thomas L. (Issue 38)  
 McWhinney, Edward (Issue 51)  
 Mennonite Central Committee (Issue 61)  
 Métis National Council (Issue 59)  
 Miller, Joanna E. (Issue 39)  
 Miller, Robert (Issue 25)  
 Mission for Peace (Issue 58)  
 Morgan, John (Issue 57)  
 Morin, Claude (Issue 49)  
 Muldoon, Paul (Issue 57)  
 Munro, Donald (Issue 50)  
 Mytelka, Lynn, Professor (Issue 23)  
 National Action Committee on the Status of Women (Issue 55)  
 Native Council of Canada (Issue 59)  
 Native People's Support Group of Newfoundland and Labrador (Issue 34)  
 NDP — St. John's East (Issue 34)  
 New Brunswick Human Rights Commission (Issue 46)  
 New Brunswick Multicultural Council (Issue 46)  
 Nicaragua Solidarity Society of British Columbia (Issue 51)  
 Njoku, Emeka A. (Issue 54)  
 Nobbe, Charles (Issue 32)  
 North, Liisa, Professor (Issue 29)  
 North-South Institute (Issue 41)  
 Northern Human Service Workers Association (Issue 52)  
 Northridge Petroleum Marketing Inc. (Issue 38)  
 Northwest Territories, Government of the (Issue 60)  
 Nossal, Kim Richard, Professor (Issue 24)  
 Nuclear Free North (Issue 60)  
 Ogletree, Gary (Issue 52)

Ontario Graduate Association (Issue 54)  
 Operation Freedom (Issue 57)  
 Orchard, David (Issue 39)  
 Orr, Patrick (Issue 60)  
 Ostry, Sylvia, Dr. (Issue 23)  
 Owen, W.H. (Issue 33)  
 Oxfam — Canada (Issue 37)  
 Oxfam — St. John's (Issue 34)  
 Pachai, Bridglal (Issue 32)  
 Pacific Basin Economic Council — Canadian Committee (Issue 53)  
 Painchaud, Paul (Issue 49)  
 Paus-Jenssen, Arne (Issue 40)  
 Peace and Justice Committee of Bethel United Church (Issue 39)  
 P.E.I. Women for Peace (Issue 32)  
 Pelletier, Jean (Issue 20)  
 Pharand, Donat, Professor (Issue 25)  
 Physicians for Social Responsibility (Issue 34)  
 Physicians for Social Responsibility — B.C. Chapter (Issue 50)  
 Ploughshares Youth (Issue 35)  
 Plourde, Robert (Issue 49)  
 Pollock, David, Professor (Issue 22)  
 Pollution Probe Foundation (Issue 58)  
 Potvin, Susie (Issue 49)  
 Price, Jeremy (Issue 54)  
 Price, Robert (Issue 38)  
 Project Ploughshares — Corner Brook Group (Issue 35)  
 Project Ploughshares — Fredericton Branch (Issue 46)  
 Project Ploughshares — Lunenburg County (Issue 32)  
 Project Ploughshares — Saskatoon Group (Issue 39)  
 Project Ploughshares — St. John's Group (Issue 34)  
 Provencher, Raymonde (Issue 20)  
*Radio Basse-Ville* (Issue 49)  
 Ratushny, Edward, Professor (Issue 25)  
*Regroupement pour un dialogue Israël-Palestine* (Issue 48)  
 Religious Society of friends (Issue 34)  
 Rickerd, Christopher (Issue 57)  
 Roberts, Guy (Issue 43)  
 Roche, Douglas (Issue 36)  
 Roman Catholic Church Office of Social Action (Issue 34)  
 Ross, Douglas (Issue 27)  
 Ruderman, A. Peter (Issue 33)  
 Sabourin, Louis, Professor (Issue 26)  
 Saldov, Morris (Issue 35)  
 Salem, Norma (Issue 48)  
 Samson, Audrey (Issue 33)  
 Saskatchewan Association on Human Rights (Issue 39)  
 Saskatchewan Council for International Cooperation (Issue 40)  
 Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation (Issue 40)  
 Saskatoon Concerned Youth (Issue 40)  
 Saskatoon Nicaragua Support Committee (Issue 39)  
 Saywell, William (Issue 51)  
 Scarfe, Brian (Issue 38)  
 Schmitz, Andrew (Issue 39)  
 Sharp, Mitchell, Honourable, P.C. (Issue 28)  
 Shaw, Timothy (Issue 33)  
 Shotton, Ross (Issue 33)  
 Siemens, Leonard (Issue 62)  
 Sigler, John, Professor (Issue 30)

Sisters of St. Martha Social Justice Committee (Issue 32)  
 Smith, Susan (Issue 54)  
 Social Action Commission of the Diocese of Charlottetown and the Diocesan Section of the  
 Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (Issue 32)  
 Social Concern Committee, Anglican Church, Diocese of Eastern Newfoundland and Labrador  
 (Issue 35)  
 Social Justice Committee of Montreal (Issue 47)  
 Sokol, John (Issue 55)  
 Solomon, Hyman (Issue 28)  
 South Asia Partnership — Canada (Issue 42)  
 South Pacific Peoples Foundation of Canada (Issue 50)  
 Stairs, Denis, Professor (Issue 30)  
 Starowicz, Mark (Issue 20)  
 Stein, Janice, Professor (Issue 55)  
 Steiner, Robert (Issue 57)  
 Stone, Frank (Issue 22)  
 Storey, Gary (Issue 39)  
 Strait Area Education and Recreation Centre (Issue 33)  
 Students Against Apartheid, University of Saskatchewan (Issue 39)  
 Support Committee for the People of Guatemala (Issue 47)  
 Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (Issue 56)  
 Ten Days for World Development — B.C. Lower Mainland Region (Issue 50)  
 Ten Days for World Development — Maidstone and Area Group (Issue 39)  
 TESL Canada (Issue 57)  
 Tetley, William (Issue 48)  
 Third World Resource Centre (Issue 54)  
 Tools for Peace (Issues 33, 39 and 57)  
 Toronto Action for Chile (Issue 57)  
 Toronto Anti-Intervention Coalition (Issue 57)  
 Toronto Disarmament Network (Issue 57)  
 Trueman, Peter (Issue 20)  
 Tucker, Michael, Professor (Issue 27)  
 Tugwell, Maurice, Professor (Issues 29 and 46)  
 Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (Issue 60)  
 Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Issue 62)  
 United Nations Association in Canada (Issue 58)  
 University College of Cape Breton — Caribbean Research Group (Issue 35)  
 University of Alberta (Issue 38)  
 University of British Columbia Students for Peace and Mutual Disarmament (Issue 50)  
 University of Guelph (Issue 54)  
 University of Western Ontario (Issue 54)  
 Vancouver Board of Trade (Issue 51)  
 Veterans for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament (Issue 32)  
 Victoria International Development Education Association  
 (Issue 50)  
 Voice of Women (Issue 32)  
 Voice of Women — Fredericton (Issue 46)  
 Von Mirbach, Henning (Issue 43)  
 Walker, Pamela (Issue 50)  
 Warrian, Peter (Issue 54)  
 Webster, Gary (Issue 31)  
 Winham, Gilbert (Issue 22)  
 Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament (Issue 61)  
 Wiseman, Henry, Professor (Issue 54)  
 Wood, Bernard (Issue 21)  
 World Federalists of Canada (Issues 42 and 50)  
 World Food Day Association of Canada (Issue 43)  
 World Literacy of Canada (Issue 55)



World Sikh Organization of Canada (Issue 50)  
World Wildlife Fund Canada (Issue 42)  
Wright, Claudia (Issue 25)  
Yaqzan, Matin (Issue 46)  
Young, Robert H. (Issue 46)  
Yukon Chamber of Commerce (Issue 52)  
Yukon Chamber of Mines (Issue 52)  
Yukon Legislative Assembly (Issue 52)  
Yukon P.C. Caucus (Issue 52)

# APPENDIX C

## Submissions Received

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The Committee received written material (articles, briefs, reports or letters) from the following groups and individuals.

Abu Laban, Baha  
Edmonton, Alberta

Academics for Nuclear Disarmament  
St. John's, Newfoundland

Acadian Writers Association  
Moncton, New Brunswick

Adlington, K. and L.K.  
Calgary, Alberta

Adlington, R.G.  
Calgary, Alberta

African National Congress (South Africa)  
Toronto, Ontario

Aga Khan Foundation Canada  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Ahmad, Jaleel  
Montreal, Quebec

Ahmad, Naseer  
Mississauga, Ontario

Alarie, Luc and Courchesne, André  
Saint Boniface, Manitoba

Alberta Chamber of Commerce  
Edmonton, Alberta

Alberta Nurses for Nuclear Disarmament  
Edmonton, Alberta

Alberta Vocational Centre — Calgary  
Calgary, Alberta

Alexanderson, A.  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Alexandrowicz, George W.  
Kingston, Ontario

*Amitiés Québec-Israël*  
Montreal, Quebec

Amnesty International — Canadian Section  
Ottawa, Ontario

Andrew, Arthur  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Antosko, Ronald J.  
Rosemere, Quebec

Arbitrators Institute of Canada  
Toronto, Ontario

Archbishop Oscar Romero Central America Refugee Committee  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Archibald, Elizabeth  
Ottawa, Ontario

Armenian National Committee of Canada  
Montreal, Quebec

Armstrong, Kimberly H.  
Edmonton, Alberta

Arusha International Development Resource Centre  
Calgary, Alberta

Asling, Jerrold  
Hanover, Ontario

Association of Atlantic Universities  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Association of Canadian Community Colleges  
Toronto, Ontario

Association of United Ukrainian Canadians  
Vernon, British Columbia

Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

*Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale*  
Montreal, Quebec

Atlantic Council of Canada  
Toronto, Ontario

Atlantic Solidarity Network  
Moncton, New Brunswick



- Austin, Mark D.  
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
- Avery, William F.  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
- B'nai Brith Canada  
Downsview, Ontario
- B.C. Teachers' Federation  
Vancouver, British Columbia
- Bagot, H.  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Baha'i Community of Canada  
Thornhill, Ontario
- Bailie, Warren R.  
Toronto, Ontario
- Balinsky, Clara  
Montreal, Quebec
- Baltic Federation in Canada  
Port Perry, Ontario
- Bartel, Robert  
Rosthern, Saskatchewan
- Bartholomew, Michael K.  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Baudais, Michelle  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
- Beasley, Alec C.  
Winfield, British Columbia
- Beaudry, Gérard  
Longueuil, Quebec
- Bélanger, Vern  
Montreal, Quebec
- Bélec, Alphonse J.  
St. Sauveur des Monts, Quebec
- Bell, Howard  
Vancouver, British Columbia
- Berlinguet, Louis  
Montreal, Quebec
- Beyond War — Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia
- Bishop, Barbara  
Penetang, Ontario

Blackwood, Thomas A.  
Victoria, British Columbia

Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto  
Toronto, Ontario

Boardman, Robert  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Booth, Bill  
Cobourg, Ontario

Bow, Malcolm N.  
Sidney, British Columbia

Boyle, Elizabeth  
Guelph, Ontario

Brampton Area Peace Council  
Brampton, Ontario

Brecher, Irving  
Montreal, Quebec

Brett, Jane P.  
Victoria, British Columbia

Brock University  
St. Catharines, Ontario

Browne, W.J., Honourable, P.C.  
St. John's, Newfoundland

Burlington Association for Nuclear Disarmament  
Burlington, Ontario

Burnett, James E.  
Kentville, Nova Scotia

Business Council on National Issues  
Ottawa, Ontario

Byberg, Ed  
Port Coquitlam, British Columbia

Byrd, Robert O.  
Richmond Hill, Ontario

C.D. Howe Institute  
Toronto, Ontario

Caccia, Charles, Honourable, P.C., M.P.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Calgary Inter-Faith Community Action Association  
Calgary, Alberta

*Campagne UN F-18 pour la paix*  
Montreal, Quebec

- Canada Israel Committee  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canada Palestine Association  
Halifax, Nova Scotia
- Canada Palestine Solidarity Committee  
Mississauga, Ontario
- Canada Taiwan Friendship Association  
Thunder Bay, Ontario
- Canadian Action for Nicaragua  
Toronto, Ontario
- Canadian Arab Federation  
Islington, Ontario
- Canadian Arab Friendship Association  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Canadian Arab Friendship Society of Toronto  
Don Mills, Ontario
- Canadian Arctic Resources Committee  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Association for Free Expression Inc.  
Rexdale, Ontario
- Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Association for the Club of Rome  
Westmount, Quebec
- Canadian Association of African Studies  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Association of University Teachers  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Bureau for International Education  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Halifax North  
Halifax, Nova Scotia
- Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace —  
Hamilton-Wentworth Deanery Group  
Dundas, Ontario
- Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Pembroke Diocesan Council  
Golden Lake, Ontario
- Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace — Prince Albert Diocesan Council  
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan
- Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament  
Ottawa, Ontario



Canadian Chamber of Commerce  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Coalition for Peace Through Strength Inc.  
Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Council for International Co-operation  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Council of Churches  
Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Crossroads International  
London, Ontario

Canadian Federation of Students — National Graduate Council  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Federation of Students — Ontario  
Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Foreign Aid Dialogue  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Canadian Friends of the International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem, Association  
Beauport, Quebec

Canadian Higher Education Research Network  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Hispanic Congress  
Islington, Ontario

Canadian Human Rights Foundation  
Montreal, Quebec

Canadian Institute of International Affairs — Montreal  
Montreal, Quebec

Canadian Institute of International Affairs — Working Group of the National Capital Branch  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies  
Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Jewish Congress  
Montreal, Quebec

Canadian Labour Congress  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Nature Federation  
Ottawa, Ontario

Canadian Peace Congress  
Toronto, Ontario

- Canadian Polish Congress  
Toronto, Ontario
- Canadian Save the Children Fund  
Toronto, Ontario
- Canadian Wildlife Federation  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Canadian Women for Free Enterprise  
West Vancouver, British Columbia
- Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa  
Toronto, Ontario
- Canadians Concerned for The Middle East  
London, Ontario
- Canadians of Armenian and Hellenic Origin  
Montreal, Quebec
- Carby-Samuels, Horace R.  
Richmond Hill, Ontario
- Carrière, Michel R.  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Carter, Marilyn L.  
Port Colborne, Ontario
- Castillo, Consuelo  
Toronto, Ontario
- Central American Anti-US Intervention Coalition  
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island
- Central Toronto Peace Group  
Toronto, Ontario
- Centre d'études Arabes pour le Développement (Canada)*  
Montreal, Quebec
- Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe*  
Montreal, Quebec
- Charbonneau, Robert  
St. Fulgence, Dubuc County, Quebec
- Children's Crusade for Peace  
St. John's, Newfoundland
- Chilliwack Interchurch Committee for World Education  
Chilliwack, British Columbia
- Christian Task Force on Central America  
Burnaby, British Columbia
- Christoffersen, A.  
Victoria, British Columbia

Church, Jim  
Esterhazy, Saskatchewan

Cinis, V.  
Toronto, Ontario

Cirkin, David  
Kitchener, Ontario

Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform  
Rexdale, Ontario

Citizens for Nuclear Responsibility  
Lennoxville, Quebec

Citizens for Peace  
Abbotsford, British Columbia

Clague, Ian  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Coalition for Aid to Nicaragua  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Coalition for the Self-Determination of Peoples  
St. John's, Newfoundland

Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the Handicapped  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Cohn, Theodore  
Burnaby, British Columbia

Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas  
Hull, Quebec

Committee of Solidarity with People of El Salvador  
Toronto, Ontario

Communist Party of Canada — Central Committee  
Toronto, Ontario

Confedco  
Toronto, Ontario

*Confédération des syndicats nationaux*  
Montreal, Quebec

Conscience Canada  
Victoria, British Columbia

Council of Muslim Communities of Canada  
Hamilton, Ontario

Council of Ontario Universities  
Toronto, Ontario

Counter Terror Study Centre  
Winnipeg, Manitoba



- Cullen, Daniel and Fisher, Gabriel  
Wolfville, Nova Scotia
- Cunningham, Allan  
Lions Bay, British Columbia
- CUSO  
Ottawa, Ontario
- CUSO — London  
London, Ontario
- CUSO — Saskatchewan  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
- Cuthbert, Constance J.  
London, Ontario
- Dalhousie University  
Halifax, Nova Scotia
- Davis, Sally  
Paradise, Newfoundland
- Davison, Charles B.  
Edmonton, Alberta
- De Groot, Eric  
Scarborough, Ontario
- De Jongh, Elly  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Degraaf, Peter  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Development Assistance and The Environment  
Hamilton, Ontario
- Diamond, Robert  
Corner Brook, Newfoundland
- Diaz, A. Marco Antonio  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Dickey, Andy  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Dingman, Frank Spence  
Surrey, British Columbia
- Dixon, Sophia Hansine  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
- Donovan, A.E.  
St. John's, Newfoundland
- Dosne, James J.E.  
Pointe Claire, Quebec

Dowhaluk, Harry  
Tamworth, Ontario

Dubé, Mark  
Regina, Saskatchewan

Ealam Tamil Association of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta

Ealam Tamil Association of British Columbia  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Eaton, Brian  
Whitehorse, Yukon

End The Arms Race  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Energy Conversion Systems, Inc.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Energy Probe  
Ottawa, Ontario

Eritrean Relief Association in Canada Inc.  
Toronto, Ontario

Estonian Central Council in Canada  
Toronto, Ontario

Esvelt, B.F.  
Bramalea, Ontario

Ewanchuk, Cliff  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Fanshawe College  
London, Ontario

Faris, Hani  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada  
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Findlay, Seaton  
Ottawa, Ontario

First Unitarian Congregation of Toronto  
Toronto, Ontario

Fitzgerald, Mike  
Calgary, Alberta

Flamborough Peace Group  
Carlisle, Ontario

Ford, Brenda  
Moncton, New Brunswick

Forum Africa Coordinating Committee (Ottawa)  
Ottawa, Ontario

Fournier, Louis  
Moncton, New Brunswick

Fraser, Ian  
Montreal, Quebec

Free South Africa Committee of Montreal  
Montreal, Quebec

Fretz, Judith  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Fretz, Katie  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Fundamental Research Institute  
Gloucester, Ontario

GATT-Fly  
Toronto, Ontario

Gearing, William R.  
Orillia, Ontario

Gertler, Ann  
Westmount, Quebec

Gibson, Alice  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Gilmore, John  
Montreal, Quebec

Gilmour, Kenneth John  
Hastings, Ontario

Global Community Centre  
Waterloo, Ontario

Global Village (Nanaimo)  
Nanaimo, British Columbia

Godderis, Ann  
Castlegar, British Columbia

Golding, Donald W.  
Oshawa, Ontario

Gordonhead United Church  
Victoria, British Columbia

Graduate Students' Union — University of Toronto  
Toronto, Ontario

Group of 78  
Ottawa, Ontario



**Group of 78 — Atlantic Caucus**  
**Halifax, Nova Scotia**

**Gullone, Anthony**  
**Hamilton, Ontario**

**Harmes, Paul E.**  
**Toronto, Ontario**

**Hassan, Merwan**  
**Ottawa, Ontario**

**Hatley, James J.**  
**Toronto, Ontario**

**Hemming, Timothy C.S.**  
**Toronto, Ontario**

**Henderson, Michael D.**  
**Downsview, Ontario**

**Heinrich, H.J.**  
**Hudson Heights, Quebec**

**Hillmer, Norman**  
**Ottawa, Ontario**

**Hiroshima-Nagasaki Relived**  
**Toronto, Ontario**

**Hoffmann, H.**  
**Toronto, Ontario**

**Hogg, D.A.**  
**Agincourt, Ontario**

**Home Street Mennonite Church**  
**Winnipeg, Manitoba**

**Hortop, Sally and Scott**  
**Hanover, Ontario**

**Howard, Rhoda E.**  
**Hamilton, Ontario**

**Howell, Helen and Doug**  
**Victoria, British Columbia**

**Hudgin, Cecil A.**  
**Scarborough, Ontario**

**Human Rights Awareness New Brunswick Inc.**  
**St. John, New Brunswick**

**Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (Canada)**  
**Mississauga, Ontario**

**Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (Canada)**  
**Montreal, Quebec**

Hunter, David  
Don Mills, Ontario

Hyndman, James E.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Indigenous Survival International  
Ottawa, Ontario

Institute for International Development and Co-operation  
Ottawa, Ontario

Inter Pares  
Ottawa, Ontario

Inter-Church Committee for World Development Education — Halifax – Dartmouth  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Inter-Church Committee for World Development Education — Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia

Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America  
Toronto, Ontario

Interchurch Uranium Committee  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Intercultural Association of Greater Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia

International Business Council of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

International Council for Adult Education  
Toronto, Ontario

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Canada)  
Ottawa, Ontario

International March for Peace in Central America  
Montreal, Quebec

International Organization on Youth and Law  
Montreal, Quebec

International Submarine Transportation Systems Inc.  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Inuit Circumpolar Conference  
Ottawa, Ontario

Inuit Committee on National Issues  
Ottawa, Ontario

Inuit Tapirisat of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

Iranian National Council of Resistance in Canada and U.S.A.  
Toronto, Ontario

Jackson, R.A.  
St. Alberta, Alberta

Jardine, Kevin  
Toronto, Ontario

Jesson, Michael George  
Granbrook, British Columbia

Jull, Peter  
Ottawa, Ontario

Justice and Peace Office — Scarboro Foreign Mission Society  
Scarborough, Ontario

Kallidumbil, Dave  
Guelph, Ontario

Karges, Ellie and Brezden, Patricia  
Kitchener, Ontario

Kelly, R.W.  
Eden Mills, Ontario

Kendall, Reginald W.  
London, Ontario

Khalifa, A. Momin  
Glance Bay, Nova Scotia

Khattak, John  
Abbotsford, British Columbia

Kingston Anti-Apartheid Coalition  
Kingston, Ontario

Kinnon, Gordon Carl

Kirk, John  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Kirkey, Christopher  
Kingston, Ontario

Klapauszak, Michael  
Edmonton, Alberta

Klassen, Menno  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Klein Cohen, Bryna  
St. Laurent, Quebec

Kollar, Ivan  
Regina, Saskatchewan

Kowalchuk, Chris  
Oakville, Ontario



Kubursi, Atef  
Hamilton, Ontario

Kukovica, Tom  
Puslinch, Ontario

Lane, Henry W.  
London, Ontario

Langara Students Union  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Laprise, Guy  
Chicoutimi, Quebec

Latin American Mission Program of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlottetown  
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island

Latter, Carol and Walter  
Duncan, British Columbia

Lawrence, E.A.  
Calgary, Alberta

Leblanc, Philippe  
Toronto, Ontario

Leeksma, Andrew C.  
Oakville, Ontario

Liddar, Bhupinder Singh  
Ottawa, Ontario

London Conference of the United Church of Canada  
Lakeside, Ontario

London Cross Cultural Learner Centre  
London, Ontario

Ljunggren, Linda  
Hamilton, Ontario

Lubbock, Michael  
Ottawa, Ontario

Lyon, Peyton V.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Macaulay, John C.  
Red Deer, Alberta

Macy, Richard Hooe  
Ottawa, Ontario

Mahant, Edelgard  
Sudbury, Ontario

Mahmood, Tariq  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

*Maison d'Afrique*  
Montreal, Quebec

Malcolmson, Robert  
Kingston, Ontario

Manitoba Action Committee on The Status of Women  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Manitoba Peace Council  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Marchak, Richard V.  
Orillia, Ontario

Marsh, John S.  
Peterborough, Ontario

Mather, G.B.  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

McDonald, Heather B.  
Barrie, Ontario

McDougall, Catherine  
Summerland, British Columbia

McEwen, Evanel  
Sydney, Nova Scotia

McIntyre, Jim  
Vancouver, British Columbia

McKenna, Lynn and Thompson, Audrey  
Lindsay, Ontario

McKenna, Suzanne  
Fredericton, New Brunswick

McMaster University  
Hamilton, Ontario

McMurtry, John  
Guelph, Ontario

McNie, John  
Hamilton, Ontario

McPhail, Thomas L.  
Calgary, Alberta

McPhee, Betty  
Toronto, Ontario

McRae, Jim  
Ottawa, Ontario

McRobert, David  
Downsview, Ontario

McWhinney, Edward  
Burnaby, British Columbia

Mennonite Central Committee  
Ottawa, Ontario

Métis National Council  
Ottawa, Ontario

Miller, Joanna E.  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Minish, Garth A.  
Oakbank, Manitoba

Mission for Peace  
Toronto, Ontario

Mohyuddin, Mirza  
Edmonton, Alberta

Mollinga, George  
Stoney Creek, Ontario

Monin, Gene  
Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario

Montreal Inter-University Pacific Island Group  
Montreal, Quebec

Mooney, Monica  
St. John, New Brunswick

Moran, Susan Mary  
Toronto, Ontario

Mott, M.  
New Westminster, British Columbia

Mundle, Garth I.  
Edmonton, Alberta

Munro, Donald W.  
Victoria, British Columbia

Murray, Andrew B.  
West Vancouver, British Columbia

Myers, Dick  
Kingston, Ontario

National Action Committee on The Status of Women  
Toronto, Ontario

Native Council of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

Navy League of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

Nelson, J. Gordon  
Waterloo, Ontario

Neufeld, E.P.  
Montreal, Quebec

New Brunswick Multicultural Council  
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Nicaragua Solidarity Society of British Columbia  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Nieman, William  
Victoria, British Columbia

Njoku, Emeka A.  
London, Ontario

North Bay Peace Alliance  
North Bay, Ontario

North-South Institute  
Ottawa, Ontario

Northwest Territories, Government of the  
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories

Nossal, Kim Richard  
Hamilton, Ontario

Nova Scotia World Food Day Committee  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Nuala Beck and Associates Inc.  
Toronto, Ontario

Nuclear Free North  
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories

Nunavut Constitutional Forum  
Ottawa, Ontario

O'Neill, M.  
Toronto, Ontario

Okonkwo, Clem  
West Hill, Ontario

Onstein, Peter  
Brockville, Ontario

Ontario Graduate Association  
Toronto, Ontario

Operation Dismantle Inc.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Orbita Consultants Limited  
Ottawa, Ontario



Orlando, Dana  
Montreal, Quebec

Orvik, Nils  
Kingston, Ontario

Ottawa Central America Solidarity Committee  
Ottawa, Ontario

Oxfam-Canada — London Branch  
London, Ontario

Oxfam-Canada — National Office  
Ottawa, Ontario

Pachai, Bridglal  
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

Pacific Basin Economic Council — Canadian Committee  
Ottawa, Ontario

Palestine-Israel Committee  
London, Ontario

Parksville-Qualicum Inter-Church World Development Study Group  
Parksville, British Columbia

Patterson, J.W.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Peace Research Institute — Dundas  
Dundas, Ontario

Peach, Nora  
Otterburn Park, Quebec

Physicians for Social Responsibility — B.C. Chapter  
Vancouver, British Columbia

*Pierre Larouche et Associés*  
Longueuil, Quebec

Pittenbrigh, A.D.  
Port Perry, Ontario

Plourde, Robert  
Saint Augustin de Desmaures, Quebec

Pollock, David  
Ottawa, Ontario

Pollock, Irwin  
Montreal, Quebec

Pollution Probe Foundation  
Toronto, Ontario

Poncelet, Maurice  
Ottawa, Ontario

Powell, Layne  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Preddie, Calvin Kenneth  
Cornwall, Ontario

Price, Jeremy  
London, Ontario

Prince George Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
Prince George, British Columbia

Prince Rupert Labour Council  
Prince Rupert, British Columbia

Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers  
Ottawa, Ontario

Project Peacemakers  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Project Ploughshares — Calgary  
Calgary, Alberta

Project Ploughshares — Cape Breton  
Sydney, Nova Scotia

Project Ploughshares — Halifax-Dartmouth Branch  
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

Project Ploughshares — Kawartha  
Lakefield, Ontario

Project Ploughshares — Lunenburg County  
Lunenburg, Nova Scotia

Project Ploughshares — National Office  
Ottawa, Ontario

Project Ploughshares — Orillia Branch  
Orillia, Ontario

Project Ploughshares — Pictou County  
Scotsburn, Nova Scotia

Project Ploughshares — Saskatoon  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Public Education for Peace Society  
New Westminster, British Columbia

Public Social Responsibility Committee — Diocese of Niagara Anglican Church of Canada  
Hamilton, Ontario

Qamar, Ijaz  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Queen's University  
Kingston, Ontario

- Quittner, J.  
Toronto, Ontario
- Ramsay, Frank L.  
Garibaldi Highlands, British Columbia
- Regroupement pour un dialogue Israël-Palestine*  
Montreal, Quebec
- Religious Society of Friends — Argenta B.C. Chapter  
Argenta, British Columbia
- Religious Society of Friends — Quaker Committee on Native Concerns  
Halifax, Nova Scotia
- Religious Society of Friends — Simcoe-Muskoka Monthly Meeting  
Oro Station, Ontario
- Religious Society of Friends — St. John's Worship Group  
St. John's, Newfoundland
- Religious Society of Friends — Victoria Monthly Meeting  
Victoria, British Columbia
- Réseau québécois de solidarité avec l'Amérique Centrale*  
Montréal, Québec
- Reyda, Carol E.  
Regina, Saskatchewan
- Richmond, Anthony H.  
North York, Ontario
- Ridd, Carl  
Winnipeg, Manitoba
- Roberts, Guy  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Roche, Douglas  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Rogers, Walter E.  
Thunder Bay, Ontario
- Rohmer, Richard  
Toronto, Ontario
- Rose, Loretta  
Edmonton, Alberta
- Rosser, D.  
Qualicum Beach, British Columbia
- Royal Canadian Legion  
Ottawa, Ontario
- Royal Kingston United Services  
Kingston, Ontario

Ruderman, A. Peter  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Rural Women's Conference  
Antigonish, Nova Scotia

Saeed, Usamah  
Longueuil, Quebec

Saint-Vincent, L.R.  
Chambly, Quebec

Salem, Norma and Antonius, Rashad  
Montreal, Quebec

Samagh, Raghbir Singh and Bal, Manohar Singh  
Toronto, Ontario

Sanderson, George  
Tottenham, Ontario

Sara, Iqbal  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Saskatchewan Council for International Cooperation  
Regina, Saskatchewan

Saskatoon Concerned Youth  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Saskatoon Nicaragua Support Committee  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Saskatoon Peace Council  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Sawdon, Ed  
Peterborough, Ontario

Schmidt, William C. and Roth, Jamie  
Stratford, Ontario

Science for Peace — Quebec Chapter  
Montreal, Quebec

Science for Peace — Toronto Chapter  
Toronto, Ontario

Science for Peace-Vancouver Chapter  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Shaw, Timothy  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Sherman, Joan  
Athabasca, Alberta

Sherwood, Fredric R.  
Victoria, British Columbia



Shilstra, U.A.  
Toronto, Ontario

Sikh Association Brantford  
Brantford, Ontario

Sikh Canadian Society  
Mississauga, Ontario

Simon Fraser University  
Burnaby, British Columbia

Simon, Lindsay  
West Vancouver, British Columbia

Smith, Kerry  
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island

Smyth, Ross  
Montreal, Quebec

Snell, Elizabeth and Cecile, Charles  
Cambridge, Ontario

Snyder, Arnold  
Waterloo, Ontario

Social Justice Committee of Montreal  
Montreal, Quebec

Social Justice Committee of The Diocese of St. Peter's  
Cudworth, Saskatchewan

Solidarity Centre  
Chatham, Ontario

South Asia Partnership — Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

South Pacific Peoples Foundation of Canada  
Victoria, British Columbia

Sowerby, E.M.  
Vancouver, British Columbia

St. Jacques, Marc  
St. Bruno, Quebec

St. John's Parish Peace and Justice Group  
Victoria, British Columbia

Starowicz, Mark  
Toronto, Ontario

Stein, Janice  
Toronto, Ontario

Stepan, Corrie  
Regina, Saskatchewan

Stewart, D.B. and Ruth  
Killarney, Manitoba

Stewart, Dorothy J.  
Qualicum Beach, British Columbia

Stiles, J.  
Montague, Prince Edward Island

Stokes, S.C.W.  
Burnaby, British Columbia

Strain, George W.  
Sudbury, Ontario

Strait Area Education and Recreation Centre  
Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia

Students' Society of McGill University  
Montreal, Quebec

Stukel, A.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Sullivan, Nora  
Lethbridge, Alberta

Swords, Mike  
Kars, Ontario

Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility  
Toronto, Ontario

Taylor, D.R.F.  
Ottawa, Ontario

Ten Days for World Development — North York  
Willowdale, Ontario

Ten Days for World Development — Surrey – White Rock  
White Rock, British Columbia

Ten Days for World Development — Vancouver  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Ten Days for World Development and Project Ploughshares — Brantford  
St. George, Ontario

Ten Days for World Development Committee — Maidstone and Area Group  
Maidstone, Saskatchewan

Tetley, William  
Montreal, Quebec

Third World Resource Centre  
Windsor, Ontario

Thysse, Bill  
Edmonton, Alberta

Tombs, Edward P.  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Toronto Anti-Intervention Coalition  
Toronto, Ontario

Toronto United Mennonite Church  
Toronto, Ontario

Toronto Universities Middle East Group  
Toronto, Ontario

Toronto Zionist Council  
Toronto, Ontario

Toronto's Central America Solidarity Committees  
Toronto, Ontario

Tremblay, Miville  
Montreal, Quebec

Turel, Franziska  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Ukrainian Canadian Committee  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Unitarian Church of Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia

United Church of Canada — Cambrian Presbytery  
Thunder Bay, Ontario

United Church of Canada — Regina Presbytery  
Regina, Saskatchewan

United Church of Canada — Toronto Conference  
Toronto, Ontario

United Council of Filipino Associations in Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

United Nations Association in Canada  
Toronto, Ontario

United Nations Association in Canada — Winnipeg Branch  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

University College of Cape Breton — Centre for International Studies  
Sydney, Nova Scotia

University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta

University of British Columbia Students for Peace and Mutual Disarmament  
Vancouver, British Columbia

University of Guelph  
Guelph, Ontario

University of Quebec at Three Rivers  
Three-Rivers, Quebec

University of Toronto — International Economics Program  
Toronto, Ontario

University of Toronto Faculty Association  
Toronto, Ontario

University of Windsor  
Windsor, Ontario

Urbanc, Peter  
Don Mills, Ontario

Valentine, Charles P.  
Argenta, British Columbia

Van Leusden, D.M.  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Vancouver Community College  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Vancouver Unitarian Church — Canadian Unitarian Council  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Vancouver Youth for Peace Action  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Vanderput, H.  
Carmen, Manitoba

Vernon Peace Coalition  
Vernon, British Columbia

Veterans for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Victoria International Development Education Committee  
Victoria, British Columbia

Virke, Zakaria  
Kingston, Ontario

Voice of Woman — Nova Scotia  
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Voice of Women — Fredericton Branch  
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Voice of Women — Nelson B.C. Branch  
Nelson, British Columbia

Voice of Women — Vancouver Branch  
Vancouver, British Columbia

Voice of Women — Victoria  
Victoria, British Columbia



Von Mirbach, Henning  
Ottawa, Ontario

Wells, Phillip H.  
Argenta, British Columbia

Weser, Ernest J.  
Laird, Saskatchewan

Western University Students' Council  
London, Ontario

Westside United Church Women  
Owen Sound, Ontario

Whalley, John  
London, Ontario

Wilkins, Lillie S.  
Killarney, Manitoba

Wilkinson, P.R.  
Lethbridge, Alberta

Wilson, Derek B.  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Wilson, Ken  
Malton, Ontario

Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament  
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Wiseman, Henry, Professor  
Guelph, Ontario

Witness for Peace  
Otterburn, Ontario

Woolcott, Peter  
Owen Sound, Ontario

World Citizens Learner Centre  
Lethbridge, Alberta

World Federalists of Canada — Kingston Branch  
Kingston, Ontario

World Federalists of Canada — Dundas Branch  
Dundas, Ontario

World Federalists of Canada — Kitchener-Waterloo Branch  
Waterloo, Ontario

World Federalists of Canada — Montreal Branch  
Montreal, Quebec

World Federalists of Canada — Ottawa Branch  
Ottawa, Ontario

World Federalist of Canada — Vancouver Branch  
Vancouver, British Columbia

World Food Day Association of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario

World Literacy of Canada  
Toronto, Ontario

World Vision Canada  
Mississauga, Ontario

Wowchuk, Stephen  
Mississauga, Ontario

YWCA — Calgary  
Calgary, Alberta

Zypchyn, Karen  
Regina, Saskatchewan

The Committee also received from 1,955 persons a mail-in petition sponsored by Non-Intervention in Central America: Canadians for Self-Determination, making recommendations on Canadian policy towards Central America.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations (*Issue Nos. 19 to 62 inclusive and Issue No. 63, which contains this Report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Jean-Maurice Simard

Tom Hockin, MP

*Joint Chairmen*







Wilson, Ken  
 Malton (Ontario)

Wiseman, Henry, professeur  
 Guelph (Ontario)

Witness for Peace  
 Otterburn (Ontario)

Woolcott, Peter  
 Owen Sound (Ontario)

*World Citizens Learner Centre*  
 Leithbridge (Alberta)

*World Literacy of Canada*  
 Toronto (Ontario)

*World Vision Canada*  
 Mississauga (Ontario)

Wowchuk, Stephen  
 Mississauga (Ontario)

YWCA — Calgary  
 Calgary (Alberta)

Zypchyn, Karen  
 Regina (Saskatchewan)

Par ailleurs le comité a reçu 1 955 cartes publiées par le groupe *Non-Intervention in Central America : Canadians For Self-Determination*, qui contiennent des recommandations concernant la politique du Canada en Amérique centrale.

Un exemplaire des procès-verbaux et témoignages pertinents du Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada (*fascicules nos 19 à 62, ainsi que le n° 63 qui contient ce rapport*) est déposé.

Respectueusement soumis,  
 Les coprésidents

Le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard

Tom Hockin, député

*Vancouver Youth for Peace Action*  
 Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Vanderput, H.  
 Carmen (Manitoba)  
*Vernon Peace Coalition*  
 Vernon (Colombie-Britannique)  
*Veterans for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament*  
 Halifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse)  
*Victoria International Development Education Committee*  
 Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Virke, Zakaria  
 Kingston (Ontario)  
 Voix des femmes — chapitre de Fredericton  
 Fredericton (Nouveau-Brunswick)  
 Voix des femmes — chapitre de Vancouver  
 Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Voix des femmes — chapitre de Victoria  
 Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Voix des femmes — Nelson  
 Nelson (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Voix des femmes — Nouvelle-Ecosse  
 Halifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse)  
 Von Mirbach, Henning  
 Ottawa (Ontario)  
 Wells, Phillip H.  
 Argenta (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Weser, Ernest J.  
 Laird (Saskatchewan)  
*Western University Students' Council*  
 London (Ontario)  
*Westside United Church Women*  
 Owen Sound (Ontario)  
 Whalley, John  
 London (Ontario)  
 Wilkins, Lillie S.  
 Killarney (Manitoba)  
 Wilkinson, P.R.  
 Lethbridge (Alberta)  
 Wilson, Derek B.  
 Winnipeg (Manitoba)

*United Council of Filipino Associations in Canada*  
Ottawa (Ontario)

Universitaires favorables au désarmement nucléaire  
St-John (Terre-Neuve)

Université de Dalhousie  
Halifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

Université Brock  
St. Catharines (Ontario)

Université de Guelph  
Guelph (Ontario)

Université de Windsor  
Windsor (Ontario)

Université du Québec à Trois-rivières  
Trois-Rivières (Québec)

Université McMaster  
Hamilton (Ontario)

Université Queen's  
Kingston (Ontario)

Université Simon Fraser  
Burnaby (Colombie-Britannique)

University College of Cape Breton — Centre for International Studies  
Sydney (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

University of Alberta  
Edmonton (Alberta)

University of British Columbia Students for Peace and Mutual Disarmament  
Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

University of Toronto — International Economics Program  
Toronto (Ontario)

University of Toronto Faculty Association  
Toronto (Ontario)

Urban, Peter  
Don Mills (Ontario)

Valentine, Charles P.  
Argenta (Colombie-Britannique)

Van Leusden, D.M.  
Winnipeg (Manitoba)

Vancouver Community College  
Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

Vancouver Unitarian Church — Canadian Unitarian Council  
Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

Swords, Mike  
Kars (Ontario)

*Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility*  
Toronto (Ontario)

Taylor, D.R.F.  
Ottawa (Ontario)

*Ten Days for World Development* — North York  
Willowdale (Ontario)

*Ten Days for World Development* — Surrey — White Rock  
White Rock (Colombie-Britannique)

*Ten Days for World Development* — Vancouver  
Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

*Ten Days for World Development* — Groupe de Maidstone et de la région  
Maidstone (Saskatchewan)

*Ten Days for World Development et Project Ploughshares* — Brantford  
St-George (Ontario)

Tetley, William  
Montréal (Québec)

Thysse, Bill  
Edmonton (Alberta)

Tombs, Edward P.  
Winnipeg (Manitoba)

*Toronto Anti-intervention coalition*  
Toronto (Ontario)

*Toronto United Mennonite Church*  
Toronto (Ontario)

*Toronto Universities Middle East Group*  
Toronto (Ontario)

*Toronto Zionist Council*  
Toronto (Ontario)

*Toronto's Central America Solidarity Committees*  
Toronto (Ontario)

Tremblay, Miville  
Montréal (Québec)

Turel, Franziska  
Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

*Ukrainian Canadian Committee*  
Winnipeg (Manitoba)

*Unitarian Church of Victoria*  
Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)



- Snyder, Arnold  
Waterloo (Ontario)
- Social Justice Committee of Montreal*  
Montréal (Québec)
- Social Justice Committee of the Diocese of St. Peter's*  
Cudworth (Saskatchewan)
- Société Asiatique des partenaires — Canada  
Ottawa (Ontario)
- Solidarity Centre*  
Chatham (Ontario)
- South Pacific Peoples Foundation of Canada*  
Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)
- Sowbery, E.M.  
Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)
- St-Jacques, Marc  
St-Bruno (Québec)
- St. John's Parish Peace and Justice Group*  
Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)
- Starowicz, Mark  
Toronto (Ontario)
- Stein, Janice  
Toronto (Ontario)
- Stepan, Corrie  
Regina (Saskatchewan)
- Stewart, D.B. et Ruth  
Killarney (Manitoba)
- Stewart, Dorothy J.  
Qualicum Beach (Colombie-Britannique)
- Stiles, J.  
Montague (Île-du-Prince-Édouard)
- Stokes, S.C.W.  
Burnaby (Colombie-Britannique)
- Strain, George W.  
Sudbury (Ontario)
- Strait Area Education and Recreation Centre*  
Port Hawkesbury (Nouvelle-Écosse)
- Stukel, A.  
Ottawa (Ontario)
- Sullivan, Nora  
Lehrbridge (Alberta)

Sara, Iqbal  
 Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

*Saskatchewan Council for International Cooperation*  
 Regina (Saskatchewan)

*Saskatoon Concerned Youth*  
 Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

*Saskatoon Nicaragua Support Committee*  
 Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

*Saskatoon Peace Council*  
 Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

Sawdon, Ed  
 Peterborough (Ontario)

Schmidt, William C. et Roth, Jamie  
 Stratford (Ontario)

*Science for Peace — Toronto*  
 Toronto (Ontario)

*Science for Peace — Québec*  
 Montréal (Québec)

*Science for Peace — Vancouver Chapter*  
 Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique)

Shaw, Timothy  
 Halifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

Sherman, Joan  
 Athabasca (Alberta)

Sherwood, Fredric R.  
 Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)

Shilstra, U.A.  
 Toronto (Ontario)

*Sikh Association Brantford*  
 Brantford (Ontario)

*Sikh Canadian Society*  
 Mississauga (Ontario)

Simon, Lindsay  
 West Vancouver (Colombie Britannique)

Smith, Kerry  
 Charlottetown (Île-du-Prince-Edouard)

Smyth, Ross  
 Montréal (Québec)

Snell, Elizabeth et Cecile, Charles  
 Cambridge (Ontario)

*Religious Society of Friends — Victoria monthly meeting*  
 Victoria (Colombie Britannique)  
 Réseau canadien de recherche pour l'enseignement supérieur  
 Ottawa (Ontario)  
 Réseau québécois de solidarité avec l'Amérique centrale  
 Montréal (Québec)  
 Reyda, Carol E.  
 Regina (Saskatchewan)  
 Richmond, Anthony H.  
 North York (Ontario)  
 Ridd, Carl  
 Winnipeg (Manitoba)  
 Roberts, Guy  
 Ottawa (Ontario)  
 Roche, Douglas  
 Ottawa (Ontario)  
 Rogers, Walter E.  
 Thunder Bay (Ontario)  
 Rohmer, Richard  
 Toronto (Ontario)  
 Rose, Loretta  
 Edmonton (Alberta)  
 Rosser, D.  
 Qualicum Beach (Colombie-Britannique)  
 Royal Kingston United Services  
 Kingston (Ontario)  
 Ruderman, A. Peter  
 Halifax (Nouvelle-Ecosse)  
*Rural Women's Conference*  
 Antigonish (Nouvelle-Ecosse)  
 Saeed, Usamah  
 Longueuil (Québec)  
 Saint-Vincent, L.R.  
 Chambly (Québec)  
 Salem, Norma et Antonius, Rashad  
 Montréal (Québec)  
 Samagh, Raghbir Singh et BAL, Manohar Singh  
 Toronto (Ontario)  
 Sanderson, George  
 Tottenham (Ontario)

*Project Ploughshares* — Bureau national  
Ottawa (Ontario)

*Project Ploughshares* — Calgary  
Calgary (Alberta)

*Project Ploughshares* — Cap-Breton  
Sydney (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

*Project Ploughshares* — Chapitre d'Orillia  
Orillia (Ontario)

*Project Ploughshares* — Chapitre de Halifax-Dartmouth  
Dartmouth (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

*Project Ploughshares* — Comité de Picton  
Scotsburn (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

*Project Ploughshares* — Comité de Lunenburg  
Lunenburg (Nouvelle-Ecosse)

*Project Ploughshares* — Kawartha  
Lakefield (Ontario)

*Project Ploughshares* — Saskatoon  
Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

*Public Education for Peace Society*  
New Westminster (Colombie-Britannique)

*Public Social Responsibility Committee* — Diocèse of Niagara Anglican Church of Canada  
Hamilton (Ontario)

Qamar, Ijaz  
Winnipeg (Manitoba)

Quitner, J.  
Toronto (Ontario)

Ralliement national des métis  
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Association canadienne des études africaines  
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Association canadienne des études latino-américaines et caraïbes  
Ottawa (Ontario)

Association canadienne des professeurs d'université  
Ottawa (Ontario)

Association canadienne pour le club de Rome  
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Le comité remercie le très honorable Charles Joseph Clark, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, d'avoir discuté avec les membres du comité des questions soulevées par le livre vert *Compétitivité et sécurité*.

Les témoins qui ont comparu devant le comité sont indiqués par ordre alphabétique. Mention est faite (entre parenthèses) du numéro du fascicule des procès-verbaux et témoignages.

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60	Le 23 avril 1986	Yellowknife (T.N.-O.)
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21	Le 20 novembre 1985	Ottawa (Ontario)
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23	Le 4 décembre 1985	Ottawa (Ontario)
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30	Le 16 janvier 1986	Ottawa (Ontario)
31	Le 20 janvier 1986	Charlottetown (I.-P.-É.)
32	Le 21 janvier 1986	Charlottetown (I.-P.-É.)
32	Le 21 janvier 1986	Halifax (Nouvelle-Écosse)
33	Le 22 janvier 1986	Halifax (Nouvelle-Écosse)
34	Le 23 janvier 1986	St-Jean (Terre-Neuve)
35	Le 24 janvier 1986	St-Jean (Terre-Neuve)
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37	Le 29 janvier 1986	Ottawa (Ontario)
38	Le 4 février 1986	Edmonton (Alberta)
39	Le 5 février 1986	Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)
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41	Le 11 février 1986	Ottawa (Ontario)
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43	Le 25 février 1986	Ottawa (Ontario)
44	Le 4 mars 1986	Ottawa (Ontario)
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46	Le 10 mars 1986	Fredericton (N.-B.)
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48	Le 12 mars 1986	Montréal (Québec)
49	Le 13 mars 1986	Québec (Québec)
50	Le 17 mars 1986	Vancouver (C.-B.)
51	Le 18 mars 1986	Vancouver (C.-B.)
52	Le 20 mars 1986	Whitehorse (Yukon)



L'internationalisme constructif permet de faire d'une pierre deux coups : donner aux Canadiens une ouverture sur le monde d'une façon qui paraisse servir leurs intérêts, et répondre aux aspirations des centaines de Canadiens qui sont venus déclarer devant le comité que le Canada devrait jouer un rôle international actif et productif. Pour que ces aspirations se réalisent pleinement, le gouvernement devra trouver le moyen de permettre aux Canadiens de participer à des activités internationales relevant du secteur non gouvernemental et de toucher la corde du bénévolat qui est toute prête à vibrer dans le cœur des Canadiens. (P. 151.)



peut permettre une amélioration des relations Est-Ouest. Nous recommandons que le programme d'échanges actuel soit convenablement financé. (P. 142.)

Nous recommandons de façon plus générale de mettre sur pied un programme concerté en vue de conclure des accords de coopération avec tous les pays du Nord. (P. 142.)

Nous recommandons que le Canada fasse des efforts particuliers pour développer de bonnes relations avec le Groenland. Sous réserve de l'accord du gouvernement du Danemark, nous recommandons d'ouvrir un consulat au Groenland (P. 142.)

### La question de la souveraineté

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement canadien tente à nouveau de s'entendre avec les Etats-Unis pour que ces derniers reconnaissent la souveraineté du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest. (P. 144.)

À moins que les Etats-Unis n'acceptent de reconnaître la souveraineté du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest, le comité estime que le mieux est de laisser délibérément le temps passer plutôt que demander à la Cour internationale de justice de trancher la question. (P. 145)

### Questions relatives à la défense

Le comité recommande que le gouvernement envisage la possibilité de doter la marine canadienne de sous-marins diesel-électriques dans le cadre de l'examen général des forces navales du Canada et de l'ensemble de la politique canadienne en matière de défense. (P. 147.)

Nous recommandons que le Canada, en collaboration avec d'autres pays arctiques et nordiques, cherche à obtenir la démilitarisation de l'Arctique en exerçant des pressions en ce sens sur les Etats-Unis ainsi que sur l'Union soviétique et en favorisant d'une manière générale le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. (P. 148.)

## Chapitre XI

### Pour un internationalisme constructif

Nous concluons que les activités du Canada à l'étranger doivent être guidées par le principe de l'internationalisme constructif, ce qui donnera à la politique étrangère du Canada une orientation et un idéal. (P. 149.)

Si l'internationalisme constructif nous apparaît tentant, ce n'est pas parce qu'il évoque un âge d'or imaginaire de la politique étrangère du Canada, mais parce qu'il décrit le mieux l'attitude que le Canada doit adopter dans un environnement international difficile et incertain. (P. 149.)

Le Canada a tout intérêt à faire preuve d'un idéalisme confiant plutôt qu'à adopter une attitude mesquine et égoïste envers le reste du monde. (P. 149.)

La recherche de moyens permettant de rendre les institutions internationales plus efficaces doit figurer parmi les grands objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada. (P. 150.)

Le comité estime qu'un programme d'échanges sur l'Arctique avec l'Union soviétique est un bon moyen d'accroître les connaissances du Canada sur le Grand Nord et qu'il

l'importation des produits de la fourrure. (P. 140.)  
 nous à Yellowknife, pour contrer toute campagne, surtout en Europe, visant à interdire internationale de survie des autochtones, dont la section canadienne a comparu devant devrait tout faire en son pouvoir pour appuyer les efforts que déploie l'Organisation renouvelables, en particulier dans le domaine de la pêche. À l'étranger, le Canada sein de la fédération canadienne. Il faudrait favoriser la mise en valeur des ressources des structures gouvernementales qui assureraient l'autonomie culturelle des Inuit au revendications territoriales dans le Nord et encourager les efforts déployés pour trouver Le Canada devrait chercher en priorité à conclure une entente acceptable sur les sa politique étrangère. (P. 139.)

L'Arctique devient de plus en plus un point de convergence de l'attention internationale. Comme le Canada a d'énormes intérêts dans cette région, il doit élaborer une politique cohérente sur l'Arctique prévoyant expressément d'intégrer le Grand Nord à

## Chapitre X L'importance du Grand Nord dans la politique étrangère du Canada

Le gouvernement fédéral devrait envisager la possibilité de désigner chaque année quelques fonctionnaires subalternes pour participer au *Congressional Intern Program*. (P. 138.)  
 Chaque fois que le Canada négociera avec les États-Unis un accord qui devra ensuite être ratifié par le Congrès, nous recommandons que l'ambassade du Canada à Washington continue à effectuer ses propres sondages de l'opinion du Congrès (P. 137.)

Nous recommandons d'organiser régulièrement des colloques à l'intention des fonctionnaires subalternes des gouvernements de nos deux pays et, si possible, des fonctionnaires des différents États et provinces. (P. 136.)

Nous recommandons au gouvernement d'entreprendre des négociations avec les États-Unis pour arriver à une entente sur les trois frontières maritimes qui sont toujours en litige. (P. 135.)  
 Nous recommandons au gouvernement d'entreprendre des négociations avec les États-Unis pour arriver à une entente sur les trois frontières maritimes qui sont toujours en litige. (P. 135.)

l'importance qu'elle a pour le Canada et pour les États-Unis. (P. 134.)  
 Nous concluons que le gouvernement devrait faire preuve de souplesse dans le choix des moyens à prendre pour exprimer son désaccord avec la politique des États-Unis. Il peut bien sûr doser le retentissement d'un tel désaccord par le choix tant de son porte-parole que des termes utilisés et du mode de présentation. Les mesures à prendre devraient être décidées en fonction de la question en litige, mais en tenant compte aussi de l'importance qu'elle a pour le Canada et pour les États-Unis. (P. 134.)

Il est extrêmement important de faire valoir les vues du Canada auprès de chaque palier du système américain et de faire preuve d'imagination dans la recherche d'alliés. La meilleure méthode consiste à s'efforcer de persuader par la voie diplomatique tandis que des pressions sont exercées par le secteur privé. La clé du succès : une bonne coordination, de la patience dans la persuasion, des exemples frappants et la mention constante du problème. (P. 132.)  
 On n'entreprendra des relations efficaces avec les États-Unis que si toutes les parties intéressées s'efforcent de présenter une politique canadienne cohérente. (P. 132.)

Nous encourageons le gouvernement à multiplier les contacts directs avec les dirigeants d'organisations politiques noires d'Afrique du Sud. Comme la levée de l'interdiction frappant le Congrès national africain et la libération de son chef, M. Nelson Mandela, sont deux des revendications prévues dans l'*Accord du Commonwealth*, des contacts de haut niveau doivent de toute évidence être établis avec le CNA. (P. 119.)

Le Canada doit continuer de leur accorder une aide généreuse et d'appuyer les efforts internationaux qui visent, comme à l'occasion de la Conférence de coordination du développement de l'Afrique australe, à aider les pays voisins de l'Afrique du Sud à pallier les difficultés économiques résultant des sanctions internationales et à contrer les mesures de représailles que le gouvernement d'Afrique du Sud pourrait prendre contre eux. (P. 119 et 120.)

### L'Amérique centrale

La majorité des membres du comité estiment nécessaire de souligner que la politique américaine est conçue en partie pour contrer l'intervention d'autres puissances militaires étrangères en Amérique centrale et soutiennent que le Canada doit pour sa part s'opposer à toute intervention extérieure en Amérique centrale, par quelque pays que ce soit. (P. 121.)

La majorité des membres du comité s'oppose pour l'instant à l'ouverture d'une ambassade du Canada à Managua, mais demande instamment au gouvernement de surveiller les occasions qui pourraient surgir. (P. 123.)

L'influence que le Canada exerce sur les mesures que prennent d'autres pays pour assurer leur sécurité est évidemment limitée, mais nous avons par contre la possibilité d'offrir une aide directe et concrète aux centaines de milliers de réfugiés de cette région qui en ont désespérément besoin. Le comité voudrait que le gouvernement prenne deux initiatives : premièrement qu'il mette sur pied, en collaboration avec d'autres pays et des organisations non gouvernementales, un programme de surveillance des réfugiés visant à relever la sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés et, deuxièmement, qu'il soutienne activement les programmes d'autosuffisance et de développement économique à l'intention des réfugiés. Le gouvernement doit également prendre des mesures pour permettre au Canada de mieux surveiller la situation des droits de la personne en Amérique centrale, en accordant une attention particulière aux conditions qui existent dans chaque pays et aux opinions des ONG canadiennes qui y travaillent. Le Canada doit appuyer les programmes de coopération qui ont pour objet l'avancement de la démocratie et des droits de la personne, ainsi que les gens et les organismes de ces pays qui militent en faveur du respect des droits de la personne. (P. 124.)

## Chapitre IX Améliorer les relations avec les États-Unis

Le comité recommande que le gouvernement, chaque fois qu'il en aura l'occasion, rappelle au gouvernement des États-Unis l'importance de consultations préalables. Pour sa part, le Canada doit lui-même s'imposer de consulter les États-Unis. Dans les deux sens, les consultations ne doivent pas simplement consister à informer les intéressés à l'avance, mais doivent laisser le temps de discuter, de réfléchir et d'apporter les modifications qui s'imposent. (P. 131.)



Il est particulièrement important que le Canada continue d'accueillir généreusement les réfugiés d'Amérique centrale victimes d'actes de répression et de violence. Nous félicitons le gouvernement d'avoir pris la décision d'accorder à tous les requérants le droit à une audition. (P. 116.)

Le gouvernement devrait faire des pressions pour que des Canadiens soient nommés à des postes de direction du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. Il pourrait alors participer à la mise à jour des programmes internationaux à l'intention des réfugiés et à la résolution de questions de politique. Il faudrait notamment définir ce que l'on entend par «réfugié» en vertu des accords internationaux, ainsi que les droits et les responsabilités des pays hôtes. (P. 116.)

Nous souhaitons vivement que le Canada appuie les projets visant à assurer une source de revenu aux réfugiés, comme celui qui existe pour les réfugiés afghans au Pakistan; nous y voyons un excellent exemple de projet destiné à aider les réfugiés à être aussi autonomes et productifs que possible, pendant qu'ils attendent leur rapatriement ou leur installation en permanence dans un pays d'accueil. (P. 116.)

## L'Afghanistan

Le comité recommande que le Canada continue de considérer la prestation d'une aide humanitaire et médicale aux réfugiés afghans au Pakistan comme une priorité et qu'il appuie fortement les initiatives de la Croix-Rouge internationale et celles du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés en particulier. Par ailleurs, dans ses relations bilatérales avec l'Union soviétique, le Canada doit, chaque fois que l'occasion se présente, soulever la question de l'Afghanistan et bien faire savoir que l'occupation et la destruction de ce pays constituent un obstacle sérieux à une amélioration des relations. (P. 117.)

## L'Afrique du Sud

Si le groupe des sages du Commonwealth avait fait savoir que les progrès accomplis en vue de mettre fin à l'apartheid étaient insuffisants, le comité aurait recommandé que le Canada prépare un autre plan d'action pour le Commonwealth, avec des sanctions bien précises, comme celles qui apparaissent à l'article 7 de l'*Accord du Commonwealth* d'octobre 1985. (P. 119.)

Comme le groupe des sages a fait savoir — comme on le craignait — que le démantèlement de l'apartheid n'a fait aucun progrès, le Canada devrait imposer du plus grand nombre possible de pays du Commonwealth et encourager les autres pays à prendre des mesures semblables. (P. 119.)

Dans les deux cas, il conviendrait de créer un programme des droits de la personne et de l'avancement démocratique des Noirs d'Afrique du Sud. Le Canada a créé un programme de bourses d'études en 1983 et a depuis augmenté les fonds qu'il lui réserve. Nous sommes tout à fait en faveur de ce genre d'initiative et nous souhaitons que d'autres mesures soient prises pour favoriser la constitution d'institutions sociales, économiques et politiques noires en prévision du jour où les Noirs d'Afrique du Sud exerceront leurs pleins droits de citoyens. (P. 119.)



personne empêchent la réalisation de l'objectif fondamental que constitue l'aide aux pauvres.

- Dans les pays qui violent systématiquement les droits de la personne ou qui, pour d'autres raisons, ne sont pas admissibles à l'aide au développement, le Canada devrait tenter, par l'entremise des organisations internationales, d'accorder une aide humanitaire à ceux qui luttent pour la protection des droits de la personne.
- Dans les pays où les violations des droits de la personne existent, mais ne justifient pas l'interruption de l'aide consentie, le Canada devrait offrir son assistance essentiellement par le truchement du secteur privé, et particulièrement des organisations non gouvernementales qui oeuvrent directement auprès des pauvres. En outre, le gouvernement canadien devrait accorder une partie de son aide aux organismes qui luttent pour maintenir et protéger les droits civils et politiques.
- Le Canada devrait accroître considérablement l'aide qu'il accorde aux pays admissibles à l'aide canadienne qui ont effectué des progrès dans le secteur du respect des droits de la personne. (P. 111.)

Le comité recommande que le Canada profite de sa voix aux réunions des institutions financières internationales pour s'élever contre les violations systématiques, flagrantes et soutenues des droits de la personne. (P. 112.)

### L'avancement des droits de la personne

Le comité est convaincu que le Canada doit continuer dans cette voie, mais qu'il doit aussi prendre les devants en créant un programme positif d'avancement des droits de la personne. En mettant sur pied des programmes d'aide financière, d'échange, de recherche et d'assistance technique en coopération avec les pays concernés, le Canada peut espérer favoriser l'avancement à long terme des droits politiques, civils et culturels, comme il contribue maintenant à l'essor économique et social à long terme de certains pays au moyen de son programme d'aide. (P. 112.)

Le Canada n'exporte pas ses propres institutions et il doit s'abstenir de le faire. En revanche, il peut et doit pouvoir partager son expérience avec les autres et les aider à mettre sur pied leurs propres institutions. De tels programmes recevraient l'appui effectif ou tout au moins l'assentiment des gouvernements et de la population des pays participants. (P. 113.)

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement envisage de créer un Institut international des droits de la personne et de l'avancement démocratique qui serait régi par des lignes directrices judiciairement élaborées, en vue d'appuyer les efforts déployés par des organisations non gouvernementales. Pour que cet institut tienne compte des diverses perspectives nationales sur l'avancement démocratique, notamment dans le tiers monde, nous recommandons que son conseil d'administration comprenne des représentants étrangers, un peu comme l'a fait le Centre de recherches pour le développement international. Une faible part des crédits de l'aide au développement pourrait servir à financer cet institut. (P. 114.)



Les organismes non gouvernementaux, qu'ils soient bénévoles ou à but lucratif, doivent participer le plus possible à la planification et à l'exécution des programmes canadiens d'aide publique au développement. Ils doivent en fait constituer le cœur de programmes d'aide technique élargis et revitalisés. (P. 100.)

Pour favoriser la collaboration sur place, il a été proposé que le gouvernement et les organisations bénévoles créent des bureaux de développement dans les pays en développement où le Canada réalise des programmes d'aide sans y posséder d'ambassade, ou dans les régions de pays en voie de développement qui sont éloignées de la capitale et de l'ambassade du Canada. Les bureaux de développement constituerait des bases de soutien fonctionnelles et non diplomatiques, tant pour l'assistance publique au développement que pour les activités des organisations bénévoles. Nous prions instamment le gouvernement et les organisations bénévoles d'étudier ensemble cette proposition, ainsi que d'autres mesures pratiques visant à renforcer leur collaboration. (P. 100.)

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement et le Comité permanent des Affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur en fassent une étude approfondie. Cette agence permettrait aux petites et moyennes entreprises canadiennes d'aider celles du tiers monde de diverses façons, notamment par la conclusion de contrats de gestion et d'ententes techniques et par la création de coentreprises. L'agence pourrait par exemple financer des programmes analogues à celui qui est administré par le *Fanshawe College* de London (Ontario). (P. 101.)

### Les étudiants étrangers

Nous pensons que les étudiants étrangers sont pour le Canada un atout important dont on n'a pas assez tenu compte jusqu'à présent en ce qui concerne l'augmentation des échanges commerciaux, l'accroissement des contacts culturels et la politique étrangère en général. (P. 104.)

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement fédéral prépare un énoncé des buts et objectifs nationaux à propos des étudiants étrangers et nous encourageons les provinces à en faire autant. Ces énoncés devront ensuite être discutés lors d'une conférence des premiers ministres afin d'en arriver à une ligne de conduite aussi cohérente que possible. (P. 104.)

Nous avons écouté d'une oreille sympathique les témoins qui ont affirmé que les pays du tiers monde devraient pouvoir créer leurs propres établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Cependant, ces pays ne peuvent pas offrir un éventail complet d'études supérieures. Nous recommandons que le Canada concentre son aide surtout dans le domaine des études du deuxième et du troisième cycle. (P. 104.)

## Chapitre VIII

### La promotion des droits de la personne

Nous tenons à affirmer, comme tant de Canadiens nous l'ont répété, que la défense des droits de la personne dans le monde est un élément fondamental de la politique étrangère du Canada. (P. 107.)

### La protection des droits de la personne

Le comité estime qu'il existe un critère fondamental qui doit guider la politique du Canada en matière de droits de la personne, à savoir la tendance apparente à des violations systématiques, flagrantes et soutenues des droits de la personne. (P. 108.)



## L'aide au développement

Nous exhortons le gouvernement canadien à insister pour que les pays en développement les plus pauvres obtiennent des quotas supérieurs en vertu de l'accord multilatéral. En même temps, il faut absolument que le Canada prévoie des programmes de recyclage efficaces, de nouvelles possibilités d'emploi pour les travailleurs et des mesures visant à restructurer et à moderniser l'industrie, de manière à pouvoir éliminer graduellement l'accord et faire en sorte que le commerce du textile et du vêtement soit régi par les règles normales du GATT. (P. 94.)

Nous préconisons l'adoption d'une politique visant à encourager les pays nouvellement industrialisés qui le peuvent à renoncer aux régimes préférentiels destinés aux pays les plus pauvres et à accepter le régime du GATT. (P. 95.)

La plupart des membres du comité ont estimé qu'il fallait rétablir l'objectif de 0,7 p. 100 du PNB consacré à l'aide publique au développement d'ici 1990. Certains ont dit que le gouvernement ne devrait rétablir cette aide que si ses recettes le lui permettent. D'autres ont même souhaité qu'on adopte un objectif de 1 p. 100 après 1990. (P. 96.)

Le comité recommande que l'objectif premier du programme d'aide canadien demeure de répondre aux besoins des pays et des populations les plus pauvres. (P. 98.)

Comme les femmes sont les plus défavorisées sur le plan économique, nous recommandons d'accorder une plus grande importance à l'aide directe aux femmes des pays en développement. On ne peut aborder la question de l'efficacité des programmes d'aide sans parler du rôle essentiel des femmes dans le processus du développement. Il n'y a pas très longtemps qu'on a pris conscience de cela. Les spécialistes du développement prétendent que l'aide liée ne permet pas vraiment de venir en aide aux pauvres gens et d'intégrer les femmes au processus de développement. Bien souvent ce sont les femmes qui cultivent la terre, qui donnent les soins médicaux et qui sont les chefs de famille. Il faut absolument les consulter sur les techniques de développement qui conviennent le mieux. L'ACDI a commencé à faire appliquer une directive-cadre intitulée Les femmes et le développement. Le comité recommande que le gouvernement affecte suffisamment de fonds et de personnel à l'ACDI pour lui permettre de mettre en place cette directive-cadre et de réaliser ses objectifs. (P. 98.)

L'assistance publique au développement est encore déficiente parce que les programmes d'aide nationaux sont parfois axés sur les intérêts des pays donateurs. Cela aboutit à des situations typiques comme celle-ci : il y a maintenant environ quinze sortes de pompes d'irrigation différentes et incompatibles au Kenya. Nous recommandons que le Canada réclame une collaboration plus étroite entre les pays donateurs, et qu'il continue d'appuyer fortement les méthodes et les institutions multilatérales qui favorisent cette attitude. Nous tenons à réaffirmer l'opinion généralement admise au Canada selon laquelle l'aide bilatérale et l'aide multilatérale sont complémentaires. (P. 99.)

Nous n'avons pas fait d'évaluation en profondeur du programme d'aide du Canada, car le Comité permanent des Affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur s'en charge. Cependant, nous recommandons vivement que ce comité, quand il établira son plan de travail, étudie de près plusieurs questions dont nous avons été saisis. Comment alléger le fardeau administratif découlant de l'aide au développement? Dans quelle mesure et comment décentraliser les effectifs et les pouvoirs? Comment réduire les coûts de l'aide liée et rendre l'aide plus utile aux pays bénéficiaires? Comment la population en général, qu'il s'agisse des gens ordinaires ou des experts, peut-elle jouer un rôle dans l'amélioration de l'aide au développement offerte par le Canada? (P. 99.)



Sans oublier pour autant l'importance des liens économiques et politiques, il faudra aussi déployer des efforts à un troisième niveau, c'est-à-dire sur le plan culturel, si nous voulons associer solidement nos rapports avec cette région. Il est important d'améliorer la compréhension entre notre société et les diverses cultures de la région du Pacifique. (P. 84.)

Le comité demande instamment au gouvernement de mettre sur pied, de concert avec le Japon et d'autres pays d'Asie, un programme permettant aux diplômés des universités canadiennes d'aller enseigner l'anglais dans ces pays, sur une base volontaire. (P. 85.)

Le comité recommande au gouvernement d'encourager le secteur privé canadien à ouvrir un bureau à Taïwan afin d'aider les entreprises canadiennes à établir des liens commerciaux dans ce pays. Cela peut et devrait se faire de façon à ne pas nuire à nos excellentes relations avec la République populaire de Chine. (P. 86.)

De l'avis du comité, le gouvernement devrait chercher plus énergiquement à tirer parti des liens entre le Canada et l'Inde pour accroître les échanges et les investissements bilatéraux. (P. 87.)

## Chapitre VII

### Le développement international

#### L'endettement et le commerce

Nous craignons que les conditions souvent difficiles imposées à de nombreux pays débiteurs pour régler le problème de la dette ne provoquent une crise grave. Les difficultés économiques auxquelles se heurtent de nombreux pays en développement exercent des pressions intolérables sur la population et les gouvernements démocratiques. Nous croyons qu'il faut de toute urgence adopter des mesures visant à mettre les pays débiteurs sur la voie de la reprise économique. (P. 92.)

Le comité est d'avis qu'il faut organiser de toute urgence une conférence intergouvernementale à laquelle participeraient des représentants des pays débiteurs, des pays créanciers, des banques et des institutions financières internationales. Afin de montrer le sérieux de la crise, qui touche aussi bien les pays en développement que les pays développés, le gouvernement canadien doit encourager les pays membres de l'OCDE et d'autres pays à se prononcer en faveur d'une telle conférence. (P. 93.)

Nous demandons au gouvernement d'être particulièrement attentif aux besoins des pays africains et, au sein du club de Paris et ailleurs, de souscrire aux mécanismes de gestion de la dette qui aideront ces derniers à se relever de la famine. Nous sommes heureux que le gouvernement ait annoncé à la session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies de mai 1986 qu'il avait déclaré un moratoire de 15 ans sur le remboursement des prêts du gouvernement aux pays les plus pauvres de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Nous croyons aussi qu'il serait bon que le gouvernement envisage de prolonger le moratoire sur les prêts accordés à ces mêmes pays par la Société pour l'expansion des exportations. (P. 93.)

Le comité note avec approbation que le gouvernement canadien a indiqué qu'il songerait à verser des crédits supplémentaires au Fonds monétaire international. Il souscrit également à l'objectif d'une meilleure coordination entre le Fonds monétaire international et la Banque mondiale, de manière à ce que les ajustements à court terme favorisent la reprise économique et le développement à long terme. (P. 93.)

exportations au Canada. Il y a aussi une deuxième voie, le commerce de contrepartie. (P. 80.)

Le comité recommande que le gouvernement continue d'étudier les modalités de financement des exportations à des conditions de faveur pour que les exportateurs canadiens ne soient pas défavorisés, sur le plan de la concurrence, par les mécanismes de financement des autres pays. (P. 81.)

Il conviendrait donc que le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces coordonnent mieux leurs activités de promotion des échanges commerciaux. Ce type de collaboration est déjà prévu dans un accord conclu entre le Québec et le gouvernement fédéral au sujet de l'immigration. En vertu d'un régime de partage des coûts, des fonctionnaires de la province travaillent dans certaines ambassades. Dans leurs activités, ils tiennent compte des intérêts du gouvernement fédéral, mais ils relèvent des autorités provinciales. Le comité, recommande que des accords analogues soient conclus entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces au sujet de la promotion et de l'expansion du commerce extérieur. (P. 82.)

Nous sommes convaincus que les liens commerciaux les plus importants se forment au niveau où des accords commerciaux peuvent être conclus. Nous estimons que les liens entre villes sont une dimension des relations commerciales internationales offrant des perspectives nouvelles et passionnantes qu'il faut activement explorer. (P. 82.)

Les sociétés qui décrochent de gros contrats à l'étranger et qui bénéficient de l'aide du gouvernement devraient employer de nouveaux diplômés afin d'augmenter, chez elles et dans tout le Canada, le nombre des personnes bien au fait des échanges internationaux. De son côté, le gouvernement devrait faire son possible pour aider à compiler un recueil des possibilités d'emploi à l'étranger pour les jeunes Canadiens. Il existe en effet une réserve inexploitée de jeunes que ce genre d'emplois intéresserait. Un emploi à l'étranger pourrait inciter de jeunes Canadiens à faire carrière dans le commerce international et permettre ainsi au Canada de devenir un pays commerçant plus dynamique. (P. 82.)

### La diversification des échanges commerciaux

Selon le comité, c'est vers la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique que doivent être orientés la plupart des efforts des secteurs public et privé. (P. 83.)

Pour réussir à pénétrer le marché de l'Asie et du Pacifique, il faudra faire des efforts à plusieurs niveaux. Premièrement, les entreprises canadiennes devront développer des liens personnels avec des clients possibles de l'Asie et du Pacifique. Les immigrants et les étudiants étrangers pourraient jouer un rôle important dans la promotion des liens commerciaux entre le Canada et la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique puisqu'ils ont à la fois des liens avec cette région et une expérience directe des produits et des compétences que peut offrir le Canada. (P. 83 et 84.)

Deuxièmement, le gouvernement canadien devra travailler en étroite collaboration avec les entreprises canadiennes afin d'établir des liens commerciaux avec les pays de l'Asie et du Pacifique. Il devra notamment accorder un financement concurrentiel aux exportateurs et appuyer leurs efforts de commercialisation en faisant appel à ses délégués commerciaux et à ses ambassadeurs, et en prévoyant à l'occasion des visites de ministres dans cette région. (P. 84.)

Nous recommandons donc au gouvernement de reconnaître les possibilités d'exportation des petites et moyennes entreprises canadiennes et d'en tenir compte dans l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre de sa stratégie de mise en marché des exportations. (P. 74.)

Nous reconnaissons qu'un certain nombre d'éléments, au Canada même, nuisent aux exportateurs canadiens; nous recommandons par conséquent que toute politique commerciale future tienne compte de ces éléments. (P. 74.)

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires pour veiller à ce que l'achat de brevets et la commercialisation des brevets à l'étranger puissent être financés en vertu de la *Loi sur les prêts aux petites entreprises* ou que les modifications nécessaires soient apportées au Programme de développement industriel et régional. (P. 75.)

En raison de ses structures et de son orientation, la SEE a des préoccupations trop souvent éloignées de celles des petites entreprises, et ce fossé est difficile à combler. Pour que la SEE soit plus à l'écoute des besoins de ces sociétés, il faudrait modifier de fond en comble son orientation et son fonctionnement, et rien ne garantit que cela pourrait se faire efficacement. Afin de tirer un meilleur parti des possibilités d'exportation des petites entreprises, le gouvernement devrait donc songer à créer un nouvel organisme qui serait chargé expressément de ce secteur et qui travaillerait en étroite collaboration avec les institutions financières privées. (P. 75.)

## L'expansion des exportations

Le comité est d'avis qu'il faut encourager le secteur privé à collaborer avec le gouvernement à la diffusion de renseignements sur les débouchés à l'étranger. (P. 79.)

Le comité recommande que soit établie une ligne téléphonique spéciale pour recueillir les suggestions du public sur les possibilités commerciales qui peuvent se présenter. (P. 79.)

Nous sommes d'accord avec les témoins selon lesquels c'est surtout dans les pays où les débouchés sont nombreux que nous avons besoin de délégués commerciaux, quand ils peuvent aider les exportateurs à surmonter les obstacles culturels et linguistiques. En conséquence, nous recommandons d'affecter davantage de délégués commerciaux dans la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique, quitte à réduire au besoin leur nombre en Europe. (P. 79.)

Le Programme de développement des marchés d'exportation doit être conservé et il conviendrait même de prendre des mesures spéciales pour en élargir le champ d'application afin qu'il s'applique aux entreprises d'experts-conseils, aux sociétés d'ingénierie et aux sociétés de services qui, en général, ne peuvent pas en bénéficier à l'heure actuelle. (P. 79.)

Selon nous, si le Canada veut consolider sa position sur les marchés d'exportation, le gouvernement doit offrir aux exportateurs canadiens des programmes de financement concurrentiels par rapport à ceux d'autres pays. (P. 80.)

Pour les aider à résorber un peu le problème de devises des pays du tiers monde, le Canada pourrait envisager de lever certaines des barrières qui limitent leurs



Le comité recommande que l'on applique des contrôles plus stricts aux points d'entrée au Canada et aux postes frontalières. (P. 66.)

Nous recommandons que Transports Canada fixe des normes minimales pour la sécurité des aéroports et les applique strictement. Nous recommandons en outre que, si l'on se rend compte après une certaine période que les services des sociétés privées laissent encore à désirer, le gouvernement envisage d'assumer lui-même la responsabilité de tous les aspects de la sécurité dans les aéroports, soit en confiant cette tâche à Transports Canada, soit en faisant appel à la GRC, en vertu d'un contrat avec Transports Canada. (P. 67.)

Le comité préconise d'avoir recours aux Nations Unies, afin d'obtenir l'appui de tous les pays du monde. Le Canada pourrait, par exemple, s'efforcer d'obtenir les appuis nécessaires pour que le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU adopte une résolution refusant aux pays qui offrent un asile aux terroristes le droit d'invoquer leur souveraineté pour refuser l'intervention de la communauté internationale. (P. 67.)

## **Chapitre VI**

### **L'accroissement des échanges internationaux**

Comme la conjoncture qui a permis à notre économie de se développer depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale a changé, le Canada doit s'adapter pour pouvoir conserver sa prospérité actuelle. Il a d'ailleurs déjà perdu du terrain dans ce domaine. (P. 69.)

Nous croyons que le gouvernement, par l'entremise de ses délégués commerciaux, devrait être bien représenté dans les domaines où le commerce croît rapidement, particulièrement dans celui des techniques de pointe et des services. (P. 70.)

### **La libéralisation des échanges**

Le comité recommande que le gouvernement s'efforce de promouvoir activement une libéralisation équilibrée et ordonnée des échanges commerciaux. (P. 71.)

Le comité pense qu'il est important d'entamer une nouvelle ronde de négociations commerciales multilatérales dans les meilleurs délais. (P. 72.)

Il est essentiel que tout accord éventuel entre le Canada et les États-Unis respecte entièrement les obligations que le GATT impose aux deux pays. Pour ce faire, il faudrait que les responsables de l'application du GATT soient avertis des conditions de toute entente conclue entre les deux parties et qu'ils créent un groupe de travail pour étudier la conformité de cette entente avec les obligations contractées dans le cadre du GATT. (P. 73.)

La conclusion d'un accord entre le Canada et les États-Unis ne réglerait donc qu'une partie des problèmes du Canada en matière de commerce international. (P. 73.)



sur le contrôle des armements. La politique sur le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, d'un côté, et la politique de défense, de l'autre, doivent fonctionner en tandem. (P. 56.)

Nous avons conclu qu'il conviendrait d'améliorer les moyens dont dispose le gouvernement pour formuler une politique sur le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de préciser comment on pourrait améliorer ces moyens mais il faudrait au moins un nouveau mécanisme d'élaboration de la politique qui permette de concilier les vues du ministère des Affaires extérieures et celles du ministère de la Défense nationale. Nous pensons également que la politique étrangère est élaborée de façon plus coordonnée et plus énergique si les grandes orientations que le gouvernement entend lui donner sont régulièrement soumises à la population. Le nouveau service devrait être tenu de faire périodiquement rapport au Parlement. (P. 56.)

Nous appuyons le principe d'échanges avec l'URSS et nous recommandons de prévoir, dans les dépenses futures, une multiplication progressive de ces échanges. (P. 58.)

### Les conflits régionaux

Nous sommes certains que le Canada est le pays tout indiqué pour servir de tiers désintéressé dans un conflit. Lorsqu'il agit en qualité de médiateur, le Canada doit, d'après nous, bien étudier les sources du conflit, l'utilité éventuelle d'une médiation et les atouts et moyens de pression dont il dispose. (P. 60.)

Lorsque le Canada est en mesure d'assumer la tâche et qu'il a de bonnes chances de favoriser un règlement, nous recommandons que le Canada se tienne prêt à offrir ses bons offices, qu'il s'agisse de la médiation ou de l'envoi de missions d'étude ou de forces de maintien de la paix, pour aider les parties à résoudre leur différend et à trouver la paix. (P. 60.)

### Le maintien de la paix

Le comité estime néanmoins que la participation du Canada à la Force des Nations Unies pour le maintien de la paix à Chypre contribue effectivement à prévenir les combats dans l'île et à maintenir la stabilité du flanc sud de l'OTAN. (P. 62.)

Nous recommandons que le gouvernement envisage d'utiliser davantage les forces de réserve canadiennes aux fins du maintien de la paix, que les réservistes soient affectés à ces tâches individuellement ou, à titre expérimental, en petites unités. (P. 63.)

Le comité recommande donc que le Canada continue à faire profiter les forces armées d'autres pays de son expérience dans le domaine des opérations de maintien de la paix. Le gouvernement devrait également continuer à financer les colloques organisés sur le sujet dans diverses universités canadiennes et à aider l'Académie internationale de la Paix, qui a notamment produit un guide sur le maintien de la paix que les forces armées canadiennes utilisent. (P. 63.)

Selon le comité, la meilleure attitude à adopter, si le Canada est invité à participer à des opérations de maintien de la paix, consiste à appliquer les principes fixés cas par cas, tout en accordant la préférence aux opérations menées sous les auspices des Nations Unies. (P. 64.)

Les décisions militaires auxquelles le Canada participe à titre de membre de l'OTAN ne doivent pas être prises sans qu'on ait dûment pesé les conséquences qu'elles auront sur

Nous exhortons le gouvernement à faire tout son possible pour encourager les superpuissances à s'engager dans des négociations constructives sur la limitation et la réduction des armes nucléaires. (P. 55.)

Nous voyons d'un bon oeil les propositions visant à instaurer un système international d'enregistrement des exportations et des importations d'armes et de munitions pour contrôler l'expansion du commerce des armes classiques et nous estimons que le Canada doit chercher à rallier d'autres pays à ce concept. (P. 55.)

6) La négociation de mesures destinées à accroître suffisamment la confiance pour permettre la réduction des forces militaires classiques en Europe et ailleurs. (P. 54 et 55.)

5) La prévention de la course aux armements dans l'espace.

4) L'élaboration d'un traité global d'interdiction des essais nucléaires dont l'application serait mutuellement vérifiable.

3) La négociation d'une interdiction totale des armes chimiques.

2) Le maintien et le renforcement du régime de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

1) Une réduction mutuelle et vérifiable des arsenaux nucléaires, ainsi que des mesures connexes visant à améliorer la stabilité stratégique. Ces dernières doivent comprendre en particulier une réaffirmation du traité ABM sur les missiles antimissiles, interprété strictement comme interdisant tous les travaux sur les systèmes défensifs, sauf la recherche fondamentale.

Nous recommandons que le Canada multiplie ses efforts multilatéraux au sein de l'OTAN, des Nations Unies et dans d'autres tribunes où il est question du désarmement, de même que ses négociations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique ainsi qu'avec d'autres pays, afin de faire accepter un ensemble complet de mesures de contrôle des armements. Ces mesures, qui ont été approuvées par le gouvernement, sont les suivantes :

Nous croyons qu'il est nécessaire d'améliorer la stabilité stratégique en recherchant le désarmement et que la voie à suivre est pavée d'ententes mutuelles, de mesures équilibrées visant à réduire considérablement les stocks d'armements et de moyens de vérification efficaces. (P. 54.)

## **Le contrôle des armements et le désarmement**

une étude immédiate de nos besoins à long terme dans le domaine de la défense, afin de déterminer exactement le montant supplémentaire qui serait nécessaire pour renouveler l'équipement de nos forces armées au cours des dix prochaines années. Si le gouvernement n'est pas en mesure de trouver ce montant, il devra alors tenter de renégocier ou de restreindre certains de nos engagements en matière de défense, en consultation avec nos alliés, afin de combler le fossé entre nos engagements et nos possibilités. Les forces armées canadiennes pourraient ainsi ne se voir confier que des tâches qu'elles sont capables d'accomplir de façon satisfaisante. (P. 52.)

D'après nous, le gouvernement doit réduire l'écart entre nos engagements et nos possibilités pour éviter qu'il n'en résulte des conséquences désastreuses. Nous proposons

## La politique de défense

À notre avis, une des priorités du gouvernement en matière de sécurité doit consister à adopter un point de vue qui lui soit propre sur les questions de stratégie, de contrôle des armements et de désarmement. À cette fin, le gouvernement doit d'abord acquérir les capacités d'analyse qui constitueront l'assise d'une participation plus active du Canada dans ce domaine. Le comité note les progrès déjà réalisés à ce chapitre grâce à la création du nouvel Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité mondiales et à l'apparition d'autres centres de recherche, notamment dans les universités. Ces établissements contribueront vraisemblablement à accroître la compétence canadienne à cet égard. Le gouvernement doit ensuite se former une opinion sur les grandes questions relatives à la stratégie et au contrôle des armements. Il pourra alors défendre plus vigoureusement ses positions auprès d'autres gouvernements dans les tribunes internationales. En dernier lieu, il doit établir un dialogue permanent avec la population sur la politique de sécurité, en commençant par faire connaître ses opinions à ce sujet et les arguments sur lesquels il s'appuie. (P. 50.)

## Chapitre V La sauvegarde de la paix et de la sécurité mondiales

Le Canada devrait, par ses déclarations et sa politique, défendre le principe général du règlement pacifique des différends. Il doit pour ce faire être prêt à offrir ses services de médiateur et à demander si possible l'intervention active d'une tierce partie, par exemple des Nations Unies ou du Commonwealth, dès le début des conflits. Nous devrions aussi encourager un recours plus rapide et plus généralisé à des missions d'enquête et d'observation menées de façon régulière par le secrétaire général des Nations Unies et les personnes qu'il nomme à cette fin. (P. 47.)

Nous recommandons que le Canada propose des candidats pour remplir des fonctions à la Cour internationale de justice et dans les autres grandes institutions juridiques internationales comme la Commission du droit international et la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international. À notre avis, le Canada devrait également encourager les autres États à reconnaître la compétence de la Cour internationale de justice et à souscrire à la clause facultative avec le moins de réserves possible. (P. 47.)

Nous considérons que le gouvernement du Canada a le devoir de demander instamment que tous les États concernés adoptent, par l'entremise de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, un ensemble de mesures de sécurité relatives à l'énergie nucléaire. Au nombre de celles-ci devraient se trouver un examen de toutes les normes de sécurité des centrales atomiques civiles, la création d'un système international d'inspection, l'élaboration de méthodes pour l'élimination des déchets radioactifs, et un accord international qui prévoirait l'annonce rapide de tout accident nucléaire et l'organisation de secours immédiats. (P. 46.)

tente par tous les moyens d'augmenter l'efficacité de cet organisme. Le gouvernement devrait également continuer à sensibiliser la communauté internationale à la détérioration de l'environnement et à collaborer avec les autres États qui reconnaissent la gravité du problème afin d'obtenir que des mesures correctives soient prises. (P. 46.)



Le comité recommande que le gouvernement du Canada étudie la possibilité de faire du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement un organisme financé de la même façon que les autres organismes spécialisés de l'ONU, et d'une manière générale, qu'il

(P. 45.)  
Nous pensons que le gouvernement devrait exercer des pressions pour que la Commission préparatoire pour le droit de la mer termine rapidement ses travaux, afin de dissiper les incertitudes qui pèsent sur l'Administration des fonds hautiers. Il devrait ensuite entreprendre une analyse détaillée des coûts et des avantages du Traité sur le droit de la mer. Comme ce traité nous a déjà procuré des avantages importants, même s'il n'est pas encore en vigueur, le comité estime que le Canada devrait le ratifier.

d'abandonner celles qui ne sont plus utiles. (P. 45.)  
Nous recommandons que le Canada recherche un accord international sur la création d'un organisme ou d'un comité compétent qui aiderait à simplifier tous les rouages du système de développement multilatéral. Nous appuyons d'ailleurs tout effort déployé pour réduire le double emploi et la centralisation excessive qui existent actuellement à l'ONU. Il faudrait également étudier la possibilité de créer de nouvelles institutions et

trop d'un seul membre. (P. 44.)  
Etat ne fournirait plus qu'un montant déterminé, afin que l'organisation ne dépende pas puissances moyennes, un nouveau barème de contributions à l'ONU, selon lequel aucun long terme, le Canada devrait étudier la possibilité d'établir, de concert avec d'autres niveau créé par le secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour étudier ces questions. A Nous recommandons que le Canada appuie les travaux du groupe d'experts de haut

## Chapitre IV Renforcer l'ordre international et accroître l'influence du Canada

Nous proposons que le gouvernement, par l'intermédiaire du comité du Cabinet chargé des affaires extérieures et que le Parlement, grâce à son Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur de la Chambre des communes, procèdent régulièrement à un examen du processus de planification par pays. Selon nous, il est particulièrement important que les gouvernements provinciaux, les gens d'affaires, les organisations non gouvernementales et le milieu universitaire participent à la définition et à l'examen des objectifs stratégiques. (P. 40.)

Nous recommandons que le ministère des Affaires extérieures envisage la possibilité de créer des centres régionaux de ressources et de soutien qui pourraient desservir les missions diplomatiques d'une région donnée. (P. 40.)

de maintien de la paix. (P. 38.)  
cette région qui a connu de nombreux conflits, a surtout consisté à y envoyer des forces le Canada n'a cependant pas vraiment exploité. L'apport du Canada à la sécurité de Moyen-Orient, il a été pendant longtemps un marché d'exportation fort attirant que dans ce pays est devenue un objectif prédominant pour les Canadiens. Quant au du Sud était un débouché important pour les produits canadiens, mais la justice sociale n'offrent jusqu'ici que peu de débouchés pour les exportations canadiennes. L'Afrique l'aide canadienne au développement, mais, par rapport aux pays industrialisés, ils du tiers monde, et ceux d'Afrique en particulier, sont les principaux bénéficiaires de canadiens, même s'il n'a pas connu le même essor que la région du Pacifique. Les pays continent européen demeure un marché important pour toute une gamme de produits



problèmes soulevés dans ces pages, nous avons jugé bon de nous y arrêter car nous sommes persuadés que le simple fait d'en discuter peut aider à aplanir les difficultés.

L'action internationale, à laquelle nous consacrons notre dernier chapitre, est le thème central de notre rapport. Nous reconnaissons toutefois que l'indépendance est la condition essentielle d'une telle action. Indépendance et action internationale sont parfois difficilement conciliables, mais en général ces deux éléments sont complémentaires. Au moment où le Canada tentait de se faire reconnaître comme nation à part entière, être indépendant signifiait pour lui être reconnu officiellement comme pays souverain et pouvoir ainsi signer des traités, participer à des conférences internationales et être représenté à l'étranger. Au cours des vingt dernières années, bien des Canadiens ont cru que les différences entre le Canada et les États-Unis étaient, jusqu'à un certain point, une mesure de leur indépendance. Bien que cette attitude existe encore, il faut que les Canadiens associent de plus en plus l'indépendance à des politiques et à des initiatives à la fois ambitieuses et constructives, comme nous en avons proposé dans ce rapport. La scène internationale offre justement au Canada de nombreuses occasions de manifester son indépendance par des réalisations concrètes; c'est ce qui ressort des conclusions et recommandations qui suivent, et nous sommes persuadés que les Canadiens ont les moyens et la volonté de se distinguer de cette façon.

## Chapitre II Les moyens du Canada

Le Canada a des moyens considérables qui lui permettent de jouer un grand rôle dans les affaires internationales et d'assumer d'importantes responsabilités dans la recherche de solutions à beaucoup de problèmes internationaux. (P. 31.)\*

Le Canada peut maximiser son influence et l'utilisation des ressources dont il dispose en travaillant de concert avec d'autres États. Il jouit toutefois d'un pouvoir suffisant pour agir de façon unilatérale dans certains cas et jouer un rôle de chef de file dans l'établissement de coalitions internationales. Comme les moyens dont dispose le pays sont limités, le gouvernement doit s'efforcer de voir quel rôle positif le Canada peut jouer dans chaque cas et concentrer ses efforts là où il peut être le plus utile, au lieu de gaspiller des ressources en tentant d'intervenir dans des situations où il ne peut compter jouer un rôle très utile. (P. 31.)

## Chapitre III Les objectifs de la politique extérieure

Les pays de la région du Pacifique et de l'Asie du Sud-Est sont ceux dont l'économie a progressé le plus rapidement au cours des deux dernières décennies. Ils sont, après les États-Unis, le marché d'exportation le plus important du Canada. Si le Canada veut accroître ses échanges commerciaux, il a tout intérêt à essayer de pénétrer ces marchés. En matière de sécurité, cependant, les ressources militaires du Canada ne lui permettent pas de contribuer directement au maintien de la sécurité dans cette région. En revanche, l'Europe demeure au cœur de l'affrontement Est-Ouest, et le Canada continue de contribuer activement à la défense militaire de l'Europe centrale. Le

\* Le chiffre entre parenthèses renvoie à la page du rapport.

## Conclusions et recommandations

Les principales conclusions et recommandations du comité apparaissent dans les chapitres IV à XI. L'avant-propos et les trois premiers chapitres servent surtout à délimiter le cadre de l'étude des différents éléments de la politique étrangère.

Trois considérations ont guidé le comité dans la formulation de ses conclusions et de ses recommandations. Premièrement, nous avons été influencés par les préoccupations exprimées par les Canadiens dans leurs mémoires et leurs témoignages. Comme on peut le voir au chapitre I, nos témoins se sont dits très inquiets pour la sécurité internationale; ils nous ont parlé des risques que la situation économique internationale pourrait présenter pour le bien-être des Canadiens; ils se sont montrés à la fois confiants et prudents en ce qui concerne nos rapports avec nos voisins américains; ils se sont prononcés en faveur d'une politique étrangère plus énergique au chapitre de la promotion des droits de la personne et du développement international, et, de façon générale, ils ont dit souhaiter que le Canada joue un rôle actif et responsable à l'étranger. Dans l'ensemble, ils espéraient voir s'accroître l'influence du Canada, tout en étant conscients des problèmes complexes que pose le contexte international.

Deuxièmement, nos opinions ont été façonnées par notre examen des possibilités qui s'offrent au Canada sur la scène internationale, ce dont nous discutons au chapitre II. Nous avons conclu que le Canada était effectivement capable de faire beaucoup plus que de défendre ses intérêts à court terme. Il y a toutefois des limites à ce qu'il peut accomplir. À notre avis, notre politique étrangère ne pourra être efficace que dans la mesure où nous saurons reconnaître ces limites.

Enfin, nous avons dû tempérer nos recommandations de manière à assurer, autant que possible, la cohérence de la politique étrangère canadienne. Ayant depuis longtemps fait ses débuts sur la scène internationale, le Canada y a des intérêts et des activités multiples. Or, certains de ses objectifs entrent inévitablement en conflit avec d'autres, et le Canada ne peut guère se permettre de consacrer tous ses efforts à la poursuite d'un seul grand objectif.

En proposant aux chapitres IV à X sept grandes orientations en matière de politique étrangère, nous ne prétendons pas avoir dressé une liste exhaustive. Ce sont là, à notre avis, les orientations sur lesquelles le Canada devrait concentrer ses efforts à moyen terme; pour chacune d'elles, nous recommandons quelques solutions précises. Même s'il est impossible, du moins à brève échéance, de résoudre certains des

espoir de changement. La question n'est pas de savoir si le Canada joue un rôle central ou marginal dans un tel effort : l'important est que cet effort soit consenti afin que nous puissions donner l'exemple, chez nous et ailleurs (30:7).

L'internationalisme constructif consiste à bien adapter les initiatives de la politique étrangère à ses ressources. À notre avis, bien comprendre les limites du Canada ne doit pas être un moyen de s'esquiver, mais doit au contraire être une formule d'efficacité. Il est tout à fait normal que le Canada contribue d'une part à la sécurité en se spécialisant dans le contrôle des armements et dans le maintien de la paix et, d'autre part, au bien-être économique et au respect des droits de la personne en mettant l'accent sur l'aide au développement. Dans ces domaines, le Canada a une expérience sans pareille, des aptitudes reconnues et une réputation internationale bien établie.

Sur le plan de l'efficacité, les Canadiens sont tout à fait justifiés de se lancer à fond sur la scène internationale. Ensemble, ils ont construit un ordre social et politique reconnu et sont donc bien placés pour aider à façonner un ordre international meilleur où anarchie et violence seront remplacées par des formes de comportement civilisées. Ils appartiennent à une société juste et prospère qui les a dotés de ressources morales et matérielles leur permettant de jouer un grand rôle dans l'amélioration de la société mondiale. Par ailleurs, la maturité et la confiance en soi que les Canadiens ont acquises en résolvant leurs problèmes internes et en trouvant des façons de maintenir leur cohésion nous rappellent qu'il faut être tolérant et comprendre les intérêts et les aspirations des autres. À ce propos, la force que les Canadiens tirent de leur histoire constitue aussi une base solide sur laquelle il est possible d'asseoir en toute confiance un internationalisme constructif.

renoncer aux arrangements qu'il a déjà pris, non seulement avec les Etats-Unis, mais aussi avec la Communauté européenne, le Japon, le Mexique et d'autres. Les résultats possibles du multilatéralisme, du bilatéralisme et même de l'unilatéralisme doivent cependant être modelés par l'atmosphère générale qui entoure l'internationalisme constructif.

Cela peut être accompli en partie en multipliant les activités multilatérales et en revitalisant les tribunes multilatérales, comme solution de rechange aux relations bilatérales. Dans certains cas, le Canada pourra faire passer d'un plan à l'autre certains problèmes qui peuvent surgir dans ses relations avec les Etats-Unis. Le plus souvent, il sera possible de faire jouer les deux plans, bilatéral et multilatéral, pour régler certaines questions. En travaillant sur ces deux plans, le Canada ferait bien d'essayer de gagner du terrain dans une négociation multilatérale pour éventuellement forcer la main aux Etats-Unis dans des négociations bilatérales.

Un internationalisme actif présente même des avantages encore plus grands dans la mesure où il peut faire contrepois aux relations nécessairement étroites que le Canada entretient avec les Etats-Unis. En dehors de nombreux avantages concrets — qu'il s'agisse de nouveaux débouchés pour les talents canadiens, d'un regain de vitalité pour la culture canadienne ou de nouveaux partenaires commerciaux — il pourrait offrir un précieux avantage psychologique. Il ne faut pas laisser les Canadiens ni les analystes étrangers oublier que notre pays peut avoir des activités internationales très variées et qu'il peut manifester de mille façons sa personnalité à l'étranger. L'internationalisme peut par conséquent aider à préserver l'image et la réalité de l'indépendance du Canada et de son caractère propre.

L'internationalisme constructif permet de faire d'une pierre deux coups : donner aux Canadiens une ouverture sur le monde d'une façon qui paraisse servir leurs intérêts, et répondre aux aspirations des centaines de Canadiens qui sont venus déclarer devant le comité que le Canada devrait jouer un rôle international actif et productif. Pour que ces aspirations se réalisent pleinement, le gouvernement devra trouver le moyen de permettre aux Canadiens de participer à des activités internationales relevant du secteur non gouvernemental et de toucher la corde du bénévolat qui est toute prête à vibrer dans le cœur des Canadiens.

Notre notion d'internationalisme constructif admet — et c'est essentiel — que nos moyens sont limités et qu'il faut bien savoir choisir le moment, le type et l'envergure des actions internationales. On perdrait beaucoup à prendre des positions et des initiatives qu'il nous serait impossible de soutenir faute d'influence ou de ressources. Le Canada risquerait d'y perdre le respect des gouvernements étrangers, d'affaiblir sa politique étrangère et de désillusionner sa population qui lui retirerait son appui. Les activités du Canada à l'étranger doivent s'appuyer sur une évaluation réaliste des possibilités du Canada sur la scène internationale. Par ailleurs, les Canadiens ne doivent pas perdre de vue que pour mener à bien une politique internationale, le Canada doit pouvoir s'appuyer sur une économie solide et compétitive.

Nous convenons que le Canada doit avoir une attitude prudente à l'égard des conflits régionaux qui sévissent ailleurs dans le monde, mais nous ne voulons pas que le gouvernement néglige les arguments de M. John Sigler en faveur d'une politique canadienne activiste susceptible d'encourager d'autres pays à emboîter le pas au Canada.

Il faut donc absolument que la diplomatie parvienne à résoudre les conflits régionaux et à prévenir les crises et les confrontations, si nous voulons vraiment garder quelque



cette cohérence ne peut exister en l'absence d'objectifs précis. Pour avoir le sentiment d'une mission à accomplir, il faut se rendre compte que le système international a grand besoin d'être réaménagé. Personne ne conteste que l'ordre international craque de toutes parts et qu'il a besoin d'être renouvelé. La recherche de moyens permettant de rendre les institutions internationales plus efficaces doit figurer parmi les grands objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada.

Le Canada n'est pas le seul pays bien placé pour entreprendre cette tâche, mais il est l'un des rares qui puissent le faire. À certains égards, les superpuissances sont limitées par leur poids et par leurs propres responsabilités, et la majorité des autres pays n'ont peut-être pas les ressources voulues pour pouvoir s'attaquer efficacement au problème. Les Canadiens n'ayant désormais plus le souci de faire reconnaître la place du Canada dans le monde, ils ont maintenant suffisamment de maturité et d'assurance pour viser des objectifs internationaux de plus grande envergure.

Pour surmonter les problèmes de l'interdépendance, il faut pouvoir compter sur la collaboration des autres pays. C'est peut-être une évidence, mais il reste que, dans la pratique, cela exige beaucoup de doigté politique, de la ténacité et de la volonté. À cette fin, le Canada doit continuer à établir des liens avec des États ayant les mêmes idées, chercher à devenir membre de groupes d'États organisés ou non, renforcer les institutions internationales et aider les pays qui prennent de l'importance à participer à la gestion de l'économie globale. Il faut des mécanismes régionaux ou internationaux pour diffuser l'information, pour faciliter le partage des tâches entre États et pour coordonner les activités des divers pays.

En outre, comme bien d'autres pays, le Canada voit des avantages dans l'action multilatérale : elle peut, en effet permettre d'améliorer l'ordre international au moyen de règles, d'institutions et de règlements internationaux. Ceux-ci revêtent une importance particulière pour le Canada, surtout pour la gestion de ses relations économiques internationales. Si le Canada et ses grands partenaires commerciaux s'engagent à respecter des principes et des règles de conduite reconnus, la position du Canada s'en trouvera renforcée et le système international en sera d'autant plus cohérent et prévisible. Cela est à l'avantage du Canada, car ses ressources, tout importantes qu'elles soient, ne lui permettent pas de prendre trop de risques s'il veut continuer à jouir d'une économie diversifiée et technologiquement avancée. Le Canada a donc beaucoup de raisons de vouloir améliorer et renouveler les arrangements qui renforcent la stabilité politique et économique internationale, et de vouloir en proposer de nouveaux.

Le Canada doit d'autant plus s'intéresser au multilatéralisme que celui-ci peut renforcer l'influence de notre pays. Les organisations multilatérales permettent de nouer des liens avec des pays ayant à peu près les mêmes idées et la même influence. Le Canada est souvent bien placé pour prendre l'initiative dans de telles situations. De plus, s'il fait cause commune avec d'autres, les arguments qu'il présente ont plus de poids.

L'union fait la force. Les meilleurs représentants du Canada à l'étranger sont ceux qui savent comment rallier d'autres États à une position commune. Cette position a beaucoup plus de poids à Washington et ailleurs lorsque l'on sait qu'une coalition d'autres gouvernements l'appuie.

Aux yeux du comité, l'internationalisme constructif n'empêche nullement d'adopter des mesures unilatérales et de nouer des liens bilatéraux. Un pays ayant des objectifs internationaux aussi complexes que le Canada ne peut absolument pas

## Pour un internationalisme constructif

Nous concluons que les activités du Canada à l'étranger doivent être guidées par le principe de l'internationalisme constructif, ce qui donnera à la politique étrangère du Canada une orientation et un idéal.

Si l'internationalisme constructif nous apparaît tentant, ce n'est pas parce qu'il évoque un âge d'or imaginaire de la politique étrangère du Canada, mais parce qu'il décrit le mieux l'attitude que le Canada doit adopter dans un environnement international difficile et incertain. L'internationalisme constructif peut se résumer ainsi : dans un monde interdépendant, les responsabilités du Canada sur le plan international doivent être intimement liées à ses objectifs nationaux de base. Dans la pratique, les Canadiens perçoivent le monde presque instinctivement de cette façon parce que la géographie et l'histoire de leur pays les ont préparés à être des internationalistes. Protégés par de vastes océans de la violence qui fait rage dans tant d'autres régions du globe, les Canadiens n'ont pas besoin de faire une distinction entre la sécurité nationale et la sécurité internationale. Pour eux, ces deux notions sont identiques.

Les grands objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada, notamment la sécurité, la prospérité économique et la préservation de la justice et de la démocratie, sont tous liés aux intérêts de la communauté internationale. Nous sommes donc d'accord avec les nombreux témoins qui se sont dits opposés à l'adoption d'une politique étrangère qui serait fondée exclusivement sur une vue étroite des intérêts du Canada. Nous convenons avec eux que la politique étrangère doit dépasser la simple projection à l'étranger de nos propres intérêts. D'après nous, le Canada a tout intérêt à faire preuve d'un idéalisme confiant plutôt qu'à adopter une attitude mesquine et égoïste envers le reste du monde.

De façon générale, les intérêts du Canada sont intimement liés au fonctionnement des institutions internationales, au maintien d'un ensemble bien développé de normes et de règles, à la préservation de la stabilité et de la paix internationales, à l'accélération du développement dans le tiers monde et à une réduction des risques de conflits régionaux.

Nous pensons que les artisans de la politique étrangère et ceux qui s'efforcent de l'influencer doivent se faire une certaine idée du rôle du Canada dans le monde. Nous sommes d'accord avec le groupe de travail de l'ICAI qui soutient que l'influence du Canada dans le monde dépend en partie de la cohérence de sa politique étrangère et que

affrontement stratégique. À notre avis, la situation des deux régions polaires est tout à fait différente.

Nous reconnaissons qu'il serait très difficile de créer une telle zone dans l'Arctique, à cause de la présence déjà notable de sous-marins américains et soviétiques. La moitié des sous-marins nucléaires de la flotte soviétique sont basés à Mourmansk, et des sous-marins soviétiques porteurs de missiles balistiques sont actuellement déployés dans le bassin arctique soviétique où ils sont très bien protégés. Il ne fait aucun doute que des sous-marins nucléaires américains naviguent aussi dans les eaux arctiques. Depuis quelques années, l'Océan Arctique revêt une importance stratégique sans cesse grandissante, tant pour les Soviétiques que pour les Américains. En outre, seuls des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire sont capables de naviguer sous la calotte glaciaire, et il se pourrait que des pétroliers sous-marins propulsés à l'énergie nucléaire servent un jour au transport du pétrole dans l'Arctique. Par conséquent, bien qu'il y ait lieu de s'inquiéter de la militarisation croissante de l'Arctique et de souhaiter le renversement de cette tendance, le Canada ne pourrait déclarer l'Océan Arctique zone denucléarisée s'il ne pouvait compter sur l'appui effectif de l'Union soviétique et des États-Unis. Nous recommandons que le Canada, en collaboration avec d'autres pays arctiques et nordiques, cherche à obtenir la démilitarisation de l'Arctique en exerçant des pressions en ce sens sur les États-Unis ainsi que sur l'Union soviétique et en favorisant d'une manière générale le contrôle des armements et le désarmement.



Des témoins bien renseignés comme MM. Albert Legault et Frank Griffith ont fait allusion à des systèmes sonar capables de suivre le mouvement des sous-marins dans les détroits de l'Arctique, mais M. George Lindsey a expliqué que le bruit causé par la glace en mouvement créait certaines difficultés techniques et faussait les signaux captés. Par ailleurs, comme ces systèmes sont purement passifs, il faudrait actuellement que le Canada compte sur des sous-marins américains s'il voulait sévir contre des intrus.

Devant cette situation, les membres du comité ont demandé aux témoins ce qui se passerait si le Canada décidait de se doter de sous-marins capables de naviguer sous la glace. On leur a répondu que le Canada pourrait ainsi non seulement assooir sa souveraineté sur la région, mais aussi obliger la marine américaine à renseigner le Canada sur le mouvement des sous-marins américains dans les eaux canadiennes. Il en résulterait une plus grande coopération navale entre les Etats-Unis et le Canada.

Dans son rapport sur la défense maritime du Canada (mai 1983), le sous-comité sur la défense nationale du Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires étrangères a proposé que le Canada se dote d'une flotte de sous-marins diesel-électriques modernes à cause de leur potentiel exceptionnel pour la lutte anti-sous-marine. Même si le sous-comité a surtout mis l'accent sur la navigation dans les eaux libres de glace, il était d'avis «qu'on réussirait pour le moment à surveiller le passage du Nord-Ouest en stationnant à son entrée et à sa sortie des sous-marins à propulsion classique (58)». Le comité recommande que le gouvernement envisage la possibilité de doter la marine canadienne de sous-marins diesel-électriques dans le cadre de l'examen général des forces navales du Canada et de l'ensemble de la politique canadienne en matière de défense.

Il faut examiner attentivement un certain nombre de facteurs avant de décider si le Canada doit acheter des sous-marins modernes. Les sous-marins nucléaires sont très onéreux. Le comité a appris que des sous-marins non propulsés à l'énergie nucléaire pourraient peut-être accomplir d'importantes opérations sous la glace grâce aux progrès accomplis dans le domaine des systèmes de propulsion conventionnels. Toutefois, ces systèmes qui sont certes beaucoup moins chers n'ont pas encore fait leurs preuves. De plus, il faudrait évaluer attentivement même le coût d'un sous-marin conventionnel moderne, car mis à part le prix d'achat, les coûts d'entretien, de formation et des effectifs nécessaires à terre sont élevés. Enfin, si, pour acheter des sous-marins modernes, le Canada devait diminuer les ressources de ses forces armées en Europe, il faudrait tenir compte de la réaction qu'une telle décision pourrait susciter chez nos alliés de l'OTAN.

Quelques-uns des témoins qui ont parlé de la sécurité dans les eaux arctiques ont proposé que le Canada exerce des pressions pour que l'Océan Arctique soit déclaré zone d'neutralisée. Certains ont même lancé l'idée de créer dans la région arctique un régime juridique semblable à celui qui a été mis en place dans l'Antarctique en vertu du traité de 1959.

Nous avons également établi un parallèle d'ordre juridique entre la situation dans l'Antarctique et la situation dans l'Arctique. Le continent antarctique n'appartient à aucun pays. Afin d'éviter toute revendication d'un quelconque pays sur ce territoire, la communauté internationale s'est entendue, il y a une trentaine d'années, pour internationaliser ce continent. Par contre, toutes les terres de la région arctique font partie du territoire d'un pays. Par ailleurs, si l'on regarde une carte de l'Arctique, on s'aperçoit que 44 p. 100 des terres appartiennent à l'Union soviétique, et 8 p. 100 aux Etats-Unis. La région entière fait donc inévitablement l'objet d'une très grande rivalité entre les deux superpuissances. L'Antarctique est, quant à lui, très éloigné de tout



renouveler, en mars 1986, l'accord du NORAD pour cinq ans, et à décider de construire le Système d'alerte du Nord. Les gouvernements canadiens qui se sont succédé ont toujours considéré que non seulement le NORAD assurait la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord, ce qui est sa fonction principale, mais qu'il protégeait aussi la souveraineté du Canada en fournissant un cadre de coopération avec les États-Unis. Nous attirons cependant l'attention, dans le chapitre V, sur certains aspects de l'IDS qui risquent de forcer les Canadiens à faire un choix difficile dans un avenir rapproché.

À cause de la glace qui recouvre une grande partie de l'Océan Arctique, toute intervention des forces navales de surface est exclue. Dans ce climat rigoureux, les brise-glace ont très peu d'utilité sur le plan de la sécurité : les satellites et les avions sont beaucoup plus efficaces pour des activités de reconnaissance, et un avion peut rapidement détruire un navire ennemi. Il faudrait que le Canada se dote de brise-glace plus puissants et plus nombreux pour surveiller le trafic maritime dans le passage du Nord-Ouest, dès que le besoin s'en fera sentir.

Il y a dix ans, beaucoup croyaient à une expansion rapide du trafic maritime dans l'Arctique, grâce à des pétroliers submersibles ou renforcés pour la navigation dans les glaces. Cependant, on n'a pas encore découvert dans la mer de Beauport des gisements de pétrole comme ceux de la baie de Prudhoe. Aujourd'hui, avec le déclin du prix du pétrole et la fin des programmes de subventions fédéraux, la prospection dans l'Arctique canadien bat de l'aile. Le transport du pétrole par navires-citernes n'est donc pas pour demain. Bien que l'activité minière se poursuive dans les îles de l'est de l'Arctique, les problèmes de navigation y sont beaucoup moins complexes; par ailleurs, on ne voit pas la nécessité d'avoir de gros brise-glace tant qu'il n'y a pas de trafic maritime. En revanche, la surveillance de l'Arctique demeure impérieuse, et la présence d'un brise-glace serait fort utile dans ce domaine.

La principale fonction du brise-glace polaire dont on envisage l'acquisition consisterait à affermir la souveraineté du Canada sur l'Arctique. Pour cette raison, M. Donat Pharaud croit qu'il faudrait équiper le brise-glace d'armes légères, «pour qu'une présence quasi militaire puisse au moins être assurée (25:33)». D'autres pensent que le brise-glace pourrait servir de laboratoire scientifique, et être utilisé pour tracer la carte du fond de l'Océan Arctique. Les témoins ne sont pas tous en faveur de l'achat d'un brise-glace polaire. L'amiral Falls (à la retraite), qui a présenté un mémoire sur la question, doute même de son utilité comme moyen de défense de la souveraineté. Il n'est pas convaincu que la présence d'un brise-glace dissuaderait les États-Unis d'envoyer un jour un autre navire dans le passage du Nord-Ouest.

Le comité n'a pas eu le temps d'approfondir la question très délicate de l'achat d'un brise-glace polaire. Un bâtiment de cette taille et de cette puissance représente une grosse dépense et ne servira pas à grand-chose tant qu'il n'y aura pas de trafic maritime, trafic qui pourrait apparaître dans les années 90.

L'importance stratégique de l'Océan Arctique s'est sensiblement accrue depuis qu'ont augmenté la portée et la précision des missiles balistiques lancés par des sous-marins. L'Union soviétique peut désormais stationner ses tout nouveaux sous-marins lance-missiles balistiques dans les eaux relativement sûres des côtes soviétiques septentrionales. Néanmoins, certains de ces sous-marins sont peut-être déployés sous la partie soviétique de la calotte polaire, où ils sont mieux protégés. On peut donc supposer que des sous-marins américains et soviétiques naviguent à l'occasion dans les eaux arctiques canadiennes; le comité n'a cependant entendu aucun témoignage à l'appui de cette thèse.

reventications du Canada, mais ils éviteraient les incertitudes d'un recours à la Cour internationale.

Par conséquent, à moins que les États-Unis n'acceptent de reconnaître dans un traité bilatéral la souveraineté du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest, le comité estime que le mieux est de laisser délibérément le temps passer. Cependant, pour éviter que cette question ne nuise aux relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis, nous estimons que le gouvernement canadien devrait faire connaître ouvertement et honnêtement sa position aux autorités américaines et leur exposer clairement les mesures qu'il entend adopter.

## Questions relatives à la défense

Ces dernières années, l'Arctique a pris une importance stratégique accrue, en raison surtout de l'apparition de nouveaux types de missiles. Selon nous, à cause de l'accroissement des activités militaires dans l'Arctique, il serait bon que l'OTAN s'intéresse davantage aux questions stratégiques liées à la dimension arctique du conflit Est-Ouest.

À propos de la défense du Nord canadien, les témoins ont été catégoriques. D'après le chef du Centre d'analyse et de recherche opérationnelle du ministère de la Défense nationale, M. George Lindsey,

[...] cette surface impénétrable et la vaste étendue de l'océan Arctique sont une bonne protection contre une invasion soviétique, protection encore accrue par l'archipel canadien et les terres septentrionales, qui sont inhabitées. Avec une telle barrière, l'idée d'une attaque terrestre d'envergure ne représente pas pour nous une menace sérieuse (49:7).

À l'exception du quartier général de la Défense à Yellowknife et de quelques détachements stationnés dans des localités comme Alert et Inuvik, le seul groupe de défense terrestre dans l'Arctique canadien est constitué de 640 *rangers* qui sont, pour la plupart, des autochtones à qui l'on a donné une formation et un équipement réduit à l'essentiel. Selon M. Mark Gordon, leur principal objectif est d'être «des yeux et les oreilles des forces armées canadiennes dans le Nord (25:14)». M. Gordon a proposé de moderniser l'équipement et d'améliorer la formation des *rangers*, après avoir établi une comparaison avec la Garde nationale inuit de l'Alaska, qui est «beaucoup mieux équipée [et mieux entraînée] que les *rangers* canadiens (25:32)». La situation en Alaska est différente parce que le territoire soviétique ne se trouve qu'à une cinquantaine de miles de distance. Cependant, comme la principale fonction des *rangers* consiste à recueillir des renseignements, il nous semblerait souhaitable d'améliorer leur formation et de moderniser leurs moyens de communication. Les *rangers* ont la responsabilité de défendre la souveraineté du Canada dans l'Arctique et doivent bénéficier pour cela d'un soutien accru.

Du côté de la défense aérienne, la mise au point des missiles de croisière, qui sont difficiles à détecter et à détruire une fois lancés, a donné une dimension nouvelle à la menace de bombardements soviétiques. Pour certains, les essais d'un nouveau bombardier, le *Blackjack*, permettent de croire que l'Union soviétique compte beaucoup sur ces missiles. Par conséquent, il est de plus en plus nécessaire de mettre en place un système efficace de repérage des bombardiers et de défense aérienne (voir le chapitre V pour plus de précisions). C'est cette conclusion (qui ne fait toutefois pas l'unanimité parmi les membres du comité) qui a amené le Canada et les États-Unis à

M. McKinnon s'est dit convaincu qu'il serait préférable que le Canada cherche à s'entendre avec les Etats-Unis pour que ceux-ci reconnaissent sa souveraineté sur ce territoire; en échange, le Canada donnerait aux navires américains le droit de franchir le passage. Cette entente, qui serait confirmée par traité, ne lierait que les Etats-Unis et le Canada, mais M. McKinnon estimait cette démarche justifiée, étant donné que seuls les Etats-Unis ont contesté les revendications du Canada et que le processus serait simple et sûr. Par ailleurs, en reconnaissant la souveraineté du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest, les Etats-Unis donneraient beaucoup de crédit aux revendications de notre pays sur la scène internationale, puisqu'ils sont l'une des principales puissances maritimes au monde.

Bien que M. McKinnon ait soutenu qu'une entente bilatérale serait préférable pour notre pays, il a dit douter que l'on puisse en ce moment persuader les Etats-Unis d'accepter les revendications du Canada.

Selon moi, le gouvernement américain n'est pas du tout disposé, du moins publiquement, à céder dans un différend concernant un détroit. Cela constituerait en effet un mauvais précédent dans tous les autres conflits (51:111).

Autrement dit, en raison de leurs intérêts mondiaux dans les domaines du commerce maritime et de la défense navale, les Etats-Unis ne tiennent pas à concéder qu'un détroit puisse être autre chose qu'un cours d'eau international à accès illimité, même si ses caractéristiques sont aussi particulières que celles du passage du Nord-Ouest. Selon M. McKinnon, cette attitude s'explique en partie par le fait que les Etats-Unis hésitent à s'engager maintenant, au cas où les données techniques du problème changeraient dans l'avenir.

Malgré cette évaluation pessimiste, nous recommandons que le gouvernement canadien tente à nouveau de s'entendre avec les Etats-Unis pour que ces derniers reconnaissent la souveraineté du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest. Le Canada dispose d'ailleurs de divers moyens de pression. Premièrement, en concluant une entente de ce genre, les Etats-Unis éviteraient les incertitudes d'un recours à la Cour internationale de justice. Deuxièmement, si le litige était réglé, ils pourraient envoyer leurs navires dans le passage, sans craindre de compromettre leurs bonnes relations avec le Canada. Un traité serait donc une façon rapide et nette de résoudre le problème.

Si les Etats-Unis refusaient fermement de reconnaître la souveraineté du Canada sur les eaux arctiques par le biais d'une entente bilatérale, notre pays devrait-il alors demander rapidement l'arbitrage d'une tierce partie? En fait, plus le temps passe, plus le Canada raffermirait sa position tant qu'il n'y a pas de nouvelle contestation. S'il y en avait une, cependant, il devrait y répondre rapidement. D'après nous, la meilleure chose à faire à ce moment-là serait d'insister pour soumettre le litige à la Cour internationale de justice. Plusieurs professeurs de droit spécialistes de la question, MM. Pharand, Cohen et McKinnon, ont dit croire que le Canada aurait alors de bonnes chances de l'emporter. De toute façon, un règlement, quel qu'il soit, mettrait fin à un litige qui, autrement, risquerait de nuire gravement aux relations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis.

Etant donné les choix difficiles que devront faire les autorités américaines à ce sujet, le comité pense que le gouvernement américain préfère probablement aussi éviter pour le moment toute action que le Canada pourrait interpréter comme une provocation. En définitive, les Etats-Unis risquent moins gros en attendant, à moins de devoir absolument envoyer un navire dans le passage. Et si vraiment cela devait se produire un jour, ils pourraient à la rigueur décider à ce moment-là de demander l'autorisation du Canada. Il est vrai qu'ils entérineraient ainsi implicitement les



\* À la suite du voyage du *Manhattan* en 1969, le Parlement a adopté la *Loi sur la prévention de la pollution des eaux arctiques*, qui établissait dans la région une zone de prévention de cent milles. Comme il s'agissait là d'un concept juridique entièrement nouveau, le gouvernement de l'époque craignait qu'il ne résiste pas à l'examen de la Cour internationale de justice. Afin de protéger la position du Canada, il avait donc émis une réserve quant à la compétence de la Cour sur cette question. Cette réserve a pu être levée par suite de l'élaboration de principes de droit touchant l'environnement arctique, dans le cadre de la Conférence sur le droit de la mer.

Dans le mémoire qu'il a présenté au comité, le groupe de travail de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales (division d'Ottawa) a suggéré une solution à trois volets pour régler les questions que posent les prétentions du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest. Avant tout, il faudrait tenter d'en arriver à une entente avec les États-Unis; ensuite, si ces tentatives échouaient, il faudrait, en accord avec les États-Unis, soumettre la question à une tierce partie; enfin, si les États-Unis refusaient cette solution, il faudrait agir unilatéralement pour obtenir un règlement judiciaire. Au cours de ses audiences à Vancouver, le comité a étudié cette suggestion de plus près avec M. Bruce McKinnon, de l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique.

Entre les voyages de ces deux bâtiments américains, trois autres navires, le *Gdynia* de Pologne, ainsi que l'*Explorer Lindblat* et le *World Explorer*, de Suède, ont franchi le passage du Nord-Ouest. Dans les trois cas, les autorités compétentes en avaient demandé l'autorisation, et l'avaient reçue. Le *Polar Sea* ne l'a pas fait, bien que les autorités canadiennes aient été mises au courant des intentions de la garde côtière américaine et qu'elles aient fini par donner leur assentiment. L'autre superpuissance, l'Union soviétique, voudrait bien faire admettre au niveau international que le passage du Nord-Est, sur sa côte septentrionale, se situe dans ses eaux intérieures; elle a donc appuyé avec prudence les revendications du Canada.

Personne ne conteste la souveraineté du Canada sur l'archipel arctique lui-même, mais les États-Unis ne sont pas satisfaits du statut actuel du passage du Nord-Ouest, qui présente un intérêt autant symbolique que défensif pour notre pays. Étant donné l'évolution récente de la situation stratégique, dont nous parlerons plus loin, il faudrait que le Canada soit en mesure de réglementer la circulation de toutes les catégories de navires dans ces eaux, entre les îles de l'archipel arctique. La réaction spontanée de la population aux voyages du *Manhattan* et du *Polar Sea* montre bien que les Canadiens sont convaincus de la compétence de leur pays sur ces eaux.

Tout comme en 1969 lorsque le *Manhattan* avait franchi le passage, la population canadienne s'est inquiétée. La tension a monté rapidement et, le 10 septembre 1985, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Clark, a annoncé à la Chambre des communes un certain nombre de mesures destinées à appuyer les revendications du Canada, notamment la délimitation du territoire revendiqué par le Canada au moyen de lignes de base droites tracées autour de l'archipel arctique, la levée de la réserve émise en 1970 au sujet de la juridiction de la Cour internationale de justice\*, l'augmentation de la surveillance aérienne, le déroulement de manoeuvres navales dans l'est de l'Arctique canadien et la construction d'un brise-glace polaire de classe 8. Ensemble, ces mesures pourraient permettre de réaffirmer concrètement les prétentions sur les eaux de l'archipel arctique.

Que le but de cette incursion ait été de contester les revendications du Canada au sujet du passage ou, comme l'ont maintenu les autorités américaines, de faire passer le *Polar Sea* du Groenland à l'Alaska de façon rapide et peu coûteuse, le gouvernement américain s'est bien gardé de demander une autorisation, parce qu'il aurait ainsi reconnu implicitement les prétentions canadiennes sur ce détroit. Il a au contraire affirmé hautement que ce voyage ne portait nullement préjudice à la position du Canada sur le plan juridique.



arctiques, des accords d'échanges satisfaisants pour les deux pays ont été longs à négocier. L'accord de 1971 conclu avec l'Union soviétique sur les échanges, de même que la Commission mixte qui a été créée à la suite de la signature de cet accord, ont donné des résultats peu concluants jusqu'en 1979, année où l'invasion de l'Afghanistan par les Soviétiques a conduit le Canada à suspendre les contacts déjà prévus. Cette sanction a été levée par le Canada ces dernières années, et plusieurs échanges sur le Nord ont été organisés depuis 1984. Les premières impressions qui ressortent de ces échanges sont qu'ils concernent cette fois-ci des domaines politiques présentant un intérêt pour le Canada. Cependant, le financement à long terme de ce programme n'est pas garanti et le Canada procède actuellement de façon ponctuelle et incertaine. Le comité estime qu'un programme d'échanges sur l'Arctique avec l'Union soviétique est un bon moyen d'accroître les connaissances du Canada sur le Grand Nord et qu'il peut permettre une amélioration des relations Est-Ouest. Nous recommandons que le programme d'échanges actuel soit convenablement financé.


Nous recommandons de façon plus générale de mettre sur pied un programme concerté en vue de conclure des accords de coopération avec tous les pays du Nord. Aujourd'hui, la seule entente internationale dont sont signataires tous les États arctiques porte sur la protection de l'ours polaire. Le Canada devrait envisager de conclure des ententes bilatérales ou des accords avec des groupes de pays. M. Frank Griffith, par exemple, a fait une suggestion intéressante lors de la réunion-débat de Québec sur la sécurité dans l'Arctique. Il a proposé que le Canada invite des scientifiques soviétiques à travailler avec des scientifiques canadiens à un projet de coopération dans une station de recherche dérivante, dans l'océan Arctique. Nous trouvons cette idée intéressante. Il conviendrait de se pencher notamment sur l'établissement de normes écologiques pour l'Arctique. Mettre ce principe à exécution exigera un certain degré d'imagination.

Nous recommandons que le Canada fasse des efforts particuliers pour développer de bonnes relations avec le Groenland qui, après l'Alaska, est son plus proche voisin dans l'Arctique. Dans un mémoire qu'il a présenté au comité, M. Gwynne Dyer s'est dit un peu préoccupé par l'évolution future du Groenland, où les partis politiques sont divisés sur la question de savoir s'il faut réclamer l'indépendance. Il est donc dans l'intérêt du gouvernement canadien et des Inuit de renforcer nos liens avec le Groenland. Plus précisément, il conviendrait d'essayer de renforcer la collaboration économique entre le Groenland et le Nord du Canada, comme l'a proposé l'Inuit Tapirisat du Canada dans son mémoire. L'accord de coopération de 1983, qui prévoit la réalisation de travaux de recherche sur l'idéologie marine dans la région du détroit de Davis et de la baie de Baffin devrait être étoffé.

Le Canada avait nommé un consul au Groenland pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, mais le consul a fermé ses portes à la fin de la guerre. Les habitants du Groenland cherchent à établir des contacts avec l'étranger, et le Canada est leur plus proche voisin. Sous réserve de l'accord du gouvernement du Danemark, nous recommandons d'ouvrir un consulat au Groenland le plus tôt possible, pour démontrer que le Canada souhaite établir des relations spéciales avec le Groenland, pour obtenir des renseignements sur les réalisations effectuées dans cette île et pour créer des liens entre les deux pays.

## La question de la souveraineté

Les difficultés que pose l'établissement de la souveraineté canadienne dans l'Arctique ont été mises en lumière l'été dernier, lorsqu'un brise-glace de la garde



Le trait continu indique la voie maritime internationale prévue entre les îles de l'Arctique. La ligne en pointillé montre l'itinéraire du *Polar Sea* en 1985. (Carte fournie par le *Canadian Arctic Resources Committee*.)

Aucun de ces pays n'a eu, dans l'histoire, le sentiment d'appartenir à une même région géographique. Leur pôle d'attraction a été soit le sud, soit l'est ou l'ouest. Ils sont toutefois de plus en plus conscients, à divers degrés, de l'importance du Nord et se rendent compte que la collaboration peut avoir des avantages.

L'attitude des Inuit est évidemment bien différente. Dans son témoignage, M. Mark Gordon a souligné à juste titre, au sujet des revendications du Canada sur l'archipel arctique, que «ses seuls alliés véritables sont les Inuit [...]». Pour [eux], l'Arctique n'est pas un arrière-pays, c'est [leur] patrie (25:13)». La Conférence circumpolaire inuit (au Canada) nous a rappelé que «les Inuit canadiens ont toujours fait usage des eaux de l'Arctique et de leur couverture de glace et ont ainsi fourni au Canada les arguments nécessaires en droit international, pour protéger les droits des Canadiens (6)». M. Gordon a cependant ajouté que, si le Canada veut entretenir de bons rapports avec les habitants du Nord, «il [doit] assurer une certaine stabilité économique et sociale. L'un des moyens [...] pour y parvenir est le règlement des revendications territoriales (25:13)». Le *Inuit Committee on National Issues* (ICNI) est allé plus loin en disant ceci :

L'utilisation continue que font les Inuit canadiens des eaux arctiques est certes plus viable du point de vue économique et du point de vue environnemental que le recours préconisé à la surveillance du passage du Nord-Ouest par des brise-glace et des avions coûtant des millions de dollars pour assurer la souveraineté canadienne (60:75).

Le comité croit que M. Mark Gordon et l'ICNI ont raison. Les Inuit sont le principal appui dont bénéficie le Canada dans l'Arctique, ce que la politique du gouvernement devrait refléter. Le Canada devrait chercher en priorité à conclure une entente acceptable sur les revendications territoriales dans le Nord et encourager les efforts déployés pour trouver des structures gouvernementales qui assureraient l'autonomie culturelle des Inuit au sein de la fédération canadienne. Il faudrait favoriser la mise en valeur des ressources renouvelables, en particulier dans le domaine de la pêche. À l'étranger, le Canada devrait faire tout en son pouvoir pour appuyer les efforts que déploie l'Organisation internationale de survie des autochtones, dont la section canadienne a comparu devant nous à Yellowknife, pour contre toute campagne, surtout en Europe, visant à interdire l'importation des produits de la fourrure, car le piégeage constitue une importante source de revenu pour les Inuit et les Indiens du Canada.

M. Mark Gordon a décrit les efforts déployés par les Inuit pour établir des liens entre les sociétés inuit des différents pays arctiques. Il a plus particulièrement fait allusion à la Conférence circumpolaire inuit réunissant les Inuit du Groenland, du Canada et de l'Alaska. Il a toutefois reconnu que toutes les tentatives de rapprochement avec les Inuit qui vivent le long de la côte soviétique de l'est de l'Arctique ont échoué. (Il n'y a pas d'Inuit sur la côte soviétique de l'ouest de l'Arctique.) Cependant, l'invitation faite au ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord, M. David Crombie, de visiter les collectivités inuit de l'Arctique soviétique en mai 1986, dans le cadre du programme d'échanges renouvelé entre nos deux pays — c'est la première fois qu'un ministre canadien reçoit une telle invitation — semble être le signe d'une nouvelle ouverture à l'étranger de la part des Soviétiques.

L'échec des tentatives de rapprochement illustre bien le problème de la coopération circumpolaire. L'Union soviétique occupe plus de la moitié des terres baignées par l'océan Arctique et considère que cette partie de son territoire a une importance stratégique particulière. Malgré les intérêts que devraient avoir en commun le Canada et l'Union soviétique, à qui appartiennent plus de quatre cinquièmes des terres



## L'importance du Grand Nord dans la politique étrangère du Canada

En faisant remarquer que les perspectives géopolitiques ont été jusqu'ici absentes, M. Paul Painchaud, de l'Université Laval, a particulièrement bien exprimé l'importance que devrait avoir le Grand Nord dans la politique étrangère du Canada :

[...] pendant si longtemps, nous avons négligé le seul système international régional auquel nous appartenons vraiment, qui est le système circumpolaire. [...] l'Arctique est la seule région où nous sommes une grande puissance géographique (49:40 et 41).

Dans son mémoire, la Conférence circumpolaire inuit (au Canada) a véhiculé le même message politique : « Dans le Nord international, le Canada pourrait jouer un rôle important (p.16) ».

L'Arctique devient de plus en plus un point de convergence de l'attention internationale. Comme le Canada a d'énormes intérêts dans cette région, il doit élaborer une politique cohérente sur l'Arctique prévoyant expressément d'intégrer le Grand Nord à sa politique étrangère.

La principale difficulté que présente l'Arctique en tant que région réside dans le fait que, malgré la structure naturelle que lui confère la géographie, la couverture de glace polaire et les distances qui séparent les localités ont empêché d'y établir le type de liaisons qui caractérisent les bassins de l'Atlantique et du Pacifique. Aucune route maritime ne passe dans l'océan Arctique et, bien qu'il y ait d'importantes activités commerciales le long de la côte nord de l'Union soviétique, la navigation dans ces eaux est interdite à tous les navires étrangers. Cependant, le transport aérien et d'autres moyens de communication permettent, dans une certaine mesure, de surmonter les obstacles que représentent la glace et la distance. Les habitants de l'Arctique sont peu nombreux et très dispersés, Mourmansk étant la seule grande ville au nord du cercle polaire arctique. Néanmoins, la population inuit autochtone forme un groupe homogène sur le plan culturel et linguistique, ce qui contribue grandement à créer une perspective régionale commune. Ainsi, l'Arctique est une région, mais une région exceptionnelle.

Les pays baignés par l'océan Arctique sont le Canada, les États-Unis, l'Union soviétique et la Norvège ainsi que le Danemark par sa province autonome du Groenland. La Suède et la Finlande, dont les côtes ne donnent pas sur l'océan Arctique, s'étendent néanmoins au nord du cercle polaire, et on y trouve des autochtones qui ont des liens avec d'autres populations autochtones du Nord. L'Islande est parfois considérée comme un pays arctique, même si elle est située au sud du cercle polaire.



Le gouvernement fédéral devrait, lui aussi, envisager la possibilité de désigner chaque année quelques fonctionnaires subalternes pour participer au *Congressional Intern Program*. Un certain nombre de gouvernements étrangers le font déjà et tous y trouvent un avantage.

négoziées par les deux gouvernements), ce qui força le président à retirer sa demande de ratification. Pour réduire les risques de surprise à l'avenir, chaque fois que le Canada négociera avec les États-Unis un accord qui devra ensuite être ratifié par le Congrès, nous recommandons que l'ambassade du Canada à Washington continue à effectuer ses propres sondages de l'opinion du Congrès.

Les États-Unis ne vont changer ni leur constitution ni leur régime politique. Ce régime fondé sur le partage des pouvoirs donne d'ailleurs aux négociateurs américains un avantage puisqu'ils peuvent essayer d'obtenir des concessions des gouvernements étrangers en évoquant la perspective d'un rejet par le Congrès. Devant l'influence croissante du Congrès, le gouvernement du Canada a complètement changé de tactique ces dernières années. Par l'intermédiaire de son ambassade à Washington, le gouvernement est fort occupé à faire valoir les vues du Canada auprès des membres du Congrès. En outre, le gouvernement du Canada et les industries canadiennes qui se sentent menacées ont commencé depuis quelques années à engager des conseillers américains pour les tenir au courant de la situation aux États-Unis. Ceci est surtout important pour les questions qui sont étudiées par le Congrès et ses comités et qui concernent directement ou indirectement des industries canadiennes. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement devrait étudier la possibilité de venir en aide aux compagnies canadiennes qui font l'objet d'enquêtes de la part des Américains au sujet des subventions qu'elles pourraient avoir reçues. Ces enquêtes, qui leur coûtent cher et leur prennent beaucoup de temps, semblent être déclenchées bien plus fréquemment de nos jours que dans le passé.

Les rencontres annuelles du Groupe interparlementaire Canada-États-Unis, de même que les rencontres spéciales organisées pour discuter d'un problème majeur, sont une excellente occasion pour les parlementaires canadiens de discuter avec les sénateurs et les membres de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis. Ces entretiens périodiques et les rencontres spéciales sont devenus encore plus importants depuis que le rôle du Congrès s'est accru. Le groupe interparlementaire s'avère également un mécanisme utile pour échanger des renseignements sur des questions qui pourraient un jour être source de problèmes. Les rencontres qu'il organise pourraient être d'une aide précieuse pour le Canada. Ces rencontres seraient encore plus utiles si l'on pouvait maintenir une certaine continuité dans la composition des délégations et trouver un moyen de mettre à profit les renseignements obtenus. Le comité a également reçu des rapports favorables sur les visites officielles organisées par le *Centre for Legislative Exchange* à l'intention des membres du Congrès américain et de leur personnel.

Le milieu des affaires au Canada pourrait prendre exemple sur la société *Northern Telecom* qui a nommé un de ses cadres moyens pour participer au *Congressional Fellowship Program* organisé par le *Conference Board* des États-Unis. Grâce à ce programme, une douzaine d'hommes d'affaires américains ont l'occasion, chaque année, de se joindre au personnel des comités du Congrès. Les participants y acquièrent une connaissance très utile du processus législatif aux États-Unis, de la façon dont les sénateurs et les membres du Congrès s'occupent des revendications de leurs électeurs et de l'influence considérable que peuvent avoir les pressions exercées de l'extérieur. Étant donné qu'elles sont de plus en plus touchées par les décisions du Congrès, les grandes entreprises canadiennes doivent en tenir compte dans leurs propres décisions et tenter d'influencer le processus. Elles seraient bien plus en mesure de le faire si un de leurs cadres supérieurs avait une expérience directe du fonctionnement du Congrès américain.

Canada devrait être prêt à recourir à l'arbitrage de manière à régler une fois pour toutes ces différends qui finiront inévitablement par s'aggraver.

## La nécessité d'accroître la compétence

La gestion des relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis doit être considérée comme un domaine spécialisé. À notre avis, certaines mesures d'ordre pratique s'imposent si l'on veut accroître la compétence et l'aptitude du secteur public et du secteur privé dans le domaine des relations avec les États-Unis. Les Canadiens acquièrent, bien sûr, une certaine connaissance des États-Unis à l'école et par les médias, mais un tel bagage est insuffisant pour le spécialiste qui doit bien saisir les moindres détails du système politique américain. Par ailleurs, nous ne pouvons plus compter, comme ce fut le cas de la génération précédente, sur les liens d'amitié entre hauts fonctionnaires canadiens et américains pour aplanir les difficultés.

**Nous recommandons d'organiser régulièrement des colloques à l'intention des fonctionnaires subalternes des gouvernements de nos deux pays et, si possible, des fonctionnaires des différents États et provinces.** Ces colloques seraient un outil de perfectionnement et auraient pour but d'accroître chez les futurs hauts fonctionnaires la connaissance et la compréhension des nombreuses facettes des relations bilatérales entre leurs pays. Ils fourniraient aussi l'occasion aux membres des bureaucraties canadiennes et américaines de mieux se connaître et d'établir des contacts qui pourraient un jour s'avérer fort utiles. La possibilité que les participants n'aient jamais à assumer de fonctions directes dans le domaine des affaires bilatérales ne nous paraît pas être un inconvénient majeur. Il nous semble que les hauts fonctionnaires chargés des questions de politique, qu'il s'agisse de politique étrangère ou non, devraient avoir une idée de l'importance des relations entre nos deux pays et de leur interdépendance.

Ces dix dernières années, le gouvernement a entrepris d'accorder une aide financière aux chaires d'études canadiennes de plusieurs grandes universités américaines, afin de mieux faire connaître le Canada aux diplômés de ces universités. Aussi louables qu'ils soient, ces efforts ne touchent que les étudiants du niveau postsecondaire. Or, les impressions que se font les étudiants dans leur jeune âge ont leur importance. Le comité a entendu parler d'une école secondaire au Michigan où l'on cherche à sensibiliser davantage les élèves à la réalité canadienne. Cette initiative nous a amenés à considérer l'opportunité de commander du matériel pédagogique destiné aux écoles primaires et secondaires des États-Unis, qui pourrait aider les élèves de toutes les régions des États-Unis à mieux connaître leurs voisins du Nord. L'idée mérite d'être étudiée attentivement et, si les résultats s'avèrent favorables, on pourra demander aux consulats canadiens de promouvoir l'utilisation de matériel par les conseils scolaires.

## Les rapports avec le Congrès

Le Canada veut pouvoir traiter avec un gouvernement capable de prendre des engagements et de les respecter. Or, la décentralisation qui caractérise la prise de décisions aux États-Unis, et plus particulièrement le pouvoir du Congrès, compliquent énormément les relations bilatérales. Ces facteurs risquent d'empêcher les relations comme ce fut le cas lorsque le comité des relations étrangères du Sénat américain refusa de ratifier les ententes de 1979 sur les pêcheries de la côte Est (qui avaient été



surveiller l'environnement des Grands Lacs, la CMI s'est révélée incapable de régler la question des pluies acides, faute d'un consensus politique sur les mesures à prendre. En outre, il est peu probable que l'un ou l'autre gouvernement accepte de confier à un tel organisme les décisions en matière de commerce et d'investissement, étant donné l'important enjeu politique qui s'y rattache. On pourrait cependant recourir à un tel organisme pour enquêter sur des questions bilatérales et pour sensibiliser les deux parties aux problèmes qui risquent de se poser.

Le gouvernement devrait garder l'esprit ouvert sur cette question. Les intérêts du Canada sont aujourd'hui beaucoup mieux représentés à Washington et dans le reste des États-Unis, et le recours à la voie diplomatique, complété par des contacts directs entre les deux gouvernements, offre bien plus de flexibilité que la création de nouveaux organismes. Cependant, si l'on parvenait à s'entendre pour élargir les relations commerciales entre nos deux pays, il pourrait s'avérer nécessaire de créer un mécanisme bilatéral pour régler les différends commerciaux selon les lignes directrices dont les deux gouvernements auraient convenu. Si un nouvel organisme devait être créé, le gouvernement aurait tout intérêt à exiger que l'on respecte rigoureusement le principe de la représentation égale qui a déjà été appliqué avec succès dans le passé.

À notre avis, le Canada doit faire tout son possible pour que l'attention des dirigeants américains demeure fixée sur le programme bilatéral. À cette fin, les nouveaux mécanismes récemment mis en place au niveau politique s'avèrent extrêmement utiles. Le sommet bilatéral annuel institué en 1985 permet à notre premier ministre et au président des États-Unis de se rencontrer une fois l'an pour examiner les principaux aspects de nos relations. Ces rencontres sont pour les deux dirigeants l'occasion de discuter, en vue de les résoudre, des problèmes que chacun considère importants. Elles servent également à ramener l'attention de la vaste bureaucratie américaine sur les questions qui intéressent le Canada. En outre, depuis 1983, notre secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et le secrétaire d'État américain se rencontrent tous les trois mois pour discuter des principaux sujets de désaccord entre nos deux pays et essayer d'y trouver des solutions pratiques. Les rencontres à ces deux niveaux semblent se compléter parfaitement, et le comité doute que le mécanisme puisse être amélioré.

Il y aura toujours un certain nombre de questions sur lesquelles nos deux pays n'arriveront pas à s'entendre et qui pourront compromettre nos rapports si elles ne sont pas réglées. Le Canada et les États-Unis ont eu recours à l'arbitrage à quelques reprises dans leur histoire. Le cas le plus récent est la requête présentée à la Cour internationale de justice en vue de régler le différend au sujet de la frontière du golfe du Maine. M. George Alexandrowicz, parlant au nom d'un comité mixte de l'Association du Barreau canadien et de l'Association du Barreau américain, a recommandé au comité qu'on ait plus souvent recours à ce genre de mécanisme.

À l'heure actuelle, trois différends portant sur la frontière maritime entre nos deux pays et sur la limite de nos eaux territoriales ne sont toujours pas réglés : le détroit de Juan de Fuca, le prolongement vers le large du point A de la ligne AB dans l'estuaire de Dixon et la frontière entre le Yukon et l'Alaska, le point en litige étant dans les trois cas la limite de 200 milles au large des côtes. Les deux pays ont intérêt à régler leurs différends de façon efficace et civilisée. Nous recommandons au gouvernement d'entreprendre des négociations avec les États-Unis pour arriver à une entente sur ces trois frontières maritimes. Le moment est peut-être bien choisi pour de telles négociations étant donné que l'enjeu politique rattaché à ces questions s'est quelque peu atténué par suite de l'effondrement du marché du pétrole et du ralentissement de l'exploration sous-marine. En cas d'échec des négociations, le comité estime que le



d'influer sur la politique de Washington. Pour cette raison, et naturellement aussi par souci d'efficacité, le Canada doit bien réfléchir à la manière dont il exprime ses opinions à Washington. L'influence est un avantage qui doit être ménagé et utilisé avec précaution.

L'importance accrue du Congrès et l'absence d'une discipline de parti font que bien des décisions importantes sont prises à la suite d'une guerre ouverte entre points de vue opposés. Un gouvernement étranger respecté peut, par une déclaration bien sentie, faire pencher la balance dans le débat aux Etats-Unis, mais il faut bien réfléchir avant d'agir de la sorte. Tout en essayant d'influencer ce débat, le gouvernement canadien doit veiller à ses intérêts et respecter son programme politique. Il lui faudra souvent s'adresser aux Canadiens pour leur expliquer sa position sur les grandes questions internationales, surtout si celles-ci sont controversées. Par ailleurs, les Canadiens doivent être assez mûrs pour reconnaître que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis a aussi le droit de critiquer la politique du Canada et des autres pays.

Nous concluons que le gouvernement devrait faire preuve de souplesse dans le choix des moyens à prendre pour exprimer son désaccord avec la politique des Etats-Unis. Il peut bien sûr doser le retentissement d'un tel désaccord par le choix tant de son porte-parole que des termes utilisés et du mode de présentation. Les mesures à prendre devraient être décidées en fonction de la question en litige, mais en tenant compte aussi de l'importance qu'elle a pour le Canada et pour les Etats-Unis.

## Les mécanismes bilatéraux

Nombre de propositions ont été faites en vue de compléter la multitude de contacts *ad hoc* entre le gouvernement du Canada et celui des Etats-Unis par des mécanismes appropriés. De telles propositions ont été plus fréquemment dernièrement à la suite de nouveaux problèmes dans nos rapports bilatéraux. La plus importante vise l'établissement d'une commission mixte du commerce et de l'investissement qui serait habilitée à effectuer des enquêtes, à faire des recommandations et à informer les deux parties des sources éventuelles de conflit.

Ces propositions ont pour le Canada un attrait indéniable. Il est essentiel que le gouvernement du Canada soit prévenu des mesures qu'envisage le pouvoir exécutif aux Etats-Unis, qu'il s'agisse d'importation, de réglementation des investissements ou de systèmes de défense. Il est également de plus en plus nécessaire de chercher à sensibiliser les hautes sphères des milieux politiques américains à la situation canadienne.

Nous ne recommandons pas pour autant que le gouvernement s'emploie aussitôt à établir une nouvelle institution bilatérale. En effet, chaque nouveau dossier diffère sensiblement des dossiers antérieurs, met en scène des acteurs différents et exige chaque fois une stratégie et une approche différentes de la part du Canada. Une commission composée de représentants désignés risque de perdre toute son utilité, comme ce fut le cas du comité ministériel canado-américain sur le commerce et les affaires économiques, qui s'est réuni à la fin des années 50 et au début des années 60.

Le modèle cité en exemple par ceux qui préconisent l'établissement d'une institution bilatérale est la Commission mixte internationale (CMI), dont l'expérience témoigne de la nécessité d'agir avec prudence. Aussi utile qu'elle ait été pour résoudre les différends portant sur les cours d'eau de part et d'autre de la frontière et pour

La meilleure méthode consiste à s'efforcer de persuader par la voie diplomatique tandis que des pressions sont exercées par le secteur privé. La clé du succès : une bonne coordination, de la patience dans la persuasion, des exemples frappants et la mention constante du problème.

Même le lobbying le plus actif et le mieux organisé ne donne pas nécessairement les résultats souhaités. Les législateurs peuvent très bien ne tenir aucun compte de la valeur des arguments du Canada s'ils établissent un lien artificiel entre la question à l'étude et d'autres questions bilatérales, ou s'ils y mêlent des choses qui n'ont aucun rapport, comme les différends entre le Congrès et l'administration américaine. Par conséquent, le Canada devrait chercher, autant que possible, à limiter la liberté d'action des Etats-Unis. Il devra évidemment accepter, lui aussi, des limites semblables, mais les avantages qu'il en retirera en vaudront peut-être bien le prix. Les limites les plus sûres sont celles qui sont consacrées par des ententes, comme le GATT ou l'accord canado-américain sur l'automobile de 1964. Malgré la signature de cet accord, le commerce de l'automobile n'a pas cessé pour autant d'être une source de litiges, mais il a été soustrait jusqu'à un certain point aux aléas du processus politique, ce qui n'est pas le cas aujourd'hui du commerce du bois d'œuvre blanc.

La réciprocité est déjà un principe tacitement reconnu. Le Canada est mieux placé pour réfuter les arguments des Américains qui l'accusent de se comporter de façon injuste s'il peut montrer que les Etats-Unis en font autant. Ainsi, quand on l'accuse de favoriser l'achat de produits canadiens, le Canada devrait se plaindre des lois incitant à «acheter américain», et quand on l'accuse d'appuyer le développement régional, il devrait rappeler à ses voisins du sud le traitement préférentiel que ceux-ci accordent aux petites entreprises et aux groupes minoritaires.

Il serait également utile de chercher à examiner séparément chaque question bilatérale. Nous croyons, comme l'a dit M. Stephen Clarkson, qu'il faut éviter autant que possible de lier tel dossier à tel autre dans les négociations bilatérales. Le Canada craint à juste titre que les Etats-Unis, en raison de leur force et de leur influence, et du fait qu'ils ont relativement moins à perdre, sacrifient un dossier au profit d'un autre et que le Canada se retrouve perdant sur plusieurs fronts. Par contre, si chaque question est négociée séparément, on peut supposer que les deux parties en arriveront au moins à un compromis. Il nous faut reconnaître toutefois qu'il n'est pas toujours possible d'éviter que les différents dossiers soient liés les uns aux autres.

## Les désaccords avec les Etats-Unis

Les rapports du Canada avec les Etats-Unis englobent une foule de questions multilatérales, comme la conduite des pourparlers de Genève sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales, la position des Etats-Unis à l'égard des troubles en Amérique centrale, l'ordre du jour des prochaines négociations du GATT ou la question de l'appui à donner aux Nations Unies et à ses organismes. A en juger par les événements passés, on peut supposer que la position du Canada ne coïncidera pas toujours avec celle des Etats-Unis. Nous avons donc jugé bon de nous interroger sur l'attitude que devrait adopter le Canada lorsqu'il n'est pas d'accord avec les Etats-Unis, et en particulier, s'il devrait en discuter publiquement ou bien se contenter de régler le différend dans les coulisses.

Le comité reconnaît que l'influence du Canada auprès de la communauté internationale tient en partie au crédit dont il semble jouir auprès des Etats-Unis. Le prestige international du Canada augmente dans la mesure où on le croit capable

**Il est extrêmement important de faire valoir les vues du Canada auprès de chaque palier du système américain et de faire preuve d'imagination dans la recherche d'alliés.**

provinciaux tiennent à jouer un rôle actif sur la scène internationale. Quelle qu'en soit la cause, cette situation risque de créer une certaine confusion dans l'esprit des Américains.

Par ailleurs, le secteur privé pose également un problème de coordination. Ceux qui ne suivent pas au jour le jour les relations canado-américaines ont du mal à en saisir toute l'ampleur et la complexité. Le Canada a des intérêts très variés, dont beaucoup dépendent, dans une certaine mesure, des États-Unis. Or, les groupes qui défendent des intérêts particuliers et qui essaient d'infléchir la politique de Washington en leur faveur ont une vue très étroite des relations bilatérales et soutiennent souvent que le gouvernement du Canada a des réserves inexploitées d'influence qu'il devrait utiliser à leur profit. Le plus ardu consiste à faire admettre à ces groupes que, pour établir de bonnes relations avec les États-Unis, ils doivent être prêts à faire des compromis et des concessions.

Il n'existe pas de solution unique au problème de la coordination des initiatives publiques et privées. Il y a pourtant eu des succès notables : tout le monde convient que la collaboration entre le gouvernement du Canada, les autorités provinciales et le secteur privé dans la défense des exportations de bois d'œuvre blanc est un modèle à suivre. À notre avis, on n'entreprendra des relations efficaces avec les États-Unis que si toutes les parties intéressées s'efforcent de présenter une politique canadienne cohérente.

## La recherche d'alliés aux États-Unis

Au cours des deux dernières années, le Congrès des États-Unis a adopté une attitude des plus protectionnistes à l'égard du Canada. L'augmentation du déficit commercial américain et la perspective d'une désindustrialisation de plusieurs grands secteurs de l'économie ont convaincu les Américains que les partenaires commerciaux des États-Unis ne jouaient pas franc jeu. Le Canada n'est pas le principal objet de cette hostilité, mais sa balance commerciale excédentaire en fait la cible fréquente de menaces protectionnistes.

Comment le gouvernement peut-il défendre les intérêts du Canada lorsque les émotions sont vives et que les risques de réactions irrationnelles sont élevés? Dans chaque cas, il est important de savoir qui sont les alliés du Canada aux États-Unis (ou, au besoin, de faire de nos adversaires des alliés) et de collaborer avec eux. Pendant la première partie de nos audiences, M. John D. Allan, président-directeur général de *Stelco Inc.*, nous a expliqué comment une telle tactique avait permis de réfuter les allégations selon lesquelles le Canada subventionnait ses exportations d'acier :

Je me souviens de la dernière séance que j'ai eue: c'était à la Maison-Blanche avec Edwin Meese. L'ambassadeur avait organisé cela pour nous deux. On a finalement reconnu que ce processus exigeait un effort conjugué. Au début, nous avions cru que le gouvernement fédéral agirait seul, mais il faut connaître notre industrie, connaître les détails: les fonctionnaires ne savaient pas que nous importions du charbon du Kentucky; il ne savait pas qu'un de nos principaux clients était Michelin, qui a une usine en Caroline du Sud, et que nous étions allés voir le sénateur de cet État ... la meilleure combinaison pour ces pourparlers est l'ambassadeur ou quelqu'un d'autre d'Ottawa et quelqu'un de l'industrie (11:15).



questions bilatérales et permettre de les régler selon des procédures établies. Les règles de base adoptées pour les échanges et les investissements, ainsi que pour d'autres activités du secteur privé, doivent être respectées. Le secteur public comme le secteur privé prennent des engagements à très long terme et ils veulent savoir que tout ce qui touche leurs activités est stable et prévisible. Des relations si étroites, si complexes et si ramifiées comportent, selon l'expression de M. John Holmes, un «élément d'intervulnérabilité» et elles doivent être renforcées par une bonne dose de confiance mutuelle. Parce qu'il est un partenaire de moindre taille, le Canada a peut-être plus intérêt à ce qu'on établisse des règles pour prendre des décisions qui touchent l'autre pays; mais les Etats-Unis sont tout aussi vulnérables et ont aussi intérêt à ce qu'il y ait des règles acceptables aux deux pays.

Pour que nos relations avec les Etats-Unis soient bonnes, il faut que les Américains se rendent compte que beaucoup de leurs politiques et de leurs actions ont des répercussions sur les intérêts du Canada. Il faut donc que les Etats-Unis acceptent de consulter le Canada avant de prendre toute initiative nouvelle. Le Canada a souvent eu des raisons de se plaindre dans le passé à ce sujet, même s'il admet, premièrement, que les intérêts mondiaux des Etats-Unis rendent difficiles les consultations bilatérales avec chaque pays et deuxièmement, que la complexité du système politique américain et l'indépendance du Congrès sont telles que le président peut voir ses initiatives présidentielles repoussées par le Congrès. De plus, en matière de consultation, le Canada doit lui-même donner l'exemple, ce qu'il a souvent omis de faire par le passé.

Le comité recommande que le gouvernement, chaque fois qu'il en aura l'occasion, rappelle au gouvernement des Etats-Unis l'importance de consultations préalables. Pour sa part, le Canada doit lui-même s'imposer de consulter les Etats-Unis. Dans les deux sens, les consultations ne doivent pas simplement consister à informer les intéressés à l'avance, mais doivent laisser le temps de discuter, de réfléchir et d'apporter les modifications qui s'imposent.

## La coordination des politiques et des actions du Canada

L'étude des relations canado-américaines illustre combien la cohérence est profitable au Canada. L'influence du Canada à Washington est à son maximum lorsque les organismes fédéraux et provinciaux appuient ensemble des stratégies et des objectifs communs. Le gouvernement fédéral canadien doit cependant veiller à coordonner la formulation de ces objectifs et la mise au point de la stratégie qui permettra de les atteindre.

L'un de nos conférenciers, M. Mitchell Sharp, a fait part de sa propre expérience en qualité de ministre des Affaires extérieures pour montrer à quel point il est difficile, pour les ministres canadiens, de coordonner leurs contacts à Washington. Ce problème bien familier tient à la facilité des communications et au volume considérable des transactions officielles. Nous ne sommes pas prêts à recommander la création d'un bureau central pour les contacts bilatéraux, car ce ne serait pas pratique, mais nous craignons que le Canada ne fasse entendre deux sons de cloche à Washington.

Un autre problème surgit lorsque les gouvernements provinciaux cherchent à intervenir dans les relations avec les Etats-Unis. Cela tient d'une part à ce que plusieurs questions relevant des autorités provinciales, comme l'environnement, la réglementation et l'expansion industrielle, font maintenant l'objet de discussions internationales, et d'autre part au fait que, depuis une dizaine d'années, plusieurs gouvernements



De bonnes relations reposent avant tout sur une bonne communication. Une communication aisée entre les deux gouvernements devrait faciliter l'évaluation des

## La consultation et la prise de décisions selon des règles établies

Voisin des États-Unis, le Canada doit trouver un équilibre entre les avantages pratiques de l'interdépendance et les impératifs politiques de l'indépendance. Situé entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, il doit trouver un moyen terme entre la collaboration avec les États-Unis dans la défense de l'Amérique du Nord et la protection de la souveraineté canadienne. Situé sur le continent nord-américain, mais ayant des intérêts et des engagements beaucoup plus vastes, il doit trouver un équilibre entre sa vocation nord-américaine, sa vocation transatlantique et sa vocation globale (4).

Ce qui importe le plus, c'est que les Canadiens aient la confiance voulue pour bien mener leurs relations avec les États-Unis. À cet égard, nous avons été heureux d'apprendre que de nombreux Latino-Américains considéraient le comportement du Canada vis-à-vis des États-Unis comme un modèle à suivre. Il faut d'abord et avant tout chercher à trouver un équilibre entre des intérêts qui se font concurrence, comme le groupe de travail de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales l'a dit dans son mémoire.

On ne peut imaginer la puissance militaire et économique considérable des États-Unis déployée contre le pauvre petit Canada. Sur la plupart des questions, la force à utiliser est fonction des intérêts en jeu (dans *Life with Uncle*).

Le Canada a cependant les moyens de se défendre. À vrai dire, les liens qui l'unissent aux États-Unis font que, dans bien des cas, il est d'avantage en mesure de protéger ses intérêts. Ainsi, les liens tissés entre les deux pays dans le domaine du commerce et des investissements, bien qu'ils soient loin d'être sa seule arme, peuvent parfois permettre au Canada d'obtenir plus facilement ce qu'il veut et de limiter les pressions que peuvent exercer les États-Unis. Comme M. John Holmes l'a fait remarquer à juste titre dans son analyse des relations canado-américaines :

[...] Le Canada n'avait pas, il y a deux ou trois décennies, de stratégie concernant ses relations avec les Américains. Il se contentait de régler de manière ponctuelle toutes les questions qui surgissaient. On a tendance maintenant, des deux côtés de la frontière, à adopter une approche stratégique. Les États-Unis sont en train de mettre au point une stratégie relative à leurs relations avec le Canada : comment régler les problèmes à l'ordre du jour et coordonner les activités des divers organismes intéressés (28:27).

Le défi est encore plus grand pour le Canada du fait que le gouvernement des États-Unis exerce une puissance formidable. M. Stephen Clarkson a dit au comité qu'on pouvait s'attendre à ce que les États-Unis s'intéressent davantage à leurs relations bilatérales avec notre pays, suivant en cela l'exemple du Canada.

Les différences dans la façon dont les deux pays abordent les problèmes reflètent souvent des différences de moyens et, en conséquence, de méthodes. La puissance militaire des États-Unis leur confère des possibilités d'action unilatérale que les Canadiens ne peuvent guère envisager pour eux-mêmes. Le gouvernement du Canada ayant des moyens limités, il a tendance à chercher instinctivement des solutions multilatérales et à accorder beaucoup plus d'importance que les États-Unis à la primauté du droit.

découlent naturellement du jeu des forces sociales, économiques et géographiques. Même si les relations entre les deux gouvernements et entre les Canadiens et les Américains sont excellentes, les frictions sont inévitables. Cependant, il est en général plus facile de régler les problèmes si nous avons de bonnes relations. Les chances de parvenir à une entente mutuellement satisfaisante sont habituellement bien meilleures si nos deux pays adoptent une attitude constructive dans une atmosphère sérieuse, ce qui exclut toute réaction excessive.

Il est également important que les Américains et les Canadiens voient loin et parlent franchement des conflits éventuels avant même qu'ils ne se produisent. Cependant, s'il est peut-être facile d'entrevoir les questions qui vont se poser, comme l'exportation d'eau douce et les effets qu'auront de nouvelles techniques de communication sur la politique culturelle du Canada, il est beaucoup plus difficile de trouver des solutions mutuellement satisfaisantes. Dans cette perspective, les communications personnelles qui existent entre les deux pays à de nombreux niveaux, par le biais des universités, des associations professionnelles, du secteur privé ainsi que des administrations publiques, sont parfois un atout précieux. Grâce à ces voies de communications, il est possible d'étudier les problèmes sous tous les angles et on a beaucoup plus de chances d'aboutir à des solutions convenant aux deux parties. De plus, comme certains problèmes seront peut-être impossibles à résoudre, ce genre de communications permettra de les tolérer plus facilement.

Une des particularités de l'Amérique du Nord, c'est le nombre d'associations qu'on y trouve, qu'il s'agisse de syndicats internationaux comme celui des machinistes ou des travailleurs de l'acier, d'organismes de bienfaisance comme les *Lions* et les *Shriners*, ou encore d'associations professionnelles comme celles des chirurgiens-cardiologues et des distributeurs de machinerie lourde. Il existe des dizaines de milliers d'associations semblables. L'importance et l'autonomie des membres canadiens varient selon chaque cas. Ces dernières années est apparu un nouveau phénomène qui montre que les Canadiens s'affirment de plus en plus; en effet, les membres canadiens se sont retirés de certains organismes internationaux, le cas le plus connu ayant débouché sur la création du Syndicat canadien des travailleurs de l'automobile. À cause de ce phénomène, notre pays dispose de moyens supplémentaires pour définir les intérêts des Canadiens et les défendre.

## Garder le sens des proportions

Il est inévitable que des problèmes surgissent entre de bons voisins, et les Canadiens ne doivent pas se faire une montagne des tiraillements qu'ils peuvent avoir avec les États-Unis. Ces problèmes apparaissent souvent plus graves qu'ils ne le sont en réalité, à cause de la façon dont ils sont traités dans l'appareil politique américain. Les articles de journaux qui font état du nombre de projets de loi soumis au Congrès qui pourraient éventuellement nuire aux intérêts du Canada en sont un exemple typique. En moyenne, trente mille projets de loi sont soumis au Congrès à chaque session. Or, un grand nombre ne sont déposés que pour gagner la faveur des électeurs ou de groupes d'intérêts, et on sait qu'il ne feront jamais l'objet d'un vote. Nous avons certes de bonnes raisons de nous méfier des revirements soudains du Congrès, mais les Canadiens ne doivent pas s'inquiéter outre mesure des intentions de certaines personnalités politiques des États-Unis, qui ne visent en fait qu'à sauver les apparences aux yeux de l'auditoire américain. En revanche, le Canada doit prendre au sérieux le pouvoir du Congrès et ne pas croire qu'il est tellement facile à un président de mettre le Congrès de son côté.

\* Un comité du GATT a confirmé le bien-fondé de ce dernier grief.

gouvernement fédéral et parce qu'il y avait une forte proportion de sociétés pétrolières étrangères au Canada. Or, les États-Unis, sur lesquels l'augmentation du prix du pétrole avait eu des effets différents, n'ont vu dans le PEN que des mesures rétroactives modifiant la réglementation canadienne en matière d'exploration et qu'une série de nouvelles règles concernant l'obtention de subventions et les approvisionnement qui défavorisaient les sociétés étrangères\*. De plus, le gouvernement américain a craint que d'autres pays n'embroient le pas au Canada.

Certains problèmes peuvent également découler du succès d'une industrie dans un pays ou dans l'autre, même si le gouvernement n'y est pour rien. Les difficultés que rencontre actuellement l'industrie canadienne du bois d'œuvre résineux aux États-Unis proviennent de l'efficacité de cette industrie et de la baisse du cours du dollar canadien. En l'occurrence, l'industrie américaine du bois d'œuvre exerce des pressions sur l'administration américaine et même sur le Congrès, car sa part du marché a diminué de plus de 10 p. 100 en quelques années. Plus récemment, les États-Unis s'en sont pris aux fabricants canadiens de bardeaux qui avaient presque réussi à doubler leur chiffre d'affaires en trois ans, au point de détenir trois quarts du marché américain. Dans des situations de ce genre, la force des institutions démocratiques des deux pays a pour effet de gonfler le problème : les sénateurs et les représentants des États producteurs de bois doivent en effet défendre les intérêts locaux sous peine de se faire battre aux élections suivantes. Dans les mois qui précèdent les élections du Congrès, le président lui-même est particulièrement vulnérable aux pressions exercées par des entreprises qui ont du mal à concurrencer les importations.

D'autres problèmes sont une conséquence inévitable de la géographie. Si les États-Unis manquent de gaz naturel ou d'eau dans le Sud-Ouest, l'abondance même de ces ressources au Canada forcera le gouvernement du Canada à modifier sa politique d'exportation de ces produits. Les problèmes écologiques ne connaissent pas non plus de frontières. De plus, les techniques peuvent elles aussi être une source de tensions. Les nouvelles techniques de communication remettent en question les règles établies pour la transmission des émissions de télévision et de radio entre les deux pays, ce qui pose des problèmes pour la protection de la culture canadienne. Les progrès techniques réalisés dans les domaines de la pêche et de l'exploitation pétrolière en mer ont déjà entraîné des différends entre nos deux pays au sujet des limites maritimes, problèmes qui ne s'étaient auparavant jamais posés.

La variété et les sources des conflits entre le Canada et les États-Unis sont presque infinies. Le Canada est parfois victime d'une mesure de l'administration américaine qui visait en fait quelqu'un d'autre. Par exemple, les États-Unis sont de plus en plus irrités par les subventions que la Communauté économique européenne accorde à l'agriculture. Celles-ci ont en effet entraîné une augmentation de la production et ont fait perdre aux États-Unis une part des marchés étrangers. Le Congrès a finalement pris des mesures de représailles en adoptant un projet de loi conçu pour faire obstacle à la politique agricole de la Communauté. Ce faisant, et presque sans qu'on s'en aperçoive, il a sans doute porté un dur coup aux autres grands producteurs de céréales, c'est-à-dire à l'Australie, à l'Argentine et au Canada. Le fait de savoir qu'elles n'étaient pas vraiment visées est une bien mince consolation pour les victimes. En outre, il est d'autant plus difficile d'attirer l'attention des Américains sur nos problèmes que la décision concerne exclusivement d'autres pays.

Si nous avons longuement parlé de la diversité et de l'origine des conflits qui opposent le Canada et les États-Unis, c'est qu'il nous paraît important de montrer qu'ils



Il est important que les Canadiens comprennent que les problèmes bilatéraux avec les États-Unis sont inévitables et naturels. En effet, nos deux pays ont peut-être des rapports étroits, mais ils ont également des traditions, des objectifs et des intérêts différents. Sans vouloir généraliser, au niveau bilatéral, les problèmes tiennent souvent à ce que nos deux pays réagissent différemment à des événements survenus à l'étranger, ou encore à ce que des pressions intérieures dans un des deux pays forcent le gouvernement à modifier les règles de base. L'exemple suivant illustre bien notre propos. Lorsque le Canada a décidé d'établir le Programme énergétique national (PEN), il l'a fait parce que les pays de l'OPEP avaient réussi à augmenter le prix du pétrole, parce qu'il en avait résulté un accroissement des recettes pétrolières de l'Alberta et du

## Les sources de conflits

D'une manière générale, les problèmes que les États-Unis posent au Canada se situent dans deux contextes différents; il y a d'une part les situations où le problème est surtout bilatéral et, d'autre part, celles où les actions ou la politique américaine ont une orientation multilatérale. Dans le premier cas, le Canada doit généralement agir seul pour défendre ses intérêts. Dans le second, le Canada doit normalement faire front commun avec d'autres gouvernements, ou du moins tenir compte de leur réaction.

Les contacts entre Canadiens et Américains font paraître négligeables, par comparaison, ceux que peuvent avoir deux autres pays, quels qu'ils soient. En effet, en dehors des contacts entre les représentants officiels des gouvernements respectifs de nos pays, au niveau fédéral ou provincial ou au niveau des États, ces relations touchent les syndicats, les entreprises et leurs associations, les équipes de sport, les touristes, les organismes de bienfaisance et les associations, pour ne nommer que les plus évidentes. Plus de 30 millions de personnes franchissent chaque année la frontière entre nos deux pays, et les transmissions de données ainsi que les télécommunications transfrontalières éclipsent complètement, par leur nombre, celles qui peuvent exister entre deux autres

Le Canada étant le plus faible des deux pays, il est inévitablement très soucieux d'affirmer son indépendance et très sensible à toute atteinte à sa souveraineté et à son indépendance. Les problèmes que nous causent les États-Unis peuvent être particulièrement difficiles à régler quand ils résultent d'initiatives du secteur privé et non des actions du gouvernement. L'esprit d'annexion, qui a longtemps existé aux États-Unis, n'est plus menaçant. Par contre, les pressions qui s'exercent aujourd'hui sur le Canada résultent souvent de l'énergie sans borne d'Américains qui cherchent, chacun de leur côté, à servir leurs propres intérêts. Cela se traduit de diverses façons : une offre publique d'achat d'une société canadienne par une société américaine, une organisation américaine qui s'efforce de promouvoir des idées extrêmes au Canada, ou encore la compagnie Exxon envoyant le *Manhattan* dans le passage du Nord-Ouest. Les mesures prises par l'administration américaine aux États-Unis, par exemple la déréglementation des transports ou la modification de la réglementation fiscale relative à l'amortissement, ont de plus en plus des répercussions directes sur le Canada. Ces initiatives, qu'elles soient publiques ou privées, peuvent, surtout quand elles sont considérées ensemble, poser des problèmes au Canada, en particulier pour la politique canadienne dans des domaines aussi divers et fondamentaux que les investissements, les affaires culturelles et l'énergie. Mais quand elles résultent des actions d'une multitude de citoyens ou de sociétés privées, leurs répercussions sont parfois difficiles à percevoir — en fait, leurs conséquences peuvent même susciter un débat au Canada — et il est donc encore plus difficile d'y parer.



des conceptions différentes de l'État, les Canadiens faisant davantage confiance à ce dernier, une préférence au Canada pour « la paix, l'ordre et la bonne administration des affaires publiques » plutôt que pour « la vie, la liberté et la recherche du bonheur », ainsi que des systèmes politiques disséminables. Au Canada, le pouvoir et la responsabilité sont entre les mêmes mains car l'exécutif et le pouvoir législatif ne sont pas dissociables. Aux États-Unis, au contraire, la constitution prévoit une séparation des pouvoirs, et les tensions sont constantes entre l'exécutif et le pouvoir législatif. Le Canada a toujours été partisan de l'économie de marché, mais, par souci de pragmatisme, il a toujours laissé à l'État un certain rôle, de sorte que notre pays se retrouve avec un genre d'économie mixte. Les États-Unis ont cherché à limiter la puissance des entreprises en comptant sur les lois antitrust et sur la concurrence, alors que le Canada a créé des entreprises étatisées, qui entrent en concurrence avec le secteur privé, pour éviter qu'un pouvoir économique ne devienne excessif. Parce que leur pays a attiré des investissements étrangers depuis le tout début, les Canadiens attendent du gouvernement qu'il limite les activités des sociétés étrangères. La foi dans les avantages de l'entreprise privée est nettement moins grande au Canada qu'aux États-Unis du fait qu'il existe chez nous un important réseau d'assistance sociale. Ces différences se retrouvent aussi dans le monde culturel, puisque le gouvernement canadien accorde une aide financière dans ce domaine et limite dans une certaine mesure la concurrence étrangère, surtout celle des États-Unis. Une telle politique n'a pas d'équivalent aux États-Unis, et les Américains s'y opposent même fortement.

Les similitudes et les différences sont à la base de notre relation avec les États-Unis. Les Canadiens se défendent d'être Américains, mais c'est en vain parce que les accidents de la géographie et de l'histoire leur ont donné un caractère que le reste du monde identifie à l'Amérique du Nord, ou tout simplement à l'Amérique. Les Canadiens ne peuvent donc éviter d'être continuellement confrontés aux Américains, avec lesquels ils ont le plus en commun. Le fait que les États-Unis soient à la tête de l'Alliance occidentale vient encore compliquer cette relation. Tous ces facteurs placent les Canadiens dans une situation exceptionnelle pour prendre du recul et voir les problèmes avec les yeux d'autrui. Ce genre d'expérience a renforcé la perspective internationale des Canadiens et les aide à aborder les questions mondiales d'une façon positive, en faisant preuve de compréhension.

Pendant plus d'un siècle, nos deux pays ont suivi des destinées distinctes mais parallèles, devenant chacun plus fort et plus sûr de lui. En même temps, une évolution technique sans précédent a modifié le fonctionnement du monde, accélérant et multipliant les rapports qui lient nos deux pays et leurs habitants. Les distances ne nous protègent plus comme autrefois. Les liens entre personnes, entre sociétés et entre institutions sont maintenant si entremêlés qu'il n'existe plus de solution simple aux problèmes qui se posent. Presque toutes les mesures prises par les pouvoirs publics dans l'un des deux pays influent sur la population de l'autre.

Deux administrations fédérales complexes et très démocratiques, chacune réagissant aux pressions de la population appuyée par une multitude d'organisations non gouvernementales, s'efforcent constamment de régler les problèmes typiques d'une société moderne et, ce faisant, comme nos deux pays partagent le même continent, se heurtent mutuellement. Étant donné qu'il n'est déjà pas facile, pour les deux gouvernements, de faire fonctionner leur propre structure fédérale et d'atteindre les tensions entre les divers paliers de gouvernement, les Canadiens devraient facilement comprendre que la collaboration entre deux pays indépendants n'est jamais aisée, même avec la meilleure volonté du monde.

## Améliorer les relations avec les États-Unis

Il a beaucoup été question des relations canado-américaines dans les témoignages et il est évident que presque tous les témoins se demandaient comment le Canada devrait se comporter envers les États-Unis. Ces relations occupent une place prépondérante dans les relations internationales du Canada, tout comme elles font inévitablement partie intégrante de la politique économique, financière, agricole, culturelle et écologique du Canada. Presque tout ce que le Canada fait à l'intérieur de ses frontières ou à l'étranger est influencé par la proximité immédiate du pays qui dispose des forces militaires les plus puissantes et de l'économie la plus forte du monde, pays qui est également le chef incontesté de l'alliance occidentale et le foyer d'une activité culturelle dynamique et envahissante. Les difficultés qu'éprouve le Canada du fait de la présence des États-Unis à sa porte ont deux causes bien différentes, et il est utile d'établir une distinction entre ces deux causes, bien qu'il soit souvent difficile de séparer leurs effets, tant ils sont étroitement liés. D'une part, le Canada subit certaines pressions parce qu'il est le voisin du pays anglophone le plus grand et plus dynamique au monde, et ne peut compter sur le contrepoids modérateur que pourrait constituer la présence de plusieurs autres pays en Amérique du Nord. D'autre part, le Canada se ressent du fait qu'il a une immense frontière commune avec une superpuissance qui, pour assurer sa sécurité, surveille surtout ce qui vient du nord.

Notre rapport aborde de front les problèmes que cette situation cause aux Canadiens. Dans plusieurs chapitres, on trouve des sections portant spécifiquement sur la dimension américaine du sujet traité. Cependant, ce sujet est si crucial que nous avons décidé de consacrer tout un chapitre à la question suivante : Quelles doivent-être les relations du Canada avec son puissant voisin ?

La fédération canadienne a été constituée en partie pour stopper la croissance soutenue et les visées expansionnistes des États-Unis. Paradoxalement, la crainte de cette expansion existe encore et est d'autant plus grande que les habitants de nos deux pays semblent avoir beaucoup en commun, du moins à première vue : un patrimoine politique, un profond respect pour les droits de la personne, un attachement à l'économie de marché, la foi dans les avantages de l'entreprise privée, la même langue (sauf pour les Canadiens francophones et les Américains de langue espagnole), et la même tradition culturelle, ainsi qu'une attitude généreuse, idéaliste et optimiste vis-à-vis du monde et de ses problèmes. Toutefois, si l'on y regarde de plus près, et surtout dans l'optique canadienne, beaucoup de ces similitudes cachent des différences importantes et mêmes profondes. Derrière l'héritage politique commun se dissimulent

frontière commune montre bien qu'il est possible de prendre des mesures concrètes pour mettre un terme aux conflits régionaux. Le Canada devrait maintenir son généreux programme d'aide en faveur du Costa Rica et continuer à appuyer fermement les efforts que fait ce pays pour ramener la paix dans la région.

Dans ce bref examen de la situation en Amérique centrale, nous avons sans cesse réitéré notre conviction que la défense des droits de la personne dans cette région repose sur trois conditions essentielles : une réforme politique et économique dans les pays concernés, la paix entre ces pays et la non-ingérence des superpuissances, notamment des États-Unis. L'Amérique centrale a par-dessus tout besoin de temps pour trouver par ses propres moyens des solutions aux problèmes qui l'assaillent. Le comité encourageant le fait que les gouvernements de cette région commencent à affirmer leur indépendance et à multiplier les efforts pour instaurer la paix.

De nombreux Canadiens estiment que le Canada peut être très actif en Amérique centrale et qu'il doit l'être. En plus d'appuyer le processus de Contadora et d'encourager le dialogue entre les différents pays d'Amérique centrale dans chacun d'entre eux, le Canada doit encourager le respect des droits de la personne dans cette région en offrant asile à tous ceux qui sont victimes de violations de ces droits. Quelque 8 300 réfugiés originaires de cette région sont venus au Canada en 1984 et en 1985 seulement. L'influence que le Canada exerce sur les mesures que prennent d'autres pays pour assurer leur sécurité est évidemment limitée, mais nous avons par contre la possibilité d'offrir une aide directe et concrète aux centaines de milliers de réfugiés de cette région qui en ont désespérément besoin. Le comité voudrait que le gouvernement prenne deux initiatives : premièrement qu'il mette sur pied, en collaboration avec d'autres pays et des organisations non gouvernementales, un programme de surveillance des réfugiés visant à relever la sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés et, deuxièmement, qu'il soutienne activement les programmes d'autosuffisance et de développement économique à l'intention des réfugiés. Le gouvernement doit également prendre des mesures pour permettre au Canada de mieux surveiller la situation des droits de la personne en Amérique centrale, en accordant une attention particulière aux conditions qui existent dans chaque pays et aux opinions des ONG canadiennes qui y travaillent. Le Canada doit appuyer les programmes de coopération qui ont pour objet l'avancement de la démocratie et des droits de la personne, ainsi que les gens et les organismes de ces pays qui militent en faveur du respect des droits de la personne.



brutale et corrompue dont le règne remontait au début des années 30. Elle a également ouvert la voie aux changements révolutionnaires et aux bouleversements politiques.

Le gouvernement sandiniste a fait des progrès importants vers la satisfaction des besoins élémentaires des plus pauvres parmi les Nicaraguayens, notamment grâce à ses programmes d'alphabétisation, de soins médicaux et de réforme agraire. En mettant en oeuvre ces programmes et d'autres réformes, les sandinistes ont été accusés de vouloir transformer le Nicaragua en Etat totalitaire. L'opposition interne au gouvernement a été suivie d'une guérilla appuyée par les Etats-Unis et d'un blocus économique décrété par ces derniers. Les organisations de défense des droits de la personne ont signalé de nombreuses violations importantes de ces droits de la part des *contras*. Ces mêmes organisations font également état de violations des droits de la personne commises par le gouvernement du Nicaragua, notamment contre les Indiens Miskitos. Le gouvernement nicaraguayen a reconnu l'existence de violations et pris des mesures en conséquence. *Amnesty International* affirme également, preuves à l'appui, qu'il existe un nombre important de détenus politiques et que des personnalités de l'opposition sont victimes de harcèlement. Il est évident que les violations des droits de la personne commises par le gouvernement du Nicaragua sont loin d'atteindre l'importance ou l'intensité de celles imputées aux gouvernements du Guatemala et du Salvador au cours des cinq dernières années.

La politique du Canada à l'égard du Nicaragua devrait reposer sur trois objectifs : premièrement, poursuivre les programmes d'aide publique au développement visant à secourir les plus démunis; deuxièmement, prendre fermement position en faveur du pluralisme politique et de la liberté de religion au Nicaragua; et, troisièmement, encourager la conclusion d'un règlement négocié du conflit opposant le Nicaragua et les Etats-Unis.

Certains membres du comité sont d'accord avec les nombreux témoins qui ont recommandé l'ouverture d'une ambassade du Canada à Managua. Le Canada est actuellement représenté au Nicaragua par l'ambassadeur du Canada au Costa Rica, qui est accrédité auprès de quatre pays de la région. Il est certain qu'il serait utile d'avoir une ambassade à Managua. On pourrait ainsi obtenir plus de renseignements sur l'évolution de la situation au Nicaragua, faciliter la réalisation de programmes d'aide au développement du Canada dans ce pays et accélérer le traitement des demandes d'immigration. Il faudrait par contre prendre en considération les besoins globaux du Canada en matière de représentation diplomatique, en Amérique centrale. Malgré les préoccupations évidentes d'un grand nombre de Canadiens, les intérêts du Canada au Nicaragua (en matière de commerce et d'immigration) sont en réalité assez limités, et les arrangements actuels semblent donner satisfaction. A moins qu'il n'y ait un accroissement marqué des échanges commerciaux, de l'aide, de l'immigration ou d'autres activités, l'ouverture d'une ambassade ne doit pas être une priorité. Par conséquent, la majorité des membres du comité s'oppose pour l'instant à l'ouverture d'une ambassade du Canada à Managua, mais demande instamment au gouvernement de surveiller les occasions qui pourraient surgir.

Quant au *Costa Rica*, la plus méridionale des républiques d'Amérique centrale, il continue, selon sa tradition, à respecter de façon générale les droits de la personne. Certains événements récents laissaient craindre que le Costa Rica ne se laisse progressivement entraîner dans le conflit régional, s'exposant de ce fait à la polarisation et à la violence. Nous sommes toutefois rassurés par le fait que le nouveau gouvernement d'Oscar Arias a pris plusieurs mesures positives en vue de juguler cette tendance et de renforcer le rôle que joue le Costa Rica en faveur de la paix en Amérique centrale. L'entente signée entre ce pays et le Nicaragua au sujet de leur



dirigée contre les guerrilleros et la forte population indienne du pays. Ces violations ont amené le Canada à mettre un terme à son programme d'aide publique au développement. Nous trouvons encourageant le fait que les violations des droits de la personne à motif politique ont diminué depuis un an. L'accession au pouvoir d'un nouveau président civil après des élections relativement honnêtes permet d'espérer, même s'il n'est pas encore certain que le gouvernement du Guatemala se soit engagé à respecter les droits de la personne et ait dit souhaiter l'instauration de la paix dans la région. Par l'intermédiaire d'organisations non gouvernementales, le Canada doit chercher à soutenir des mesures conçues pour aider les gens les plus pauvres du Guatemala et pour favoriser une réforme sociale et économique. Par ailleurs, des programmes coopératifs canadiens portant sur les droits de la personne et le développement démocratique pourraient être utiles au Guatemala.

Le *Salvador*, avec lequel le Guatemala partage sa frontière sud, continue à subir les ravages d'une guerre civile qui dure depuis cinq ans et qui a entraîné de nombreuses violations des droits de la personne et a eu des conséquences économiques désastreuses. Il ne fait aucun doute que les droits de la personne ont été bafoués par les deux parties engagées dans cette guerre civile, même si *Amnesty International* continue à signaler que la vaste majorité des violations sont commises par les escadrons de la mort et les forces de sécurité de la droite, qui détiennent actuellement le pouvoir. Le nombre de meurtres à caractère politique a sensiblement baissé depuis deux ans, bien que les organisations vouées à la défense des droits de la personne au Salvador continuent à signaler chaque mois de quatre à six assassinats par les escadrons de la mort.

L'élection d'un président civil, Napoleon Duarte, en 1984, a été considérée à l'époque comme un progrès sensible vers la réconciliation politique. Malheureusement, le gouvernement de M. Duarte ne semble pas vraiment en mesure de mettre fin aux violations des droits de la personne et de promouvoir la réforme socio-économique. Nous trouvons cependant encourageant le fait que le gouvernement ait récemment offert de reprendre les négociations avec les forces révolutionnaires et que celles-ci aient accepté l'offre du gouvernement. Dans ce contexte, le Canada doit s'efforcer d'encourager le dialogue et veiller à ce que son programme d'aide soit axé sur le secours aux réfugiés ainsi que sur l'aide aux indigents, tant dans les villes que dans les campagnes. Pour cela, le mieux est de faire appel à des organisations non gouvernementales canadiennes et salvadoriennes dont l'expérience, l'intégrité et l'indépendance sont reconnues et qui assurent une aide humanitaire et d'autres formes d'aide en fonction des besoins et non pas de considérations politiques.

Le *Honduras*, tout comme le Salvador et le Guatemala, montre bien l'individualité qui caractérise les pays d'Amérique centrale. Bien qu'il soit le plus pauvre parmi les pays de la région, les violations des droits de la personne n'y ont pas été aussi atroces que chez ses voisins. Les principaux problèmes auxquels se heurte le Honduras sont la pauvreté croissante d'un grand nombre de ses habitants et les dangers liés à l'utilisation de son territoire comme base pour les opérations militaires contre le Nicaragua, dirigées par les États-Unis. Il est encourageant de voir que le gouvernement civil du Honduras semble de moins en moins disposé à laisser les *contras* poursuivre leurs activités à partir de son territoire et qu'il cherche à renouer le dialogue avec son voisin au sud, le Nicaragua. Le rôle du Canada doit être d'empêcher qu'une partie de l'aide considérable qu'il accorde à des fins de développement ne contribue à la militarisation du pays et aussi d'encourager le dialogue entre le Honduras et le Nicaragua.

Le *Nicaragua* est au coeur des tempêtes qui ravagent l'Amérique centrale depuis dix ans. La révolution de 1979 s'est soldée par le renversement d'une dynastie politique

Pour essayer de mieux comprendre la crise en Amérique centrale, nous sommes reportés à un document publié par le sous-comité chargé d'étudier les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Antilles. Ces mots du rapport final de 1982 sont tout aussi justes aujourd'hui qu'ils l'étaient à l'époque.

La violence qui monte actuellement en Amérique centrale, et qui menace d'envahir toute la région, découle surtout de causes internes, mais elle est aggravée et répandue par l'introduction de modèles idéologiques de l'extérieur et par l'aide militaire fournie tant aux gouvernements répressifs qu'aux groupes révolutionnaires. Loin de promouvoir la stabilité, les politiques de certains pays voisins tendent à perpétuer et à intensifier l'instabilité.

Le sous-comité reconnaît que l'Amérique centrale et les Antilles ont une importance vitale pour les Etats-Unis et le bloc occidental. Il faut tenter dans la mesure du possible de protéger ces pays des rivalités entre superpuissances. L'indépendance de tous les pays de la région doit être respectée, et les interventions militaires de l'extérieur, quelle qu'en soit la source, doivent cesser (p. 11-12).

Mais la situation a évolué depuis lors. Beaucoup de témoins ont affirmé que, dans l'interval, la politique américaine avait contribué à la militarisation massive de l'Amérique centrale et entraîné par là même des violations généralisées et chroniques des droits de la personne. Ils ont recommandé que le Canada critique plus ouvertement l'administration américaine pour l'aide qu'elle accorde aux *contras* et la plupart des auteurs de mémoire ont dit souhaiter que le Canada ouvre une ambassade à Managua. D'après eux, en optant pour une solution militaire alors que les problèmes sont surtout sociaux et économiques, le gouvernement américain a armé les forces militaires d'Amérique centrale et les a grandement aidées à augmenter leurs effectifs; or les militaires ont prouvé à maintes reprises qu'ils étaient tout à fait indifférents aux droits de la personne. La majorité des membres du comité estime nécessaire de souligner que la politique américaine est conçue en partie pour contre l'intervention d'autres puissances militaires étrangères en Amérique centrale et soutenir que le Canada doit pour sa part s'opposer à toute intervention extérieure en Amérique centrale, par quelque pays que ce soit.

Quelques membres du comité considèrent que le gouvernement devrait exercer des pressions sur le gouvernement des Etats-Unis pour l'amener à substituer à sa politique actuelle envers l'Amérique centrale, qui est axée sur le conflit Est-Ouest et sur la militarisation, une politique favorable à l'instauration de réformes sociales, économiques et politiques.

Ces mêmes membres du comité voudraient que le Canada participe à l'initiative des ministres des affaires étrangères du Groupe de Contadora et du Groupe de Lima pour convaincre Washington de la nécessité de mettre un terme au conflit et de modifier sa politique envers l'Amérique centrale. Nous convenons tous cependant que le Canada doit continuer à s'opposer à toute intervention de l'extérieur dans cette région, y compris au financement de groupes comme les *contras* et à l'envoi de troupes.

Ces généralités posées, le comité voudrait attirer l'attention sur la situation dans ces cinq républiques de cette région. Bien que la situation des droits de la personne dans ces pays demeure au mieux incertaine, on observe des signes importants d'espoir et de progrès.

Le Guatemala est le pays d'Amérique centrale où les droits de la personne ont été le plus malmenés. Les violations des droits de la personne ont culminé dans ce pays au début des années 80, lors d'une campagne militaire de destruction terriblement efficace

aide généreuse et d'appuyer les efforts internationaux qui visent, comme à l'occasion de la Conférence de coordination du développement de l'Afrique australe, à aider les pays voisins de l'Afrique du Sud à pallier les difficultés économiques résultant des sanctions internationales et à contrer les mesures de représailles que le gouvernement d'Afrique du Sud pourrait prendre contre eux.

Nous ne sommes pas sans savoir que la situation en Afrique du Sud ne se réglera pas sans violence et que, quoi que puisse faire la communauté internationale, les effusions de sang et les conflits raciaux ne s'arrêteront pas en un jour. Nous sommes toutefois convaincus que la solution proposée dans l'*Accord du Commonwealth* présente les meilleures chances de transition vers une société démocratique. Même si l'apartheid était bientôt aboli, les explosions de violence ne cesseraient sans doute pas pour autant, car la répression exercée par la minorité blanche a suscité une animosité qu'il ne sera pas facile de dissiper. Il reste que si le monde ne se concentre pas pour ajouter ses pressions à la résistance intérieure, la situation évoluera trop lentement pour éviter des troubles encore plus graves et de nouvelles effusions de sang. Par les mesures que nous proposons, nous voulons faire savoir aux Blancs d'Afrique du Sud qu'ils doivent entamer un véritable dialogue avec leurs concitoyens noirs et nous espérons favoriser une véritable réconciliation des habitants de l'Afrique du Sud. Ces quelques phrases de Nelson Mandela expriment bien l'esprit dans lequel tous ces efforts doivent être déployés :

Je tiens à bien faire comprendre ceci aux Blancs d'Afrique du Sud. Nous serons la majorité, mais cela ne veut pas dire que les Blancs perdront leurs pouvoirs, leur participation, leur vie économique. Comme nulle part ailleurs en Afrique, les Blancs sont chez eux ici. Ce pays est leur foyer. Nous voulons partager ce foyer et partager le pouvoir avec eux.

## L'Afrique centrale

Le troisième cas sur lequel nous sommes penchés, celui de l'Afrique centrale, présente un autre type de violations flagrantes, et continues des droits de la personne. Selon les estimations, la répression et la guerre civile au Salvador, au Guatemala et au Nicaragua auraient fait en dix ans de 150 000 à 200 000 victimes et auraient entraîné un mouvement de réfugiés touchant 1,5 à 2 millions de personnes, soit 10 p. 100 de la population de cette région. De plus, les destructions massives, combinées aux pressions économiques internationales, ont poussé l'Afrique centrale au bord de la faillite. Ces souffrances ont ému la communauté internationale, et notamment beaucoup de Canadiens.

Le comité a reçu plus de mémoires sur l'Afrique centrale que sur tout autre sujet. Une proportion remarquablement élevée des témoins s'étaient déjà rendus dans cette région, souvent à titre de coopérants ou de membres de délégations, ce qui leur a permis de parler avec une grande conviction et en pleine connaissance de cause. Les auteurs de beaucoup de mémoires ont fait ressortir l'intérêt spécial que doit porter le Canada à la défense des droits de la personne en Afrique centrale; ils ont parlé notamment des réfugiés, des programmes d'aide au développement et des répercussions néfastes que l'instabilité dans cette région a sur l'hémisphère occidental. Les auteurs de mémoires et les témoins ont généralement imputé les violations des droits de la personne en Afrique centrale à l'échec du développement économique, à l'absence fréquente de solutions de rechange aux dictatures et aux régimes militaires, aux bouleversements sociaux, à l'accélération des cycles de violence et à l'intervention de puissances étrangères, opinions que partagent les membres du comité.



d'Afrique du Sud et à surveiller de près la situation, pour ensuite faire rapport sur le rythme et l'orientation des changements. Ce groupe est censé soumettre son rapport à un comité constitué de sept chefs d'Etat du Commonwealth, dont fait partie le premier ministre du Canada et qui a été chargé d'élaborer la politique future du Commonwealth en la matière.

Le comité est tout à fait en faveur de cette démarche, mais il tient néanmoins à exprimer quelques réserves. Nous espérons que le groupe des sages sera vraiment en mesure de favoriser le dialogue en Afrique du Sud. Si cela s'avérait impossible, il pourrait néanmoins tenter de créer un consensus au sujet des mesures à prendre dans l'avenir. Il faut admettre que de gros obstacles, en particulier la résistance de la Grande-Bretagne, rendent difficile une action vigoureuse et concertée du Commonwealth. Il est donc important que le gouvernement du Canada prépare soigneusement ses propres plans en cas d'échec et joue un rôle de chef de file au sein du Commonwealth.

Si le groupe des sages du Commonwealth avait fait savoir que les progrès accomplis en vue de mettre fin à l'apartheid étaient insuffisants, le comité aurait recommandé que le Canada prépare un autre plan d'action pour le Commonwealth, avec des sanctions bien précises, comme celles qui apparaissent à l'article 7 de l'*Accord du Commonwealth* d'octobre 1985. On y trouve notamment : a) l'interdiction des liaisons aériennes avec l'Afrique du Sud; b) l'interdiction des nouveaux investissements ou des réinvestissements des bénéfices gagnés en Afrique du Sud; c) l'interdiction de l'importation de produits agricoles provenant d'Afrique du Sud; d) la résiliation des conventions de double imposition conclues avec l'Afrique du Sud; e) la cessation de toute aide publique aux investissements en Afrique du Sud et aux échanges avec ce pays; f) l'interdiction de tous les approvisionnement publics en Afrique du Sud; g) l'interdiction des contrats gouvernementaux avec des sociétés contrôlées par des intérêts sud-africains; h) l'interdiction de la promotion du tourisme en Afrique du Sud. Le Canada a pris trois des mesures susmentionnées.

Comme le groupe des sages a fait savoir — comme on le craignait — que le démantèlement de l'apartheid n'a fait aucun progrès, le Canada devrait imposer immédiatement toute la gamme des sanctions économiques, chercher à obtenir l'appui du plus grand nombre possible de pays du Commonwealth et encourager les autres pays à prendre des mesures semblables.

Dans les deux cas, il conviendrait de créer un programme des droits de la personne et de l'avancement démocratique des Noirs d'Afrique du Sud. Le Canada a créé un programme de bourses d'études en 1983 et a depuis augmenté les fonds qu'il lui réserve. Nous sommes tout à fait en faveur de ce genre d'initiative et nous souhaitons que d'autres mesures soient prises pour favoriser la constitution d'institutions sociales, économiques et politiques noires en prévision du jour où les Noirs d'Afrique du Sud exerceront leurs pleins droits de citoyens.

Nous encourageons le gouvernement à multiplier les contacts directs avec les dirigeants d'organisations politiques noires d'Afrique du Sud. Comme la levée de l'interdiction frappant le Congrès national africain et la libération de son chef, M. Nelson Mandela, sont deux des revendications prévues dans l'*Accord du Commonwealth*, des contacts de haut niveau doivent de toute évidence être établis avec le CNA.

Outre la situation en Afrique du Sud, le comité s'inquiète vivement du sort des pays noirs voisins de l'Afrique du Sud. Le Canada doit continuer de leur accorder une



sont des citoyens, les Noirs sont des inférieurs à la merci des lois dictées par les Blancs. Bien que le monde condamne l'apartheid depuis vingt ans, ce régime discriminatoire est resté intact.

Depuis le début des années 80, on se rend compte que les Noirs d'Afrique du Sud sont de plus en plus déterminés à obtenir le respect de leurs droits à n'importe quel prix. Face à ce militantisme grandissant, le gouvernement blanc a décidé de recourir à la force et de procéder par ailleurs à certaines réformes mineures. Le prix a été élevé en effusions de sang et en souffrances. Quelque 1 500 personnes sont mortes depuis dix-huit mois, et bien davantage ont été blessées et jetées en prison. La situation s'envenime de jour en jour et risque d'aboutir à des affrontements encore plus violents.

La communauté internationale s'est émue et a commencé à exercer des pressions concertées sur l'Afrique du Sud. Soutenu par tous les partis et par une écrasante majorité de Canadiens, le gouvernement du Canada s'est prononcé très ouvertement contre l'apartheid. Le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures a parlé, à la Chambre des communes, le 13 septembre 1985, de «l'horreur qu'éprouvent les Canadiens devant le racisme institutionnalisé dans une société qui prétend partager nos valeurs. Que le gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud ne se leurre pas, a-t-il ajouté, nous sommes prêts à aller jusqu'au bout s'il ne prend pas des mesures décisives pour mettre fin au régime d'apartheid». Le gouvernement et le comité doivent donc tenter de déterminer si «des mesures décisives» sont effectivement prises et, dans la négative, décider quand et comment prendre des sanctions.

Le comité a longuement débattu de ces questions. Nous sommes convaincus que l'application généralisée de lourdes sanctions économiques toucherait durement le gouvernement de Pretoria. Comme l'a dit un témoin, le fait que l'Afrique du Sud considère comme une trahison toute action visant à inciter les pays étrangers à prendre des sanctions prouve leur efficacité. Les témoignages qu'a entendus le comité l'ont convaincu que la meilleure façon d'utiliser cette arme était d'exercer des pressions internationales progressives, coordonnées et soutenues.

Le Canada cherche actuellement avec les autres pays du Commonwealth à canaliser les pressions internationales. Les signataires de l'*Accord du Commonwealth*, conclu à Nassau en octobre 1985, ont imposé certaines sanctions et ont demandé au gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud de prendre de toute urgence des mesures concrètes, à savoir :

- a) déclarer qu'il a l'intention d'abolir l'apartheid et qu'il prendra des mesures précises et concrètes dans ce but.
- b) mettre un terme à l'état d'urgence actuel.

- c) remettre immédiatement en liberté sans condition Nelson Mandela, ainsi que toutes les autres personnes détenues en raison de leur opposition à l'apartheid.
- d) instaurer la liberté politique et en particulier lever l'interdiction qui vise actuellement le Congrès national africain et les autres partis politiques.

- e) Après la suspension de la violence de tous les côtés, amorcer un dialogue général, sans considération de couleur, d'affiliation politique ou de religion, en vue de l'instauration d'un gouvernement représentatif, sans discrimination raciale.

Aux termes de l'Accord a également été créé un groupe des sages, parmi lesquels figure notamment l'archevêque Scott, primat de l'Eglise anglicane du Canada, dont le mandat consiste à promouvoir le dialogue entre la majorité noire et le gouvernement

Chaque cas de violation des droits de la personne est unique. En Afghanistan, les violations massives résultent de l'occupation d'un pays par des forces étrangères. En Afrique du Sud, le problème est engendré par un racisme institutionnalisé qui se reflète dans tous les aspects (personnel, social, politique et économique) de la vie. Les Blancs

## L'Afrique du Sud

Il faudra peut-être des années pour y arriver, mais nous sommes persuadés que les Soviétiques accepteront l'inévitabilité de ce dénouement. Dans l'interval, la population continue à souffrir. Le comité recommande que le Canada continue de considérer la prestation d'une aide humanitaire et médicale aux réfugiés afghans au Pakistan comme une priorité et qu'il appuie fortement les initiatives de la Croix-Rouge internationale et celles du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés en particulier. Par ailleurs, dans ses relations bilatérales avec l'Union soviétique, le Canada doit, chaque fois que l'occasion se présente, soulever la question de l'Afghanistan et bien faire savoir que l'occupation et la destruction de ce pays constituent un obstacle sérieux à une amélioration des relations. À cet égard, nous recommandons aux représentants du Canada aux Nations Unies (à New York, à Genève ou ailleurs) de continuer de s'exprimer de façon très franche et très directe.

Dans les circonstances, que peut faire la communauté internationale? Il est impossible d'en appeler à l'opinion publique soviétique parce que les médias d'URSS ne parlent pas de la situation en Afghanistan et que les gens qui voudraient contester la politique soviétique n'ont aucun moyen de faire connaître leur opposition à l'intérieur du pays. Le seul moyen de pression réside dans l'effet que l'opinion publique internationale peut avoir sur l'URSS. Il est essentiel que les médias du monde entier et les organisations internationales gardent l'Afghanistan dans leurs feux. Des réunions ont eu lieu à Genève entre des représentants de l'Union soviétique et des officiels des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'entre les ministres des Affaires étrangères du Pakistan et de l'Afghanistan. Le comité demande instamment aux Nations Unies de continuer à essayer d'obtenir un règlement négocié reposant d'abord et avant tout sur le retrait des troupes soviétiques d'Afghanistan.

Poussés par une brutale ambition géopolitique, l'Union soviétique et le régime fantoche qu'elle a installé à Kaboul procèdent à la destruction massive d'un peuple. L'Union soviétique a envoyé plus de 100 000 soldats en Afghanistan afin, dans l'immédiat, de procéder à une violente répression et, à long terme, de réduire l'Afghanistan à l'état de colonie soviétique. Or, comme d'autres dans l'histoire du colonialisme, cette puissance impérialiste a sous-estimé le nationalisme et l'esprit d'indépendance de la population locale. Malgré de terribles massacres, le peuple afghan ne s'est pas laissé dominer. Il continue à se battre.

Les rapports [...] reflètent le microcosme d'une nation massacrée et mutilée. Plus d'un million de morts. Un nombre égal ou supérieur de personnes déracinées, dévastées et sans foyer dans leur propre pays. Quatre à cinq millions (sur une population totale de seize millions) de malheureux réfugiés au Pakistan et en Iran. (Discours prononcé le 12 novembre 1985 à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies.)

L'ambassadeur du Canada aux Nations Unies a fait observer ceci :

des preuves de violations extrêmes, flagrantes et massives des droits de la personne directement imputables à l'occupation de l'Afghanistan par les Soviétiques. En commentant les divers rapports dont est saisie la communauté internationale,

En raison de l'extrême brutalité dont sont victimes les Afghans, nous recommandons que le Canada accorde une aide généreuse aux réfugiés afghans, tant sur le plan humanitaire que sur celui de l'assistance au développement. Le Comité de surveillance d'Heisinki, la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies et d'autres organisations d'excellente réputation qui défendent les droits de la personne ont amassé

## L'Afghanistan

Le rôle premier du comité consiste à recommander des orientations et des principes généraux. Dans ce genre d'étude, il est évidemment impossible d'examiner les nombreux cas particuliers auxquels ces principes s'appliquent. Dans le domaine des droits de la personne, toutefois, trois cas méritent qu'on s'y arrête : l'Afghanistan, l'Afrique du Sud et l'Amérique centrale.

Malgré tous les efforts de la communauté internationale, il arrive que l'aide aux réfugiés crée une situation semi-permanente de dépendance sociale internationale à cause de l'existence de vastes camps de réfugiés. En outre, ces camps font naître un sentiment d'amertume et de ressentiment chez les réfugiés et suscitent une vive hostilité parmi les citoyens des pays hôtes. On a porté à l'attention du comité une initiative prometteuse à cet égard. L'ACDI a beaucoup contribué à un projet du HCR et de la Banque mondiale visant à assurer une source de revenu aux réfugiés afghans au Pakistan. Il s'agissait d'un projet de réfection de routes et de reboisement conçu de façon à profiter aux réfugiés et au pays d'accueil tout en répondant aux besoins des Pakistais. Des discussions sont en cours pour la mise en oeuvre de la deuxième phase du projet. Nous souhaitons vivement que le Canada appuie les projets visant à assurer une source de revenu aux réfugiés, comme celui qui existe pour les réfugiés afghans au Pakistan; nous y voyons un excellent exemple de projet destiné à aider les réfugiés à être aussi autonomes et productifs que possible, pendant qu'ils attendent leur rapatriement ou leur installation en permanence dans un pays d'accueil.

Outre qu'il a une politique nationale d'aide aux réfugiés, le Canada est un des plus ardents défenseurs des organismes internationaux qui viennent en aide aux réfugiés, comme le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) et le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. Nous approuvons tout à fait cette politique et nous recommandons fortement d'aller plus loin dans cette voie. Même si le Canada appuie fortement les initiatives du HCR, il n'est pas représenté à la direction de cet organisme. Le gouvernement devrait faire des pressions pour que des Canadiens soient nommés à des postes de direction du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. Il pourrait alors participer à la mise à jour des programmes internationaux à l'intention des réfugiés et à la résolution de questions de politique. Il faudrait notamment définir ce que l'on entend par «réfugié» en vertu des accords internationaux, ainsi que les droits et les responsabilités des pays hôtes.

Le gouvernement a récemment annoncé un train de mesures sur la reconnaissance du statut des réfugiés et a fait part de son intention de régler à brève échéance le cas des réfugiés en attente. Le comité n'a pas eu l'occasion d'étudier attentivement ces mesures. Il tient cependant à réaffirmer que le Canada doit continuer à accorder automatiquement asile aux personnes qui fuient des persécutions, pendant qu'on vérifie si elles ont droit au statut de réfugié. À cet égard, il est particulièrement important que le Canada continue d'accueillir généreusement les réfugiés d'Amérique centrale victimes d'actes de répression et de violence. Nous félicitons le gouvernement d'avoir pris la décision d'accorder à tous les requérants le droit à une audition.



Le Canada a une longue tradition à cet égard. Il a accueilli des réfugiés de bien des pays déchirés par la guerre civile, et il est venu en aide à ceux qui ont dû quitter temporairement leur pays. Le témoignage le plus frappant de la générosité des Canadiens est peut-être l'accueil qui a été fait à plus de 60 000 réfugiés de la mer venue d'Indochine entre 1975 et 1980. Plus de 34 000 d'entre eux ont pu s'établir au Canada grâce à l'aide accordée à titre privé par quelque 7 000 groupes.

Les principes de base de l'aide aux réfugiés sont conformes à deux objectifs généraux de notre politique étrangère, l'aide humanitaire aux populations défavorisées et le maintien d'un ordre international juste et stable. Le Canada est en mesure de contribuer à la réalisation de ces objectifs au niveau international. D'une part, notre situation géographique nous isole du problème immédiat des réfugiés et, d'autre part, nous sommes l'un des rares pays du monde à avoir les moyens, économiquement et socialement, d'accueillir beaucoup de réfugiés, et nous continuerons à le faire. Comme l'a fait remarquer M. George Cram, de l'Eglise anglicane du Canada,

[...] le Canada a un rôle unique et important à jouer dans la famille des nations en fixant des normes et en devenant en quelque sorte le modèle de référence dans le domaine des politiques s'adressant aux réfugiés (56:19).

Le comité tient à apporter une précision importante. Bien qu'apparentées, la politique à l'égard des réfugiés et la politique d'immigration sont en fait bien distinctes. Beaucoup de réfugiés se sont révélés être des citoyens travailleurs et compétents et se sont parfois établis ici plus facilement que d'autres immigrants. Il reste que la politique relative aux réfugiés repose sur d'autres considérations. Elle s'inscrit dans la politique globale d'aide humanitaire du Canada, alors qu'en matière d'immigration notre politique est dictée bien davantage par nos intérêts économiques et sociaux. Il est donc important que les cycles économiques, qui jouent un grand rôle dans le calcul des niveaux d'immigration, n'entraînent en rien les préoccupations d'ordre humanitaire qui poussent le Canada à accueillir des réfugiés.

Le risque de confusion entre ces deux politiques est d'autant plus grand que le nombre de personnes qui revendiquent le statut de réfugié a énormément augmenté. On entend généralement par réfugiés des personnes qui cherchent asile en dehors de leur pays d'origine parce qu'elles craignent à juste titre d'être persécutées à cause de leur race, de leur religion, de leur nationalité ou de leurs opinions politiques. Sont également incluses les personnes qui franchissent une frontière pour échapper à une agression extérieure ou à des désordres civils. Le nombre de personnes appartenant à ces dernières catégories a cru de façon alarmante depuis le début des années 80, en raison surtout d'événements comme l'invasion de l'Afghanistan par les Soviétiques et les troubles en Amérique centrale. Actuellement, on estime à plus de 10 millions le nombre de ces réfugiés dans le monde. Plus récemment, la détérioration de la conjoncture économique dans de nombreux pays en développement a fait grossir les rangs de ceux qui revendiquaient le statut de réfugié pour échapper à la misère. Le droit de ces personnes au statut de réfugié suscite un très vif débat à l'échelle internationale.

Le nombre croissant de réfugiés dans le monde a entraîné un arriéré considérable dans l'examen des cas de réfugiés au Canada. Le problème vient de ce que l'on a cherché à séparer les réfugiés «légitimes» des personnes qui devraient en fait suivre la filière normale. Il est évident que le processus de détermination du statut de réfugié a besoin d'être remanié. Il faudrait mettre sur pied un système qui refléterait avant tout l'engagement qu'a pris le Canada en signant la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur les réfugiés, mais qui comporterait un mécanisme rapide et efficace d'identification des réfugiés légitimes.



## L'aide aux réfugiés

L'aide aux réfugiés occupe une place spéciale dans les mesures que prend le Canada pour secourir les victimes de violations des droits fondamentaux.

Le Canada ne figure pas au nombre des pays qui ont, par le passé, fait de vigoureux efforts à l'échelle internationale pour favoriser l'avancement des droits de la personne. Il y a des raisons impérieuses et pratiques pour lesquelles non seulement il peut intervenir plus activement, mais il doit le faire. Le Canada a la compétence et, selon nous, la crédibilité nécessaires pour offrir son concours dans ce domaine. Dans ses relations extérieures, le Canada privilégie la coopération au lieu de tenter d'imposer ses valeurs et ses institutions. Les programmes ayant pour but de promouvoir les droits de la personne au moyen de l'avancement démocratique sont aussi un moyen d'établir des liens politiques avec d'autres pays. D'une part, les Canadiens pourraient transmettre leurs valeurs et partager leur expérience et d'autre part, ils pourraient apprendre à connaître les besoins et la vulnérabilité de leur propre démocratie. À ces raisons, nous en ajoutons une autre : ces programmes pourraient servir d'élément unificateur dans la politique extérieure du Canada, notre pays pourrait ainsi exprimer son attachement aux droits de la personne en évitant toute idéologie et toute partialité. À cette fin, nous recommandons que le gouvernement envisage de créer un institut international des droits de la personne et de l'avancement démocratique qui serait régi par des lignes directrices judicieusement élaborées, en vue d'appuyer les efforts déployés par des organisations non gouvernementales. Pour que cet institut tienne compte des diverses perspectives nationales sur l'avancement démocratique, notamment dans le tiers monde, nous recommandons que son conseil d'administration comprenne des représentants étrangers, un peu comme l'a fait le Centre de recherches pour le développement international. Une faible part des crédits de l'aide au développement pourrait servir à financer cet institut.

Il y a d'autres secteurs de coopération prometteurs, comme la création de postes d'ombudsman chargés de défendre les droits de la personne, le fédéralisme, le renforcement des institutions judiciaires, la primauté du droit, la participation des gouvernements locaux et les médias. Le gouvernement et le Parlement du Canada devraient songer à créer leurs propres programmes. Ainsi, la Direction de la coopération institutionnelle et des services de développement de l'ACDI pourrait créer une division des institutions électORALES et représentatives, et le cadre du programme de coopération parlementaire du Secrétaire des relations parlementaires pourrait être élargi. D'une manière générale, nous croyons que les projets devraient être mis sur pied et gérés par des organisations non gouvernementales en collaboration avec des organismes équivalents des pays participants.

- création d'un programme de recherche coopérative Canada-Amérique latine sur les institutions législatives. À la longue, ce programme pourrait aboutir à la création d'un réseau d'assistance technique et de recherche législative latino-américain (25:41 à 67).
- encouragement de la collaboration entre les organismes canadiens de recherche et de consultation sur les droits de la personne et leurs homologues étrangers dans le cadre de programmes d'échange et de recherche.
- prestations d'une aide financière et technique en vue du renforcement d'organisations ouvertes. On pourrait s'inspirer de programmes comme ceux que le Congrès du travail du Canada a mis en oeuvre avec l'aide de l'ACDI au Belize et en Jamaïque (création d'instituts de recherche sur les syndicats).

politiques et sociales. Il a même souvent l'effet contraire. Ainsi, dans de nombreux pays d'Amérique latine qui ont connu une croissance économique rapide dans les années 1970, on a également constaté une polarisation politique, une instabilité et des violations des droits de la personne.

Ces troubles sont en partie attribuables à de très grandes inégalités et à la concentration du pouvoir économique et politique. Ils découlent également du fait que les institutions se sont révélées incapables de défendre les droits de l'individu, des groupes minoritaires et de la collectivité. De plus en plus de gens dans le monde entier souhaitent le renforcement des institutions politiques représentatives et d'autres institutions dans l'espoir de voir disparaître les problèmes d'instabilité et de répression qui les assaillent. Les enjeux de cette lutte, qui n'ont rien à voir avec son idéologie, sont la création d'associations ouvrières, universitaires, religieuses et politiques, la mise en place d'un pouvoir judiciaire indépendant et d'institutions démocratiques efficaces, la liberté de presse ainsi que la tenue de véritables élections au cours desquelles toutes les convictions politiques peuvent s'exprimer librement.

Malgré toute l'importance des droits de la personne et de l'avancement de la démocratie, il ne faut pas en déduire que la coopération internationale dans ce domaine est facile ou toujours possible. Ces questions sont souvent considérées comme n'étant pas du ressort des étrangers, ce que les Canadiens peuvent bien comprendre. Le principal danger tient au fait que ce qu'on appelle coopération peut constituer en réalité une forme d'ingérence, voire d'intervention. Ces interventions ont souvent des conséquences anti-démocratiques et répressives dans le tiers monde, même quand les motifs invoqués semblent louables.

L'expérience nous montre que, à cause de ces obstacles, il est crucial de concevoir et d'appliquer les programmes internationaux relatifs à l'avancement des droits de la personne et de la démocratie dans un esprit de coopération : ils doivent répondre aux demandes qu'adressent les pays concernés après avoir défini leurs besoins et leurs intérêts.

**Le Canada n'exporte pas ses propres institutions et il doit s'abstenir de le faire. En revanche, il peut et doit pouvoir partager son expérience avec les autres et les aider à mettre sur pied leurs propres institutions. De tels programmes recevraient l'appui effectif ou tout au moins l'assentiment des gouvernements et de la population des pays participants.** C'est dans des pays comme l'Argentine ou les Philippines, où la démocratie vient d'être restaurée après de nombreuses années de dictature, que les possibilités de coopération seraient les plus prometteuses. Les pays où les droits de la personne sont sérieusement bafoués refuseraient sans aucun doute de participer à des programmes canadiens visant à favoriser l'avancement de la démocratie et chercherait à dissuader leurs ressortissants d'y participer. Le Canada devrait alors chercher, dans la mesure du possible, à nouer des liens avec les organisations non gouvernementales qui s'efforcent de promouvoir la démocratie.

Ces programmes auraient une application pratique et seraient principalement de nature technique. Ils ne seraient pas propagandistes et éviteraient de soulever les questions les plus délicates ou les plus controversées de l'avancement de la démocratie. C'est à la population du pays qu'il appartient en effet d'en débattre et d'y trouver des solutions, l'aide internationale pouvant seulement fournir des moyens d'atteindre des objectifs convenus. Voici quelques exemples d'activités embryonnaires auxquelles le Canada pourrait donner suite :

- renforcement de la capacité et de l'efficacité du Canada comme observateur d'élections à l'étranger et création de programmes d'assistance technique en vue de la mise en place d'institutions et de procédures électorales (56:26 et 27).

favoriser l'avancement des droits de la personne. Par ailleurs, il n'ignore pas non plus que les violations les plus flagrantes des droits de la personne empêchent tout profit de sa voix aux réunions des institutions financières internationales pour s'élever contre les violations systématiques, flagrantes et soutenues des droits de la personne.

Mentionnons enfin les sanctions les plus rigoureuses, exception faite de la déclaration de guerre, qui peuvent être imposées en raison de violations systématiques et extrêmes des droits de la personne; ce sont les sanctions économiques et la rupture des relations diplomatiques. En imposant des sanctions économiques, le gouvernement étend sa compétence au-delà des relations internationales pour contrôler le commerce privé. La question de savoir si une telle action peut être efficace, et dans quelles circonstances, a été débattue aux séances du comité. De façon générale, nous concluons que l'interdépendance des économies modernes les rend effectivement très vulnérables à un boycottage international touchant le commerce et les investissements, mais que cette vulnérabilité est directement proportionnelle à l'importance et à la durée de l'interdiction. Aussi les sanctions économiques ne peuvent être efficaces que si elles reçoivent l'appui le plus universel de la communauté internationale. Sans cet appui, elles ont quand même une valeur symbolique, surtout si elles sont imposées par une puissance moyenne comme le Canada.

Quant à la rupture des relations diplomatiques, elle doit être décidée uniquement en dernier recours. Une telle décision serait en effet contraire à notre tradition, car le Canada a toujours reconnu le gouvernement *de facto* d'un pays comme l'autorité avec laquelle il doit maintenir des liens. D'autre part, nous croyons qu'il est vain d'agir ainsi lorsque des changements positifs sont envisageables ou lorsque le Canada est en mesure de jouer un rôle utile, car il devient très difficile d'intervenir après la rupture des relations diplomatiques.

## L'avancement des droits de la personne

Il a jusqu'à maintenant été question de la protection des droits de la personne au moyen de sanctions internationales et du droit international. Le comité est convaincu que le Canada doit continuer dans cette voie, mais qu'il doit aussi prendre les devants en créant un programme positif d'avancement des droits de la personne. En mettant sur pied des programmes d'aide financière, d'échange, de recherche et d'assistance technique en coopération avec les pays concernés, le Canada peut espérer favoriser l'avancement à long terme des droits politiques, civils et culturels, comme il contribue maintenant à l'essor économique et social à long terme de certains pays au moyen de son programme d'aide. En participant à la mise en place d'institutions politiques représentatives et d'autres institutions, de même qu'au renforcement des mécanismes qui favorisent, directement ou indirectement, le respect des droits de la personne, le Canada peut ajouter un élément de protection aux incitations et aux menaces de la politique traditionnelle.

La croissance économique est susceptible de favoriser plus ou moins automatiquement d'autres formes de développement social et politique, y compris un plus grand respect des droits de la personne; c'est du moins le principe sur lequel repose la politique d'aide au développement. L'expérience montre toutefois que la création et la distribution de la richesse revêtent une importance fondamentale pour les pays en développement, mais que l'essor économique comme tel n'apaise pas les tensions



respect des droits de la personne pour qui sait doser judicieusement les pressions en public et la persuasion en privé. Nous encourageons le gouvernement à saisir ces occasions, comme ont su le faire le premier ministre durant son récent séjour en Chine et en Corée du Sud, le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures lorsqu'il s'est rendu en Union soviétique et le ministre des Relations extérieures lors de son voyage en Amérique centrale à l'automne de 1985. En incorporant la question des droits de la personne à des discussions portant sur le commerce, la diplomatie et l'aide, le Canada peut arriver à faire comprendre que les droits de la personne ne sont pas une question accessoire, mais font partie intégrante de ses relations extérieures.

Outre des mesures purement diplomatiques, le Canada peut également se servir de son important programme d'aide au développement pour défendre les droits de la personne. Il a été beaucoup question, dans les mémoires et les témoignages qui ont été présentés au comité, de l'opportunité d'utiliser de tels moyens et de la façon de s'y prendre. D'après ce que nous avons entendu, les Canadiens estiment qu'il devrait y avoir des liens entre l'aide au développement et les droits de la personne, mais des liens soigneusement établis. Nous partageons ce point de vue, et nous sommes entièrement d'accord avec les recommandations de l'ancien sous-comité sur les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Antilles, contenues dans le rapport intitulé *Nouvelles orientations de la politique étrangère du Canada* (78:14 et 15), qui a été déposé à la Chambre des communes le 30 novembre 1982.

- Le Canada devrait réduire substantiellement ou interrompre les programmes canadiens d'aide au développement, ou encore ne pas en lancer de nouveaux, dans les pays où les violations flagrantes et systématiques des droits de la personne empêchent la réalisation de l'objectif fondamental que constitue l'aide aux pauvres.

- Dans les pays qui violent systématiquement ces droits ou qui, pour d'autres raisons, ne sont pas admissibles à l'aide au développement, le Canada devrait tenter, par l'entremise des organisations internationales, d'accorder une aide humanitaire à ceux qui luttent pour la protection des droits de la personne.

- Dans les pays où les violations des droits de la personne existent, mais ne justifient pas l'interruption de l'aide consentie, le Canada devrait offrir son assistance essentiellement par le truchement du secteur privé, et particulièrement des organisations non gouvernementales qui œuvrent directement auprès des pauvres. En outre, le gouvernement canadien devrait accorder une partie de son aide aux organismes qui luttent pour maintenir et protéger les droits civils et politiques.

- Le Canada devrait accroître considérablement l'aide qu'il accorde aux pays admissibles à l'aide canadienne qui ont effectué des progrès dans le secteur du respect des droits de la personne.

En plus de mettre en oeuvre des programmes d'aide bilatéraux, le Canada participe aux travaux de nombreuses institutions financières internationales (IFI) comme la Banque mondiale et les banques régionales de développement, qui fournissent d'importants capitaux au pays du tiers monde. D'après certains témoins, le Canada devrait inciter les IFI à assujettir l'octroi de prêts et d'autres crédits d'aide à des critères fondés sur le respect des droits de la personne. Il s'agirait là d'une entorse à la règle des IFI, défendue à maintes reprises par le Canada, qui consiste à évaluer les demandes uniquement d'après leur valeur sur le plan technique ou sur celui du développement. Le comité est profondément conscient des risques qu'il y aurait à politiser les IFI pour



personne qui servirait de mécanisme régulier de consultation politique. Nous appuyons le principe, mais nous tenons à souligner qu'il y a plusieurs modèles possibles en ce qui a trait au fonctionnement et à la composition d'un tel organisme. Nous recommandons, par conséquent, que le gouvernement recherche sans délai les moyens les plus efficaces de créer une Commission consultative des droits de la personne.

Le comité a été heureux d'entendre des témoins affirmer que les autorités canadiennes étaient fermement acquiescentes à la nécessité d'avoir une politique efficace sur les droits de la personne. Nous sommes par ailleurs conscients des pressions qui s'exercent au ministère des Affaires étrangères pour que le commerce, la sécurité et des considérations politiques passent avant les droits de la personne. Pour contrer cette tendance, nous recommandons que le ministère des Affaires étrangères suive l'exemple du ministère des Affaires étrangères des Pays-Bas en organisant pour tous ses agents des séances de formation et des cours d'appoint sur les droits de la personne.

Le Canada a depuis longtemps recours aux organismes internationaux et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui se consacrent à la défense des droits de la personne pour faire avancer ces droits. À ceux-ci est venu s'ajouter depuis peu un troisième mécanisme, qui lui permettra d'adopter une démarche plus cohérente et plus active. Un comité permanent des droits de la personne vient en effet d'être créé à la Chambre des communes. Nous recommandons que ce comité, au moment d'entamer le volet international de ses travaux, accorde une attention particulière aux violations flagrantes et systématiques des droits de la personne qui sont signalées, notamment dans les pays où le Canada a d'importants programmes d'aide au développement ou avec lesquels il fait beaucoup de commerce, et qu'il travaille en étroite collaboration avec le comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur. De plus, nous demandons instamment aux comités des affaires extérieures du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes de garder cette question à l'ordre du jour et de la placer dans le contexte plus général de la politique extérieure du Canada. Les conclusions et recommandations de ces comités pourront être un facteur important dans les décisions du Cabinet lorsqu'il dresse la liste des pays admissibles à l'aide publique au développement, si les comités demandent au gouvernement de donner une réponse globale à leurs rapports, comme les comités de la Chambre des communes peuvent le faire en vertu de l'article 99(2) du Règlement.

Le simple fait d'enquêter sur les violations des droits de la personne et de les faire connaître a du mérite en soi. Toutefois, de façon générale, il ne s'agit que d'une première étape qui appelle ensuite une intervention ou, à tout le moins, des pressions incitant la communauté internationale à intervenir.

Il y a des occasions où la critique publique est un outil essentiel de la défense des droits de la personne. Mais, en principe, une politique bien pensée en matière de droits de la personne est comme un iceberg dont on ne voit que la pointe. Parlant de la malheureuse tendance que nous avons au Canada à penser que, entre la diplomatie tranquille et la diplomatie vociférante, l'une est bonne et l'autre est mauvaise, M. John Holmes a fait les observations suivantes au comité :

Or, un pays intelligent choisit celle qui est la plus efficace. Il y a des cas où la diplomatie tranquille offre de meilleures chances de sauver des personnes. Si vous cherchez à faire sortir certaines personnes d'un pays totalitaire, il est souvent préférable de mener des négociations en privé au lieu de marquer des points en faisant des discours (25:46).

Les visites à l'étranger du premier ministre, de ministres du Cabinet et de parlementaires sont de précieuses occasions d'exprimer des inquiétudes au sujet du

Premièrement, il y a les organismes internationaux qui s'occupent des droits de la personne et dont le plus important est la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies. Créée par l'Assemblée générale en 1945, cette commission s'intéresse aux grands problèmes de droits de la personne dans le monde, et elle est également chargée de l'élaboration de normes et de conventions relatives aux droits de la personne. Selon les témoignages que nous avons reçus, le Canada, qui a fait partie de la commission comme membre élu de 1976 à 1984, a su se mériter le respect des autres pays ainsi que d'organisations non gouvernementales qui comptaient sur la délégation canadienne pour soulever certaines questions aux séances de la commission et pour défendre leurs intérêts. Par contre, M. Philippe LeBlanc, dans son mémoire, a reproché au Canada sa participation effacée et beaucoup moins efficace en tant qu'observateur à la session de 1985 (2). Le comité se joint aux témoins pour recommander que le Canada cherche à être rélu à la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies et que, dans l'interval, il suive activement le déroulement de ses travaux. Le Canada devrait notamment s'employer à protéger et à renforcer la position de la Commission dans la structure onusienne. Le comité recommande également que le Canada cherche à affirmer l'assise du Groupe de travail des Nations Unies pour les autochtones. Les peuples autochtones sont depuis fort longtemps au nombre des victimes les plus malmenées des violations des droits de la personne.

Nous sommes persuadés que le Canada a des possibilités d'action multilatérale en dehors de l'ONU, qui lui permettraient de poursuivre une politique active en matière de droits de la personne. Ainsi, le Canada devrait appuyer le Bureau des droits de la personne récemment créé par le Secrétaire du Commonwealth. Il devrait collaborer, tant au sein du Commonwealth qu'en dehors de celui-ci, avec d'autres puissances démocratiques moyennes parmi les pays industrialisés ou en développement, d'autant plus que les puissances moyennes sont peut-être moins susceptibles de troubler le cours de la politique concernant les droits de la personne par des considérations et des activités géopolitiques. En collaborant étroitement avec les pays en développement, le Canada pourra prendre en considération dans sa politique en la matière les vues et les préoccupations des pays du tiers monde.

Deuxièmement, le Canada peut faire appel au réseau d'organisations bénévoles travaillant dans le domaine des droits de la personne pour enquêter sur les violations de ces droits et les dénoncer. Il peut s'agir tant d'organismes nationaux, dont les membres, dans certains pays, n'hésitent pas à mettre leur vie en péril pour dénoncer les violations des droits de la personne, que d'organisations internationales spécialisées dans la collecte et la diffusion de ces informations. Dans le mémoire qu'elle a présenté au comité, la section canadienne (anglophone) d'*Amnesty International* — une des organisations bénévoles les plus respectées dans le monde — s'est félicitée de l'appui qu'elle reçoit du gouvernement canadien.

[La section canadienne] constate avec beaucoup de satisfaction que le gouvernement canadien s'emploie activement à défendre les droits de la personne et à dénoncer les violations des droits de la personne au sein d'instances bilatérales et multilatérales. C'est ce qui a amené la section canadienne à déclarer à maintes occasions que la Commission de l'immigration (qui s'occupe des réfugiés) et le ministère des Affaires extérieures sont ses alliés dans la lutte qu'elle mène pour défendre les droits de la personne partout dans le monde (2).

**Le comité recommande vivement au gouvernement du Canada de faire en sorte que la collaboration avec les organisations bénévoles demeure un élément central de sa politique sur les droits de la personne.** À cet égard, M. Edward Ratushny a fortement recommandé au gouvernement de créer une Commission consultative des droits de la



Outre qu'il est nécessaire d'en préciser le sens et le but, la politique de défense des droits de la personne se heurte à divers obstacles d'ordre pratique, notamment à l'absence de tout mécanisme d'application reconnu. Notre but véritable étant d'atténuer l'injustice, notre ligne de conduite, en ce qui a trait aux droits de la personne, doit être dictée non seulement par l'obéissance à un principe, mais par la nécessité d'agir prudemment et d'obtenir des résultats tangibles. En ce qui concerne les moyens de promouvoir les droits de la personne dans le monde, nous croyons utile de faire une distinction entre la protection de ces droits et leur avancement. Le premier objectif vise principalement à repérer les cas de violation des droits de la personne, à les faire connaître et à les dénoncer, tandis que le second consiste à essayer de renforcer les institutions et les valeurs qui, au bout du compte, sont les seuls garants du respect des droits de la personne.

## La protection des droits de la personne

Le principal objectif de la politique relative aux droits de la personne a toujours été de révéler les cas de violation de ces droits et de trouver des moyens d'y mettre un terme. Nous pensons qu'il est nécessaire de poursuivre les efforts en ce sens et même, en ce qui concerne le Canada, de s'y employer de façon encore plus énergique. Nous estimons, par contre, que cette approche est d'une efficacité très restreinte et que son succès dépend au plus haut point de la créance qu'elle trouve auprès de la communauté internationale. Une politique de protection des droits de la personne doit obligatoirement s'appuyer sur des normes, des enquêtes probantes et des sanctions.

Comme l'ont souligné les témoins qui ont comparu devant le comité, la promotion des droits de la personne dans le monde est exposée à une multitude de dangers, notamment à la frivolité et à la politisation. Ainsi, on peut être tenté de lever continuellement un doigt accusateur, ou encore de poursuivre des buts politiques ou idéologiques sous prétexte de défendre les droits de la personne. Pour éviter ces écueils, il faut d'abord et avant tout établir certaines normes.

**Le comité estime qu'il existe un critère fondamental qui doit guider la politique du Canada en matière de droits de la personne, à savoir la tendance apparente à des violations systématiques, flagrantes et soutenues des droits de la personne.** Dans le mémoire qu'il a présenté au comité, le Conseil canadien des églises a décrit ces droits de la façon suivante :

Les églises présument que les gens du monde entier, indépendamment de toute appartenance idéologique, culturelle ou politique, souhaitent ne plus être victimes de disparitions et être libérés de toute forme d'arrestation arbitraire, de détention, de torture, d'exécution extrajudiciaire et de discrimination raciale encouragée par un Etat (34).

Lorsque ces violations systématiques et soutenues résultent de la politique d'un Etat, le Canada doit les dénoncer sans hésitation.

Il est très rare que des violations flagrantes et systématiques des droits de la personne fassent officiellement partie de la politique nationale ou soient pratiquées au grand jour. En règle générale, elles sont plutôt cachées, et leur existence est niée avec véhémence. D'ailleurs, la terreur psychologique qu'inspirent les cas de torture ou les disparitions est due en grande partie au secret qui les entoure. C'est pourquoi l'un des meilleurs moyens de lutter contre les violations des droits de la personne consiste à les porter à l'attention du monde entier. Le Canada dispose de trois grands mécanismes d'enquête.

## La promotion des droits de la personne

Nous tenons à affirmer, comme tant de Canadiens nous l'ont répété, que la défense des droits de la personne dans le monde est un élément fondamental de la politique étrangère du Canada. Elle est l'expression vitale et naturelle des valeurs canadiennes. En outre, elle est conforme aux droits et aux obligations existant en droit international, notamment en vertu de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et du Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, auxquels le Canada a librement souscrit.

La promotion efficace des droits de la personne à l'échelle internationale n'est pas sans poser de nombreux problèmes sur le plan pratique. Elle est rejetée dans certains milieux parce qu'on y voit une ingérence inacceptable dans les affaires de pays souverains. Pour notre part, nous soutenons au contraire que le comportement des gouvernements, tout comme celui des particuliers, est assujéti à des valeurs universelles. Prononcer un jugement sur la conduite d'un gouvernement et adapter en conséquence ses relations avec ce gouvernement ne veut pas dire qu'on empiète sur ses pouvoirs. La rupture de relations dans les domaines du commerce ou de l'aide, par exemple, se situe précisément à l'opposé de toute forme d'intervention dans les affaires internes d'un autre pays.

D'autres critiquent la promotion des droits de la personne, parce qu'ils y voient un moyen détourné de faire passer l'économie et la pauvreté au second rang des préoccupations internationales. Ce n'est nullement notre intention, et les observations que nous avons faites sur le développement international ne font que le confirmer. Comme le Conseil canadien des églises, nous croyons que «des besoins fondamentaux, tels que la nourriture, l'eau et le logement, [sont aussi] des droits inviolables, sans lesquels un être humain ne saurait vivre (34)». C'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons réaffirmé que l'assistance aux populations et aux pays les plus pauvres constituait le principal objectif du programme d'aide canadien. Nous affirmons, avec tout autant de conviction, que le Canada doit défendre les droits aussi bien collectifs qu'individuels, y compris les droits des travailleurs, des femmes et des minorités religieuses et culturelles. Nous souscrivons entièrement à l'argument de M. Edward Ratushny selon lequel le Canada doit refuser de choisir entre les droits de la collectivité et ceux de l'individu. Nous devons «considérer tout simplement que tous les droits sont importants, et qu'il n'y a pas de raison de choisir les droits de la collectivité au détriment des droits individuels (25:36)».





dont sont victimes les étudiants étrangers qui veulent travailler à temps partiel pendant l'été. On nous a signalé que, même quand ces étudiants obtenaient l'autorisation de travailler, ils devaient cotiser à la caisse d'assurance-chômage et au Régime de pensions du Canada bien qu'ils n'aient pas droit aux prestations. Dans l'examen global actuel de la question des étudiants étrangers, nous demandons au gouvernement de faire enquête sur ces pratiques et de faire supprimer les restrictions qui ne sont pas jugées nécessaires.

s'ils reviennent jamais dans leur pays, ne soient alors aliénés sur le plan culturel. En outre, certains gouvernements du tiers monde préféreraient que le Canada les aide à élargir et à perfectionner leurs propres établissements d'enseignement. D'autres pays, qui ont des universités, sont consternés d'apprendre que leurs étudiants préfèrent faire leurs études de premier cycle au Canada ou ailleurs.

Nous pensons que les étudiants étrangers sont pour le Canada un atout important dont on n'a pas assez tenu compte jusqu'à présent en ce qui concerne l'augmentation des échanges commerciaux, l'accroissement des contacts culturels et la politique étrangère en général. Il serait possible de charger des étudiants étrangers, une fois rentrés dans leur pays d'origine, de représenter des entreprises canadiennes, ce qui serait intéressant pour tout le monde. Il fait sienne la conclusion du Groupe de travail ministériel chargé de l'examen des programmes, qui a récemment étudié la situation des boursiers étrangers au Canada.

Le fait qu'un nombre considérable d'étudiants étrangers fréquentent les universités canadiennes pourrait contribuer, dans le concert des nations, à projeter du Canada l'image d'une société ouverte et attentive. Par contre, si les conditions imposées à ces étudiants leur semblent intolérables, cette situation peut devenir négative, voire nuisible (*Éducation et recherche*, p. 260).

Nous savons que les problèmes en cause sont complexes et que l'éducation postsecondaire relève en grande partie des provinces. Nous convenons avec M. W.A. Mackay, président de l'Université Dalhousie,

que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux doivent adopter ensemble une politique nationale harmonisée en matière de frais de scolarité imposés aux étudiants étrangers et de l'aide qui leur est accordée afin de remplacer ce que nous considérons [...] comme une gamme disparate de politiques mal conçues et prêtant à confusion (33:33).

Nous notons cependant avec plaisir que le Conseil des ministres de l'Éducation a admis, dans une déclaration inhabituelle, lors de l'assemblée de mai 1986, que le gouvernement fédéral avait un rôle à jouer dans les questions concernant les étudiants étrangers qui fréquentent «des institutions d'enseignement postsecondaire, qu'il s'agisse de leur entrée au Canada ou de leur importance potentielle dans nos relations étrangères». Nous recommandons que le gouvernement fédéral prépare un énoncé des buts et objectifs nationaux à propos des étudiants étrangers et nous encourageons les provinces à en faire autant. Ces énoncés devront ensuite être discutés lors d'une conférence des premiers ministres afin d'en arriver à une ligne de conduite aussi cohérente que possible.

Si l'on veut que le rôle du Canada dans l'éducation des personnes provenant des pays en développement soit apprécié à sa juste valeur à l'étranger, il faut qu'il soit défini de concert avec ces pays. Nous avons écouté d'une oreille sympathique les témoins qui ont affirmé que les pays du tiers monde devraient pouvoir créer leurs propres établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Cependant, ces pays ne peuvent pas offrir un éventail complet d'études supérieures. Nous recommandons que le Canada concentre son aide surtout dans le domaine des études du deuxième et du troisième cycle.

Un des aspects de la question des étudiants étrangers est carrément de compétence fédérale. Il s'agit des procédures d'immigration. Nous avons entendu des témoignages alarmants au sujet de la lenteur de l'examen des demandes de visas et des restrictions

qu'elle revenait à un «protectionnisme éducatif». On presse le gouvernement fédéral de prendre l'initiative et de remplacer les politiques disparates du gouvernement fédéral, des provinces et des universités par une politique nationale cohérente. On a notamment recommandé au comité de supprimer le double barème des frais de scolarité ou, s'il est maintenu, d'affecter les recettes à un programme d'aide financière à l'intention des étudiants étrangers compétents qui n'ont pas les moyens de payer ces frais. Certains ont aussi recommandé la création d'un programme de bourses d'études en vue de financer totalement les études d'un nombre d'étudiants (jusqu'à 10 000) provenant de pays qui jouent un rôle important dans les relations extérieures du Canada ou de créer le même genre de programme à l'intention des étudiants originaires des 25 (ou 40) pays les plus pauvres.

La question des étudiants étrangers comporte des aspects complexes. Selon les témoins qui souhaiteraient qu'on aide davantage les étudiants étrangers dans les universités canadiennes, la présence de ces étudiants présente des avantages à court et à long terme pour le Canada et pour les Canadiens. D'après eux, ces étudiants enrichissent le Canada sur le plan culturel; ils améliorent la qualité de la vie universitaire et sont un apport pour certains cours, comme les cours portant sur certaines régions du monde, ainsi que pour la recherche universitaire en général, puisqu'ils sont nombreux au deuxième et troisième cycles. Leur inscription dans les universités canadiennes constitue une forme d'assistance aux pays en développement. Leur présence dans nos universités aide aussi à rembourser une dette, puisque de nombreux Canadiens étudient actuellement à l'étranger ou y ont déjà fait des études. Les connaissances qu'acquissent les étudiants étrangers sur le Canada et sur ses produits leur permettent de faire plus tard office «d'agents de promotion des ventes» du Canada dans leur propre pays. La présence d'étudiants dans les universités canadiennes contribue en outre à améliorer l'image du Canada dans le monde et ses relations avec certains groupes de pays. Enfin, les dépenses des étudiants étrangers, en sus de leurs frais de scolarité, injectent des sommes non négligeables dans l'économie canadienne.

Personne ne conteste ces arguments. Evoquant la forte concentration d'étudiants étrangers dans certaines régions, dans certaines universités et dans certains programmes d'études au Canada, la Commission des études canadiennes, constituée en 1984, a fait valoir que ce déséquilibre annihilait l'un des principaux avantages que devraient retirer les étudiants canadiens, c'est-à-dire la possibilité d'élargir leurs horizons grâce à leurs contacts personnels avec des étudiants étrangers. La présence d'étudiants étrangers peut également causer d'autres problèmes. L'afflux d'un grand nombre d'étudiants d'un même pays étranger dans une université risque d'aboutir à la création de «ghettos universitaires, psychologiques et sociaux.»

En outre, certains témoins ont signalé que, même avec l'existence du double barème des frais de scolarité, les contribuables canadiens devaient encore assumer une partie du coût des études des étudiants étrangers. D'aucuns soutiennent également que, en raison du nombre élevé d'étudiants étrangers dans certains cours et dans certains établissements, les étudiants canadiens ont du mal à y être acceptés. D'autres, qui fondent leurs arguments sur une étude détaillée menée par le gouvernement de l'Australie auprès d'étudiants étrangers, ne croient pas que les étudiants étrangers procurent un avantage économique net au Canada par le biais de leurs contributions en frais de scolarité et de leurs dépenses de subsistance.

Enfin, on a fait remarquer au comité que l'aide offerte pour inciter les étrangers à venir étudier au Canada n'était pas nécessairement bien accueillie par les pays d'origine des étudiants. Certains pays en développement craignent que les pays développés, comme le Canada ne drainent leurs jeunes les plus prometteurs, et que ces étudiants,



Les gens s'intéressent surtout au fait que, ces dernières années, sept des dix provinces ont décidé d'imposer des frais de scolarité plus élevés aux étudiants étrangers qu'aux étudiants canadiens. Dans certains cas, ces frais sont plus de dix fois plus élevés. On comprend facilement pourquoi les provinces et les universités imposent des frais de scolarité plus lourds aux étudiants étrangers. En effet, vu l'augmentation des coûts et l'afflux d'étudiants étrangers au milieu des années 70, les provinces considèrent qu'imposer des frais de scolarité plus élevés aux étudiants étrangers est un bon moyen de recouvrer certains coûts en période de restrictions financières, d'autant plus que depuis 1975 les paiements de transfert du gouvernement fédéral au titre de l'éducation postsecondaire, qui sont fondés sur le nombre d'habitants de la province, ne tiennent aucun compte de l'augmentation considérable du nombre des étudiants étrangers.

Les frais imposés varient énormément selon la province. C'est en Ontario et au Québec qu'ils sont le plus élevés. Au Manitoba, à Terre-Neuve et en Saskatchewan, ils sont les mêmes pour les étudiants étrangers et pour les étudiants canadiens. En Colombie-Britannique, les étudiants du deuxième et du troisième cycles en sont exemptés. Certains soutiennent que ces frais de scolarité expliquent la baisse actuelle du nombre d'étudiants étrangers dans les universités canadiennes (qui est passé de 36 000 en 1982-1983 à 33 500 en 1984-1985). La baisse a toutefois été irrégulière. En Ontario, où l'on trouve le plus grand nombre d'étudiants étrangers, on a observé une forte baisse depuis deux ans (20,5 p. 100). Les inscriptions d'étudiants étrangers ont diminué dans une province où les frais de scolarité sont les mêmes pour tous, tandis qu'elles ont augmenté dans une autre où l'on impose des frais plus élevés aux étrangers.

Par rapport à la norme internationale, le Canada accueille beaucoup d'étudiants étrangers. On estime qu'un million d'étudiants de toutes les régions du globe font des études supérieures dans un pays étranger. Le Canada est un des cinq principaux pays qu'ils choisissent; en fait, le Canada, la France, l'Allemagne, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni accueillent ensemble environ 60 p. 100 de tous les étudiants étrangers. Les étudiants étrangers représentent environ 5 p. 100 des effectifs universitaires du Canada. Leur concentration est particulièrement élevée au niveau du doctorat, où ils représentent plus de 25 p. 100 des effectifs. Dans quelques universités, il serait difficile de maintenir certains cours de deuxième ou de troisième cycle, en génie par exemple, où les étudiants étrangers représentent 50 p. 100 des effectifs, si ces étudiants décidaient de partir.

Les étudiants qui fréquentent les universités du Canada proviennent de nombreux pays du monde, mais environ 50 p. 100 sont originaires des États-Unis, de Hong Kong et de la Malaisie. Dans leur cas, on peut penser que beaucoup s'inscrivent dans une université canadienne parce que les frais de scolarité y sont inférieurs à ceux imposés dans leur propre pays, ou parce qu'ils envisagent d'immigrer au Canada.

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures, l'ACDI et le Centre de recherches pour le développement international administrent divers programmes de bourses d'études grâce auxquels plus de 3 500 non-Canadiens peuvent venir étudier au Canada. Par ailleurs, on a récemment porté à 500 le nombre de places d'un programme à l'intention des étudiants du Commonwealth et, lors du récent Sommet francophone, le gouvernement a annoncé qu'il envisageait de créer de nouvelles bourses d'études, cette fois à l'intention des étudiants étrangers francophones. En outre, quelques provinces offrent aussi des bourses d'études, notamment le Québec dont le programme est le plus important.

Dans les mémoires et les témoignages, on a qualifié la politique actuelle à l'égard des étudiants étrangers de «confuse», «complexe», et «injuste», certains affirmant aussi

très bien qu'elles doivent conserver la confiance du public. Le comité pense que les ONG joueront un plus grand rôle à l'avenir dans le programme d'aide du Canada et, pour cette raison, il recommande fortement à l'ACDI et aux organisations bénévoles d'accorder la plus grande attention aux abus de confiance occasionnels, de porter ces cas à l'attention du public et de prendre les mesures qui s'imposent.

En matière de développement, il importe également de renforcer la participation du secteur privé. Un grand nombre de pays en développement les plus démunis veulent et doivent acquérir une expérience commerciale concrète et pratique, d'autant plus qu'ils se dirigent maintenant de plus en plus vers une économie de marché. Le Canada doit favoriser cette orientation en facilitant la coopération de son propre monde des affaires et de celui qui se fait progressivement jour dans le tiers monde. Nous croyons qu'il importe tout particulièrement de créer des liens entre les petites et moyennes entreprises, fondamentalement véritable des activités commerciales.

Les pays en développement ont surtout des petites entreprises. Celles-ci font appel à une importante main-d'œuvre et sont généralement disséminées dans tout le pays et non concentrées dans les grandes villes. Dans de nombreux pays pauvres, les petites entreprises constituent les meilleurs outils de développement économique, mais elles doivent surmonter de gros obstacles, notamment la rareté des capitaux et du savoir-faire. Elles sont aussi en bien moins bonne position que les grosses entreprises qui, elles, ont des contacts internationaux. Les organisations non gouvernementales canadiennes comme le SACO (Service administratif canadien outre-mer) jouent un rôle très utile dans ce domaine, mais d'après nous il est important que le Canada fournisse une aide supplémentaire.

Le comité a reçu une proposition visant la création d'une agence canadienne de coopération industrielle. Nous recommandons que le gouvernement et le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur en fassent une étude approfondie. Cette agence permettrait aux petites et moyennes entreprises canadiennes d'aider celles du tiers monde de diverses façons, notamment par la conclusion de contrats de gestion et d'ententes techniques et par la création de coentreprises. L'agence pourrait par exemple financer des programmes analogues à celui qui est administré par le *Fanshawe College de London (Ontario)*. Ce programme, conçu pour assurer la formation professionnelle des administrateurs de petites entreprises pendant les trois premières années d'exploitation, donne de bons résultats en Ontario et est maintenant étendu à l'Est des Antilles. Dans le projet d'agence annexé à son mémoire, M. Michael Lubbock admet que la Division de la coopération industrielle de l'ACDI finance déjà ce genre d'activités, mais il soutient que ce type de travail suppose «non seulement un examen de faits et de données quantitatives, mais de l'intuition; or, sont seuls à en posséder ceux qui ont passé de nombreuses années à lancer de nouveaux projets et qui ont ainsi acquis une longue expérience pratique (2)». L'agence proposée remplirait les fonctions actuellement dévolues à la Division de la coopération industrielle et serait administrée par des gens d'affaires d'expérience.

## Les étudiants étrangers

Le comité a été étonné par le nombre de mémoires qu'il a reçus du milieu universitaire sur les étudiants étrangers au Canada. Des présidents d'université, des représentants des enseignants et des étudiants de niveau universitaire et des organisations du domaine de l'enseignement ont présenté des mémoires assez longs.



bénévoles devraient concentrer leurs efforts. Comme on l'avait envisagé dans le plan par pays qui a été introduit au début des années 80, les organismes non gouvernementaux, qu'ils soient bénévoles ou à but lucratif, doivent participer le plus possible à la planification et à l'exécution des programmes canadiens d'aide publique au développement. Ils doivent en fait constituer le cœur de programmes d'aide technique élargis et revitalisés.

À cette fin, il faudra sans doute se doter de nouveaux mécanismes et de nouvelles capacités. Tout au long de nos audiences, nous avons rencontré des bénévoles, ainsi que des représentants d'organisations bénévoles et d'associations qui regroupent des ONG. On nous a livré un message d'enthousiasme et de dévouement, tempéré toutefois par le réalisme et l'autocritique. Au cours de nos audiences à Charlottetown, qui ont été surtout consacrées à des bénévoles qui s'occupent de développement, M. Garry Webster a décrit la force des ONG en rappelant leur assise populaire, le souci qu'elles ont de l'épanouissement total de la personne et pas seulement de la croissance économique, leur idéalisme, leur savoir-faire et leur disposition à dépasser les idéologies pour venir en aide aux populations. Toutefois, il a aussi reconnu les limites et les faiblesses de certaines ONG en disant :

Je pourrais critiquer le travail de certaines d'entre elles [...]. Tout d'abord, ce sont des organismes qui ne fournissent que de l'aide sous forme d'expédients. Ils ont tendance à donner de l'argent ou de l'aide alimentaire ou des vêtements ou toutes sortes d'autres produits matériels aux populations des pays étrangers, sans se donner la peine de déterminer si la population locale n'est pas capable de se doter de ces ressources elle-même (31:20).

On nous a appris que, si l'ACDI ne souhaite plus autant voir des organisations bénévoles s'engager dans la planification du développement, son changement d'attitude est en partie attribuable aux ONG. Selon une étude, en tant que filiales de financement d'organisations bénévoles internationales, de nombreuses ONG canadiennes n'affectent elles-mêmes aucun de leurs représentants sur les lieux, dans le tiers monde. Elles n'ont donc pas su exploiter à fond cette occasion d'acquérir de l'expérience en matière de développement, de l'analyser et d'en tirer des leçons. Nous croyons que le programme d'aide du Canada doit pouvoir compter sur l'étroite collaboration des organisations bénévoles. Pour favoriser la collaboration sur place, il a été proposé que le gouvernement et les organisations bénévoles créent des bureaux de développement dans les pays en développement où le Canada réalise des programmes d'aide sans y posséder d'ambassade, ou dans les régions de pays en voie de développement qui sont éloignées de la capitale et de l'ambassade du Canada. Les bureaux de développement constitueraient des bases de soutien fonctionnelles et non diplomatiques, tant pour l'assistance publique au développement que pour les activités des organisations bénévoles. Nous prions instamment le gouvernement et les organisations bénévoles d'étudier ensemble cette proposition, ainsi que d'autres mesures pratiques visant à renforcer leur collaboration.

Une bonne partie des fonds permettant aux ONG canadiennes de financer leurs activités de développement viennent des dons du public. L'ACDI octroie ensuite des subventions correspondant au montant des fonds ainsi recueillis. La plupart des ONG méritent tout à fait la confiance des Canadiens. Il arrive cependant que certains créent des organisations à la seule fin d'exploiter à leur profit des vagues de générosité. On sait par ailleurs qu'une ou deux organisations bien établies ont financé des activités politiques condamnables dans le tiers monde. L'ACDI a les moyens d'exercer une surveillance pour l'octroi des subventions, et il lui est arrivé de réduire ou d'annuler ses subventions lorsque cela se justifiait. Pour leur part, les organisations bénévoles savent

Les audiences nous ont amenés à nous demander comment on évalue l'efficacité de l'aide. La question a déjà été posée et on y a répondu en décrivant de multiples procédures bureaucratiques. À ce propos, M. Christopher Bryant, du *Canadian University Service Overseas*, a fait remarquer : « Nous n'avons manifestement pas encore trouvé le moyen le plus efficace [de promouvoir le développement international], mais nous commençons à savoir ce qui donne des résultats et ce qui n'en donne pas (21:14) ». Voilà l'essentiel à notre avis : se donner les moyens d'apprendre. On nous a laissé entendre que les évaluations du fonctionnement de l'ACDI n'étaient pas toujours aussi impartiales qu'elles le devraient. Par ailleurs, le Canada est beaucoup moins enclin que de nombreux autres pays donateurs — comme les États-Unis — à publier les évaluations des projets d'aide au développement. Actuellement, les députés peuvent consulter les rapports d'évaluation au siège de l'ACDI, mais à titre confidentiel seulement. Nous admettons que certaines informations contenues dans ces rapports peuvent être délicates, mais nous croyons que l'ACDI a tout à gagner à rendre publiques les évaluations des projets d'aide au développement.

Pour améliorer les résultats globaux de l'aide, il faut que les pays donateurs partagent les leçons tirées du développement et collaborent les uns avec les autres. Or, l'assistance publique au développement est encore déficiente parce que les programmes d'aide nationaux sont parfois axés sur les intérêts des pays donateurs. Cela aboutit à des situations typiques comme celle-ci : il y a maintenant environ quinze sortes de pompes d'irrigation différentes et incompatibles au Kenya. Nous recommandons que le Canada réclame une collaboration plus étroite entre les pays donateurs, et qu'il continue d'appuyer fortement les méthodes et les institutions multilatérales qui favorisent cette attitude. Nous tenons à réaffirmer l'opinion généralement admise au Canada selon laquelle l'aide bilatérale et l'aide multilatérale sont complémentaires.

Nous n'avons pas fait d'évaluation en profondeur du programme d'aide du Canada, car le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur s'en charge. Cependant, nous recommandons vivement que ce comité, quand il établira son plan de travail, étudie de près plusieurs questions dont nous avons été saisis. Comment alléger le fardeau administratif découlant de l'aide au développement? Dans quelle mesure et comment décentraliser les effets et les pouvoirs? Comment réduire les coûts de l'aide liée et rendre l'aide plus utile aux pays bénéficiaires? Comment la population en général, qu'il s'agisse des gens ordinaires ou des experts, peut-elle jouer un rôle dans l'amélioration de l'aide au développement offerte par le Canada?

### *Une association*

L'aide au développement est une sorte d'association entre le gouvernement, les bénévoles, le secteur privé et les Canadiens. En 1968, le gouvernement du Canada a créé un programme conçu pour faciliter les travaux de développement des organisations non gouvernementales. Ce programme a pris beaucoup d'ampleur depuis. La Direction des programmes spéciaux de l'ACDI répond maintenant aux initiatives tant des organismes bénévoles que des organismes à but lucratif, et les encourage. Elle appuie tous les ans de 3 500 à 4 000 projets, ce qui comprend plus de 1 500 projets du secteur privé dans plus de 100 pays. Son budget total est de près de 200 millions de dollars par an.

L'association ne doit pas se limiter aux aspects financiers. Il est tout aussi important que les ONG fassent profiter l'ACDI de leur expérience et que l'ACDI, après avoir consulté les ONG, indique les activités et les régions sur lesquelles les organismes



dévastateurs de la famine et où la lutte contre la pauvreté dans le monde est douloureusement lente, il est essentiel que l'aide au développement soit réorientée vers son objectif premier. En conséquence, le comité recommande que l'objectif premier du programme d'aide canadien demeure de répondre aux besoins des pays et des populations les plus pauvres. Comme les femmes sont les plus défavorisées sur le plan économique, nous recommandons d'accorder une plus grande importance à l'aide directe aux femmes des pays en développement.

### *L'efficacité de l'aide*

Mis à part les incertitudes au sujet de l'objectif du programme d'aide, certains témoins s'interrogent sérieusement sur son efficacité. M. Ed Cayer, qui a appartenu à la direction de l'ACDI et a été expert-conseil en développement pendant de nombreuses années, a insisté sur la persistance des problèmes de base :

En 1977, quand je suis retourné à l'ACDI, j'occupais le poste de directeur général des opérations bilatérales. J'étais responsable du suivi à donner aux observations du vérificateur général. Les systèmes, à l'ACDI, ne fonctionnaient pas. Il y avait un blocage énorme, tout simplement parce que tout était *ad hoc*. J'y reviens maintenant, une dizaine d'années plus tard, et je vois une agence qui a beaucoup plus de systèmes, mais qui n'avance pas beaucoup plus vite (31:42).

M. Peter Kilburn, à l'instar de plusieurs autres témoins, a déclaré qu'il était fort possible que les mécanismes de supervision soient eux-mêmes à l'origine de la bureaucratisation et des lenteurs du système. Pour remédier à ces problèmes, il a proposé de laisser aux pays bénéficiaires le soin de concevoir et d'administrer eux-mêmes les projets d'investissement à la place de l'ACDI lorsque la situation le permet (21:12). D'autres témoins se sont dits d'avis que la première chose à faire pour améliorer l'efficacité du programme d'aide consistait à décentraliser le personnel et les pouvoirs de l'ACDI.

Sur certains de ces points, l'ACDI a fait des progrès considérables ces dernières années. Par exemple, il faut maintenant beaucoup moins de temps, en moyenne, pour lancer un projet. Par ailleurs, les contraintes qui demeurent sont parfois indépendantes de la volonté de l'ACDI. De nombreux projets sont assujettis à des conditions forçant les bénéficiaires à s'approprier au Canada en biens et services. Or, même si l'aide ainsi dispensée est souvent d'excellente qualité, ce type de conditions nous écarte parfois des objectifs visés et amoindrit la valeur et l'efficacité de l'aide fournie. D'après nous, il est important de faire une place aux approvisionnements canadiens, mais pas au point où l'on risque de nuire en fait au développement.

On ne peut aborder la question de l'efficacité des programmes d'aide sans parler du rôle essentiel des femmes dans le processus du développement. Il n'y a pas très longtemps qu'on a pris conscience de cela. Les spécialistes du développement prétendent que l'aide liée ne permet pas vraiment de venir en aide aux pauvres gens et d'intégrer les femmes au processus de développement. Bien souvent ce sont les femmes qui cultivent la terre, qui donnent les soins médicaux et qui sont les chefs de famille. Il faut absolument les consulter sur les techniques de développement qui conviennent le mieux. L'ACDI a commencé à faire appliquer une directive-cadre intitulée Les femmes et le développement. Le comité recommande que le gouvernement affecte suffisamment de fonds et de personnel à l'ACDI pour lui permettre de mettre en place cette directive-cadre et de réaliser ses objectifs.

Bien que tous les membres du comité n'aient pas les mêmes priorités ni les mêmes préférences, ils sont unanimes à regretter qu'on ait ainsi ralenti l'accroissement de l'aide au développement, parce que, comme nous l'a rappelé un homme d'affaires, M. Peter Kilburn, «le meilleur révélateur de notre volonté est le volume d'aide que nous sommes disposés à octroyer (21:11)». A la lumière de l'expérience passée, nous concluons que le Canada doit se donner des objectifs ambitieux mais réalisables et qu'il doit aussi adopter des plans réalistes en vue de les atteindre.

Bien qu'il ait été question de l'aide sur le plan quantitatif, la plupart des témoins estimaient surtout qu'on améliore la qualité de cette aide. Sur ce point, le comité estime lui aussi qu'il faut veiller en premier lieu à accroître l'efficacité de l'aide du Canada. C'est sur cette question que nous nous penchons dans les paragraphes suivants.

### *Le but de l'aide*

Beaucoup de témoins ont l'impression que l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) ne suit pas une ligne d'action cohérente parce qu'elle est tiraillée dans tous les sens par des pressions politiques et commerciales. M. Bernard Wood, directeur de l'Institut Nord-Sud, qui a réalisé des études détaillées du programme d'aide au développement, a fait observer ceci au comité :

[...] les Canadiens croient que pour aider, il faut aider. Ils ne savent pas vraiment quels ont été les résultats des programmes d'aide, et ils ont raison de se poser des questions à cet égard. Nos études et les travaux effectués par d'autres groupes ont révélé que le Canada et les autres pays donateurs ont imposé des fardeaux inacceptables aux programmes d'aide. Nous les avons rendus beaucoup moins efficaces qu'ils pourraient l'être et, parfois, ces programmes représentent même un danger pour ceux à qui ils sont offerts (21:8).

Le thème le plus souvent abordé à ce sujet est la crainte que le programme d'aide du Canada ne se transforme en un mécanisme de promotion des échanges commerciaux. Ceux qui font cette critique admettent que la promotion des échanges est une fonction essentielle, mais ils soutiennent que ses objectifs et ses méthodes sont fondamentalement différents de ceux de l'aide au développement. Dans son mémoire, M. Michael Lubbock, ancien directeur de l'Association canadienne pour l'Amérique latine, distingue ces deux programmes en fonction de leurs horizons temporels :

Si l'aide est distribuée dans le tiers monde d'une façon qui tente de remédier à l'extrême dénuement des plus pauvres, de les sortir de leur isolement économique actuel et de leur permettre de vendre, et par conséquent d'acheter, il y aura un jour de nouveaux clients pour les produits canadiens ... Mais il faut accepter que l'augmentation des clients sera longue à se matérialiser. Tout projet dont l'objet est d'obtenir des avantages à court terme pour l'économie canadienne doit être considéré comme faisant partie de l'expansion des échanges commerciaux et non de l'aide (2).

Il est essentiel de clarifier cette question d'objectif en comparant l'aide au développement et les vastes opérations du système économique international. Dans l'ensemble, le commerce et les finances sont régis par des principes où n'entrent pas en considération les inégalités économiques et la pauvreté dans le monde. Par exemple, ce sont les pays les plus pauvres, ceux qui présentent également les risques les plus élevés, auxquels on accorde le moins de prêts bancaires privés. L'aide au développement est l'un des rares mécanismes internationaux qui permettent de contre la tendance séparant nantis et démunis et de promouvoir le développement des pays et des régions les plus pauvres du monde. A une époque où l'Afrique se remet difficilement des effets

bien chez nous, notre seul souci est qu'on nous fiche la paix. Nous avons tous tendance à agir ainsi, mais nous devrions quand même essayer de nous intéresser davantage au sort les uns des autres, non seulement au Canada mais dans le monde entier (31:15).

Comme toutes les vocations, l'aide au développement a continuellement besoin d'être renouvelée et mérite qu'on se rappelle périodiquement sa raison d'être. Cette mission qui, à l'origine, était le fait de particuliers et d'ordres religieux, occupe maintenant plus de 200 organismes bénévoles au Canada, qui viennent en aide à la population du tiers monde par une multitude d'activités. Nous avons aujourd'hui une aide publique au développement qui est assurée à coups de milliards de dollars par d'importantes bureaucraties nationales et internationales. En 1951, le Canada a accordé pour 10 millions de dollars d'aide alimentaire à l'Inde; en 1986, il versera plus de 2 milliards de dollars d'aide publique au développement à des dizaines de pays. Cette croissance phénoménale s'est accompagnée de réalisations, mais aussi de questions, de critiques et de doutes. Le moment est bien choisi pour tenter de répondre à ces questions.

### *Le niveau d'aide*

Conformément à son programme de réduction des dépenses publiques, le ministre des Finances a annoncé dans son budget de février 1986 que le niveau de l'aide publique au développement demeurerait à 0,5 p. 100 du produit national brut (mesure commune utilisée par la communauté internationale pour calculer l'importance de l'aide au développement accordée par chaque pays) jusqu'à la fin de la décennie. On a donc repoussé jusqu'à l'an 2000 l'objectif qui avait été proposé par la Commission Pearson en 1969 et qui consistait à porter à 0,7 p. 100 le rapport entre le niveau d'aide et le PNB. En maintenant le rapport à 0,5 p. 100, le Canada continuera à accroître ses dépenses réelles au titre de l'aide au développement en fonction de sa croissance économique, mais le taux d'accroissement sera sensiblement moins élevé qu'il ne l'aurait été autrement. Globalement, si l'on ne tient pas compte de l'inflation et de la croissance de l'économie, l'aide publique au développement, qui a totalisé 8 milliards de dollars au cours des cinq dernières années, représentera probablement plus de 12 milliards de dollars dans les cinq prochaines années. Le niveau actuel de l'aide consentie par le Canada place celui-ci au septième rang parmi les pays qui accordent une aide au développement, après les Pays-Bas, la Norvège, le Danemark, la Suède, la Belgique et la France.

En reportant ainsi la réalisation des niveaux cibles déjà adoptés pour l'aide au développement, le gouvernement n'a fait que suivre la tendance qui se dessine depuis dix ans déjà. En 1975, le gouvernement de l'époque avait, dans le cadre de son plan quinquennal appelé *Stratégie de coopération au développement international*, réaffirmé «sa volonté d'atteindre l'objectif de 0,7 p. 100 du PNB fixé par les Nations Unies et de se rapprocher de cet objectif en augmentant annuellement la part de son PNB consacrée à l'aide publique au développement». Malgré cet engagement, la part du PNB consacrée à l'aide au développement n'a cessé de diminuer au cours des cinq années qui ont suivi, tombant de 0,56 p. 100 en 1975 à 0,42 p. 100 en 1980. Ce n'est qu'en 1984 qu'on est revenu au niveau de 0,5 p. 100.

Devant cette situation, les membres du comité ont réagi de façons très diverses. La plupart ont estimé qu'il fallait rétablir l'objectif de 0,7 p. 100 pour 1990. Certains ont dit que le gouvernement ne devrait rétablir cette aide que si ses recettes le lui permettent. D'autres ont même souhaité qu'on adopte un objectif de 1 p. 100 après 1990.



**faire en sorte que le commerce du textile et du vêtement soit régi par les règles normales du GATT.** Dans la mesure où il s'oppose à la libéralisation des échanges, le Canada fait augmenter le prix des produits visés et nuit à l'accroissement de ses exportations sur les marchés du tiers monde.

Les pratiques commerciales de certains pays en voie de développement ne sont pas sans susciter des doléances et des revendications légitimes parmi les pays industrialisés. Les plus importantes concernent le fait que les pays en développement qui ont atteint une certaine prospérité refusent de passer du régime préférentiel au régime d'échanges libéralisés d'application générale que constitue l'Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce. Ce refus a notamment pour conséquence, comme le montre l'accord multilatéral, de priver de débouchés préférentiels les plus pauvres parmi les pays en développement. Nous préconisons l'adoption d'une politique visant à encourager les pays nouvellement industrialisés qui le peuvent à renoncer aux régimes préférentiels destinés aux pays les plus pauvres et à accepter le régime du GATT.

## L'aide au développement

Dans les années 50 et 60, la coopération internationale en matière de développement se présentait surtout sous forme de programmes d'aide, mais, depuis les années 70, l'attention s'est plutôt tournée vers les relations économiques internationales. Un de nos témoins a été très catégorique là-dessus : « Pour le monde en voie de développement, nos politiques économiques sont beaucoup plus importantes que nos programmes d'aide (21:7) ». À notre avis, il s'agit là d'une attitude trop extrême, qui risque de sous-estimer l'importance considérable des programmes d'aide, notamment en ce qui concerne la politique du Canada à cet égard.

Même si elle ne compte que pour 13 p. 100 de l'investissement dans le tiers monde, l'aide au développement contribue beaucoup à financer le développement de certains des pays les plus pauvres du monde, notamment de pays d'Afrique. Elle constitue une importante source d'aide technique, laquelle répond à un besoin essentiel de bien des pays en voie de développement. Dans le cas du Canada, dont les relations commerciales avec les pays en voie de développement ne représentent qu'une part relativement faible de son commerce total, l'aide publique au développement est une composante majeure, sinon la principale, de sa politique Nord-Sud. Qui plus est, nous y voyons une vocation pour le Canada.

Nous avons constaté, en nous déplaçant d'un bout à l'autre du pays, que le désir d'aider les autres par la coopération au développement semble plus vif et plus répandu aujourd'hui qu'il ne l'a jamais été dans notre histoire. Cet esprit de coopération était évident dans les propos qu'a tenus M. Adrian Van Ekris, président du *Project Committee of Farmers Helping Farmers*, quand il a témoigné devant le comité à Charlottetown. M. Van Ekris a expliqué comment le projet était né, en 1979, d'un échange entre agriculteurs :

Des délégations de 30 pays en voie de développement se sont réunies à l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard pendant une semaine. Chaque soir, les délégués ont été invités chez les fermiers canadiens, ce qui nous a permis d'avoir un dialogue franc et d'obtenir ainsi des renseignements de première main. Le pense que ce qui m'a beaucoup surpris, c'est qu'alors que les fermiers du tiers monde étaient venus chez nous pour apprendre, nous aussi nous avons appris beaucoup de choses auprès d'eux, à ce point que j'étais moi-même parfois dépassé par ce que je venais d'entendre. On a bien entendu tendance à se dire que pour autant que tout va



monétaire international. Il souscrit également à l'objectif d'une meilleure coordination entre le Fonds monétaire international et la Banque mondiale, de manière à ce que les ajustements à court terme favorisent la reprise économique et le développement à long terme.

À l'heure actuelle, la gestion de la dette est la question la plus délicate dans les relations économiques entre pays développés et pays en développement. À plus long terme, toutefois, il faut également tenir compte du commerce. Si les pays en développement veulent croître et rembourser ne serait-ce qu'une partie de leur dette, ils devront augmenter fortement leurs recettes d'exportation. Pour cela, il faudra surtout que la croissance économique des pays industrialisés soit soutenue et que l'accès à leurs marchés soit amélioré.

Il ne fait aucun doute que les pays industrialisés ont tout à gagner à encourager le commerce. Ils trouvent en effet d'importants marchés d'exportation dans le tiers monde. D'autre part, les banques privées pourront ainsi récupérer peu à peu les sommes prêtées. Environ 30 p. 100 des produits japonais, 36 p. 100 des produits américains et 46 p. 100 des produits européens sont exportés vers l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique latine. Le Canada fait exception à la règle, car seulement 10 p. 100 de ses exportations sont acheminées vers les pays en développement. Malgré cela, l'Institut Nord-Sud en est arrivé à la conclusion que les possibilités d'exportation de l'ordre de un milliard de dollars que le Canada n'a pas exploitées entre 1981 et 1983, en Argentine, au Brésil, au Mexique et au Venezuela seulement, auraient permis de créer un nombre considérable d'emplois partout au pays (*Revue 84, Optique 85*, p. 3).

En dépit de l'importance qu'on y attache de part et d'autre, il existe bien des obstacles à l'accroissement des échanges Nord-Sud. Le principal obstacle est le protectionnisme. Les pays en voie de développement bénéficient depuis longtemps de tarifs préférentiels de la part des États avec lesquels ils traitent, mais ces tarifs sont devenus moins avantageux par suite de la réduction générale des tarifs et de la prolifération des barrières non tarifaires. Ce sont ces barrières qui entravent leurs exportations, notamment dans des secteurs importants pour eux comme la chaussure et le textile. Or, le bilan des activités du Canada à cet égard est loin d'être reluisant. Nos gouvernements ont toléré des contradictions manifestes dans leur politique, en cherchant d'une part à promouvoir le développement industriel du tiers monde grâce au programme d'aide canadien et en freinant, d'autre part, les exportations dont les pays du tiers monde ont besoin pour financer leur développement industriel.

La situation actuelle semble être le résultat aussi bien de progressions que de régressions. Le gouvernement a éliminé en grande partie le contingentement des importations de chaussures, exception faite des chaussures pour femmes et pour enfants. Cette décision laisse entrevoir une nouvelle attitude du gouvernement à l'égard des exportations du tiers monde. Par contre, on semble s'acheminer vers la signature d'un nouvel accord multilatré (régissant le commerce du vêtement et du textile) qui imposera des restrictions encore plus sévères que celles prévues par l'accord existant à l'égard des nouvelles sources d'importation. Par conséquent, les pays nouvellement industrialisés, avec leur économie prospère et leurs débouchés bien établis, pourront conserver leur part du marché au détriment de pays bien plus pauvres, comme le Bangladesh, qui cherchent désespérément à pénétrer notre marché. Nous exhortons le gouvernement canadien à insister pour que les pays en développement les plus pauvres obtiennent des quotas supérieurs en vertu de l'accord multilatré. En même temps, il faut absolument que le Canada prévoie des programmes de recyclage efficaces, de nouvelles possibilités d'emploi pour les travailleurs et des mesures visant à restructurer et à moderniser l'industrie, de manière à pouvoir éliminer graduellement l'accord et

Le message est clair. La situation actuelle ne peut plus durer. La sécurité financière du monde entier est très menacée [...]. Il n'y a pas lieu d'être complaisant. Nous avons l'impression que les gens sont de plus en plus conscients de la gravité des enjeux et des risques que présente la crise de l'endettement dans un monde interdépendant (13).

La crise ne disparaîtra pas d'elle-même, et le système bancaire est durement mis à l'épreuve. Il faut donc élaborer des principes généraux de gestion de la dette. Il faut aussi évaluer les nouvelles techniques d'allègement de la dette qui ont été proposées par les pays débiteurs et leurs créanciers, comme la conclusion d'accords de rééchelonnement pluriannuels, la remise de dette, le report des échéances, l'abolition des droits de commission, l'établissement d'un calendrier d'amortissement d'après les recettes d'exportation, la diminution des taux d'intérêt et la capitalisation des intérêts. À cette fin, le comité est d'avis qu'il faut organiser de toute urgence une conférence intergouvernementale à laquelle participeraient des représentants des pays débiteurs, des pays créanciers, des banques et des institutions financières internationales. Afin de montrer le sérieux de la crise, qui touche aussi bien les pays en développement que les pays développés, le gouvernement canadien doit encourager les pays membres de l'OCDE et d'autres pays à se prononcer en faveur d'une telle conférence.

La multiplication des investissements étrangers directs dans les pays en développement pourrait également contribuer à améliorer la situation des pays débiteurs, bien qu'il s'agisse d'une mesure à long terme. De nombreux pays du tiers monde imposent des restrictions aux investissements étrangers parce qu'ils craignent de perdre le contrôle de leur industrie. Il faudrait leur faire comprendre à quel point le savoir-faire administratif et les transferts de techniques qui accompagnent généralement ces investissements peuvent être importants pour leur développement futur. À l'heure actuelle, les multinationales hésitent à prendre les risques politiques et financiers associés à ces investissements, si bien que les investissements étrangers ont diminué dans de nombreux pays. Afin de renverser cette tendance, la Banque mondiale vient de mettre sur pied l'Agence multilatérale d'assurance des investissements. La Société financière internationale encourage elle aussi les multinationales à investir dans les pays en développement.

Il faut également trouver des solutions régionales à la question de la dette. Les pays à faible revenu d'Afrique sahélienne ont surtout pour créanciers des gouvernements étrangers et des institutions financières internationales comme le FMI et la Banque mondiale, contrairement aux pays d'Amérique latine qui sont les débiteurs de banques commerciales. D'autres pays d'Afrique ont augmenté leurs emprunts en profitant des crédits à l'exportation. Etant donné la situation désespérée qu'a entraînée la famine en Afrique, il faudra certainement accorder aux pays les plus pauvres d'Afrique la remise partielle de leur dette. Nous demandons au gouvernement d'être particulièrement attentif aux besoins des pays africains et, au sein du club de Paris et ailleurs, de souscrire aux mécanismes de gestion de la dette qui aideront ces derniers à se relever de la famine. Nous sommes heureux que le gouvernement ait annoncé à la session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies de mai 1986 qu'il avait déclaré un moratoire de 15 ans sur le remboursement des prêts du gouvernement aux pays les plus pauvres de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Nous croyons aussi qu'il serait bon que le gouvernement envisage de prolonger le moratoire sur les prêts accordés à ces mêmes pays par la Société pour l'expansion des exportations.

Il faudra accorder des ressources supplémentaires à la Banque mondiale qui, d'après le plan Baker, devra financer davantage les ajustements structurels des pays débiteurs à revenu moyen. Le comité note avec approbation que le gouvernement canadien a indiqué qu'il songeait à verser des crédits supplémentaires au Fonds



priver les pays les plus pauvres de fonds publics dont ils ont grand besoin, et qu'il fallait augmenter sensiblement l'aide publique au développement. Le groupe a également recommandé de confier un rôle beaucoup plus important aux institutions financières internationales. En outre, l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, dont font partie les pays débiteurs de l'Afrique sahélienne, tente d'obtenir la remise ou le rééchelonnement de la dette de ces derniers, de même que des subventions.

**Nous craignons que les conditions souvent difficiles imposées à de nombreux pays débiteurs pour régler le problème de la dette ne provoquent une crise grave. Les difficultés économiques auxquelles se heurtent de nombreux pays en développement exercent des pressions intolérables sur la population et les gouvernements démocratiques. Nous croyons qu'il faut de toute urgence adopter des mesures visant à mettre les pays débiteurs sur la voie de la reprise économique.**

Le plan mis de l'avant par le secrétaire du Trésor américain, M. Baker, en octobre 1985, constitue un premier pas dans cette direction. Selon le plan Baker, la Banque mondiale augmenterait de 27 milliards de dollars les prêts qu'elle octroierait aux principaux pays débiteurs au cours des trois prochaines années, tandis que les banques commerciales accorderaient pour environ 20 milliards de dollars de crédits supplémentaires durant la même période à 15 pays débiteurs désignés. On veut ainsi encourager les pays débiteurs à prendre des mesures qui favoriseront la croissance économique. La Banque mondiale a été invitée à jouer un rôle nouveau et plus important pour favoriser le redressement des économies du tiers monde.

Les gouvernements des pays industrialisés et les milieux bancaires souscrivent au plan Baker, même si, comme M. David Hillon de la Banque de la Nouvelle-Ecosse l'a déclaré au comité :

Certains économistes estiment que le financement de ce plan est insuffisant et que, même si l'on ajoute 40 milliards de dollars aux crédits accordés aux pays en développement, la situation de ces emprunteurs ne s'améliorera pas sensiblement d'ici trois ans, et la facture du service de la dette demeurera lourde, particulièrement si les nouvelles règles de politique macro-économique leur imposent de poursuivre des objectifs liés à la croissance, puisque cela fera augmenter la facture de leurs importations (23:40 et 41).

Les pays débiteurs ont accueilli favorablement le plan Baker, mais ne le trouvent pas suffisant. Onze pays lourdement endettés d'Amérique latine qui se sont groupés pour former le Consensus de Cartagena réclament la modification en profondeur des accords de prêt et, surtout, la réduction des taux d'intérêt, l'accroissement des apports financiers dans la région, la différenciation de la dette actuelle et des emprunts futurs, le plafonnement éventuel du pourcentage des recettes d'exportation affectées au service de la dette, l'augmentation sensible des ressources allouées aux organisations multilatérales de développement, la limitation des conditions d'octroi de l'aide qu'elles imposent, ainsi que la suppression des mesures protectionnistes qui empêchent les pays de la région d'exporter davantage. Un dialogue utile est en train de s'établir, mais il faudra améliorer le plan Baker.

Dans ce plan, il est prévu que la situation des pays débiteurs continuera d'être examinée cas par cas. Toutefois, un examen de cette nature donne aux pays débiteurs l'impression d'être dans une position d'infériorité vis-à-vis de leurs créanciers au cours des négociations. D'autre part, si cette façon de procéder permet de tenir compte des caractéristiques de chaque pays débiteur, elle ne permet pas de s'attarder à la crise dans toute sa gravité. Comme on le mentionne dans le rapport du Secrétariat du Common-

canadiennes à des emprunteurs peu sûrs est relativement plus élevé que celui des prêts à risques élevés consentis par des banques américaines.

Le service de la dette représente un fardeau énorme. En effet, la dette correspond à 56 p. 100 du produit intérieur brut des pays débiteurs d'Amérique latine et, l'an dernier, le remboursement de l'intérêt et du capital a totalisé plus de 60 p. 100 des recettes d'exportation. Ce sont des chiffres alarmants. Les pays les plus pauvres de l'Afrique sahélienne doivent des sommes beaucoup moins importantes, mais le fardeau de leur dette est, par comparaison, plus lourd. En outre, ils sont très tributaires des recettes tirées des exportations de produits de base, dont les prix demeurent déprimés.

Depuis 1982, on a pu éviter l'effondrement du système financier international grâce au rééchelonnement de la dette et à l'octroi de nouveaux crédits totalisant 326 milliards de dollars. Ces rééchelonnements ont été assortis de conditions sévères imposées par le Fonds monétaire international afin de favoriser un redressement économique. Selon M. John Loxley, ces conditions difficiles n'ont pas l'effet voulu et entraînent une forte diminution des importations :

Cette réduction des importations a entraîné des taux de chômage très élevés, un excédent de capacité, une austérité très dure, étant donné le repli des salaires réels et de la consommation. En général, le niveau de vie a baissé et le fardeau énorme des rajustements s'est fait sentir durement dans certaines couches de la société de ces pays-la. Notamment, on s'inquiète de plus en plus de l'incidence de ce genre de rajustements sur la santé et le bien-être des enfants (23:43).

Pire encore, les banques, qui commencent à s'essouffler, manifestent un certain pessimisme quant à la solvabilité des pays débiteurs. Au cours des deux dernières années, les sources dispensatrices de nouveau crédits se sont presque taries. Dans bien des cas, les pays qui ont désespérément besoin d'argent pour poursuivre leur développement ont dû se résoudre à effectuer des sorties nettes de capitaux.

Des sorties de capitaux se produisent non seulement quand les gouvernements remboursent leurs dettes, mais aussi lorsque des particuliers décident de placer leurs capitaux dans un pays plus sûr. En Argentine et au Mexique, par exemple, ces transferts de fonds coûtent très cher en devises. Les dépenses militaires viennent aussi aggraver le problème de la dette dans certains pays. Deux des pays qui ont connu un exode de capitaux privés, l'Argentine et les Philippines, doivent aussi assumer une dette résultant d'importants achats de matériel militaire par les anciens dictateurs.

Quelle que soit l'origine de leurs problèmes d'endettement, de nombreux pays ne prévoient pas retrouver dans un avenir immédiat les niveaux de revenu national qu'ils avaient il y a cinq ou six ans. La question est de savoir pendant combien de temps encore les pays débiteurs dont l'économie est déprimée pourront affecter des pourcentages aussi élevés de leurs recettes d'exportation au service de la dette. Quel sera le prix à payer en souffrances humaines et sur le plan de la stabilité politique?

Dans un rapport publié en 1984, le groupe d'experts du Secrétariat du Commonwealth a recommandé de mettre un terme aux sorties prématurées de ressources des pays en développement, d'octroyer une aide financière supplémentaire, de négocier des arrangements de rééchelonnement plus souples, de préserver l'intégrité du système financier international et des systèmes nationaux, sans toutefois venir à la rescousse des banques, et d'accroître les investissements étrangers directs dans les pays en développement. À propos de la situation difficile des pays en développement à faible revenu, surtout ceux d'Afrique, le groupe a indiqué que les mesures d'urgence qui pourraient être prises pour venir en aide aux pays lourdement endettés risquaient de



Ces gens risquent de devenir de plus en plus nombreux au cours des vingt prochaines années et de se concentrer dans d'immenses bidonvilles.

La double réalité de l'expansion rapide des pays du tiers monde et de la pauvreté persistante pose un problème de taille aux Canadiens. Ceux-ci doivent faire face à une concurrence nouvelle et féroce, et doivent participer à la gestion de l'économie mondiale en cherchant à renforcer l'intérêt mutuel. Ils doivent par ailleurs demeurer attentifs au problème de la pauvreté mondiale et redoubler d'ardeur pour le combattre.

## L'endettement et le commerce

Rien n'illustre mieux l'interdépendance grandissante des pays développés et des pays en développement que la crise de la dette internationale des années 80. Un pourcentage élevé des surplus de capital accumulés par les pays de l'OCPE à la suite de la hausse prononcée du prix de l'énergie dans les années 70 a été réinvesti par les banques d'Europe et d'Amérique du Nord dans un petit nombre de pays en développement considérés comme les plus solvables, en Asie et en Amérique latine. Ces pays et leurs banquiers ont cru que les recettes provenant d'une croissance économique soutenue et de la multiplication des échanges commerciaux mondiaux leur permettaient de rembourser facilement le capital d'une dette qui augmentait rapidement, de même que de payer les intérêts. L'économie mondiale a malheureusement refusé de coopérer : la récession du début des années 80 a entraîné la chute des prix de nombreux produits du tiers monde et a considérablement réduit leurs marchés. Beaucoup de pays débiteurs, surtout en Amérique latine, se sont donc retrouvés avec des obligations dépassant largement leur capacité de payer.

Il est surtout ressorti des audiences du comité consacrées au problème de l'endettement que la situation ne s'améliorait pas. Au contraire, le fardeau financier des pays en développement devient, dans la plupart des cas, de plus en plus lourd. D'autre part, on se rend progressivement compte que bon nombre de pays du tiers monde ne pourront pas assurer le service de la dette dans les années à venir, encore moins rembourser le capital. Afin d'éviter une crise grave et l'accroissement de la souffrance humaine, toutes les parties concernées doivent se concerter, qu'il s'agisse des pays débiteurs, des banques prêteuses, des pays créanciers ou des institutions financières internationales.

Les statistiques sont alarmantes. La dette totale des pays du tiers monde s'élève à près de 900 milliards de dollars, et environ la moitié de cette somme est considérée par le FMI comme un endettement problématique, ce qui signifie que les pays concernés ont été obligés de réechelonner leurs obligations ou de retarder leurs versements. Sur cette dette problématique, environ 240 milliards de dollars sont dus à des banques du système international, dont plus de 100 milliards à des banques américaines. On estime que les banques canadiennes ont des créances problématiques s'élevant à quelque vingt milliards de dollars. Ces prêts ont été consentis principalement à un groupe d'environ 20 pays, et les plus endettés sont des pays d'Amérique latine. Il faut néanmoins indiquer que les prêts consentis aux pays en développement par les banques canadiennes ne représentent qu'environ 10 p. 100 du total de leurs prêts et que ceux accordés à des pays d'Amérique latine peu solvables n'en représentent que 7 p. 100. À titre de comparaison, signons que 60 p. 100 des prêts consentis par des banques canadiennes le sont à des emprunteurs canadiens et que 30 p. 100 le sont à d'autres pays industrialisés. À l'instar des banques américaines, les banques canadiennes ont des créances qui dépassent le montant de leur capital, et le pourcentage de prêts accordés par des banques

## Le développement international

La coopération au développement est un domaine de la politique extérieure dans lequel le Canada jouit d'une excellente réputation et qui lui permet d'affirmer son indépendance. À cause de l'aide financière et du savoir-faire non négligeables qu'il met à la disposition des pays dans le besoin, le Canada peut exprimer des vues qui sont respectées à l'échelle internationale. La coopération au développement offre des possibilités rêvées aux Canadiens qui désirent améliorer le sort d'autrui et pour qui cette expérience est un enrichissement. Nous sommes tout particulièrement conscients des bienfaits de la participation au développement international pour les jeunes Canadiens dont l'idéalisme trouve tôt dans la vie des applications pratiques.

Les Canadiens ressentent depuis longtemps le besoin impérieux de venir en aide aux populations du tiers monde. Depuis l'époque de la Confédération, des églises et des groupes bénévoles canadiens s'emploient à améliorer la qualité de l'enseignement et des soins médicaux dans les Antilles, en Afrique, en Inde et dans d'autres régions du monde. Depuis 1950, année de la première conférence sur le Plan de Colombo, tous les gouvernements canadiens se sont efforcés d'encourager le développement social et économique des pays les plus pauvres du monde. Diverses raisons ont été invoquées au fil des ans, mais elles se résument finalement à ceci : la coopération au développement est une activité valable, et il est dans l'intérêt du Canada que tous les peuples de la terre vivent décemment.

La raison d'être de la coopération est simple, mais les relations entre les pays en développement et les pays développés sont de plus en plus complexes. Au cours des quarante dernières années, le tiers monde a subi de profondes transformations et s'est diversifié au point de ne plus correspondre exactement à la définition qu'on lui donnait. C'est pourquoi la Banque mondiale établit désormais une distinction entre pays en développement à faible revenu, à revenu moyen et à revenu supérieur. Parmi les pays à revenu supérieur, souvent appelés pays nouvellement industrialisés, se trouvent quelques-unes des économies les plus compétitives et les plus dynamiques au monde.

Malgré tous ces changements, la dure réalité de la pauvreté demeure présente en Afrique et dans certaines régions de l'Asie et de l'Amérique latine. Certes, des progrès considérables ont été accomplis dans des domaines comme la nutrition, l'enseignement et les soins de santé, mais des millions d'êtres humains n'arrivent pas encore à subvenir à leurs besoins essentiels, c'est-à-dire à se nourrir, à se loger et à se vêtir correctement.



Les Européens ont été les premiers à prendre conscience des possibilités commerciales du Canada, et les exigences du marché européen ont laissé une marque encore visible sur l'activité commerciale du Canada. Durant l'après-guerre, l'essor de l'économie américaine a aiguillonné l'économie canadienne, et la prépondérance des liens commerciaux canado-américains a été fermement établie. Toutefois, à l'approche de la fin du siècle, le Canada pourrait fort bien avoir à subir une épreuve très difficile en tant que nation commerçante sur les marchés extrêmement concurrentiels de l'Asie.

plus d'importance que nos rapports avec la Chine. Le Canada est déjà uni à l'Inde par de nombreux liens, à partir desquels il pourra consolider ses rapports avec ce pays. Ainsi, il y a plus de quarante ans que l'Inde bénéficie du programme canadien d'aide au développement, et il y a encore plus longtemps que les missionnaires canadiens y exercent leur activité. En outre, parmi nos marchés d'exportation, l'Inde est le quatorzième en importance et elle arrive bonne troisième dans la région, après le Japon et la Chine. Enfin, c'est de l'Inde que nous viennent le plus grand nombre de nos immigrants. **De l'avis du comité, le gouvernement devrait chercher plus énergiquement à tirer parti des liens entre le Canada et l'Inde pour accroître les échanges et les investissements bilatéraux.**



Depuis le rétablissement des liens diplomatiques en 1970, les relations sino-canadiennes se sont beaucoup diversifiées. Les échanges sont nombreux dans les domaines des arts, des sciences et de la technologie, de l'éducation, de la médecine, des sports, des médias, du tourisme, de l'agriculture et de l'industrie. Plus de 1 000 étudiants et universitaires chinois fréquentent actuellement des universités et des collèges communautaires canadiens. Il y a eu plusieurs visites officielles, dans les deux pays, dont le récent voyage à Pékin du premier ministre, lors duquel il a rencontré l'artisan des réformes économiques chinois, M. Deng Xiaoping. L'assise des relations économiques, qui continueront vraisemblablement de croître, est solidement établie. Après bien des hésitations, la Chine s'est enfin décidée à donner suite à ses plans de développement économique dans le domaine de l'énergie, des transports, des communications et de la modernisation de certaines industries; certaines sociétés canadiennes possèdent les compétences et l'expérience nécessaires pour participer à leur mise en œuvre.

La Chine a montré à plusieurs occasions qu'elle était prête à s'ouvrir à l'Occident. Cette volonté s'est surtout manifestée dans le cas de Hong Kong, qui doit revenir à la Chine en 1997. Au cours des négociations à ce sujet avec le Royaume-Uni, la Chine s'est dite prête à accorder une grande liberté économique à Hong Kong et à lui permettre de demeurer un important entrepôt pour le commerce entre la Chine et le reste du monde.

D'autre part, on a pu constater certains signes de modération dans la politique chinoise envers Taiwan. Le Canada pourrait saisir l'occasion pour examiner ses relations avec Taiwan, qui est son quinzième marché d'exportation par ordre d'importance. Le Canada n'a pas de liens diplomatiques avec Taiwan, mais, contrairement à beaucoup d'autres pays, il ne possède pas de mécanisme pour assurer aux exportateurs éventuels les services gouvernementaux habituels comme l'information sur les marchés et les conseils en matière de documentation. D'autres pays entretiennent des relations bilatérales avec Taiwan par l'entremise de bureaux commerciaux privés, souvent administrés par la chambre de commerce nationale. Des témoins ont proposé que le gouvernement canadien fasse de même, sans toutefois modifier pour autant sa position officielle vis-à-vis de la République populaire de Chine. Le sinologue M. William Saywell nous a dit :

Pour ce qui est des relations officielles avec Taiwan, nous sommes montrés des plus circonspects (51:73).

Par conséquent, le comité recommande au gouvernement d'encourager le secteur privé canadien à ouvrir un bureau à Taiwan afin d'aider les entreprises canadiennes à établir des liens commerciaux dans ce pays. Cela peut et devrait se faire de façon à ne pas nuire à nos excellentes relations avec la République populaire de Chine.

Parmi les pays d'Asie et du Pacifique qui risquent d'être négligés, le comité estime que l'Inde mérite une mention particulière. En effet, il existe un écart important entre l'image de pauvreté et de sous-développement que les Canadiens se font de ce pays et ses réalisations, ses aptitudes et ses capacités réelles. Peu de gens savent que l'Inde est devenue ces dernières années un exportateur net de denrées alimentaires. D'autre part, on trouve en Inde un secteur industriel moderne, qui est le neuvième au monde, de même qu'un vaste marché de consommation aux besoins très nombreux. L'Inde est peut-être le seul grand pays en développement qui puisse se permettre des investissements majeurs puisqu'elle ne souffre pas d'un endettement massif; c'est aussi l'un des pays qui ont les meilleures perspectives de croissance économique pour la prochaine décennie. Il se peut que, d'ici le début du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, nos relations avec l'Inde aient

Canadiens pour l'enseignement de l'anglais comme langue seconde, parce qu'on trouve leur accent « neutre ». Par conséquent, le comité demande instamment au gouvernement de mettre sur pied, de concert avec le Japon et d'autres pays d'Asie, un programme permettant aux diplômés des universités canadiennes d'aller enseigner l'anglais dans ces pays, sur une base volontaire. Un programme de ce genre permet déjà à des Canadiens d'enseigner l'anglais en France depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale; il pourrait servir de modèle. La présence d'enseignants canadiens dans ces pays nous permettrait de mieux faire connaître notre pays dans une région du monde qui n'en a pas beaucoup entendu parler. Et surtout, les volontaires qui iraient là-bas en reviendraient avec des connaissances linguistiques, une expérience du milieu et peut-être même des contacts personnels qui, à leur retour au Canada, augmenteraient leurs chances de trouver un emploi dans des entreprises désireuses d'établir des liens commerciaux avec ces pays.

L'absence de liens personnels avec des gens d'affaires des pays d'Asie et du Pacifique n'est pas le seul obstacle auquel doivent faire face les sociétés canadiennes. En effet, dans la plupart de ces pays, on perçoit le Canada comme une mine géante ou un immense grenier, et on ne se rend pas compte de nos réalisations industrielles et technologiques. Tout en reconnaissant l'importance de nos ressources agricoles et minières, le comité estime que la région offre aux sociétés canadiennes qui veulent s'y implanter toutes sortes de possibilités dans des domaines très variés, allant des produits électroniques au génie, en passant par les services bancaires. Il est donc important de faire mieux connaître dans les pays d'Asie et du Pacifique la compétence canadienne dans ces domaines; il faudrait pour ce faire que les gouvernements, les entreprises et les associations d'affaires intensifient leurs efforts et coordonnent mieux leur activité.

Il existe des perspectives intéressantes dans la région dynamique et en mutation de l'Asie et du Pacifique. Le Japon, qui est le plus important partenaire commercial du Canada dans la région, vient évidemment en tête de liste. Il reste des obstacles à surmonter pour y vendre des produits manufacturés, mais les entreprises canadiennes devront surtout s'efforcer d'y pénétrer le marché naissant des services. La Corée vient au deuxième rang. La voiture *Pony* fabriquée par la société coréenne Hyundai a connu un immense succès au Canada, et les investissements et les échanges bilatéraux entre les deux pays poursuivront sans doute leur essor. De plus, même si les six pays membres de l'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (l'Indonésie, les Philippines, la Malaisie, Singapour, Brunei et la Thaïlande) ont récemment connu des difficultés, ils offrent, à plus long terme, d'importants débouchés. Les relations commerciales entre le Canada et les pays de l'Asie du Sud-Est ne profiteront d'une reprise éventuelle de l'économie dans cette région que dans la mesure où on aura déjà établi des contacts d'affaires. Le Canada aurait aussi intérêt à se montrer plus réceptif aux efforts que font ces pays pour avoir davantage accès à notre marché. Cette question fait actuellement l'objet d'une étude de l'Institut Nord-Sud (à Ottawa) et de son homologue asiatique, l'Institut des études sur le Sud-Est asiatique.

L'ouverture graduelle de l'économie chinoise au reste du monde est extrêmement importante pour le Canada. Le gouvernement chinois semble résolu à favoriser la croissance en encourageant le développement d'une économie dans laquelle l'entreprise privée jouera un rôle important. Tous les pays développés du monde ont envoyé des missions commerciales en Chine dans l'espoir de décrocher des contrats sur ce marché de plus d'un milliard d'habitants. La concurrence y est extrêmement féroce, mais le Canada bénéficie d'un léger avantage. En effet, les Canadiens sont très bien considérés par les Chinois, surtout parce que le Canada a reconnu officiellement la République populaire de Chine avant les États-Unis.

la région, soit mettre sur pied des programmes de formation destinés à développer ces compétences parmi leur personnel. Le nombre croissant d'immigrants canadiens originaires des différents pays de cette région constitue une réserve de talent inexploitée. Ces immigrants et leurs enfants sont le plus souvent des membres de professions libérales très instruits ou des gens d'affaires expérimentés qui continuent à entretenir des liens avec leur pays d'origine. Ainsi, à l'occasion de la visite commerciale organisée par la ville de Toronto dans la ville de Chongqing, plusieurs Canadiens d'origine chinoise ont fourni un apport inestimable en aidant les participants à établir des contacts. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus les étudiants originaires de ces pays qui sont inscrits dans des universités canadiennes. Ces deux groupes pourraient jouer un rôle important dans la promotion des liens commerciaux entre le Canada et la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique puisqu'ils ont à la fois des liens avec cette région et une expérience directe des produits et des compétences que peut offrir le Canada.

Deuxièmement, le gouvernement canadien devra travailler en étroite collaboration avec les entreprises canadiennes afin d'établir des liens commerciaux avec les pays de l'Asie et du Pacifique. Il devra notamment accorder un financement concurrentiel aux exportateurs et appuyer leurs efforts de commercialisation en faisant appel à ses délégués commerciaux et à ses ambassadeurs, et en prévoyant à l'occasion des visites de ministres dans cette région. Ainsi, le voyage qu'a effectué récemment le premier ministre dans plusieurs pays de la région a contribué à y relever l'image du Canada. Etant donné les rapports étroits qu'entretiennent les milieux d'affaires et les autorités gouvernementales dans ces sociétés, la stratégie commerciale qu'adoptera le Canada appellera une plus grande collaboration entre le gouvernement, les dirigeants d'entreprise et les organisations commerciales de notre pays.

Sans oublier pour autant l'importance des liens économiques et politiques, il faudra aussi déployer des efforts à un troisième niveau, c'est-à-dire sur le plan culturel, si nous voulons assoier solidement nos rapports avec cette région. Il est important d'améliorer la compréhension entre notre société et les diverses cultures de la région du Pacifique. Pour ce faire, il faudra favoriser l'établissement de contacts personnels au moyen de programmes d'échanges s'adressant aussi bien à des étudiants qu'à des adultes venant de différents milieux. Il faudra aussi diffuser des connaissances sur ces sociétés grâce à des programmes d'éducation et à des services d'information destinés aux entreprises, aux médias et à tous les intéressés. Après avoir entendu le vice-président des affaires pédagogiques et culturelles de la toute nouvelle Fondation Asie-Pacifique du Canada, le comité estime que celle-ci est en mesure de jouer ce rôle et qu'elle pourra compléter les services déjà assurés par d'autres organisations (par exemple, l'Institut commercial Asie-Pacifique dont la création est encore plus récente, et le Comité canadien du Conseil économique du bassin du Pacifique) et stimuler l'activité dans des régions encore inexploitées. Le comité croit que la Fondation pourra réaliser cet objectif à la manière de la Fondation Australie-Japon, dont les activités sont devenues un véritable modèle des moyens à prendre pour amener deux pays à mieux comprendre leurs particularités culturelles respectives. Il espère toutefois qu'elle mettra son énergie et ses ressources au service des initiatives locales et saura éviter les écueils des programmes qui sont trop abstraits et trop généraux pour régler les aspects pratiques des relations entre le Canada et l'Asie.

Il est important que davantage de Canadiens nés ici connaissent les langues et les cultures de l'Extrême-Orient. Aussi certains témoins ont-ils recommandé d'envoyer de jeunes Canadiens enseigner l'anglais dans divers pays d'Asie. En effet, le Japon et d'autres pays de la région où l'on ne parle pas l'anglais aimeraient que cette langue y soit plus répandue, mais n'ont pas assez de professeurs. Or, on aime bien faire appel aux



à l'étranger pourrait inciter de jeunes Canadiens à faire carrière dans le commerce international et permettre ainsi au Canada de devenir un pays commerçant plus dynamique.

## La diversification des échanges commerciaux

Toute discussion sur les mesures d'expansion des exportations aboutit naturellement à la question de savoir quels sont les marchés les plus prometteurs. Selon le comité, c'est vers la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique que doivent être orientés la plupart des efforts des secteurs public et privé. Depuis le dernier examen de la politique extérieure du Canada, il y a quinze ans, la croissance économique des pays de l'Asie et du Pacifique a été plus rapide que celle du monde entier. Cette région est en voie de devenir un centre important de l'activité économique mondiale et en tant que nation du Pacifique, le Canada prend peu à peu conscience de son importance. Comme l'a déclaré M. Jan Walls de la Fondation Asie-Pacifique du Canada :

Il faudra attendre que la vision traditionnelle des Canadiens change et que leur attention se détourne de l'Europe pour englober l'Asie et le Pacifique (51:55).

Les Canadiens ne sont peut-être pas tout à fait conscients de l'importance de nos liens avec cette région, mais il suffit de prendre quelques statistiques pour voir à quel point la situation a évolué. En 1982, la valeur des échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et la région du Pacifique a été supérieure pour la première fois à celle de nos échanges avec l'Europe de l'Ouest. En outre, il y a dix ans, le nombre d'immigrants provenant de la région du Pacifique a dépassé celui des immigrants d'origine européenne et cette tendance a toutes les chances de se maintenir. La percée qu'ont effectuée certains pays de la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique sur le plan commercial constitue l'un des changements les plus importants survenus dans le système des échanges internationaux. On connaît bien les réalisations du Japon et de la Corée du Sud, mais on ignore généralement que l'Inde est maintenant le neuvième pays manufacturier au monde et que Taïwan est le troisième partenaire commercial du Canada dans la région du Pacifique.

De l'avis du comité, cette région mérite une attention accrue de la part des Canadiens. Cependant, il faut bien se rendre compte que nous ne pourrions pénétrer ce marché que dans la mesure où nous parviendrons à adopter des techniques et des attitudes différentes de celles qui nous ont bien servis sur les marchés traditionnels et plus familiers des États-Unis et de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Premièrement, les différences culturelles et linguistiques représentent un défi de taille pour les exportateurs canadiens; ainsi, il faut se garder de sous-estimer l'importance des contacts personnels, car les entreprises de cette partie du monde s'attendent à un service plus personnel que les milieux d'affaires nord-américains. Deuxièmement, il est onéreux d'établir des relations commerciales avec ces pays étant donné le coût élevé du transport et la nécessité de faire plusieurs visites avant d'en arriver à une entente. Troisièmement, le Canada a mis beaucoup de temps à reconnaître l'importance de cette région. Si l'on ajoute à tous ces facteurs l'absence de liens historiques entre le Canada et les pays de la région, on constate que les entreprises canadiennes devront faire face à une vive concurrence afin d'y obtenir des contrats.

**Pour réussir à pénétrer le marché de l'Asie et du Pacifique, il faudra faire des efforts à plusieurs niveaux. Premièrement, les entreprises canadiennes devront développer des liens personnels avec des clients possibles de l'Asie et du Pacifique.** Elles devront soit recruter des candidats connaissant déjà les langues et les cultures de



pratique a tendance à semer la confusion dans les pays bénéficiaires, car la plupart sont des Etats unitaires qui ne comprennent pas toujours très bien comment fonctionne la promotion des échanges commerciaux dans un Etat fédéral. Il conviendrait donc que le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces coordonnent mieux leurs activités dans ce domaine. Ce type de collaboration est déjà prévu dans un accord conclu entre le Québec et le gouvernement fédéral au sujet de l'immigration. En vertu d'un régime de partage des coûts, des fonctionnaires de la province travaillent dans certaines ambassades. Dans leurs activités, ils tiennent compte des intérêts du gouvernement fédéral, mais ils relèvent des autorités provinciales. Le comité, recommandant que des accords analogues soient conclus entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces au sujet de la promotion et de l'expansion du commerce extérieur.

Nous pensons qu'il serait extrêmement intéressant d'utiliser des missions commerciales municipales, des échanges culturels et éducatifs et le jumelage de villes pour développer nos relations commerciales. Rassembler des gens d'affaires et des représentants d'une ville canadienne et des homologues d'une ville étrangère est un excellent moyen de susciter des débats très concrets, en partie parce que les délégués de chaque pays ont déjà l'habitude de faire affaires entre eux et sont donc en mesure de conjuguer leurs forces pour présenter des offres globales. Ce type d'échanges permettrait ainsi d'aborder des questions importantes comme les services de transport en commun municipaux et les services d'éducation et d'ouvrir des portes aux petites et moyennes entreprises qui ne sont généralement pas représentées dans les missions commerciales internationales de plus grande envergure.

Le jumelage fait depuis longtemps partie intégrante de la stratégie commerciale des villes japonaises. En revanche, les municipalités canadiennes ont relativement peu d'expérience de la promotion et du développement des exportations et elles ont tendance à considérer le jumelage comme une activité de relations publiques. On observe cependant des signes encourageants qui témoignent de l'évolution des attitudes. La ville de Toronto a envoyé récemment une mission commerciale dans la ville chinoise de Chongqing avec laquelle elle est jumelée. Ce fut une grande réussite qui a sensibilisé les villes canadiennes à de nouvelles perspectives commerciales intéressantes. Nous sommes convaincus que les liens commerciaux les plus importants se forment au niveau où des accords commerciaux peuvent être conclus. Nous estimons que les liens entre villes sont une dimension des relations commerciales internationales offrant des perspectives nouvelles et passionnantes qu'il faut activement explorer.

Même si l'économie canadienne est l'une des plus ouvertes au monde et si les Canadiens exportent beaucoup, il reste que nous n'avons pas suffisamment de spécialistes du commerce international. Il faut nous préparer si nous voulons continuer de soutenir la concurrence dans l'avenir. Nous manquons de gens connaissant bien l'économie, et en particulier les exportations. A cet égard, on pourrait notamment encourager les établissements d'enseignement secondaire et postsecondaire à mettre sur pied des programmes destinés à former davantage d'étudiants dans les divers secteurs du commerce international. Il serait cependant encore plus important que les sociétés embauchent des jeunes et les encouragent à se perfectionner dans ce domaine en les envoyant travailler dans leurs filiales ou sociétés affiliées à l'étranger. En particulier, les sociétés qui décrochent de gros contrats à l'étranger et qui bénéficient de l'aide du gouvernement devraient employer de nouveaux diplômés afin d'augmenter, chez elles et dans tout le Canada, le nombre des personnes bien au fait des échanges internationaux. De son côté, le gouvernement devrait faire son possible pour aider à compiler un recueil des possibilités d'emploi à l'étranger pour les jeunes Canadiens. Il existe en effet une réserve inexploitée de jeunes que ce genre d'emplois intéresserait. Un emploi

produits en échange, et non de l'argent. Les exportateurs canadiens n'ont pas beaucoup l'habitude du commerce de contrepartie, en raison surtout du volume relativement faible des échanges entre le Canada et les pays en développement. Cependant, comme beaucoup de pays en développement manquent sans doute de devises pendant encore un certain temps, il faudra que les exportateurs canadiens apprennent à mieux connaître ce type de mécanisme. Le gouvernement peut aider les sociétés canadiennes à cet égard en devenant un centre de collecte et de diffusion d'informations sur les possibilités de commerce de contrepartie et sur l'évolution de ce type d'échanges.

Quand on étudie les exportations canadiennes à destination des pays en développement, il faut être conscient de l'inégalité du développement économique de ces pays. À titre d'exemple, des pays comme la Corée du Sud, Singapour, le Brésil et l'Argentine, qui sont de plus en plus actifs sur les marchés mondiaux, sont des cibles pleines de promesse. Par contre, les pays les plus pauvres du monde ne sauraient se passer de l'aide publique au développement.

Entre ces deux extrêmes, on trouve des pays comme l'Inde, la Chine et l'Algérie, dont le potentiel économique est considérable, mais qui ont aussi des problèmes graves et persistants. Le Canada est désavantagé sur ces marchés parce que ses concurrents sont prêts à offrir suffisamment de formules de crédit mixte, c'est-à-dire des prêts commerciaux ordinaires et des prêts à des conditions de faveur, pour décrocher des contrats. Les conditions consenties par ces pays sont plus intéressantes que celles que peut offrir le Canada, qui perd ainsi des contrats. Le Canada n'a jamais aimé combiner aide et commerce, car les objectifs du développement ne se marient pas toujours très bien aux intérêts commerciaux. Par exemple, en raison de son mandat, l'ACDI s'intéresse surtout aux pays en développement les plus pauvres, alors que les impératifs du commerce nous dicteraient plutôt de financer surtout les projets exécutés dans des pays en développement jouissant d'un revenu plus élevé. Actuellement, l'ACDI et la Société pour l'expansion des exportations administrèrent des programmes grâce auxquels des prêts sont consentis à des conditions de faveur aux exportateurs canadiens. Dans le dernier budget fédéral, on a supprimé le mécanisme de commerce extérieur et de développement de l'ACDI, selon lequel une partie de l'augmentation des fonds du programme d'aide aurait été consacrée au financement de projets de développement présentant un intérêt pour les entreprises canadiennes.

Nous comprenons bien pourquoi, surtout en période de compressions budgétaires, on s'efforce de garantir l'efficacité des sommes consacrées à l'aide. Il reste que le Canada passe à côté d'importantes possibilités de vente sur de grands marchés du tiers monde parce qu'il n'est pas aussi disposé que ses concurrents à combiner financement commercial et prêts à des conditions de faveur. À cet égard, le comité recommande que le gouvernement continue d'étudier les modalités de financement des exportations à des conditions de faveur pour que les exportateurs canadiens ne soient pas défavorisés, sur le plan de la concurrence, par les mécanismes de financement des autres pays.

Le comité a également été à même de constater que les gouvernements provinciaux participaient de plus en plus à la promotion et à l'expansion des exportations. Plusieurs provinces ont ouvert des bureaux commerciaux à l'étranger, et de plus en plus de gouvernements provinciaux paraissent des missions commerciales chargées de découvrir de nouveaux débouchés. Cette situation nouvelle n'est pas sans importance, car elle a à coup sûr des retombées avantageuses pour les exportations du Canada. Cependant, il n'y a aucune coordination entre les nombreuses missions commerciales envoyées à l'étranger, ce qui entraîne parfois des doubles emplois. De plus, cette



contrat d'exportation. En effet, d'autres facteurs tout aussi importants relèvent de l'entreprise elle-même : le prix et la qualité des produits, les modalités de livraison, la fiabilité et la réputation de l'entreprise, la connaissance du marché, le service après vente et l'aptitude à procéder à des transferts de techniques par des contrats de fabrication sous licence, des coentreprises et des investissements directs. Les mécanismes de financement des exportations ne jouent pas un grand rôle dans les échanges entre pays industrialisés, mais ils sont importants dans les rapports commerciaux avec les pays du tiers monde ou de l'Europe de l'Est, dont les possibilités sont limitées en raison de l'insuffisance de l'épargne intérieure, du manque de réserves en devises et de l'accès restreint à des marchés financiers privés.

La concurrence internationale est de plus en plus vive sur les marchés d'exportation. Selon nous, si le Canada veut y consolider sa position, le gouvernement doit offrir aux exportateurs canadiens des programmes de financement concurrentiels par rapport à ceux d'autres pays. Comme les taux d'intérêt sont plus élevés au Canada que dans d'autres grands pays exportateurs comme le Japon et l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, le Canada doit surmonter un obstacle de plus. D'autre part, plusieurs gouvernements, en particulier celui de la France, appuient leurs exportations au moyen d'une aide financière extrêmement généreuse, ce qui entraîne périodiquement des « guerres » de subventions. Même si l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques tente de faire plafonner le niveau des subventions à l'exportation, les gens d'affaires canadiens s'estiment encore désavantagés sur les marchés internationaux. Le financement des exportations coûte cher, et le Canada n'est pas en mesure de rivaliser avec les grands pays exportateurs à ce chapitre. Cependant, comme l'a fait remarquer la Chambre de commerce du Canada :

Il est certes contraignant que de plus en plus de pays subventionnent le financement des exportations, mais si nous voulons rester dans la course, nous devons affronter la réalité et mettre sur pied des mécanismes de financement concurrentiels (12).

Il conviendrait également de s'interroger sur les moyens à prendre pour multiplier nos échanges commerciaux avec les pays en développement, car le Canada y effectue une part bien moins grande de ses échanges totaux que tous les autres pays industrialisés. Des raisons d'ordre historique et culturel expliquent cette différence. En effet, le Canada n'a avec ces pays aucun des liens traditionnels associés à l'époque coloniale et aux sociétés commerciales dont bénéficiaient certains de ses concurrents européens. D'autre part, comme le Canada a une économie fondée sur les ressources naturelles, il entre en concurrence avec des pays en développement pour certains produits. Enfin, le Canada n'a pas la puissance industrielle de pays comme les Etats-Unis et ne peut pas aussi facilement conclure des contrats de vente clés en main. Certaines entreprises canadiennes tentent actuellement de faire une percée dans ce domaine.

On ne peut pas parler des mesures à prendre pour promouvoir les exportations du Canada dans les pays du tiers monde sans d'abord parler des problèmes d'endettement avec lesquels sont aux prises la plupart de ces pays. Cette question est analysée en détail au chapitre VII, mais comme il existe un lien direct entre l'endettement des pays du tiers monde et nos échanges commerciaux avec eux, il est utile d'en faire mention ici. Le problème se résume en quelques mots : ces pays n'ont tout simplement pas les moyens d'acheter des produits canadiens parce qu'ils doivent consacrer une grande partie de leurs ressources au remboursement de leur dette, principal et intérêts. Pour les aider à résorber un peu leur problème de devises, le Canada pourrait envisager de lever certaines des barrières qui limitent leurs exportations au Canada. Il y a aussi une deuxième voie, le commerce de contrepartie. Synonyme de troc, le commerce de contrepartie est constitué de transactions où le vendeur d'un produit reçoit d'autres

collecte et de diffusion d'informations sur le marché. Le comité est d'avis qu'il faut encourager le secteur privé à collaborer avec le gouvernement à la diffusion de renseignements sur les débouchés à l'étranger.

Les milliers de Canadiens qui voyagent à l'étranger voient fréquemment des occasions d'accroître les échanges commerciaux du Canada. Des gens d'affaires qui participent à des missions commerciales pour leur compagnie ou leur secteur industriel voient souvent des possibilités d'accroître le commerce dans d'autres secteurs. Généralement ces Canadiens n'ont pas le temps ou les moyens de mettre ces projets à exécution, mais ils aimeraient en faire part à d'autres qui pourraient les réaliser. Pour favoriser l'exploitation de ce potentiel latent, le comité propose qu'on établisse une ligne téléphonique spéciale pour recevoir des idées et des suggestions en matière de commerce. Le numéro de téléphone pourrait figurer sur les brochures que les douanes canadiennes distribuent régulièrement aux voyageurs des lignes aériennes. Le comité recommande que soit établie une ligne téléphonique spéciale pour recueillir les suggestions du public sur les possibilités commerciales qui peuvent se présenter.

Le Service des délégués commerciaux s'est bâti une solide réputation auprès des entreprises canadiennes qui veulent exporter leurs produits. Ses membres s'emploient notamment à trouver de nouveaux débouchés, à mettre en contact des entreprises canadiennes et des acheteurs éventuels, à aider les gens d'affaires canadiens à se trouver un représentant dans le pays d'exportation, et à préparer des rapports économiques et financiers. Les gens d'affaires canadiens craignent cependant que les délégués commerciaux ne deviennent progressivement des généralistes du service extérieur, à cause de l'incorporation de la fonction «commerce extérieur» au ministère des Affaires extérieures. Pour le moment, rien ne permet de conclure que cela pose de gros problèmes, mais le risque existe, et il sera important de continuer à faire passer les délégués commerciaux par une filière distincte.

La répartition géographique des délégués commerciaux inquiète également le secteur privé. Nous sommes d'accord avec les témoins selon lesquels c'est surtout dans les pays où les débouchés sont nombreux que nous avons besoin de ces délégués, quand ils peuvent aider les exportateurs à surmonter les obstacles culturels et linguistiques. En conséquence, nous recommandons d'affecter davantage de délégués commerciaux dans la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique, quitte à réduire au besoin leur nombre en Europe. Selon le comité, l'ouverture de missions commerciales à Shanghai, Osaka et Bombay, que l'on a annoncée récemment, devrait dans une certaines mesure répondre à ces besoins.

L'aide financière est le troisième volet de la politique d'expansion des exportations. Des représentants des milieux d'affaires ont fait des commentaires élogieux sur le Programme de développement des marchés d'exportation dans le cadre duquel le gouvernement assume une part des dépenses engagées pour développer de nouveaux marchés. Malgré les restrictions budgétaires annoncées par le gouvernement, le Programme de développement des marchés d'exportation doit être conservé et il conviendrait même de prendre des mesures spéciales pour en élargir le champ d'application afin qu'il s'applique aux entreprises d'experts-conseils, aux sociétés d'ingénierie et aux sociétés de services qui, en général, ne peuvent pas en bénéficier à l'heure actuelle.

C'est la Société pour l'expansion des exportations qui offre les principaux programmes de financement direct des exportations, dont bénéficient moins de 5 pour 100 des exportations canadiennes. Il convient de souligner que le financement des exportations n'est qu'un des éléments qui font qu'une entreprise gagne ou perd un



modernisation et de restructuration deviennent plutôt des moyens de maintenir en vie certaines industries et de retarder des améliorations bien nécessaires ou la décision de fermer des usines. Il faut reconnaître que certaines stratégies d'adaptation se sont soldées par le gaspillage de derniers publics, alors que cela aurait été moins coûteux et moins douloureux pour toutes les parties si le gouvernement n'était pas intervenu massivement. Les entreprises ne devraient recevoir une aide temporaire que si elles peuvent vraiment améliorer leur compétitivité dans les délais prescrits. Certaines sociétés, comme *Electrohome Ltd.*, ont en fait été incitées à restructurer leurs opérations, avec succès d'ailleurs, sachant très bien que l'aide publique n'aurait qu'un temps. Une politique de restructuration qui permet à une compagnie de passer d'un secteur à un autre peut aussi être valable, mais elle nécessite souvent une aide gouvernementale à longue échéance. Une aide à long terme peut aussi se justifier lorsque la situation est complexe ou lorsqu'il y a peu de solutions de rechange.

Deuxièmement, les programmes de transition doivent être axés principalement sur les travailleurs obligés de se chercher un nouvel emploi. Il faut encourager ces derniers à se recycler. Une aide financière doit leur être fournie parce que le système scolaire n'est pas adapté aux besoins des adultes qui sont déjà sur le marché du travail et parce que les entreprises hésitent généralement à offrir des programmes de recyclage à cause de leur coût. D'autre part, les travailleurs mis à pied devraient pouvoir bénéficier d'un revenu d'appoint au cours de leur période de recyclage et lorsqu'ils doivent se réinstaller dans une nouvelle localité.

Nous ne saurions trop insister sur les avantages d'un programme global d'aide à la réorientation pour la politique commerciale. Il faut mettre en place des mécanismes visant à faciliter le processus d'adaptation afin que tous les intéressés aient confiance dans l'orientation que prend l'économie et soient prêts à faire face au changement.

## L'expansion des exportations

Pour être véritablement efficace, toute politique d'expansion des exportations visant à aider les gens d'affaires canadiens à saisir toutes les occasions d'exporter doit comporter trois volets, à savoir la diffusion de renseignements commerciaux, le concours du Service des délégués commerciaux et l'octroi d'une aide financière.

Les entreprises canadiennes ont besoin de renseignements sur les débouchés à l'étranger. Cette information est particulièrement importante pour les petites et moyennes entreprises qui hésitent à s'aventurer hors des marchés des États-Unis et de l'Europe de l'Ouest qu'elles connaissent bien, soit parce qu'elles ne savent pas qu'il existe des débouchés ailleurs, soit parce qu'elles manquent tout simplement d'audace. Mais il ne suffit pas de recueillir ces renseignements; il faut aussi les communiquer au plus grand nombre d'entreprises possible au moyen, par exemple, de colloques, de publications et de bases de données facilement accessibles et continuellement mises à jour. Or, cette tâche ne saurait incomber au seul gouvernement. Ainsi, les gens d'affaires de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et de Hong Kong ont trouvé des moyens de renseigner les exportateurs éventuels sur les débouchés commerciaux qu'offre leur pays. Au Canada, d'importants organismes du secteur privé comme la Chambre de commerce du Canada, l'Association canadienne d'exportation et l'Association des manufacturiers canadiens ont mis en place, à l'intention de leurs membres, des réseaux d'information qui pourraient fort bien être élargis. S'il y avait plus de représentants de sociétés canadiennes de transport de marchandises à l'étranger, ils pourraient jouer un rôle utile en servant de réseau de

de la formation. Le patronat obtiendra des résultats encore meilleurs s'il permet aux employés de détenir des intérêts dans leur entreprise, car la motivation de ces derniers compte pour beaucoup dans le succès de l'entreprise. De leur côté, les salariés doivent se montrer plus favorables au recyclage, étant donné les changements économiques et les progrès technologiques. D'autre part, s'ils veulent améliorer la productivité, le patronat et les syndicats doivent manifester un plus grand esprit de collaboration.

Nous tenons particulièrement à souligner que les progrès technologiques réalisés à l'étranger procurent des avantages dont il faut profiter. Étant donné la petitesse du marché canadien, l'adoption de techniques mises au point à l'étranger est tout aussi importante que la création de nouvelles techniques. À cet égard, les investissements étrangers au Canada jouent un rôle fort utile dans la diffusion de techniques et d'innovations mises au point ailleurs et exportables. Le gouvernement doit cependant favoriser la circulation des renseignements concernant de nouveaux produits et procédés en encourageant les accords de licence et les coentreprises surtout parmi les petites et moyennes entreprises, pour que ces renseignements profitent à l'économie dans son ensemble. Le gouvernement pourrait faciliter ce processus en augmentant les responsabilités du ministère des Affaires extérieures dans le domaine des sciences et de la technologie. Nous pensons que le ministère doit continuer d'aider les ambassades canadiennes à évaluer les innovations techniques étrangères qui pourraient être utiles à l'industrie canadienne.

Comme nous l'avons vu, la compétitivité consiste en grande partie à savoir tirer profit rapidement de l'évolution du commerce mondial, par suite des changements dans les préférences des consommateurs, des innovations techniques ou de la signature de nouvelles ententes commerciales. Il faut pour ce faire accélérer la réorientation de la main-d'œuvre et du capital des secteurs de l'économie qui sont en perte de vitesse vers des secteurs en expansion où les profits peuvent être plus élevés.

Il faut cependant reconnaître que certains emplois perdus ne seront probablement jamais recréés. Certaines entreprises ne seront pas capables d'adapter leur production assez rapidement ou assez complètement pour éviter la faillite; certaines villes seront particulièrement touchées, surtout celles qui possèdent une seule industrie. Dans les secteurs mous, les travailleurs, les entreprises et les collectivités devront assumer les coûts de cette évolution, ce qui les poussera à faire tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour la ralentir. La plupart du temps, les forces normales du marché et les personnes touchées peuvent régler les problèmes dus à la suppression d'emplois. Toutefois, lorsque surviennent des changements structurels à long terme qui entraînent la disparition définitive de certaines catégories d'emplois, il faut prendre des mesures pour faciliter l'adaptation et la transition. Nous tenons à souligner que, si le gouvernement ne réussit pas à résoudre les problèmes posés par ces bouleversements, il contribuera à créer une situation encore plus difficile qui drainera les énergies de tous les agents économiques.

Le Canada a pris au fil des ans de nombreuses mesures d'adaptation, mais il n'a pas obtenu beaucoup de succès dans ce domaine. Le gouvernement a cherché, par divers moyens, à venir en aide à des entreprises, à des industries et à des régions en difficulté. Il a accordé des subventions, des prêts et des crédits d'impôt à l'investissement, il a mis sur pied des programmes de retraite anticipée et des programmes spéciaux d'assurance-chômage, et il a même fait l'acquisition de certaines entreprises pour protéger des emplois. À partir de cela, il est possible de définir les principes sur lesquels devrait se fonder la prochaine génération de mesures en ce sens.

Premièrement, toute politique de réorientation doit faciliter le processus de l'adaptation, et non l'entraver. Il est en effet à craindre que les programmes de

point de nouvelles techniques et leur application pratique. M. Harold Crookell, de la faculté d'administration de l'Université Western Ontario, a donné au comité une idée de ce que cette aide pourrait représenter :

[...] je pense que le gouvernement pourrait faire beaucoup pour rendre le climat plus propice à l'innovation au Canada. Il pourrait notamment mieux faire respecter les règlements sur les brevets et encourager les échanges de technologie avec d'autres pays, au lieu de chercher à nous isoler. Il faudrait adopter une nouvelle politique de la concurrence qui mette l'accent sur la compétitivité internationale, au lieu de s'ingérer indûment de la concurrence au Canada, et qui permette à plusieurs entreprises de poursuivre ensemble des travaux de recherche et de développement sans craindre de tomber sous le coup des règlements antitrust quand elles mettent en commun leurs plans de recherche et de développement (54:18).

D'autres témoins avaient un point de vue différent sur la façon dont l'intervention gouvernementale pourrait améliorer les résultats du Canada dans le domaine technologique. Certains ont expliqué les problèmes du Canada dans ce domaine par la présence d'importants intérêts étrangers dans l'économie canadienne. Selon le Conseil des Canadiens :

[...] cette présence massive de capitaux étrangers au sein de l'économie canadienne suffit à limiter notre champ d'action sur la scène commerciale internationale à l'extérieur de l'Amérique du Nord, tout en limitant nos possibilités d'exportation, en freinant le dynamisme de nos entreprises en même temps que la recherche et le développement et la productivité (43:37).

Une minorité des membres du comité estime, en se fondant sur ce diagnostic, que le gouvernement devrait veiller à ce que les filiales étrangères effectuent plus de travaux de recherche et de développement au Canada et mettent davantage l'accent sur les exportations; ils voudraient que le gouvernement favorise l'établissement d'entreprises canadiennes dans des secteurs désignés et qu'il propose des mesures législatives plus strictes pour empêcher la mainmise étrangère dans les secteurs de haute technologie stratégique. La majorité des membres du comité ont cependant une autre opinion sur la question, opinion que partage d'ailleurs le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires étrangères, qui a étudié le rendement technologique du Canada dans le cadre de son examen des relations canado-américaines :

Le comité conclut qu'il doit exister un ingrédient indispensable pour qu'une telle entreprise engage des fonds dans la recherche et le développement : c'est l'étendue du marché. Dans tous les cas où le comité a constaté qu'une entreprise privée consacrait une somme importante à la recherche et au développement, il a constaté aussi que cette entreprise disposait d'un marché plus grand que celui qu'offre le Canada à lui seul. (*Les relations Canada - États-Unis*, Volume III, 1982, p. 90 et 91.)

La plupart d'entre nous estime que la libéralisation des échanges commerciaux, qui donne accès à un marché plus vaste, constitue un moyen intéressant d'améliorer la situation du Canada dans le domaine technologique.

L'augmentation de la compétitivité du Canada n'est pas seulement la responsabilité du gouvernement. En fait, le gros du travail incombe au secteur privé, car la productivité est l'affaire du patronat et des syndicats. On a accusé le patronat de ne pas voir suffisamment loin et de manquer de dynamisme sur les marchés étrangers. Ce comportement doit changer pour que le Canada puisse être compétitif à l'échelle internationale. Les chefs d'entreprise doivent continuer d'innover et d'implanter de nouvelles techniques. Il leur faut également se rendre compte de l'importance des ressources humaines et chercher à accroître les compétences des travailleurs au moyen



d'exportation et, pour y arriver, leurs dirigeants devront tenir compte davantage de la situation internationale.

Le gouvernement doit également tenter d'élaborer, en collaboration avec le patronat et les syndicats, des stratégies efficaces qui refléteront l'importance des exportations et de l'innovation technologique. L'un de ses principaux problèmes consiste à établir un équilibre entre la souplesse et la planification détaillée. Le comité a discuté de plusieurs possibilités allant du libre jeu des forces du marché jusqu'à une collaboration étroite destinée à établir des buts et des programmes de planification pour chaque secteur.

Nous estimons que le gouvernement peut contribuer pour une large part à l'augmentation de la compétitivité. Il ne peut certes pas obtenir les résultats recherchés en légiférant, mais il peut favoriser la création d'un climat propice à l'optimisation des ressources humaines, financières et technologiques des entreprises canadiennes. Il doit faire en sorte que les marchés fonctionnent mieux, afin que l'économie tout entière en profite. En outre, il doit tenter de faciliter la réorientation des ressources humaines et financières vers les secteurs compétitifs sans causer trop de problèmes personnels ni d'injustices. Il doit mettre en œuvre une politique macro-économique qui favorise une croissance économique plus constante à long terme, de même qu'un taux d'inflation stable et un recul du chômage. Enfin, il doit être attentif aux répercussions que la politique de ses organismes de réglementation peut avoir sur la compétitivité des entreprises.

Pour améliorer le contexte dans lequel les entreprises doivent se débrouiller, le gouvernement pourrait par exemple leur accorder des ressources pour leur permettre d'adapter plus rapidement les nouvelles techniques. Les petites entreprises pourraient prendre de l'expansion et accroître leur effectif si on les aidait à acheter des brevets. Si l'on se fie à l'expérience passée, un certain nombre d'entreprises pourraient améliorer les idées et les procédés qu'elles auraient ainsi repris. À l'heure actuelle, l'aide gouvernementale pour l'achat de brevets est accordée en vertu de conditions trop strictes. Nous recommandons par conséquent que le gouvernement prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires pour veiller à ce que l'achat de brevets et la commercialisation des brevets à l'étranger puissent être financés en vertu de la *Loi sur les prêts aux petites entreprises* ou que les modifications nécessaires soient apportées au Programme de développement industriel et régional.

Le gouvernement devrait également envisager de créer un organisme de financement des exportations chargé précisément de répondre aux besoins des petites entreprises. En effet, le financement offert actuellement par la Société pour l'expansion des exportations ne profite guère qu'à quelques grandes entreprises. En raison de ses structures et de son orientation, la SFE a des préoccupations trop souvent éloignées de celles des petites entreprises, et ce fossé est difficile à combler. Pour que la SFE soit plus à l'écoute des besoins de ces sociétés, il faudrait modifier de fond en comble son orientation et son fonctionnement, et rien ne garantit que cela pourrait se faire efficacement. Afin de tirer un meilleur parti des possibilités d'exportation des petites entreprises, le gouvernement devrait donc songer à créer un nouvel organisme qui serait chargé expressément de ce secteur et qui travaillerait en étroite collaboration avec les institutions financières privées.

Étant donné l'évolution rapide de la conjoncture économique, il est peu probable qu'une planification détaillée, secteur par secteur ait des chances de réussite. Le gouvernement peut cependant aider à créer un environnement favorable à la recherche et au développement, ainsi qu'à l'innovation technologique, afin de permettre la mise au



canadiennes à l'étranger justifie-t-elle un certain optimisme? Dans l'affirmative, quelles sortes d'entreprises canadiennes semblent avoir le plus d'avenir sur la scène internationale? Quels sont les secteurs les plus prometteurs?

Des sociétés manufacturières canadiennes sont en train de réussir des percées remarquables à l'étranger, et l'on connaît les raisons de leur succès. Selon les études effectuées par D.J. Daly et D.C. McCharles, certaines petites entreprises appartenant à des intérêts canadiens manifestent un dynamisme peu commun. Ces sociétés, qui comptent en général moins de 400 salariés, ont trouvé sur les marchés d'exportation un créneau qui correspond à leur savoir-faire et qui avait été négligé par les grandes compagnies. Ainsi, le comité a entendu parler de deux entreprises qui illustrent parfaitement cette situation. L'une d'elles exporte avec succès des poubelles de cuisine au Japon (54:10), et l'autre est une entreprise de Regina qui fabrique des baguettes de bois avec tellement de succès qu'elle en vendra bientôt en Chine (56:79). Ces entreprises ont su profiter de possibilités nouvelles en se spécialisant et en fabriquant leurs produits en plus grande série, de sorte que beaucoup d'entre elles ont très bien tiré leur épingle du jeu, même pendant la récession du début des années 80. Nous recommandons donc au gouvernement de reconnaître les possibilités d'exportation des petites et moyennes entreprises canadiennes et d'en tenir compte dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de sa stratégie de mise en marché des exportations.

Le sens des affaires de ces entreprises se manifeste dans tous les aspects de leurs activités. Ces sociétés ont compris qu'il ne suffisait pas de posséder du matériel moderne, mais qu'il fallait aussi l'intégrer à leurs méthodes de gestion et de fabrication. Elles s'intéressent davantage à la formation des cadres et des employés que la plupart des entreprises canadiennes. Bon nombre d'entre elles ont adopté le principe de la participation des salariés à la gestion, de sorte que la motivation et le moral de ces derniers sont excellents.

En plus de la réussite remarquable de certaines entreprises manufacturières canadiennes dans le domaine des exportations, il faut souligner que les investissements directs des entreprises manufacturières canadiennes à l'étranger ont énormément augmenté, au point de représenter désormais près de la moitié des sommes que les sociétés étrangères ont investies au Canada. Ce phénomène s'explique sans aucun doute par toutes sortes de raisons et il nous rassure sur la santé du secteur manufacturier. Ce qui est plus inquiétant, toutefois c'est qu'un grand nombre des sociétés qui ont du succès à l'exportation envisagent sérieusement de poursuivre leur développement en dehors du Canada pour échapper à un climat qu'elles trouvent défavorable aux investisseurs. Elles considèrent notamment comme des facteurs négatifs les salaires élevés, les conflits patronaux-syndicaux et un régime d'imposition des bénéfices des sociétés qui ne leur laisse pas la marge d'autofinancement dont elles ont besoin. Nous reconnaissons qu'un certain nombre d'éléments, au Canada même, nuisent aux exportateurs canadiens; nous recommandons par conséquent que toute politique commerciale future tienne compte de ces éléments.

Les grandes sociétés canadiennes pourraient prendre exemple sur certaines de nos petites entreprises, car, d'une manière générale, elles sont beaucoup plus lentes que leurs concurrentes étrangères à adopter la technologie nouvelle, tant sur le plan de la gestion que sur celui de la technique pure et de la science. Au cours des dernières années, certaines d'entre elles ont été distraites de leurs tâches principales par la perspective de prises de contrôle de grande envergure. Les entreprises canadiennes doivent désormais travailler dans des conditions de plus en plus compétitives à cause de la rapidité des progrès technologiques et de la libéralisation graduelle des échanges commerciaux. C'est seulement en se spécialisant qu'elles réussiront sur les marchés

ans pour appliquer l'accord. Si les prochaines, qui seront encore plus complexes et plus ardues, durent aussi longtemps, il faudra attendre le siècle prochain pour que l'accord qui en résultera soit appliqué intégralement. Il n'est pas certain non plus que des exportations de produits agricoles, figureront à l'ordre du jour. Tout cela nous préoccupe, car nous ne pensons pas que le Canada puisse attendre aussi longtemps, d'autant plus que la réussite des négociations est loin d'être acquise.

Comme nous l'avons souligné dans notre rapport intérimaire, c'est pour ces raisons que le gouvernement canadien a jugé nécessaire d'envisager un accord de libre-échange avec les Etats-Unis. Pour assurer sa prospérité, le Canada a besoin de conserver ses débouchés aux Etats-Unis; or ceux-ci sont de plus en plus menacés par les forces protectionnistes qui s'exercent au Congrès. De récentes mesures prises par les Etats-Unis ont prouvé que le protectionnisme n'était pas qu'une simple menace.

Le comité ne peut pas savoir à l'avance si les négociateurs américains et canadiens réussiront à conclure une entente qui conviendra aux deux parties. Toutefois, nous jugeons essentiel que tout accord éventuel entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis respecte entièrement les obligations que le GATT impose aux deux pays. Pour ce faire, il faudrait que les responsables de l'application du GATT soient avertis des conditions de toute entente conclue entre les deux parties et qu'ils créent un groupe de travail pour étudier la conformité de cette entente avec les obligations contractées dans le cadre du GATT.

Si ces conditions sont respectées, il n'y a aucune raison de penser que les prochaines négociations du GATT et les discussions bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis sont incompatibles. Certains aspects de ces discussions pourraient même servir de modèle à des négociations semblables dans le cadre du GATT, surtout s'ils ont un caractère novateur. Par contre, d'autres questions importantes qui concernent les deux pays ne pourront se régler que par des discussions multilatérales. Par exemple, il faudra bientôt se pencher sérieusement sur les besoins et les problèmes des pays en développement. (L'accord multilatère, dont il est question au chapitre VII, doit notamment être négocié cette année.) La conclusion d'un accord entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis ne réglerait donc qu'une partie des problèmes du Canada en matière de commerce international. Par exemple, bien que l'Europe reste un marché important, les pays de la région du Pacifique offrent de nouvelles possibilités intéressantes. Il est par ailleurs tout aussi important d'entretenir des relations commerciales avec les pays en développement.

## L'augmentation de la compétitivité du Canada

L'élimination des barrières commerciales est une façon d'améliorer la compétitivité de l'économie canadienne. Cependant, il ne suffit pas d'avoir accès aux marchés étrangers. En fait, la compétitivité d'un pays dépend probablement davantage de la politique monétaire et fiscale du gouvernement, des taux de change, des principes qui régissent les investissements et la concurrence, de même que de la politique gouvernementale en matière de transport et de main-d'œuvre. Enfin, nous trouvons important de ne pas perdre de vue le rôle du secteur privé (patronat et salariés) et de se rappeler que ce dernier peut faire des choses qui sont impossibles au gouvernement.

Pour pouvoir concurrencer les grandes puissances économiques occidentales et les pays du Pacifique en plein essor, le Canada devra tabler sur ses points forts. Certains douteront peut-être qu'il en possède, étant donné les problèmes évidents que connaissent le secteur primaire et le secteur manufacturier au Canada. L'expérience des entreprises



Il est difficile, même pour les pays les plus puissants, de contrer séparément chaque mesure protectionniste. La seule véritable solution serait que toutes les nations commerçantes du monde établissent ensemble de nouvelles règles pour se protéger mutuellement. Une telle chose est toujours difficile, et elle l'est encore davantage maintenant que le commerce mondial a pris de l'ampleur et que les nations commerçantes se sont multipliées. Depuis que les ministres du GATT ont approuvé, en novembre 1982, l'idée d'une nouvelle ronde de négociations commerciales multilatérales, il a fallu quatre ans simplement pour obtenir des principales nations commerçantes qu'elles acceptent d'y participer, sans grand enthousiasme d'ailleurs.

S'il a été difficile d'entamer une nouvelle ronde de négociations dans le cadre du GATT, c'est notamment en raison de désaccords sur les questions qu'il conviendrait d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour de ces négociations. Il est certainement dans l'intérêt du Canada que les discussions portent surtout sur le commerce des produits agricoles et, en particulier, sur le recours aux subventions pour promouvoir les exportations dans ce domaine. Il faudrait des règles plus strictes et plus justes pour régir, d'une part, les subventions en général et, d'autre part, les mesures compensatoires et antidumping, qui sont de plus en plus souvent utilisées et qui rendent la planification à long terme extrêmement difficile pour les exportateurs canadiens. La politique d'achat du gouvernement s'est souvent révélée désastreuse pour le commerce international et devrait être remise en question. Tout compte fait, le Canada profiterait d'un renforcement des mécanismes du GATT pour la résolution des conflits commerciaux. Il devrait également souhaiter que les pays en voie de développement les plus avancés, qui n'ont plus besoin d'un traitement particulier, soient pleinement intégrés au système commercial international. Il est évident que les prochaines négociations du GATT ne seront pas axées avant tout sur la suppression des barrières tarifaires, mais porteront sur toutes sortes de barrières non tarifaires.

**Le comité pense qu'il est important d'entamer une nouvelle ronde de négociations commerciales multilatérales dans les meilleurs délais.** Le GATT a bien servi les intérêts du Canada depuis quarante ans, et les gouvernements canadiens successeurs ont participé activement aux diverses négociations organisées sous ses auspices. La réglementation découlant du GATT, qui est venue mettre de l'ordre dans les échanges commerciaux, a procuré au Canada la stabilité dont son économie avait besoin. Il est vrai que le processus de négociation est lent et ennuyeux, mais il présente l'avantage que, pendant la durée des négociations, il est peu probable que des pays prennent des mesures protectionnistes.

Le Canada a toujours été un ardent partisan du GATT. Le traité a permis une libéralisation du commerce international dont le Canada a profité. En outre, les Canadiens ont toujours préféré négocier dans un contexte multilatéral, car ils peuvent se trouver des alliés ayant des objectifs semblables. Cependant, le processus de négociation traditionnel du GATT est en train de changer, et le Canada doit tenir compte des conséquences qu'aura cette situation nouvelle. Depuis l'élargissement de la Communauté économique européenne, qui comprend maintenant douze pays, les grandes puissances commerciales, c'est-à-dire les États-Unis, le Japon et la CEE, ont tendance, au cours des négociations du GATT, à conclure des ententes entre elles et à offrir ensuite les mêmes conditions aux autres pays en leur disant que c'est à prendre ou à laisser. Toutefois, le GATT demeure encore le meilleur moyen de négocier une politique commerciale multilatérale, et le Canada doit veiller à pouvoir continuer à faire cause commune avec des pays partageant ses opinions.

La lenteur des négociations du GATT est un autre problème. Ainsi, les dernières négociations, connues sous le nom de «Tokyo Round», ont duré six ans et il a fallu huit

Certains pensent qu'il importe de se spécialiser, d'encourager les innovations technologiques, de mieux mettre en valeur nos ressources naturelles, et de fabriquer davantage de machines et d'appareils et d'accroître nos exportations. Pour les tenants de cette opinion, le Canada ne peut réussir à vendre sur les marchés internationaux que s'il s'impose d'abord sur le marché intérieur.

D'autres estiment qu'une politique de libéralisation des échanges commerciaux est d'une importance primordiale. Le gouvernement devrait commencer par établir un programme à trois volets, qui consisterait à libéraliser les échanges internationaux à encourager la compétitivité sur le marché intérieur et à prendre des mesures pour accroître les exportations. De toute façon, les initiatives du gouvernement devront s'accompagner d'efforts de promotion soutenus de la part des exportateurs canadiens pour que ces derniers puissent pénétrer de nouveaux marchés internationaux.

## La libéralisation des échanges

L'amélioration de la position concurrentielle du Canada dans une conjoncture économique mondiale en pleine évolution et de plus en plus difficile, dépend en grande partie de l'élargissement de nos échanges internationaux. Dans de nombreux secteurs d'activité, notre marché intérieur est trop petit pour permettre la création d'usines de dimensions optimales et la spécialisation; aussi cette dernière doit-elle se faire à l'aide des échanges commerciaux. La libéralisation des échanges durant l'après-guerre a eu un double effet sur la compétitivité des entreprises canadiennes. D'une part, l'accès à des marchés plus vastes a permis aux entreprises de réaliser des économies d'échelle et de retirer d'autres avantages connexes; d'autre part, l'économie canadienne est devenue plus efficace à force de lutter contre la concurrence étrangère. Surtout entre 1979 et 1984, avant même que le Canada n'entreprene des négociations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, il était évident que les entreprises canadiennes se réorganisaient pour pouvoir mieux faire face à la concurrence internationale.

Tous les pays ne souhaitent pas comme le Canada l'instauration d'un système libéralisé d'échanges internationaux. La récession des dernières années et le fait que la relance économique mondiale soit encore incertaine et inégale ont provoqué une vague de protectionnisme. Tous les gouvernements ont trouvé difficile de ne pas adopter de mesures pour limiter les importations, et rares sont ceux qui ont accepté d'envisager l'élimination des barrières commerciales actuelles. En outre, à cause de la prolifération des mesures protectionnistes, de nombreux pays ont estimé nécessaire de prendre des moyens radicaux pour promouvoir leurs exportations, ce qui n'a fait qu'aggraver la situation.

Le Canada ne peut pas espérer gagner au jeu du protectionnisme, mais il lui est difficile de rester passif. Sa population étant dispersée et peu nombreuse, il ne peut pas prospérer sans les marchés d'exportation. Pour cette raison, le comité recommande que le gouvernement s'efforce de promouvoir activement une libéralisation équilibrée et ordonnée des échanges commerciaux.

Le système commercial international et le GATT (Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce) constituent de remarquables moyens de défense contre les attaques des forces protectionnistes. Cependant, l'ingéniosité humaine étant ce qu'elle est, les gouvernements, y compris celui du Canada, ont conçu toutes sortes de barrières non tarifaires pour contourner les règles du GATT et réduire les importations.



troisième option des années 70, n'ont guère eu d'effet. Les forces du marché ont été l'un des principaux moteurs du changement, et, facteur de plus en plus important, l'essor rapide des multinationales a entraîné la spécialisation de leur production globale (comme en témoigne la proportion grandissante d'échanges commerciaux entre différentes filiales d'une même société). Il est donc très important de bien prévoir les tendances et d'essayer d'en tirer profit.

L'économie est en train de subir des modifications profondes, sur le plan tant national qu'international, dont on ne saisit pas encore toute l'ampleur. Beaucoup d'industries, surtout dans les secteurs traditionnels, s'implantent dans de nouvelles régions, particulièrement dans des pays du tiers monde où l'on trouve une main-d'œuvre très qualifiée, disciplinée et peu rémunérée, ce dernier facteur découlant souvent de l'inexistence ou de la faiblesse des syndicats, de l'emploi d'enfants, de l'absence de lois sur la sécurité et d'autres avantages sociaux. En fait, bon nombre de ces pays se trouvent dans une position avantageuse pour la production de masse. Par ailleurs, les pays industrialisés sont entrés dans ce que l'on a appelé l'ère post-industrielle du développement économique, où l'information, les connaissances et les services jouent un rôle de plus en plus important. Selon M<sup>me</sup> Lynn Mytelka, de l'École des affaires internationales de l'Université Carleton :

Les pays hautement industrialisés tendent rapidement vers un système de production fondé sur la connaissance, système dans lequel l'accumulation et l'attribution des connaissances sont les éléments essentiels du processus de production et de sa rentabilité (23:11).

Et comme l'a souligné dans son mémoire le Conseil canadien pour le commerce international, les nouvelles techniques issues d'un système de production fondé sur les connaissances commencent à influencer toute l'économie :

Nous n'en sommes plus à l'époque où la micro-électronique était limitée à quelques secteurs de pointe. L'automatisation est maintenant de mise dans toutes les industries, que ce soit dans les usines ou dans les bureaux (2).

La spécialisation a entraîné la multiplication des échanges commerciaux au sein d'un même secteur d'activité. D'autre part, la concurrence s'intensifie entre les différents pays exportateurs de produits manufacturés. Nous croyons que le gouvernement, par l'entremise de ses délégués commerciaux, devrait être bien représenté dans les domaines où le commerce croît rapidement, particulièrement dans celui des techniques de pointe et des services.

Le Canada se heurte à un problème particulier. En effet, il ne peut plus compter sur les exportations de matières premières autant qu'il l'a fait depuis la Confédération. Plus récemment, les mégaprojets d'exploitation des ressources, qui étaient considérées comme le «moteur de la croissance» ont cessé d'être rentables. Les exportations de la plupart des ressources naturelles du Canada ont diminué à cause de plusieurs facteurs : augmentation de la production de matières premières des pays du tiers monde, épuisement des gisements de minerais et des ressources forestières les plus accessibles du Canada, forte augmentation de la production agricole de la Communauté économique européenne et des États-Unis, qui est largement subventionnée, et récession économique mondiale.

Bien que les producteurs canadiens aient réussi à réduire leurs prix de revient et à améliorer leur position sur les marchés mondiaux, on ne prévoit pas de progrès spectaculaires dans le domaine de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. Le gouvernement doit donc décider avant tout ce qui est le plus important pour lui.

## L'accroissement des échanges internationaux

Comme la conjoncture qui a permis à notre économie de se développer depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale a changé, le Canada doit s'adapter pour pouvoir conserver sa prospérité actuelle. Il a d'ailleurs déjà perdu du terrain dans ce domaine. Le revenu actuel de la plupart des Canadiens demeure satisfaisant, mais l'avenir n'est pas rose; tous les agents économiques doivent en être bien conscients et s'attaquer ensemble au problème.

L'économie du Canada doit absolument devenir plus concurrentielle sur le plan international. Le comité s'intéresse à la question de la compétitivité non pas dans l'absolu, mais parce qu'elle est essentielle à l'essor de l'économie, à l'accroissement des revenus et à la création d'emplois. La compétitivité n'est pas simplement un critère d'évaluation des possibilités d'exportation du Canada. En effet, elle permet non seulement de mesurer notre capacité de produire des biens et des services que nous pouvons ensuite exporter, mais aussi d'accroître notre niveau de vie et de créer des emplois. Même si le débat sur la compétitivité tourne souvent autour de l'amélioration de l'efficacité du secteur manufacturier il est également important de faire bon usage de nos ressources dans le secteur des services et l'industrie des matières premières. L'économie canadienne ne pourra prospérer que si elle est fondée sur un secteur industriel fort et diversifié comptant de nombreuses industries très productives.

Sur le plan économique, le Canada se distingue des autres pays industrialisés par la composition de ses échanges commerciaux et par la destination de ses exportations. Il exporte à la fois beaucoup de matières premières et de biens manufacturés sommes une grande nation commerçante, mais notre commerce de biens manufacturés a surtout augmenté avec les États-Unis, qui absorbent aujourd'hui plus de 78 p. 100 des exportations canadiennes. Un fort pourcentage de nos échanges avec les autres pays industrialisés se compose encore de matières premières, de produits semi-finis et de denrées alimentaires. Ainsi, dans le cas du Japon, ces trois catégories représentaient 96 p. 100 de nos ventes. Par ailleurs, alors que d'autres pays industrialisés réalisent plus d'un tiers de leurs échanges commerciaux avec le tiers monde, ces pays représentent moins de 10 p. 100 des échanges commerciaux du Canada, et une partie de ce commerce est financée par des subventions canadiennes.

Les échanges commerciaux ont beaucoup évolué en une génération. Les mesures prises par le gouvernement pour tenter d'infléchir cette évolution, notamment les efforts pour relancer le commerce avec la Grande-Bretagne à la fin des années 50 et la

création d'un mécanisme permanent de ce genre vaincrait peut-être les réticences des gouvernements qui hésitaient jusqu'ici à participer à une action multilatérale; ils seraient ainsi encouragés à emboîter le pas à leurs alliés de l'OTAN. Cette solution aurait aussi l'avantage de prévenir une action unilatérale d'un pays de l'OTAN.

Nous recommandons que Transports Canada fixe des normes minimales pour la sécurité des aéroports et les applique strictement. Nous recommandons en outre que, si l'on se rend compte après une certaine période que les services des sociétés privées laissent encore à désirer, le gouvernement envisage d'assumer lui-même la responsabilité de tous les aspects de la sécurité dans les aéroports, soit en confiant cette tâche à Transports Canada, soit en faisant appel à la GRC, en vertu d'un contrat avec Transports Canada.

La politique en matière d'information joue également un rôle essentiel puisqu'une publicité mal avisée peut en fait inciter au terrorisme. Nous convenons cependant que la censure n'est ni utile, ni souhaitable. Comme M. Maurice Tugwell, du Centre des études sur les conflits, l'a dit au comité :

Quel que soit l'événement, il doit être couvert. Dans le cas contraire, les pays qui ne participeraient pas à cette conspiration du silence en feraient état et dans cet univers à la McLuhan, nous finirions de toute façon par en entendre parler, mais sur le mode de la rumeur, mais avec des distorsions et des effets pervers dix fois plus dangereux (46:24).

Cependant, quand les médias couvrent les conférences de presse des terroristes, ils font souvent leur jeu et risquent d'encourager d'autres attentats. C'est ce qu'a fait valoir, lors d'une conférence, M<sup>me</sup> Katharine Graham, présidente du conseil d'administration de la *Washington Post Company*, affirmant qu'il existe un risque réel que des terroristes prennent en otage non seulement des avions et des passagers, mais aussi les médias.

L'élaboration des plans d'urgence en cas d'attentats terroristes doit comprendre des discussions approfondies entre les responsables de la sécurité et les médias. M. Leslie Green, de l'Université de l'Alberta, a dit au comité qu'il faudrait établir un point de contact unique pour les médias dès qu'un attentat est perpétré. Il a recommandé de «créer [...] un "cordon sanitaire" autour de l'événement, pour prévenir tout contact direct du public, y compris des journalistes (46:26)».

Lorsqu'il se produit un acte terroriste au Canada, on risque toujours qu'un journaliste ou une équipe violent les règles du jeu et portent ainsi préjudice aux autres. Pour cette raison, il faut faire adopter volontairement par les journalistes et les médias canadiens un code de conduite approprié. Par ailleurs, les autorités doivent s'engager à divulguer le plus d'informations possible.

Les tragédies des derniers mois prouvent que la communauté internationale doit se concerter pour lutter contre le terrorisme. Les participants au sommet de mai 1986 à Tokyo ont décidé d'un certain nombre de mesures précises, mais ne se sont pas prononcées sur l'organisme multilatéral qui coordonnerait l'action commune. Le comité préconise d'avoir recours aux Nations Unies, afin d'obtenir l'appui de tous les pays du monde. Le Canada pourrait, par exemple, s'efforcer d'obtenir les appuis nécessaires pour que le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU adopte une résolution refusant aux pays qui offrent un asile aux terroristes le droit d'invoquer leur souveraineté pour refuser l'intervention de la communauté internationale. En l'absence de tels appuis, et surtout de l'appui des superpuissances, la plupart des membres du comité estiment qu'il serait alors plus facile d'obtenir au sein de l'OTAN un consensus susceptible de se traduire par une action décisive, bien que certains d'entre nous considèrent qu'il serait malavisé de travailler avec les membres d'une alliance exclusivement occidentale. Pour la majorité d'entre nous, la proposition voulant que l'OTAN charge un groupe de travail d'élaborer des normes internationales pour la lutte contre le terrorisme et de coordonner les mesures à prendre lorsqu'un membre de l'alliance est menacé a toutefois du mérite. La



en justice et la prise de sanctions sévères contre eux sont essentielles dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le Canada devrait promouvoir l'adoption d'une convention internationale sur le terrorisme afin d'établir des mécanismes ayant une application aussi générale que possible pour déterminer la source des attaques terroristes et la réponse multilatérale qui s'impose, et pour juger de la sévérité des sanctions à prendre dans les divers cas.

La rupture des liens diplomatiques avec un Etat responsable d'actes terroristes serait non seulement une marque d'intense désapprobation, mais entraînerait la fermeture de l'ambassade du pays accusé, ce qui mènerait fin aux abus des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques qui facilitent le terrorisme international. Le boycottage économique (le refus d'acheter certains produits) et l'embargo (le refus d'en vendre) contre les Etats qui appuient le terrorisme dans le cadre de leur politique nationale pourraient aussi être adoptés comme mesures de dissuasion, tout comme la réduction ou la suppression des liaisons aériennes avec ces pays. Dans ce dernier cas, le gouvernement devrait tenter de faire appliquer de façon plus générale la déclaration du sommet de Bonn, en 1978, qui contient l'extrait suivant :

[...] les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement décident conjointement de prendre des mesures pour suspendre immédiatement tout vol vers un pays qui refuserait d'extraire ou de poursuivre des pirates de l'air.

En même temps, ils veilleront à ce que soient interrompus tous les vols en provenance de ce pays ou assurés, à partir d'un autre pays, par ses lignes aériennes. Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement demandent en outre instamment aux autres gouvernements de se joindre à eux dans cette résolution.

La *Loi sur l'interdiction de services aériens internationaux*, adoptée par le Parlement canadien en 1981, permet au gouverneur en conseil de prendre une ordonnance interdisant à des transporteurs aériens canadiens de desservir un pays et aux transporteurs de ce pays de survoler le Canada ou d'y atterrir, si le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures affirme que l'Etat en cause ne prend pas de mesures suffisantes contre des pirates de l'air ou contre toute autre personne qui nuit au bon fonctionnement de l'aviation civile. Le gouvernement devrait tenter d'appliquer des sanctions de ce genre à d'autres formes de terrorisme et faire des efforts renouvelés pour faire adopter ces normes par le plus grand nombre possible de pays et d'organismes internationaux.

Il faut évidemment miser aussi sur la prévention, fondée sur le renseignement, sur des mesures de sécurité accrues visant les installations matérielles et les formalités, et sur des plans d'urgence. Bien que l'échange de renseignements et de connaissances techniques semble raisonnablement satisfaisant, le Canada manque d'experts du renseignement. Il faudrait également surveiller de plus près les arrivées de réfugiés, mais il faut que ceux qui n'ont rien à se reprocher, c'est-à-dire l'immense majorité, en souffrent le moins possible. Il existe toutefois un danger réel que des groupes terroristes profitent du droit d'asile accordé aux réfugiés légitimes pour s'assurer au Canada une tête de pont aux fins de leurs activités. **Le comité recommande que l'on applique des contrôles plus stricts aux points d'entrée au Canada et aux postes frontières.** Il est essentiel que les exigences et les formalités relatives à l'immigration et à l'octroi de visas soient resserrées pour les ressortissants de pays qui appuient, activement ou non, le terrorisme.

Le comité s'est aussi intéressé à la sécurité dans les aéroports canadiens. Actuellement, les services de sécurité sont généralement assurés par des sociétés privées choisies par appels d'offres. Les sociétés retenues sont donc souvent les plus bas soumissionnaires et, par conséquent, celles dont le personnel est le moins bien entraîné.

Dans son témoignage, M. David Charters, du Centre des études sur les conflits de l'Université du Nouveau-Brunswick, a défini le terrorisme politique en ces termes :

la menace ou l'utilisation de techniques criminelles violentes, accompagnées d'actes politiques et psychologiques par une faction politique ou un groupe armé clandestin ou semi-clandestin, gouvernemental ou non, dans le but de créer un climat de crainte et d'incertitude où l'opposition visée sera forcée par intimidation ou autrement à concéder au terroriste quelque avantage politique (46:6).

Selon M. Charters, il y a trois grandes catégories de terrorisme. Le terrorisme d'Etat consiste en une répression violente de l'opposition, à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur du pays, et parfois en une violence illégale et sélective dirigée contre des individus ou des groupes perçus comme étant une menace pour l'Etat. Le terrorisme non étatique est l'arme de groupes qui représentent une cause, et non un gouvernement. Enfin, on parle de terrorisme encouragé par un Etat lorsqu'un gouvernement incite à la violence et aide des terroristes indépendants dans d'autres pays. Ce qu'il y a de plus abominable dans la plupart des actes terroristes, c'est que leurs conséquences tragiques frappent surtout des particuliers, qui deviennent en fait les instruments dont se servent les terroristes pour faire connaître leur cause, pour secouer les gouvernements et pour jeter la population dans un état de choc et de consternation qui l'amène à souhaiter presque qu'on mette un terme à ces actes de violence à tout prix.

Pour les gouvernements démocratiques, le défi consiste à trouver une position équilibrée. D'un côté, il est important de lutter contre le terrorisme. D'un autre côté, il faut éviter d'exacerber les tensions soit en stimulant la spirale de la violence, soit, dans un zèle excessif, en portant atteinte à la vie privée et à la liberté des citoyens.

Les terroristes sont motivés par les raisons les plus diverses. Certains sont le produit de bouleversements sociaux et du sentiment d'aliénation qui en résulte. Ce sont des désespérés qui cherchent à saisir le monde de leurs griefs et dont la fureur ne peut que s'accroître si les gouvernements réagissent exclusivement par la force. D'autres sont des mercenaires bien payés qui allument pour le plaisir les feux de l'anarchie. Le terrorisme est également l'arme à laquelle recourent ceux qui n'ont pas réussi à réaliser leurs objectifs par la voie démocratique ou qui recherchent tout simplement le pouvoir et le prestige. Comme l'a fait observer un des témoins entendus à Vancouver, M. Allan Cunningham, il faut aller «au-delà de l'idée de terrorisme comme simple forme de violence pour la violence (50:20)», et il faut bien se rendre compte que le terrorisme prend normalement racine dans des griefs politiques et sociaux. C'est ce qui explique que les objectifs des terroristes bénéficient souvent d'un appui populaire généralisé et qu'il soit difficile d'organiser une résistance mondiale devant leurs actes de violence. Le terrorisme est un moyen odieux de chercher à atteindre ses objectifs, et aucun grief, si légitime soit-il, ne peut le justifier.

Malgré les difficultés que pose l'organisation de la résistance, le monde ne peut pas tolérer d'actes de violence gratuits qui menacent les fondements mêmes des relations ordonnées entre Etats. La faction palestinienne d'Abu Nidal est un bon exemple de ce danger : elle s'est vouée à semer le trouble au Moyen-Orient précisément pour miner les efforts de ceux qui préchent la modération et pour saboter tout espoir de règlement. Le terrorisme parainé par des Etats comme la Libye constitue une autre menace particulièrement insidieuse, car il fait ouvertement fi des normes reconnues en matière de comportement international.

Le comité n'a pas de solution miracle à proposer. Les griefs qui sont à l'origine du terrorisme sont trop profonds pour qu'on puisse espérer une victoire facile ou rapide. Nous sommes d'avis que la diplomatie, la prévention, le fait de traduire les terroristes

L'expérience et, en particulier, les déconvenues qu'a connues le Canada au Viêt-Nam, au Congo et lorsque son contingent a été expulsé d'Égypte en 1967 ont amené le gouvernement à fixer les principes permettant de décider si le Canada participera ou non à des opérations de maintien de la paix. Ces principes, révisés, ont été rendus publics au Sénat :

a) une force semblable devrait être sous les auspices des Nations Unies, être neutre et impartiale et avoir un mandat précis et adéquat pour lui permettre d'assumer les fonctions qui lui sont assignées;

b) le déploiement de cette force devrait être accepté par toutes les parties en cause; c) les parties en cause devraient consentir à respecter un cessez-le-feu et il devrait y avoir un esprit sérieux et raisonnable de réconciliation entre les différentes factions par suite du déploiement de cette force;

d) le financement de cette force devrait être assuré par tous les pays membres des Nations Unies plutôt que par des contributions volontaires (*Débats du Sénat*, 6 mars 1984, p. 293).

Au cours des audiences tenues à Toronto, M<sup>me</sup> Janice Stein a mis en doute le bien-fondé du premier critère. Selon elle, il importe peu que les opérations de maintien de la paix soient organisées ou non sous les auspices des Nations Unies; l'essentiel est d'aider ceux qui veulent négocier plutôt que combattre (2). Le principal mérite des opérations parrainées par les Nations Unies, c'est que ces interventions ont l'appui tacite d'au moins une des grandes puissances et des principales parties en cause; le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU ne donne en effet son approbation qu'à ces conditions. L'expérience malheureuse de la Force multinationale de paix déployée à Beyrouth sans l'aval du Conseil de sécurité pour aider le gouvernement Gemayel témoigne des risques inhérents à ce genre d'entreprise, quoique le succès de l'entreprise ait peut-être été compromis d'avance à cause de facteurs locaux. Le Canada avait prudemment décidé de ne pas y participer. La Force multinationale de paix a été entraînée dans le conflit entre factions libanaises et a finalement dû se retirer du pays. En revanche, les opérations de la Force multilatérale et d'observateurs au Sinaï, qui n'étaient pas non plus parrainées par l'ONU, ont été couronnées de succès parce que les deux grands protagonistes, l'Égypte et Israël, voulaient qu'elles réussissent et étaient en mesure d'assurer les conditions nécessaires à la réalisation de cet objectif. Un contingent canadien a remplacé le contingent australien le 1<sup>er</sup> avril 1986. Selon le comité, la meilleure attitude à adopter, si le Canada est invité à participer à des opérations de maintien de la paix, consiste à appliquer les principes fixés cas par cas, tout en accordant la préférence aux opérations menées sous les auspices des Nations Unies.

## Le terrorisme

Le terrorisme est devenu ces dernières années une malédiction dont tout pays civilisé doit tenir compte dans ses relations extérieures. Depuis la fin des années 60, le monde entier a été témoin d'une multiplication inquiétante des actes terroristes, qui sont devenus de plus en plus violents. Cette escalade montre l'incapacité des méthodes de prévention conventionnelles et l'extrême difficulté de résoudre les problèmes politiques qui engendrent le terrorisme. Le Canada a de la chance; il n'a été la cible que d'une infime fraction des attentats terroristes commis dans le monde, mais il y est en conséquence moins bien préparé.



Actuellement, trois régions seulement sont le théâtre d'opérations de maintien de la paix : Chypre, le Moyen-Orient et le Cachemire. Dès lors, il est raisonnable que le Canada s'attende à être appelé de nouveau à mettre à profit son expérience et ses capacités techniques. Il existe de nombreux endroits dans le monde où des opérations de maintien de la paix pourraient être requises en raison de troubles actuels ou potentiels, par exemple l'Afrique centrale, plusieurs régions d'Afrique (la Namibie, le Tchad, le Maroc, le Sahara occidental, le Togo et le Burkina Faso), l'Afghanistan, l'Iran et l'Irak, les Antilles, ainsi que le Kampuchéa et d'autres Etats de l'Asie du Sud-Est et du Pacifique Sud. En outre, si des forces de maintien de la paix sont mises sur pied pour stabiliser l'une ou l'autre de ces régions, la demande viendra certainement avec un très court préavis et, par conséquent, les autres pays n'auront pas le temps d'acquiescer à l'expérience que le Canada possède déjà.

Le comité a trouvé très intéressante l'idée d'affecter les forces de réserve canadiennes aux opérations de maintien de la paix. Actuellement, seuls quelques réservistes triés sur le volet font partie des unités canadiennes membres de la force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement (FNUOD) dans le Golan. M. Henry Wiseman, un Canadien qui a été membre de l'Académie internationale de la Paix, a suggéré que ce ne serait pas une mauvaise idée d'envoyer des réservistes à Chypre. «Cela permettrait peut-être d'accroître considérablement la capacité du Canada à l'avenir, sans compter que cela donnerait aux réservistes quelque chose de vraiment constructif à faire (54:41).»

Les pays scandinaves (le Danemark, la Finlande, la Norvège et la Suède) offrent un modèle intéressant par l'utilisation intensive qu'ils font de leurs forces de réserve dans diverses activités de maintien de la paix. En 1964, ces quatre pays se sont entendus pour créer la *Nordic Standby Force in UN Service (NORDBERFN)*, qui est chargée de la coordination d'unités nationales organisées et équipées indépendamment par chacun des pays et constituées surtout de réservistes volontaires. De vastes campagnes de recrutement sont organisées tous les ans dans les médias, et les volontaires suivent un entraînement intensif. Bien que le modèle scandinave ne soit pas entièrement applicable au Canada, le désir généralisé d'élargir le rôle de la réserve et les compressions de l'effectif des forces armées canadiennes donnent beaucoup d'intérêt à certaines de ses variantes. On ne pourrait évidemment pas garantir à chaque volontaire que les forces de maintien de la paix seraient mises sur pied pendant sa période de service, mais la formation acquise pourrait être utile dans d'autres situations. Les unités de secours d'urgence organisées par la Suède, par exemple, sont appelées à intervenir lors de tremblements de terre, d'inondations et de famines, ou sont affectées à la construction de camps de réfugiés. Nous recommandons que le gouvernement envisage d'utiliser d'avantage les forces de réserve canadiennes aux fins du maintien de la paix, que les réservistes soient affectés à ces tâches individuellement ou, à titre expérimental, en petites unités.

Le Canada peut aussi rendre un autre service : dispenser de la formation sur le maintien de la paix. Comme l'a dit M. John Sigler, le Canada s'est doté «du meilleur programme d'entraînement des forces militaires pour le maintien de la paix dans le monde entier (30:34)». C'est une ressource qu'on pourrait exploiter d'avantage dans l'avenir. Le Canada doit être prêt à offrir ce genre de service. Le comité recommande donc que le Canada continue à faire profiter les forces armées d'autres pays de son expérience dans le domaine des opérations de maintien de la paix. Le gouvernement devrait également continuer à financer les colloques organisés sur le sujet dans diverses universités canadiennes et à aider l'Académie internationale de la Paix, qui a notamment produit un guide sur le maintien de la paix que les forces armées canadiennes utilisent.



À ce propos, la décision prise par l'Union soviétique de voter—pour la première fois—en faveur d'une résolution du Conseil de sécurité renouvelant le mandat de la Force intermédiaire des Nations Unies au Liban (FINUL), le 18 avril 1986, est fort encourageante. L'Union soviétique a également annoncé qu'elle contribuerait à l'avenir au budget de la FINUL. Ce changement permet d'espérer que les superpuissances sont désormais plus conscientes de l'importance des opérations de maintien de la paix pour désamorcer les conflits locaux et régionaux.

Le Canada devrait s'efforcer de raviver l'intérêt pour ces opérations et de leur trouver de nouveaux appuis. Il pourrait notamment demander qu'elles soient financées grâce aux contributions versées par les États membres au budget ordinaire de l'ONU. Il pourrait également organiser une conférence sur le sujet, de concert, par exemple, avec des puissances comme le Nigéria, l'Inde et les pays scandinaves, afin de déterminer quand et comment des opérations de maintien de la paix peuvent être utiles à la résolution de conflits régionaux. Enfin, la délégation canadienne à l'ONU pourrait être priée d'étudier la possibilité de remettre sur pied le Comité spécial des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU.

Certains Canadiens critiquent les opérations de maintien de la paix en disant qu'elles s'éternisent, et citent généralement en exemple la participation du Canada à la Force des Nations Unies à Chypre (UNFICYP) depuis 1964. L'UNFICYP a certes pu prévenir les effusions de sang, mais elle n'a pas réussi à empêcher, dans la pratique, la division de l'île en deux territoires distincts, et rien ne permet de penser que les Chypriotes grecs et turcs aient fait des progrès dans la résolution de leurs différends. Certains se plaignent que la stabilité garantie par la Force de l'ONU ôte aux belligérants toute motivation pour en arriver à un accord, ce qui les amène à conclure que cette force est désormais une partie du problème plutôt qu'un élément de solution.

Étant donné la rivalité qui oppose depuis longtemps la Grèce et la Turquie, et la Force de l'ONU dans le but de préserver la stabilité dans cette partie du monde. En fait, sur le plan de la contribution à l'OTAN, l'importance des 515 Casques bleus canadiens à Chypre se compare à celle de la brigade que le Canada affecte au front central de l'OTAN. De façon plus générale, l'expérience canadienne à Chypre montre qu'il est souvent impossible de combler le fossé qui divise les deux parties dans un conflit international. Comme l'a fait remarquer un ancien fonctionnaire de l'ONU, M. George Sherry : « Nous devons penser non pas tant à résoudre les conflits dans l'immédiat, parce que c'est très souvent impossible, mais plutôt à les maîtriser. Il existe une différence entre solution et maîtrise du conflit ». Il est important que les Canadiens ne fonderont pas trop d'espoirs sur les opérations de maintien de la paix, car ils risquent d'être déçus et, en fin de compte, de leur retirer leur appui. Au mieux, les opérations de maintien de la paix peuvent permettre de contenir la violence et d'amener les parties en présence à rechercher une solution à leur différend. Mais, même si un règlement semble illusoire, l'absence de violence et d'effusion de sang n'est certainement pas à négliger.

Les ressources du Canada au chapitre du maintien de la paix sont utilisées à leur maximum et, après vingt-deux ans, il est temps que d'autres pays prennent la relève. Si d'autres pays n'offrent pas de remplacer le Canada, le comité estime néanmoins que la participation du Canada à la Force des Nations Unies pour le maintien de la paix à Chypre contribue effectivement à prévenir les combats dans l'île et à maintenir la stabilité du flanc sud de l'OTAN.

réglement, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'avvenir de Jérusalem, et nous ne pouvons qu'appuyer ces principes fondamentaux. Cependant, les pays de la région, les grandes puissances et les Nations Unies doivent faire des efforts sérieux pour trouver des solutions durables et pacifiques.

Le Canada doit prendre grand soin de demeurer impartial, mais il doit se tenir prêt à intervenir. Nous approuvons la politique du gouvernement qui consiste à favoriser des négociations entre les parties directement concernées. La difficulté de la situation ne doit pas interdire la réflexion créatrice. De plus, nous pensons que le Canada doit réitérer sa volonté de fournir une aide concrète. Vu sa longue expérience du maintien de la paix dans cette région, le Canada doit être notamment prêt à participer à d'autres opérations du même genre si l'occasion s'en présente.

## Le maintien de la paix

Depuis trente ans, les opérations multinationales de maintien de la paix, menées par des missions d'observation ou par des forces constituées expressément à cette fin, ont été utilisées à maintes occasions comme tampon entre les parties à un conflit, afin de ramener la stabilité et l'ordre dans une région. La plupart ont été organisées par l'ONU, et toutes se composaient de militaires, qui n'avaient toutefois pas de pouvoirs d'intervention. La manière d'organiser de telles forces de maintien de la paix, ainsi que les raisons pour lesquelles certaines ont relativement bien réussi alors que d'autres ont failli à la tâche sont maintenant bien connues. Les opérations de maintien de la paix ont traversé avec succès des épreuves difficiles, mais elles demeurent ponctuelles.

Le Canada a joué un rôle de premier plan tout au long de la courte mais brillante histoire des opérations de maintien de la paix. Il est en effet le seul pays à avoir participé à chacune des treize missions organisées sous les auspices des Nations Unies. De plus, les Canadiens ont fourni du personnel à la plupart des forces de maintien de la paix moins importantes, qui, pour une raison ou pour une autre, ont été occasionnellement organisées en dehors de l'ONU. Ces forces se composaient habituellement en majeure partie d'effectifs détachés par des pays non alignés. Le Canada est l'un des rares pays industrialisés qui soit jugé suffisamment éloigné des conflits régionaux pour participer aux forces de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Abstraction faite de ce facteur politique, les Canadiens sont également recherchés pour leur compétence dans les domaines des communications et des transports.

En raison de cette expérience, la réputation du Canada dans ce domaine n'est plus à faire. En dehors de ces opérations de maintien de la paix, le gouvernement a toujours été prêt à partager son expérience avec d'autres pays ou organisations qui examinaient de nouvelles modalités de maintien de la paix. Récemment, nous a-t-on dit, le groupe de Contadora a reçu d'excellents conseils des ministères de la Défense nationale et des Affaires extérieures sur les moyens d'utiliser les techniques du maintien de la paix pour faire respecter les modalités d'un plan de paix éventuel, quel qu'il soit, conçu pour l'Amérique centrale.

Le comité a été déçu de constater que les États membres de l'ONU hésitent souvent à avoir recours aux forces de maintien de la paix. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité n'en a créé que quelques-unes au cours des dernières années. Comme l'a fait observer M. Henry Wiseman : « En dehors du Moyen-Orient, les Nations Unies n'ont pas lancé d'opération de maintien de la paix depuis 1965 (54:31) ». Il faut de toute évidence que les membres du Conseil de sécurité sentent davantage qu'il leur incombe d'assurer un règlement pacifique et rapide des conflits.



Que doit faire le Canada au sujet des conflits au Moyen-Orient et en Amérique centrale, ainsi que d'autres en Afrique et en Asie du Sud-Est, où les atrocités commises sont moins souvent montrées au petit écran, mais menacent la vie de millions de personnes? Les souffrances causées par chacun de ces conflits éveillent la compassion des Canadiens. Il leur apparaît intolérable que des familles vivent constamment dans l'insécurité et que leur vie soit ponctuée d'invasions, d'échanges de coups de feu et d'explosions de voitures piégées. Les Canadiens sont particulièrement concernés par les dévastations et les pertes de vie inutiles en Amérique centrale et ils veulent que leur gouvernement s'attaque au problème avec zèle et détermination.

Grâce au Commonwealth et à La Francophonie, le Canada a l'avantage d'avoir de bonnes relations avec de nombreux pays. De plus, il a une longue expérience des relations, aux Nations Unies et ailleurs, avec des puissances régionales influentes comme le Mexique, le Brésil, l'Inde et le Nigéria. Dans les domaines où il est en mesure de jouer un rôle utile, le plus efficace serait de constituer des groupements spéciaux officiels avec des États comme ceux-là.

Nous encourageons fortement le gouvernement à faire de vigoureux efforts diplomatiques dans ce sens, mais nous ne nous faisons guère d'illusions sur leurs chances de succès. Le Canada est beaucoup trop éloigné des pays en guerre d'Asie et d'Afrique pour espérer pouvoir leur faire entendre raison. Les superpuissances continueront d'exercer une énorme influence, et il ne faut pas oublier que certaines puissances régionales dont les intérêts immédiats sont liés de très près à ces conflits ont beaucoup plus de poids que le Canada. Dans ces circonstances, il pourrait être souhaitable que le Canada cherche à modérer dans toute la mesure possible l'intervention des superpuissances, comme cela s'est produit en Amérique centrale. À d'autres moments et dans d'autres régions, par exemple au Moyen-Orient, le Canada pourrait peut-être réussir à convaincre les États-Unis de participer plus activement aux tentatives de règlement des conflits.

Nous sommes certains que le Canada est le pays tout indiqué pour servir de tiers désintéressé dans un conflit. Lorsqu'il agit en qualité de médiateur, le Canada doit, d'après nous, bien étudier les sources du conflit, l'utilité éventuelle d'une médiation et les atouts et moyens de pression dont il dispose. Ses possibilités d'action doivent être bien adaptées à la tâche et il doit avoir de bonnes chances de favoriser un règlement. En s'empressant trop d'offrir ses bons offices, le Canada risque de nuire à sa réputation d'efficacité et même d'exacerber le conflit. Lorsque ces conditions sont remplies et lorsque c'est possible et utile, nous recommandons que le Canada se tienne prêt à offrir ses bons offices, qu'il s'agisse de la médiation ou de l'envoi de missions d'étude ou de forces de maintien de la paix, pour aider les parties à résoudre leur différend et à trouver la paix. C'est parfois une tâche cruciale, et le Canada pourrait être bien placé pour l'accomplir. Les Canadiens doivent cependant se rendre compte qu'agir en tiers peut comporter de nombreuses déconvenues. Pour être un intermédiaire acceptable aux yeux des protagonistes, il faut souvent être resté relativement neutre par rapport au conflit. De plus, il s'écoule parfois beaucoup de temps avant que les parties ne soient prêtes à chercher un règlement.

En ce qui concerne le Moyen-Orient, où tous les efforts de règlement ont échoué jusqu'à ce jour, nous croyons que le Canada doit continuer d'exprimer ouvertement ses inquiétudes quant à la sécurité de la région et au sort de ses habitants. À notre avis, la politique actuelle du Canada contient les ingrédients essentiels à un règlement viable : reconnaissance du droit des Palestiniens à une patrie en Cisjordanie et dans la Bande de Gaza et reconnaissance du droit à l'existence de l'État d'Israël à l'intérieur de frontières sûres. Nous sommes douloureusement conscients des obstacles qui bloquent la voie à un

plaints publiquement du temps qu'a mis l'URSS à les prévenir, les pays de l'Est semblent être en faveur de l'établissement de règles internationales visant à prévenir les membres de la communauté internationale de tout accident nucléaire entraînant des émanations radioactives. Les propositions du comité à ce sujet se trouvent au chapitre IV. D'éventuelles discussions sur ce sujet et sur d'autres pourraient jeter une lumière nouvelle sur les questions relatives à la sécurité internationale et permettre au Canada d'en apprendre beaucoup sur la façon dont l'Union soviétique voit les questions de sécurité. Le gouvernement doit cependant faire preuve de savoir-faire dans ces contacts et tenir ses alliés de l'OTAN pleinement au courant de leurs résultats.

## Les conflits régionaux

Bien que le voisinage des forces de l'OTAN et de celles du Pacte de Varsovie en Europe centrale entraîne une plus grande concentration de puissance militaire que ce n'est le cas ailleurs, l'Europe vit en paix depuis maintenant plus de 40 ans. Durant la même période, comme l'a déclaré le rédacteur en chef de la revue *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, M. John Gelliner, il y a eu, dans d'autres régions du monde, environ 160 guerres qui n'ont pas été déclarées officiellement, mais dont beaucoup ont eu de graves conséquences. Il a attiré l'attention du comité sur la guerre entre l'Iran et l'Irak, qui aurait déjà fait un million de victimes (22:11). D'autres témoins, se fondant sur des définitions différentes, arrivent à un nombre de guerres supérieur ou inférieur, mais nul ne conteste qu'il y a eu, ailleurs qu'en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, de multiples attaques lancées par un Etat contre un autre durant l'après-guerre.

Le conflit dont il a été le plus souvent question au cours des audiences est celui qui bouleverse l'Amérique centrale. Les questions de sécurité sont un élément important de la crise dans cette région, mais les préoccupations et les activités du Canada concernent surtout l'aspect humanitaire et les droits de la personne. C'est pourquoi le comité a reporté au chapitre VIII ses commentaires sur la situation en Amérique centrale. Par contre, le Moyen-Orient, qui est aussi témoin de scènes sanglantes et de malheurs, risque davantage d'opposer les superpuissances que l'Amérique centrale. Il concerne donc plus directement les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité.

Le Moyen-Orient est en réalité le théâtre non pas d'un, mais de plusieurs conflits interminables. Les combats qui ont fait le plus grand nombre de victimes sont ceux qui opposent l'Iran à l'Irak dans une guerre acharnée qui dure depuis cinq ans déjà. Le conflit dont les ramifications sont les plus étendues est celui qui oppose Israël à ses voisins arabes et qui concerne personnellement de nombreux Canadiens. Depuis les combats qui se sont déroulés lors de la naissance de l'Etat d'Israël, ce pays a été quatre fois en guerre avec un ou plusieurs Etats voisins. Les répercussions de ce conflit dépassent le Moyen-Orient et ont considérablement exacerbé les tensions internationales. Dans cette région déjà perturbée par les conflits entre Etats, la guerre civile a pris des dimensions alarmantes. Une violente guerre civile entre des factions rivales fondées surtout sur des groupes religieux déchire le Liban depuis dix ans. Par ailleurs, les dirigeants du Yémen du Sud se sont récemment livrés une lutte qui a fait de nombreuses victimes.

Les témoignages contradictoires que le comité a entendus, et qui portaient presque tous sur le conflit israélo-arabe, lui ont permis de se rendre compte que la situation présente de nombreux aspects insolubles. Des témoins ont encore une fois recommandé que le Canada prenne des mesures propres à relancer le processus de paix, notamment en encourageant la reprise de négociations entre les protagonistes et en demeurant prêt à envoyer des forces de maintien de la paix. Des témoins ont également fait des recommandations qui peuvent sans aucun doute être considérées comme partiales.



Pour sa part, le Canada a de bonnes raisons de chercher à établir de meilleures relations bilatérales avec l'URSS. En effet, comme le Canada est géographiquement situé entre les deux superpuissances, il est naturel qu'il essaie de servir d'intermédiaire et d'atténuer les tensions Est-Ouest. La militarisation croissante de la région de l'Arctique donne au Canada une raison spéciale de tenter de préserver l'équilibre militaire dans cette zone. Le Canada a également diverses relations bilatérales avec l'Union soviétique, par exemple dans le domaine économique ou scientifique, et ces relations sont importantes pour les deux pays. De plus, le Canada et l'URSS ont des intérêts et des activités qui justifient des échanges de vues fréquents.

Sur le plan économique, nos relations bilatérales sont peut-être impressionnantes en termes statistiques, mais elles reposent sur des assises assez fragiles à cause de l'importance prépondérante des ventes de blé du Canada à l'Union soviétique. Jusqu'à présent, on n'a pas réussi à établir des échanges commerciaux équilibrés. L'Union soviétique est de loin le plus important marché pour le blé canadien, mais le Canada importe très peu en retour. De plus, on sait que l'Union soviétique fait tout ce qu'elle peut pour ne pas être obligée d'importer autant de blé.

Il serait possible d'accroître nettement les échanges de connaissances entre les deux pays, d'autant plus que le Canada et l'URSS ont beaucoup de problèmes communs : un climat rigoureux, des distances considérables entraînant des difficultés de transport, et la culture des céréales dans un environnement froid et aride. Un programme d'échanges bilatéraux variés avait vu le jour en 1971, mais le Canada l'a suspendu en 1980 après l'invasion de l'Afghanistan. Le Canada a repris ses échanges officiels avec l'URSS en ce qui concerne l'Arctique, l'agriculture et les sports, mais les échanges scientifiques, universitaires, professionnels et culturels sont toujours au point mort. Rien n'empêche leur reprise en vertu de l'accord bilatéral en vigueur, si ce n'est que le Canada n'a pas pour le moment débloqué les crédits nécessaires.

Il serait dans l'intérêt du Canada de reprendre ces échanges. Sans pour autant approuver implicitement la politique soviétique en Afghanistan, le Canada montrerait ainsi qu'il est conscient des perspectives nouvelles résultant de l'arrivée de nouveaux dirigeants en URSS et qu'il désire encourager un certain relâchement des tensions Est-Ouest. Nous admettons qu'il est extrêmement difficile de trouver les fonds nécessaires. Nous appuyons le principe d'échanges avec l'URSS et nous recommandons de prévoir, dans les dépenses futures, une multiplication progressive de ces échanges.

Les échanges sont importants pour augmenter les connaissances du Canada. Nous estimons nécessaire de mieux mettre en commun nos informations sur l'Union soviétique pour mieux comprendre ce pays et ainsi faciliter nos relations avec lui. Les Canadiens qui sont compétents dans un secteur donné de la politique publique et qui connaissent bien l'URSS sont trop rares. Il conviendrait également d'accroître les programmes d'enseignement du russe. Il faut rappeler au gouvernement fédéral, aux universités et aux organismes de financement publics et privés à quel point il est important que des Canadiens soient en mesure de porter un jugement éclairé sur l'URSS.

Le Canada a aussi de nombreuses relations bilatérales avec les autres pays d'Europe de l'Est. Ces relations vont exiger beaucoup de doigté parce que les Soviétiques craignent que les gouvernements d'Europe de l'Est n'essaient d'établir des liens qui leur donneraient une plus grande indépendance vis-à-vis de l'URSS. Chaque fois qu'il en a l'occasion, le Canada devrait s'efforcer d'établir un dialogue avec eux. Ce genre de dialogue est d'ailleurs déjà en cours, et l'accident nucléaire survenu à Tchernobyl a suscité une commune inquiétude au Canada et dans ces pays. S'étant

occidentaux à coordonner leurs politiques sur des questions extrêmement diverses, par exemple sur les échanges commerciaux et les conditions d'octroi des crédits à l'exportation, sur les transferts de technologies, en particulier en ce qui concerne les techniques pouvant se prêter à des applications militaires, et sur la façon de réagir à l'aide offerte par l'Union soviétique aux mouvements révolutionnaires dans les pays en développement. Non seulement il est difficile d'obtenir des gouvernements de l'Ouest qu'ils pensent et agissent à l'unisson dans ces domaines, mais il y a des divergences d'opinion sur ce qui motive les Soviétiques et sur la façon d'influer sur leur attitude.

L'accession au pouvoir de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a entraîné un profond remaniement des hautes instances politiques de l'Union soviétique, qui ont adopté un style plus moderne. Le nouveau chef de l'Union soviétique nous apparaît plus compétent que ses prédécesseurs, plus vif, plus calculateur, plus souple et plus en mesure de prendre au besoin des décisions rapides. Les pays de l'Ouest devraient réagir de façon constructive aux efforts apparemment sérieux des dirigeants soviétiques de réduire la tension Est-Ouest. Nous avons réagi favorablement à la décision de M. Gorbatchev de prolonger le moratoire que l'URSS s'est imposé sur les essais nucléaires souterrains. Cette décision a renouvelé les espoirs qui avaient sombré lorsque les Soviétiques s'étaient opposés à la mise en place d'un réseau international de détection des secousses sismiques lors de la 40<sup>e</sup> session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Nous pensons que le moratoire soviétique offre la possibilité de mettre au point un accord sur l'arrêt de tous les essais nucléaires. Nous sommes d'avis, notamment, que le gouvernement devrait inciter les Etats-Unis à déclarer un moratoire semblable dont la durée devrait permettre de déterminer s'il est possible d'en arriver à un accord sur un arrêt total des essais et sur un mécanisme acceptable de vérification.

Le Canada peut également contribuer à l'amélioration des relations Est-Ouest en exerçant des pressions sur les Etats-Unis. Il peut le faire bilatéralement, mais aussi en prenant le temps de se gagner l'appui d'Etats qui partagent ses idées et qui peuvent, ensemble, influencer sur l'attitude des Américains. Le Canada aurait avantage à procéder à des échanges de vues avec d'autres puissances de l'OTAN. La République fédérale d'Allemagne, par exemple, a depuis longtemps l'attention fixée sur Moscou et voit fréquemment les questions internationales du même oeil que le Canada, ce qui amène souvent nos deux pays à voter de la même façon aux Nations Unies. L'Allemagne a de plus beaucoup de poids auprès des Etats-Unis.

L'avénir de l'Europe demeure au coeur des relations Est-Ouest. La sécurité de l'Europe est très importante pour le Canada. Notre pays a des échanges commerciaux avec les Etats du bloc soviétique, et il s'intéresse activement aux questions à caractère humanitaire, notamment à la réunion des familles et à la libre circulation des personnes. En partie à cause des liens que de nombreux Canadiens ont avec l'Europe de l'Est, le Canada suit de près l'attitude des gouvernements de ces pays envers les droits de la personne. En tant que participant à la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe et aux diverses réunions et rencontres connexes, le Canada est bien placé pour favoriser l'adoption de mesures renforçant la confiance et jetant les bases d'un contrôle régional des armements.

Certes, les relations entre les superpuissances et les affaires européennes sont au coeur du conflit entre l'Est et l'Ouest, mais il y a aussi d'autres questions qui les divisent, en particulier l'occupation de l'Afghanistan et les efforts faits par l'Union soviétique pour étendre sa sphère d'influence à d'autres parties du tiers monde. En revanche, les deux camps ont des intérêts communs, notamment l'établissement de liens commerciaux et même la préservation de la stabilité internationale, comme en témoigne leur collaboration aux efforts déployés pour stopper la prolifération des armes nucléaires.



diplomate canadien, a proposé que le contrôle des armements soit un élément essentiel de la planification stratégique et de la prise de décisions à l'OTAN. Selon ce dernier, le Canada devrait recommander à l'OTAN « d'insister en toute occasion pour que le contrôle des armements soit un facteur de tous les plans ou décisions stratégiques, particulièrement lorsqu'il est question de déployer des effectifs ou des systèmes d'armements nouveaux ou modifiés (50:109) ».

Pour qu'on puisse aboutir à une politique efficace de contrôle des armements et de désarmement qui bénéficie d'appuis suffisants au sein du gouvernement, celle-ci doit être le fruit de la collaboration des planificateurs de la politique étrangère et de ceux de la politique de défense. Cependant, nous sentons un écart entre l'attitude du ministère des Affaires extérieures et celle du ministère de la Défense nationale à ce sujet. Cela nous fait craindre que les propositions de contrôle des armements ne soient pas mises de l'avant avec suffisamment d'énergie et manquent de coordination. À notre avis, les décisions militaires auxquelles le Canada participe à titre de membre de l'OTAN ne doivent pas être prises sans qu'on ait dûment pesé les conséquences qu'elles auront sur le contrôle des armements. La politique sur le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, d'un côté, et la politique de défense, de l'autre, doivent fonctionner en tandem.

Nous avons conclu qu'il conviendrait d'améliorer les moyens dont dispose le gouvernement pour formuler une politique sur le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de préciser comment on pourrait améliorer ces moyens mais il faudrait au moins un nouveau mécanisme d'élaboration de la politique qui permette de concilier les vues du ministère des Affaires extérieures et celles du ministère de la Défense nationale. Nous pensons également que la politique étrangère est élaborée de façon plus coordonnée et plus énergique si les grandes orientations que le gouvernement entend lui donner sont régulièrement soumises à la population. Le nouveau service devrait être tenu de faire périodiquement rapport au Parlement.

## Les relations Est-Ouest

Nous croyons que le Canada a un rôle à jouer dans l'orientation politique des relations Est-Ouest. Comme M. John Halstead l'a dit au comité, « [...] les relations Est-Ouest sont trop importantes pour en laisser la gestion aux seules superpuissances (30:10) ». Ces relations doivent reposer sur des contacts multilatéraux entre alliés et sur des échanges bilatéraux avec les gouvernements des pays du bloc soviétique. Sur le plan multilatéral, le Canada devrait s'entendre avec ses alliés sur ce qui peut être considéré comme acceptable de la part de l'Union soviétique et sur les mécanismes d'encouragement et de dissuasion à utiliser pour faire respecter les limites convenues. Ces consultations devraient englober toutes les actions et décisions des Soviétiques. Cependant, les façons très diverses dont les membres de l'alliance ont réagi à l'imposition de la loi martiale en Pologne et la décision de construire un pipeline reliant l'Europe de l'Ouest et l'Union soviétique donnent à penser qu'il conviendrait d'essayer de concilier les différences qui existent au sein de l'alliance. Le Canada devrait inciter l'alliance à adopter envers l'Union soviétique une attitude ferme et concertée, mais dénuée de toute provocation et susceptible de se prêter à des compromis raisonnables.

L'Ouest peut espérer se servir de certaines situations pour exercer des pressions sur les Soviétiques. De la même façon, il est des points sur lesquels l'Union soviétique peut tabler pour tenter de diviser les alliés du bloc occidental. Cela force les gouvernements

En plus de participer à des discussions bilatérales avec les Américains, le Canada devrait chercher à élargir les discussions avec tous ses alliés. Plusieurs propositions nous ont été présentées en vue d'accroître l'importance de l'OTAN en tant que tribune, non seulement pour la consultation sur le contrôle des armements, mais aussi pour l'élaboration de positions de négociation détaillées. Ainsi, M. Malcolm Bow, ancien

Nous savons qu'il est très difficile pour une puissance militaire modeste de se faire entendre dans les discussions sur la sécurité, notamment à Washington. A moins d'avoir les moyens de proposer des idées et des solutions nouvelles, le Canada ne peut pas s'attendre à avoir de l'influence dans la capitale américaine ou dans quelque autre capitale. Pour pouvoir jouer un tel rôle, il lui faudra accroître considérablement sa capacité technique d'analyse des questions liées au contrôle des armements. Il lui faudra également s'assurer que ses représentants sont suffisamment bien informés pour pouvoir traiter sur un pied d'égalité avec les décisionnaires américains. En outre, ses porte-parole devront revendiquer avec force le droit de participer à ces discussions d'intérêt vital pour le Canada.

Nous nous sommes tout naturellement attardés aux propositions respectives sur le contrôle des armements que l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis ont présentées à Genève à l'automne 1985. Bien que les deux ensembles de propositions soient très éloignés à bien des égards, ils soulèvent tous deux la possibilité de réductions considérables du nombre autorisé de lanceurs et d'ogives nucléaires. Par ailleurs, nous pensons que les propositions mises de l'avant par M. Gorbatchev dans son allocution du 15 janvier 1986, en vue d'une réduction en trois étapes des armes nucléaires, et de leur élimination d'ici la fin du siècle, méritent d'être examinées. Le comité estime que ces propositions ne doivent pas être qu'un premier pas. Comme il est important de faire des progrès au sujet du contrôle des armements, nous exhortons le gouvernement à faire tout son possible pour encourager les superpuissances à s'engager dans des négociations constructives sur la limitation et la réduction des armes nucléaires.

Une proposition intéressante nous a été faite à ce sujet par M. Douglas Ross, qui préconisait la création de zones de protection pour les forces de dissuasion nucléaires de chaque camp basées en mer, en gardant celles-ci aussi éloignées que possible du territoire de l'adversaire, de manière à accroître le temps d'avertissement et à réduire le risque de déclencher une guerre par inadvertance (27:21 et 29:30). Le comité n'est pas en mesure de se prononcer en connaissance de cause sur la possibilité de mettre en oeuvre une telle mesure, mais nous estimons qu'elle mérite d'être étudiée attentivement. Si l'on juge qu'elle a du mérite sur le plan pratique, on pourrait en faire une initiative multilatérale, puisqu'elle n'aurait guère de chance d'être retenue si elle venait uniquement du Canada.

Nous voyons d'un bon oeil les propositions visant à instaurer un système international d'enregistrement des exportations et des importations d'armes et de munitions pour contrôler l'expansion du commerce des armes classiques et nous estimons que le Canada doit chercher à rallier d'autres pays à ce concept.

- 6) La négociation de mesures destinées à accroître suffisamment la confiance pour permettre la réduction des forces militaires classiques en Europe et ailleurs.
- 7) Nous voyons d'un bon oeil les propositions visant à instaurer un système international d'enregistrement des exportations et des importations d'armes et de munitions pour contrôler l'expansion du commerce des armes classiques et nous estimons que le Canada doit chercher à rallier d'autres pays à ce concept.
- 8) La prévention de la course aux armements dans l'espace.
- 9) L'application d'un traité global d'interdiction des essais nucléaires dont l'application serait mutuellement vérifiable.
- 10) La négociation d'une interdiction totale des armes chimiques.



ministère des Affaires extérieures sur le désarmement et le contrôle des armements remettent en question l'orientation fondamentale du Canada dans ce domaine :

Etant donné [...] que les structures actuelles ne nous ont pas permis de contrôler la course aux armements au cours des 40 dernières années, [...] n'est-il pas temps d'adopter des approches nouvelles, plus radicales? Qu'entendons-nous par «sécurité»? Quels sont les besoins du Canada en matière de sécurité? Ces besoins sont-ils mieux servis au sein des structures et des alliances existantes (36:5)?

Les questions du contrôle des armements et du désarmement sont souvent complexes, englobant toutes sortes de facteurs politiques, techniques et militaires; il est donc nécessaire de bâtir la confiance à chaque étape de nos démarches en ce sens. Nous tenons à souligner d'ailleurs que la plupart des groupements pacifistes prônent la réduction mutuelle des armements plutôt que l'action unilatérale; beaucoup sont prêts à travailler au sein de l'OTAN, ainsi que des Nations Unies, à condition qu'il existe des possibilités raisonnables de progrès dans un avenir rapproché.

Nous partageons l'impatience de ceux qui perçoivent la gravité croissante de la situation stratégique, laquelle exige un effort renouvelé pour contrer les dangereuses accumulations d'armements. Nous croyons qu'il est nécessaire d'améliorer la stabilité stratégique en recherchant le désarmement et que la voie à suivre est pavée d'ententes mutuelles, de mesures équilibrées visant à réduire considérablement les stocks d'armements et de moyens de vérification efficaces. Nous félicitons le gouvernement d'avoir assumé un rôle de chef de file dans la vérification du contrôle des armements. C'est le Canada qui a parrainé la première résolution des Nations Unies sur la vérification, qui a été approuvée par la Première Commission de l'Assemblée générale à l'automne 1985. Sur le plan pratique, notre gouvernement s'est récemment engagé à améliorer son matériel d'évaluation sismique à Yellowknife, en vue de participer aux activités de surveillance qui suivraient l'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires. Le Canada est extrêmement bien placé, sur le plan de la recherche et des techniques de pointe, pour jouer un rôle plus grand dans l'application d'un régime efficace de contrôle des armements.

Le Canada participe activement à la Conférence du Comité du désarmement à Genève. De plus, du fait qu'il a des forces en Europe, il participe, avec les autres membres de l'alliance, aux pourparlers de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Ces pourparlers ont pour but de négocier la réduction des forces terrestres classiques en Europe.

Nous recommandons que le Canada multiplie ses efforts multilatéraux au sein de l'OTAN, des Nations Unies et dans d'autres tribunes où il est question du désarmement, de même que ses négociations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique, ainsi qu'avec d'autres pays, afin de faire accepter un ensemble complet de mesures de contrôle des armements. Ces mesures, qui ont été approuvées par le gouvernement, sont les suivantes :

- 1) Une réduction mutuelle et vérifiable des arsenaux nucléaires, ainsi que des mesures connexes visant à améliorer la stabilité stratégique. Ces dernières doivent comprendre en particulier une réaffirmation du traité ABM sur les missiles antimissiles, interprété strictement comme interdisant tous les travaux sur les systèmes défensifs, sauf la recherche fondamentale.
- 2) Le maintien et le renforcement du régime de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Nous avons perçu une grande insatisfaction au sujet du contrôle des armements. Comme Mme Joanna Miller nous l'a dit à Saskatoon : « Dans les négociations sur la limitation des armements, les aspirations militaires et les nouvelles techniques prennent plus d'importance que les efforts en vue de les contrôler (39:34) ». Comme nous avons pu le voir d'après les témoignages, certains des membres du groupe consultatif du

## Le contrôle des armements et le désarmement

De son côté, M. Gwynne Dyer a suggéré que le Canada abandonne ses engagements envers l'OTAN et le NORAD et adopte une neutralité semblable à celle de la Finlande, qui reste neutre tout en s'engageant à empêcher que son territoire ne soit utilisé pour menacer la sécurité de son puissant voisin. La majorité des membres du comité ne partagent pas ce point de vue. En effet, la Finlande ne se trouve pas dans l'axe d'une attaque directe qui pourrait être dirigée contre l'Union soviétique, tandis que, selon nous, la protection de la partie septentrionale du continent nord-américain ne peut être assurée efficacement sans une étroite collaboration entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Par ailleurs, contrairement à la Finlande, le Canada a la chance d'avoir un voisin qui a un mode de vie semblable au sien et qui croit en la démocratie. Enfin, la plupart d'entre nous pensent que le fait de participer à des alliances permet au Canada de promouvoir ses propres intérêts à long terme, y compris la défense de la liberté et de l'ordre international. Les membres du comité qui représentent le Nouveau parti démocratique doutent que les alliances militaires permettent de réaliser la paix et la sécurité internationales, et ils estiment que la question doit faire l'objet d'une étude plus approfondie.

Nous convenons qu'il faut suivre de près l'évolution de la situation dans ces secteurs; toutefois, étant donné que les forces canadiennes sont déjà surchargées, nous ne pensons pas qu'il soit souhaitable de rechercher de nouvelles tâches. En tout cas, les Antilles ne serait pas le meilleur moyen, pour le Canada, de contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité internationales. Le seul rôle que nous pourrions envisager pour les forces canadiennes en Amérique centrale consisterait à participer à des opérations de maintien de la paix.

Certains témoins nous ont également proposé que le Canada élargisse et intensifie ses efforts militaires afin de participer davantage à la défense des intérêts occidentaux dans d'autres régions du monde. Ainsi, M. George Bell, de l'Institut canadien des études stratégiques, affirmait que le Canada devrait modifier ses positions de défense afin d'assurer la sécurité au-delà de la région côtière du Pacifique, compte tenu de l'expansion de nos liens commerciaux avec les pays du Pacifique et de l'importance croissante des forces soviétiques en Asie, dans le Pacifique et dans l'Océan Indien (45:36 à 40). Il a également attiré l'attention du comité sur les intérêts du Canada dans les Antilles et en Amérique centrale, laissant entendre que nous devrions aussi contribuer à la défense de cette région.

nécessaire pour renouveler l'équipement de nos forces armées au cours des dix prochaines années. Si le gouvernement n'est pas en mesure de trouver ce montant, il devra alors tenter de négocier ou de restructurer certains de nos engagements en matière de défense, en consultation avec nos alliés, afin de combler le fossé entre nos engagements et nos possibilités. Les forces armées canadiennes pourraient ainsi ne se voir confier que des tâches qu'elles sont capables d'accomplir de façon satisfaisante.

Etats-Unis à rappeler eux aussi leurs forces, beaucoup plus nombreuses. Aux yeux des Européens, les militaires canadiens en Europe sont beaucoup plus importants que leur nombre le laisse croire.

Il existe une autre raison pour laquelle le Canada doit participer davantage à la défense de l'Europe : c'est qu'en renforçant notre position dans le domaine des armes classiques, nous pourrions peut-être dissuader l'OTAN de songer à utiliser les armes nucléaires en premier pour défendre l'Europe. Nous pourrions ainsi réduire le risque qu'un conflit mineur ne dégénère en guerre nucléaire dévastatrice. Cependant, comme cette question est très controversée, nous suggérons qu'elle soit mise à l'ordre du jour d'un comité parlementaire.

Nous sommes sceptiques quant à la proposition de M. Douglas Ross, selon qui le Canada devrait maintenir en Europe environ deux divisions de l'armée de terre au lieu d'une seule brigade. Certains d'entre nous estiment que le Canada devrait laisser le NORAD expirer tranquillement et qu'il devrait se charger lui-même de la défense aérienne en temps de paix et des services d'alerte avancée pour le Commandement aérien stratégique des Etats-Unis. La majorité des membres du comité croient au contraire que le Canada devrait continuer à jouer un rôle important dans le cadre du NORAD parce que les services d'alerte avancée actuellement fournis au Commandement aérien stratégique, qui sont un élément de dissuasion, coûteraient forcément plus cher si le Canada devait s'en charger seul. Cependant, nous considérons que, si les Etats-Unis décidaient un jour de déployer des armes résultant de l'IDS, il conviendrait que le Canada réexamine la forme de sa participation à la défense aérienne du continent nord-américain.

Si le Canada ne veut pas modifier ses engagements actuels en matière de défense, il pourrait au moins prendre des mesures pour permettre à ses forces de les respecter. C'est ce que prônait le vice-amiral H.A. Porter, de la Fédération des Instituts militaires et des Instituts des Services unis du Canada, qui a affirmé au comité : « Si le Canada veut être écouté dans les tribunes où l'on discute des questions de défense, il doit prendre un certain nombre de mesures pour raffermir sa propre défense, afin de prouver à ses alliés et au monde entier qu'il peut respecter les engagements qu'il a contractés en ce qui concerne la sécurité collective et la protection de sa souveraineté (46:89 et 90) ». Le vice-amiral Porter et le lieutenant-colonel J.H. Evans, vice-président du Congrès des associations de la Défense (Atlantique), ont également évoqué la nécessité de former davantage de militaires et, surtout, d'établir une force de réserve nombreuse et efficace.

Le gouvernement a continué d'augmenter son budget de défense d'un pourcentage supérieur au taux d'inflation, malgré d'énormes difficultés financières. Toutefois, l'efficacité de notre défense dépend aussi de la façon dont nous administrons nos fonds; nos décisions futures en matière d'approvisionnements ne devront donc pas être dictées par les pressions exercées pour que les retombées économiques soient distribuées dans tout le pays. Nous n'oublions pas, cependant, que le comité spécial du Sénat sur la défense nationale a établi que, pour pouvoir respecter tous ses engagements actuels en matière de défense, le Canada devra faire passer son budget de 2 p. 100 environ à 2,5 ou 3 p. 100 de son produit national brut.

D'après nous, le gouvernement doit réduire cet écart entre nos engagements et nos possibilités pour éviter qu'il n'en résulte des conséquences désastreuses. On peut difficilement s'imaginer, par exemple, que le Canada puisse à la fois renforcer la brigade du front central et dépêcher en Norvège le groupe de combat canadien air-mer. Nous proposons une étude immédiate de nos besoins à long terme dans le domaine de la défense, afin de déterminer exactement le montant supplémentaire qui serait



Selon nous, le Canada doit concilier ses compétences et ses responsabilités s'il veut jouer un rôle efficace en matière de défense. À l'heure actuelle, les forces armées canadiennes n'ont pas les moyens de s'acquitter des multiples tâches qui leur sont confiées. Elles doivent se débrouiller avec un personnel trop réduit et un équipement désuet, par suite de la négligence dont elles ont fait l'objet pendant les années 70 et de restrictions financières continues. Elles comptent environ 84 000 membres de la force régulière et 25 500 de la première réserve, à qui l'on demande de s'acquitter des responsabilités suivantes :

- 1) protection du territoire canadien et des intérêts du Canada au pays et à l'étranger, notamment surveillance du Grand Nord et du littoral à l'est et à l'ouest, appui aux autorités civiles, missions de recherche et de sauvetage et autres tâches au pays;

- 2) participation à la protection des installations stratégiques de dissuasion dans le cadre du NORAD, en collaboration avec les États-Unis;

- 3) respect des engagements pris en tant que membre de l'OTAN, notamment participation à la défense terrestre et aérienne de l'Europe, protection des routes maritimes de l'Atlantique servant à assurer les approvisionnement et à envoyer des renforts, et renforcement des positions de défense dans le nord de la Norvège en cas de crise internationale;

- 4) Missions de maintien de la paix.

Ces engagements sont trop nombreux pour que le Canada puisse les respecter tous. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que divers témoins, dont M<sup>me</sup> Cynthia Cannizzo, nous aient proposé de rationaliser les engagements du Canada en matière de défense en vue d'une plus grande spécialisation. Ces suggestions sont fort intéressantes.

Par exemple, un rôle accru pour les forces armées dans le Nord, comme nous le préconisons dans le chapitre sur l'importance du Nord dans la politique étrangère du Canada (chapitre X), susciterait probablement beaucoup d'enthousiasme parmi les Canadiens et, en même temps, pourrait rendre un service utile aux membres de l'OTAN. Il y aurait aussi d'autres façons de restructurer les engagements du Canada, par exemple en retirant le contingent de l'armée de l'air stationné en Europe pour intensifier nos opérations de surveillance et de détection en Amérique du Nord, ou en mettant davantage l'accent sur nos forces maritimes, qui peuvent également effectuer des tâches très utiles tant pour le Canada que pour l'alliance. Presque tous ces réaménagements limiteraient l'activité des forces canadiennes, mais permettraient à ces dernières d'assumer leurs diverses tâches beaucoup plus efficacement qu'elles ne peuvent espérer le faire à l'heure actuelle.

Nous reconnaissons cependant que cette réorganisation des engagements du Canada en matière de défense serait extrêmement complexe et qu'on ignore quelles économies elle permettrait de réaliser le cas échéant. En outre, comme les effectifs militaires canadiens sont limités et doivent se partager diverses tâches, une vaste réorganisation risquerait de nuire à leur viabilité globale. De plus, les 6 700 réservistes canadiens actuellement stationnés sur le front central en Europe assument une fonction politique essentielle en sus de leur rôle militaire; ils prouvent concrètement que le Canada est solidaire de ses alliés dans la défense de l'Europe. La réaction des membres de l'alliance à la réduction des forces canadiennes en Europe en 1969 permet de croire qu'un retrait de notre effectif total serait fort mal vu, parce qu'il pourrait pousser les



politique stratégique. Nous sommes d'avis que le Canada doit continuer d'oeuvrer au sein d'organisations multilatérales tout en s'efforçant d'influer sur les décisions les plus importantes au chapitre de la sécurité internationale.

À notre avis, une des priorités du gouvernement en matière de sécurité doit consister à adopter un point de vue qui lui soit propre sur les questions de stratégie, de contrôle des armements et de désarmement. À cette fin, le gouvernement doit d'abord acquiescer les capacités d'analyse qui constitueront l'assise d'une participation plus active du Canada dans ce domaine. Le comité note les progrès déjà réalisés à ce chapitre grâce à la création du nouvel Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité mondiales et à l'apparition d'autres centres de recherche, notamment dans les universités. Ces établissements contribueront vraisemblablement à accroître la compétence canadienne à cet égard. Le gouvernement doit ensuite se former une opinion sur les grandes questions relatives à la stratégie et au contrôle des armements. Il pourra alors défendre plus vigoureusement ses positions auprès d'autres gouvernements dans les tribunes internationales. En dernier lieu, il doit établir un dialogue permanent avec la population sur la politique de sécurité, en commençant par faire connaître ses opinions à ce sujet et les arguments sur lesquels il s'appuie.

La politique de sécurité du Canada doit avoir comme objectifs la sauvegarde de la stabilité internationale et la défense de la paix mondiale. Pour préserver cette stabilité, il faut disposer de forces de défense capables de dissuader l'adversaire, sans toutefois le provoquer. Il faut mettre en place des mécanismes mutuellement acceptables pour le contrôle des armements afin de s'assurer qu'aucune partie ne lancera une attaque en premier. Enfin, il faut maintenir la communication diplomatique entre les deux parties pour éviter tout malentendu ou le déclenchement accidentel d'une guerre.

Étant donné les risques évidents d'instabilité stratégique, il est d'autant plus important que le Canada soit en mesure d'élaborer sa propre politique de sécurité. En particulier, comme nous l'a fait remarquer l'amiral R.H. Falls, ancien chef de l'état-major de la Défense et président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN : « Les deux superpuissances sont en train de s'équiper d'ogives à têtes multiples et d'armements tellement perfectionnés qu'on peut s'en servir pour atteindre des cibles extrêmement précises. [...] Cela donne évidemment à chaque pays, de poursuivre l'amiral Falls, la capacité de lancer une première attaque contre les silos blindés de l'adversaire. Voilà ce qu'il accroit l'incertitude et l'instabilité (21:38) ».

Nous notons également une évolution du climat stratégique qui touche directement le Canada. Le territoire canadien acquiert en effet une valeur stratégique de plus en plus grande, en partie à cause de l'importance qu'accroissent dorénavant les États-Unis à la défense contre les missiles balistiques et en partie à cause de la mise au point de nouvelles armes offensives, par exemple des bombardiers à long rayon d'action, des missiles de croisière et des missiles balistiques très précis lancés à partir de sous-marins. Il est donc possible qu'on demande un jour au Canada d'autoriser l'implantation d'installations de défense antimissiles sur son territoire. En outre, l'inclusion de missiles de croisière dans l'arsenal soviétique pourrait accroître les risques d'une offensive visant directement des installations situées sur le territoire canadien, en cas d'attaque contre l'Amérique du Nord. À ce propos, nous avons trouvé fort intéressant le témoignage de M. John Lamb, directeur général du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, qui a soutenu que le Canada pourrait profiter de son importance stratégique accrue pour favoriser un climat propice à la sécurité tant nationale qu'internationale.

## La sauvegarde de la paix et de la sécurité mondiales

Le Canada doit se donner les moyens de porter des jugements vraiment indépendants sur les grandes questions touchant la sécurité internationale. Comme nous l'avons souligné dans la partie de notre rapport intérimaire traitant de la participation du Canada aux travaux de recherche prévus dans le cadre de l'Initiative de défense stratégique, les Canadiens du secteur privé et du secteur public se fient beaucoup trop aux renseignements et aux analyses provenant de sources américaines. Les gouvernements canadiens qui se sont succédé n'avaient pas l'habitude de se prononcer de façon précise sur les choix stratégiques que l'OTAN ou le Pacte de Varsovie étaient amenés à faire, ni sur les propositions que l'Occident devait avancer dans le cadre des négociations sur le contrôle des armements avec l'Union soviétique et ses alliés. Au lieu d'adopter une attitude indépendante dans le débat sur la politique de sécurité, ils acquiesçaient plutôt aux positions prises par les États-Unis, en critiquant peut-être parfois certains aspects secondaires, mais généralement sans s'attaquer de front aux grands problèmes.

À notre avis, le gouvernement doit favoriser un débat éclairé au Canada s'il veut jouer un rôle plus actif à l'échelle internationale. Faute de savoir avec précision jusqu'où leur gouvernement juge utile de pousser la dissuasion, les Canadiens ont du mal à saisir ce qui justifie ses achats d'armements ou la formulation de ses propositions sur le contrôle des armements. La Chambre des communes débat ces questions plus souvent qu'autrefois, mais on n'a toujours pas de position claire, étayée par des arguments fondés sur l'expérience canadienne. Nous avons remarqué que ce manque de détermination crée un certain malaise parmi les citoyens que la question intéresse. Il est en effet difficile d'être certain que les intérêts du Canada sont défendus efficacement ou que le Canada donne vraiment le meilleur de lui-même sur la scène internationale quand on ignore les principes qui guident le gouvernement.

Il faut cependant reconnaître que le Canada s'est illustré à plusieurs reprises comme défenseur de la paix et de la sécurité mondiales. Il participe activement aux travaux d'organisations multilatérales qui se consacrent à ces questions, et de nombreux fonctionnaires canadiens sont devenus des spécialistes dans ce domaine. Le Canada s'acquitte de plusieurs tâches utiles, comme l'élaboration de techniques de vérification du contrôle des armements qui font appel à des compétences qu'il possède. Cette orientation convient bien au Canada qui est membre du bloc occidental mais qui sait conserver une certaine objectivité au sujet des différends qui opposent les superpuissances. Par contre, le Canada ne fait qu'effleurer les questions fondamentales de la

notre identité nationale, nous fournit une occasion idéale pour écouter le point de vue des pays en voie de développement de ces deux groupes linguistiques; en effet, 44 des 49 Etats membres du Commonwealth et 34 des 39 Etats de la Francophonie sont des pays en voie de développement. Il est également important, pour l'image que nous avons de nos rapports avec la communauté internationale, que nous soyons prêts à jouer un rôle de chef de file au sein de ces organisations quand les circonstances l'exigent.

L'important, c'est que le Canada continue à souscrire pleinement aux principes de la coopération internationale qui caractérisent depuis longtemps ses relations extérieures, surtout à une époque où le multilatéralisme même semble compromis. Le Canada doit continuer à chercher des solutions pratiques aux nouvelles réalités politiques. En ce sens, il doit poursuivre deux objectifs : a) promouvoir la réforme des institutions internationales afin d'en augmenter au maximum l'efficacité en réduisant le double emploi et le gaspillage, et b) favoriser le dialogue entre le Nord et le Sud, en aidant les pays du tiers monde à se rapprocher des centres de décision de ces institutions. Ainsi sera-t-il possible de créer un nouveau consensus au sujet de ces organisations internationales.

Dans ce monde qui ne cesse de se faire plus petit chaque jour et où nous sommes de plus en plus interdépendants, la coopération multilatérale ne peut avoir lieu que par l'intermédiaire d'institutions telles que les Nations Unies. Malgré les problèmes immédiats qui se posent à l'ONU, il y a place pour l'espoir, même à court terme. L'ambassadeur du Canada aux Nations Unies, M. Stephen Lewis, a d'ailleurs terminé son témoignage sur une note optimiste :

Je suis un de ceux qui sont d'avis que l'Organisation des Nations Unies, malgré toutes ses faiblesses [...] est un organisme auquel nous pouvons être fiers de participer; lors de son 40<sup>e</sup> anniversaire, nombre de chefs d'Etat et de gouvernements ont fait les éloges du groupe, et l'on a pu constater que c'était là un moment important dans l'histoire du groupe, un moment psychologique important, où au niveau interne on signalait que l'existence des Nations Unies était un avantage et où, au niveau externe, on pouvait constater que le public percevait les Nations Unies d'un meilleur œil (22:10).



devoir de demander instamment que tous les États concernés adoptent, par l'entremise de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, un ensemble de mesures de sécurité relatives à l'énergie nucléaire. Au nombre de celles-ci devraient se trouver un examen de toutes les normes de sécurité des centrales atomiques civiles, la création d'un système international d'inspection, l'élaboration de méthodes pour l'élimination des déchets radioactifs, et un accord international qui prévoirait l'annonce rapide de tout accident nucléaire et l'organisation de secours immédiats.

Le droit international peut également permettre au Canada de réaliser des objectifs importants en matière de politique étrangère, particulièrement dans le domaine multilatéral. Étant donné la diversité des organisations internationales existantes, tant à l'extérieur qu'à l'intérieur de l'ONU, nous pensons que le Canada a tout intérêt à tenter d'accroître les ramifications du droit international et, en même temps, d'assurer une utilisation maximale des institutions dans ce domaine.

Dans cette perspective, nous sommes très heureux que le gouvernement ait décidé récemment de retirer les réserves qu'il avait faites en 1970 au sujet des zones de pêche arctiques et côtières. Comme l'a fait observer M. Edward McWhinney :

Le défi, pour les hommes politiques et les juristes occidentaux, consiste à contribuer au processus législatif international, et à chercher à remanier les règles établies et à en élaborer de nouvelles, en veillant à ce que ce processus soit nettement imprégné de l'esprit occidental. Ils se rendent vite compte que le tiers monde est loin de constituer un bloc monolithique pratiquant une orthodoxie rigide; il est au contraire pluraliste dans son organisation et sa vision des choses, et caractérisé par conséquent par des différences importantes dans les intérêts, les perspectives et les espoirs des pays qui le composent (*International Journal* XL/3, 1985, p.422).

Un seul Canadien a siégé jusqu'ici à la Cour internationale de justice : M. John Read, de 1946 à 1958. Nous recommandons que le Canada propose des candidats pour remplir des fonctions à la Cour internationale de justice et dans les autres grandes institutions juridiques internationales comme la Commission du droit international et la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international. À notre avis, le Canada devrait également encourager les autres États à reconnaître la compétence de la Cour internationale de justice et à souscrire à la clause facultative avec le moins de réserves possible.

Le Canada devrait, par ses déclarations et sa politique, défendre le principe général du règlement pacifique des différends. Il doit pour ce faire être prêt à offrir ses services de médiateur et à demander si possible l'intervention active d'une tierce partie, par exemple des Nations Unies ou du Commonwealth, dès le début des conflits. Nous devrions aussi encourager un recours plus rapide et plus généralisé à des missions d'enquête et d'observation menées de façon régulière par le secrétaire général des Nations Unies et les personnes qu'il nomme à cette fin. Il faudrait également que le secrétaire général, de concert avec le Conseil de sécurité suive plus régulièrement et plus systématiquement la situation mondiale en ce qui concerne la paix et la sécurité.

Bien sûr, l'appui du comité aux organisations internationales ne se limite pas à l'ONU. Au contraire, nous considérons que les liens du Canada avec le Commonwealth sont d'une importance primordiale et qu'ils nous apportent des avantages innombrables et souvent inattendus, tant au niveau bilatéral que sur le plan multilatéral. Nous nous réjouissons également de notre appartenance à la nouvelle organisation qui réunit les membres de la Francophonie, et espérons qu'avec le temps celle-ci réussira à se tailler sur la scène mondiale une place aussi importante que le Commonwealth. Notre appartenance à ces deux organisations, outre qu'elle constitue un élément essentiel de



Tant le gouvernement fédéral que les gouvernements provinciaux ont pris des mesures énergiques pour lutter contre les pluies acides émanant du Canada. Représentant les préoccupations de leurs électeurs, ils ont beaucoup aussi insisté sur l'importance d'une concertation internationale pour protéger l'environnement. La participation du Canada à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur l'environnement, en 1972, et à la création subséquente du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUÉ) (notamment grâce à M. Maurice Strong, qui a été secrétaire général de la conférence et premier directeur exécutif du PNUÉ), montre bien que notre pays s'intéresse depuis longtemps à la question. Le PNUÉ est unique parmi les organismes de l'ONU, en ce sens qu'il n'est financé que par des contributions volontaires; le Canada a toujours été l'un de ses principaux promoteurs. Le représentant permanent du Canada au PNUÉ, M. David Miller, a eu l'honneur d'être choisi comme premier président du nouveau Groupe de représentants résidents. Ce groupe exerce une influence considérable parce qu'il assure la liaison entre le secrétariat du programme et les États membres, entre les réunions du Conseil d'administration (dont le Canada fait également partie). M. Charles Caccia, ancien ministre de l'Environnement, a cependant laissé entendre que le PNUÉ serait plus efficace si son personnel était logé dans les bureaux du secrétariat général de l'ONU : « Il pourrait établir des politiques, jouer un rôle de représentation et promouvoir la recherche et la réflexion à long terme (58:65) ». Le comité recommande que le gouvernement du Canada étudie la possibilité de faire du PNUÉ un organisme financé de la même façon que les autres organismes spécialisés de l'ONU, et d'une manière générale, qu'il tente par tous les moyens d'augmenter l'efficacité de cet organisme. Le gouvernement devrait également continuer à sensibiliser la communauté internationale à la détérioration de l'environnement et à collaborer avec les autres États qui reconnaissent la gravité du problème afin d'obtenir que des mesures correctives soient prises.

La catastrophe qui s'est produite récemment à la centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl, en Union soviétique, a ravivé dans le monde entier les craintes que suscite l'énergie nucléaire. Il existe déjà 361 réacteurs nucléaires en service dans le monde, et 144 autres sont en construction ou à l'état de projet; et pourtant, il reste encore des questions à résoudre sur l'énergie nucléaire. Il faut notamment se demander ce qu'il adviendra des centrales nucléaires après leur vie utile qui n'est que de 25 à 30 ans, et trouver des moyens efficaces pour se débarrasser des déchets radioactifs extrêmement dangereux qui ne cessent de s'accumuler et qui risquent de nous mener un jour à la catastrophe.

L'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), organisation intergouvernementale autonome créée sous l'égide des Nations Unies, a pour principaux objectifs a) de promouvoir la contribution de l'énergie atomique à la paix, à la santé et à la prospérité dans le monde entier et b) d'éviter que l'équipement nucléaire destiné à des fins pacifiques soit détourné vers un usage militaire. L'Agence ne peut cependant effectuer d'inspections que si elle a l'autorisation du pays concerné, et ces inspections ne peuvent porter que sur la prolifération des armes nucléaires. L'AIEA a certes élaboré des normes de sécurité très complètes sur le fonctionnement des réacteurs nucléaires et sur la gestion des déchets radioactifs, mais il n'existe pas encore de véritable consensus international dans ce domaine. Aucune inspection n'est prévue non plus pour vérifier si les installations civiles sont sûres et si elles sont conformes aux normes de protection de l'environnement. Le comité admet qu'il est très difficile d'obtenir des accords internationaux à ce sujet. Cependant, le cas de Tchernobyl a montré que les accidents survenant dans des centrales nucléaires peuvent bien contaminer la population d'autres pays. Dans ces circonstances, nous considérons que le gouvernement du Canada a le

Nous savons tous que les émissions d'anhydride sulfureux émanant des centrales situées aux États-Unis contribuent à l'acidification des lacs et à la destruction des forêts du sud-est du Canada. La même chose se produit en Europe. La pollution provenant de tous les pays de l'hémisphère nord produit un brouillard arctique dans les

L'environnement constitue un secteur où le Canada peut contribuer utilement à élaborer de nouvelles restrictions et de nouvelles normes juridiques internationales. M. Paul Painchaud, de l'Université Laval, a demandé avec beaucoup de conviction qu'on accorde plus d'importance aux questions internationales relatives à l'environnement, soutenant que les problèmes écologiques mondiaux «constituent une menace aussi grave que la menace nucléaire (49:42)». M. David Munro, de la Fédération canadienne de la faune, a pour sa part attiré notre attention sur le fait que, si l'on ne parvient pas à établir des liens plus solides entre la conservation et le développement, les problèmes actuels s'aggraveront sur une grande partie du globe, si bien que «la dégradation des sols se poursuivra, les ressources nationales continueront de disparaître et les possibilités de développement économique seront réduites (42:58)». La famine qui sévit au Sahel pourrait être un triste précurseur des problèmes qui nous attendent si nous ne sommes pas bien préparés. Les Canadiens ne peuvent pas non plus être pleinement optimistes face à leur propre situation. À ce sujet, les observations de M. Munro sont éloquentes :

Nous pensons que le gouvernement devrait exercer des pressions pour que la Commission préparatoire pour le droit de la mer termine rapidement ses travaux, afin de dissiper les incertitudes qui pèsent sur l'Administration des fonds marins. Il devrait ensuite entreprendre une analyse détaillée des coûts et des avantages du Traité sur le droit de la mer. Comme ce traité nous a déjà procuré des avantages importants, même s'il n'est pas encore en vigueur, le comité estime que le Canada devrait le ratifier.

Le Canada participe actuellement, de concert avec les autres pays du monde, aux travaux de la Commission préparatoire pour le droit de la mer. Le Traité sur le droit de la mer n'a pas complètement mis au point les statuts et les règlements ayant trait à l'exploitation minière des fonds marins; la commission préparatoire est chargée de cette tâche. Le Canada sera touché de près par les résultats de ces négociations, qui permettront également de faire le tri des diverses revendications faites par les premiers investisseurs dans l'exploitation minière des fonds marins, parmi lesquels figurent Noranda et Inco.

La troisième Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer a justement donné le jour à une nouvelle institution, l'Administration des fonds marins. Le Canada s'est particulièrement distingué lors de cette conférence et des longues négociations qui y ont abouti. Son rôle de médiateur entre les pays en voie de développement et les pays industrialisés était conforme à ses meilleures traditions en matière de coopération. C'est un rôle pour lequel le Canada, selon Mme Elizabeth Mann Borghese, est particulièrement bien placé et qui «convient parfaitement à notre pays (33:6)».

d'autres régions du tiers monde. Au siège social de l'ONU, à New York, une organisation bien structurée, pendant économique du Conseil de sécurité, superviserait l'activité de ces organismes intégrés de développement régional. Ces propositions méritent à tous le moins d'être étudiées de près. Nous recommandons que le Canada recherche un accord international sur la création d'un organisme ou d'un comité compétent qui aiderait à simplifier tous les rouages du système de développement multilatéral. Nous appuyons tout effort déployé pour réduire le double emploi et la centralisation excessive qui existent actuellement à l'ONU. Il faudrait également étudier la possibilité de créer de nouvelles institutions et d'abandonner celles qui ne sont plus utiles.



[...] les pays en développement [...] considèrent les Nations Unies comme leur organisation. Ils y prêtent beaucoup attention et y envoient souvent leurs meilleurs éléments au lieu de les nommer à d'autres postes diplomatiques. Je me rends parfaitement compte qu'il y a des problèmes financiers, mais il me semble que l'on pourrait peut-être leur demander de payer un petit peu plus que les 0,01 p. 100 que versent bon nombre d'entre eux (58:30).

Il est de toute évidence dangereux, tant politiquement que financièrement, que les Nations Unies dépendent dans une trop large mesure d'un seul Etat membre; les conséquences de cette situation commencent d'ailleurs à se faire sentir de plus en plus. A l'heure actuelle, les cotisations de 147 des 159 Etats membres de l'ONU, prises ensemble, sont inférieures à la seule contribution des Etats-Unis. Dans ces circonstances, nous recommandons que le Canada appuie les travaux du groupe d'experts de haut niveau créé par le secrétaire général pour étudier ces questions. A long terme, le Canada devrait étudier la possibilité d'établir, de concert avec d'autres puissances moyennes, un nouveau barème de contributions à l'ONU, selon lequel aucun Etat ne fournirait plus qu'un montant déterminé, afin que l'organisation ne dépende pas trop d'un seul membre.

En outre, un des grands rôles du Canada est de s'assurer que les Etats-Unis, qui sont l'un des pays fondateurs de l'ONU, continuent d'en être un membre actif. La pleine participation des Etats-Unis est en effet indispensable à une organisation qui a pour vocation d'englober et surtout de rallier tous les pays du monde. Ceux qui déplorent l'incapacité croissante de l'ONU ne pensent sûrement pas que le désengagement progressif des Etats-Unis soit un remède à la situation.

La réforme de l'ONU est une condition préalable au consensus renouvelé que souhaitent tous ses partisans. Il y a lieu de réexaminer les priorités et les programmes pour augmenter au maximum leur efficacité, et de simplifier les mécanismes internationaux pour éviter tout double emploi. A l'heure actuelle, par exemple, le Conseil économique et social et diverses commissions de l'Assemblée générale étudient à peu près les mêmes questions chaque année; cette situation, vouée à l'origine, n'a plus aujourd'hui de raison d'être. Dans l'optique de la réforme souhaitée, il convient d'étudier plus longuement les propositions que nous ont présentées MM. David Pollock et Charles Nobbe, qui demandaient tous deux une révision de divers organismes multilatéraux, comme le Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement, l'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture, et l'UNESCO. Selon M. Charles Nobbe : « Il y a beaucoup de double emploi et une trop grande centralisation (32:89) ». Quant à M. David Pollock, il suggérerait de se poser deux questions simples : premièrement, l'organisme à l'étude est-il aussi valable aujourd'hui qu'il l'était lors de sa création et, deuxièmement, est-il efficace? (22:15) Nous pensons qu'il serait utile de communiquer cette idée à d'autres pays qui se préoccupent autant que le Canada du sort des Nations Unies, pour voir jusqu'à quel point ils seraient d'accord avec cette révision externe.

Nous pensons qu'il faut au moins trouver un meilleur moyen de coordonner les divers programmes de développement de l'ONU, du Fonds monétaire international et de la Banque mondiale. M. David Pollock a signalé diverses lacunes dans la coordination au sein des organismes de développement multilatéraux, en dépit des diverses tentatives pour créer un mécanisme satisfaisant (22:14). A titre d'exemple, le groupe d'enquête mixte de l'ONU a recommandé de démanteler les bureaux de l'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture, de l'UNICEF, des programmes de développement, de démographie et d'aide alimentaire, et même de la Banque mondiale, à New York, à Washington et à Rome. Il suggérerait à la place de confier toutes ces activités à une seule organisation, qui aurait des bureaux en Afrique, aux Antilles, en Asie du Sud et dans

rétablir une plus grande harmonie, l'ONU risque de s'atrophier progressivement faute d'intérêt de la part de ses propres membres. Le profond attachement des Canadiens au multilatéralisme, qu'ils embrassent presque instinctivement d'après M. Lewis, exige que le comité prenne ce risque très au sérieux (22:10).

Ces questions sur l'efficacité de l'ONU ont certainement contribué à la disparité actuelle entre les programmes de l'organisation et sa situation financière. La vérité, c'est que l'ONU manque d'argent. Cette situation est attribuable à un certain nombre de facteurs, notamment au fait que certains Etats membres retiennent à l'occasion le versement de leurs contributions dûment établies. Toutefois, ce problème s'est aggravé récemment en raison de deux événements survenus aux Etats-Unis, qui sont depuis longtemps le principal banquier de l'ONU. Le premier, comme l'a expliqué M. Lewis, est un amendement proposé par la sénatrice Nancy Kassebaum aux affectations de crédits du Secrétariat d'Etat. Cet amendement aura pour effet de ramener de 25 à 20 p. 100 la contribution américaine au budget total des Nations Unies, à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 1986. Il réclame aussi la mise sur pied d'un système de vote pondéré sur les questions budgétaires, système qui serait fondé sur la contribution financière des Etats membres plutôt que sur une formule complexe reflétant essentiellement leur capacité de payer, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui. L'amendement Kassebaum a reçu l'appui d'une importante majorité des deux chambres du Congrès.

Le deuxième événement est l'amendement Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, adopté en décembre 1985, qui décrète une réduction automatique des dépenses des Etats-Unis à moins que le Congrès et l'exécutif ne parviennent à s'entendre sur un délai pour éliminer le déficit fédéral. Cela a amené le président à soumettre un projet de budget qui ampute considérablement les fonds normalement accordés aux organisations internationales. La proposition du président n'a pas encore été étudiée dans le cadre du processus budgétaire du Congrès, mais on estime que la contribution des Etats-Unis à l'ONU pourrait être réduite de 80 millions de dollars américains en 1986, somme qui représente près de dix pour cent du budget total de l'ONU.

Cette dernière crise, qui ne s'est manifestée qu'en janvier 1986, ne peut être dissociée du problème que pose l'endettement de l'ONU, qui est lui-même dû au non-paiement des contributions de certains pays membres. L'Union soviétique, par exemple, doit plus de 200 millions de dollars en cotisations normales et en contributions à des opérations de maintien de la paix qu'elle refuse de reconnaître. Pourtant, ce pays s'arrange habilement pour que sa dette ne dépasse pas le seuil au-delà duquel son droit de vote serait révoqué en vertu de l'article 19 de la Charte de l'ONU. En bref, comme M. Lewis l'a fait remarquer : «Une des grandes questions qui préoccupent l'ONU actuellement, c'est sa solvabilité financière (22:9)».

Le problème, c'est qu'aux Nations Unies la responsabilité financière n'est pas répartie de façon équilibrée; la majorité des Etats qui prennent les décisions au sein de l'organisation ne contribuent en fait que très peu à son budget. Il faut absolument rétablir un certain équilibre à ce sujet, sinon l'écart entre le pouvoir que détient la majorité grâce à ses votes et la volonté des donateurs de continuer à financer l'ONU, risque de mettre en péril l'existence même de l'organisation.

Le Conseil des Canadiens a exhorté le Canada à montrer la voie «à la fois financièrement et politiquement, et à assumer les responsabilités abandonnées par les Etats-Unis dans la famille des Nations Unies (43:41)». D'autre part, le président de l'Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies, M. Robert Reford, a souligné que le Canada faisait très bonne figure au chapitre des contributions et a laissé entendre que les pays du tiers monde pourraient supporter une part plus importante des coûts de l'organisation.



Cet attachement pousse inévitablement le Canada à appuyer les organisations multilatérales. Comme l'a fait observer M. Denis Stairs, celles-ci constituent un «moyen d'amplification de notre influence et d'élargissement de notre marge de manoeuvre diplomatique»; en outre, une participation active à ces institutions permet au Canada «de jouer dans le maintien de l'ordre international un rôle utile, tout aussi pacifique que constructif (30:15)». Le comité est tout à fait d'accord avec ces propos. Si nous cherchons à assurer la continuité de la politique étrangère du Canada, ce n'est pas parce que cela constitue une fin en soi, mais parce que les Canadiens peuvent être fiers des résultats déjà obtenus dans ce domaine.

Le cas des Nations Unies montre bien que les organisations internationales sont utiles et qu'il est grand temps d'y porter un intérêt nouveau. Outre que ses divers organismes spécialisés ont réussi à susciter une coopération avantageuse pour les États membres, le terrain neutre qu'offre l'ONU est sans doute essentiel dans les moments difficiles (comme l'a prouvé la crise des missiles de Cuba) pour permettre aux grandes puissances de faire des compromis et de s'entendre. Pour toutes ces raisons, les Canadiens ont toujours figuré parmi les plus ardents partisans d'une ONU active et dynamique et le comité n'a entendu aucun témoignage qui le porte à croire qu'ils auraient changé d'avis. Presque tous les témoins qui ont soulevé cette question ont en effet exhorté le gouvernement à réaffirmer son engagement envers l'ONU et, si possible, à défendre cette organisation avec encore plus de vigueur.

Toutefois, l'ONU ne suscite plus les espoirs et la fierté qui ont caractérisé ses débuts. Les critiques à son sujet se mêlent aux éloges, parce que l'organisation ne semble pas s'être montrée à la hauteur des espérances qu'elle avait suscitées. Cette désillusion était à peu près inévitable étant donné l'optimisme démesuré et les discours enflammés de l'immédiat après-guerre et, pour de nombreux États nouvellement indépendants, l'ivresse de la décolonisation qui a marqué cette période. Certains pays occidentaux ont en outre eu du mal à s'adapter au fait que l'ONU, qui était au départ un club relativement restreint, soit devenu en une seule génération une organisation vraiment mondiale, où l'Occident n'occupe plus le haut du pavé.

À ces problèmes d'ajustement des doutes croissants sur l'efficacité de nombreuses institutions des Nations Unies. Au cours d'une récente entrevue avec le journaliste britannique Jonathan Power, le secrétaire général de l'ONU, M. Pérez de Cuellar, s'est plaint que les gouvernements membres ne cessaient de créer de nouvelles bureaucraties et de nouvelles dépenses, affirmant ne même plus savoir combien l'ONU comptait d'organismes. Dans un rapport récent, le groupe d'enquête mixte des Nations Unies a fait lui-même observer que la qualité du personnel laissait à désirer, et que la compétence et le travail bien fait ne semblaient susciter qu'une indifférence généralisée, alors même que les tâches confiées aux Nations Unies, à savoir la paix, le développement et la protection des droits de la personne, étaient parmi les plus difficiles que l'on pût imaginer.

Tous ces facteurs ont clairement contribué à la crise du multilatéralisme. À ce propos, le secrétaire général notait dans son rapport de 1984 :

Il est paradoxal que les règles, les outils et les modalités de la coopération multilatérale soient de plus en plus remis en question au moment même où les réalités contemporaines intensifient la nécessité de faire appel aux institutions multilatérales pour résoudre nos problèmes, et où celles-ci ont accru nos possibilités de croissance et de développement.

Cette crise est attribuable surtout à la diversité croissante des intérêts des divers pays depuis une vingtaine d'années. La triste réalité est que, si l'on ne parvient pas à y

## Renforcer l'ordre international et accroître l'influence du Canada

La coopération internationale est le phénomène le plus marquant de l'après-guerre. En cette fin du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, il est impératif de renforcer le plus efficacement possible l'ordre mondial pour résoudre les problèmes qui dépassent les frontières nationales. Ce renforcement graduel des institutions internationales, ainsi que des ententes et des régimes de coopération, s'effectue d'ailleurs déjà depuis un certain temps. Le brassage phénoménal de cultures et d'idées, favorisé par la révolution des communications, a été encore intensifié par l'internationalisation croissante des problèmes, qu'il s'agisse de la répartition démographique, de la sécurité nucléaire, du trafic de drogues ou de l'approvisionnement en énergie. Bien que les dissensions n'aient pas sensiblement diminué et que les conflits aient dominé l'actualité, les gouvernements ont réagi à ces tendances de l'après-guerre en décidant de coopérer comme cela ne s'était jamais fait auparavant.

Après quarante ans d'expérimentation, cette coopération a donné dans la pratique des résultats encourageants. L'éradication de la variole et la victoire sur d'autres maladies infectieuses, l'adoption de normes en matière de transport aérien international, l'attribution de fréquences pour les télécommunications, les secours aux régions victimes d'une catastrophe, et même les échanges internationaux d'information météorologique ne sont que quelques-uns des innombrables avantages que nous ont apportés les accords internationaux. Les différents pays du monde ne pourront résoudre les problèmes complexes qui affligent aujourd'hui l'humanité qu'en unissant leurs efforts et en tentant de régler leurs différends. Pourtant, malgré ces truismes, il est de plus en plus manifeste que l'ordre international se désagrége lentement et doit être reconstruit de toute urgence. Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, le Canada doit exercer ses talents de médiateur et de conciliateur au sein de la communauté internationale.

Les Canadiens sont tout à fait à l'aise dans le domaine de la coopération internationale à cause de leurs traditions, de leurs efforts et de leur expérience. C'est aussi le domaine qui les intéresse le plus, comme a pu le constater le comité. En outre, c'est dans cette direction que nous entraîner inévitablement l'intérêt national du Canada, en tant que puissance intermédiaire. M. Peyton Lyon, professeur à l'Université Carleton, nous a fait remarquer que le Canada n'était pas considéré comme un «grand» dans les réunions au sommet, mais qu'il exerçait une très grande influence au sein du Commonwealth et de nombreux comités de l'ONU (p. 5 et 6). Sur le plan mondial, les Canadiens se distinguent par leur attachement à un idéal international à la fois pragmatique et altruiste, celui de la coopération internationale.

économies en créant des missions régionales qui seraient chargées de coordonner les activités de plusieurs missions actuelles et de fournir des services de soutien. Il pourrait ainsi réduire le personnel de plusieurs missions qui, au besoin, pourraient recevoir des renforts de missions avoisinantes. Il sera sans doute plus rapide et moins coûteux de transférer du personnel d'une ambassade voisine que de le faire venir d'Ottawa, et il y a tout lieu de croire que ces employés auront déjà une certaine connaissance de la situation dans ce pays. Nous recommandons que le ministère des Affaires extérieures envisage la possibilité de créer des centres régionaux de ressources et de soutien qui pourraient desservir les missions diplomatiques d'une région donnée.

Pour éviter que le processus de planification par pays ne devienne routinier et ne s'embourbe dans la bureaucratie, nous proposons que le gouvernement, par l'intermédiaire du comité du Cabinet chargé des affaires extérieures et que le Parlement, grâce à son Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur de la Chambre des communes, procèdent régulièrement à un examen du processus de planification par pays. Selon nous, il est particulièrement important que les gouvernements provinciaux, les gens d'affaires, les organisations non gouvernementales et le milieu universitaire participent à la définition et à l'examen des objectifs stratégiques.



canadiennes. L'Afrique du Sud était un débouché important pour les produits canadiens, mais la justice sociale dans ce pays est devenue un objectif prédominant pour les Canadiens. Quant au Moyen-Orient, il a été pendant longtemps un marché d'exportation fort attirant que le Canada n'a cependant pas vraiment exploité. L'apport du Canada à la sécurité de cette région qui a connu de nombreux conflits, a surtout consisté à y envoyer des forces de maintien de la paix.

Dans les chapitres suivants, nous exposons les sept grandes orientations que devra, à notre avis, prendre la politique extérieure du Canada. Nous avons tenté de définir les principales tâches à effectuer. Dans la plupart des cas, nous avons procédé de façon fonctionnelle. Nous nous sommes cependant attardés plus longuement à deux régions géographiques, les États-Unis et l'Arctique, pour des raisons particulières. En effet, les États-Unis sont le principal point de convergence des activités internationales du Canada; l'Arctique, quant à lui, est un élément de la politique extérieure du Canada qui a été négligé pendant longtemps, mais qui va inévitablement passer au premier plan dans les années à venir.

Nous n'avons pas cherché à définir ce que devrait être la politique canadienne dans les différentes régions du monde, mais nous sommes convaincus qu'il faut élaborer des stratégies nationales et régionales détaillées. Les ressources du Canada sont trop restreintes pour que soient prises des mesures *ad hoc* qui ne s'inscrivent pas dans un plan d'ensemble. Les activités en matière de commerce et d'investissement, les relations culturelles et scientifiques avec les universités, et même les visites ministérielles à l'étranger doivent être régies par un ensemble d'objectifs stratégiques.

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures doit constamment modifier la composition de ses missions diplomatiques à l'étranger en fonction des marchés mondiaux et des intérêts du Canada, afin d'éviter des dépenses inutiles et le double emploi. Un vaste exercice de planification par pays est en cours au ministère des Affaires extérieures et le comité a appris que quatre nouveaux bureaux commerciaux allaient être ouverts en Asie et qu'on songeait à affecter des conseillers en investissement auprès des ambassades canadiennes situées dans les grands centres financiers. Ceci prouve que le mécanisme de planification fonctionne bien.

Il est vrai que ce processus n'est jamais simple; l'inertie bureaucratique est un risque omniprésent. C'est pourquoi le comité a envisagé la possibilité de réduire le nombre de nos missions en Afrique. Ceci libérerait des ressources qui pourraient être affectées à peu de frais à de nouveaux bureaux commerciaux dans la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique; mais au cours de nos délibérations, nous nous sommes rendu compte que cela présentait des inconvénients. En effet, si l'on veut que le Canada ait des relations plus étroites avec les pays de la Francophonie tout en maintenant celles qu'il a avec le Commonwealth, on ne peut fermer aucune de nos ambassades dans des pays de ces deux organisations sans déplaire à quelqu'un et nuire à nos efforts de rapprochement. Nous avons donc songé à remplacer les ambassades par des «bureaux de développement» (comme nous le proposons au chapitre VII), mais il nous est apparu que ceci ne serait pas bien vu, que les économies réalisées seraient faibles, sinon nulles, et que les représentants du Canada ne bénéficieraient plus de l'immunité diplomatique. Par ailleurs, si on demandait un jour à un bureau de développement de faire de la promotion commerciale, son personnel risquerait d'être dans une situation défavorable si le pays où il se trouve est très à cheval sur le protocole.

Ces discussions nous ont révélé les problèmes que pose la fermeture d'une ambassade. Il existe toutefois une solution qui ne présente pas les inconvénients mentionnés plus haut : le ministère des Affaires extérieures pourrait réaliser des



Les intérêts environnementaux du Canada ont cependant une dimension internationale évidente à cause de la proximité du territoire américain. La coopération bilatérale dans ce domaine est devenue nécessaire parce que les polluants atmosphériques qui sont à l'origine des pluies acides traversent la frontière, parce qu'un même cours d'eau peut arroser les deux pays et parce qu'il faut régler le développement industriel dans un pays s'il a des répercussions sur l'autre.

M. David Munro, qui est membre de la Fédération canadienne de la faune, nous a toutefois rappelé que la protection des ressources naturelles du globe était étroitement liée à l'intérêt que le Canada porte au développement international. Le développement économique doit être durable. Il faut exploiter les ressources de façon rationnelle, en prenant soin de sauvegarder les mécanismes écologiques essentiels et les milieux vivants. Autrement, une fois les ressources épuisées, le développement économique s'arrêtera à coup sûr. Il n'y a qu'à prendre l'exemple du Sahel. La dégradation de l'environnement y est une cause directe de l'appauvrissement de la population, de la propagation de maladies, et même de l'instabilité régionale. Comme l'a déclaré M. Munro :

[...] le bien-être de tous les peuples de la terre exige que les initiatives de protection et les initiatives de développement soient menées parallèlement. En fait, si l'on ne parvient pas à établir des liens plus solides et plus équilibrés entre la protection et le développement, les problèmes actuels s'aggraveront (42-58).

Nous avons de nouveau constaté avec étonnement que toute la planète doit se soucier d'un problème qui semblait, au départ, avoir un caractère local ou régional. Les intérêts de chaque pays et de chaque citoyen sont étroitement liés aux questions environnementales : c'est ce que nous avons été à même de constater vers la fin de nos délibérations avec la catastrophe nucléaire de Tchernobyl en Union soviétique, qui a eu des répercussions à l'échelle mondiale. Les recommandations du comité au sujet de la position que doit adopter le Canada dans ce domaine figurent au chapitre IV.

## Le point de vue du comité

L'attitude du Canada à l'égard de certains problèmes internationaux et de certaines régions dépend des objectifs qu'il s'est fixés. Si les objectifs ne déterminent pas automatiquement l'ordre d'importance des diverses lignes de conduite, ils servent moins à déterminer l'orientation d'ensemble de la politique. La politique doit cependant être fonction des moyens disponibles ainsi que des problèmes qui surgissent ou des occasions qui se présentent.

Ainsi, les pays de la région du Pacifique et de l'Asie du Sud-Est sont ceux dont l'économie a progressé le plus rapidement au cours des deux dernières décennies. Ils sont, après les États-Unis, le marché d'exportation le plus important du Canada. Si le Canada veut accroître ses échanges commerciaux, il a tout intérêt à essayer de pénétrer ces marchés. En matière de sécurité, cependant, les ressources militaires du Canada ne lui permettent pas de contribuer directement au maintien de la sécurité dans cette région. En revanche, l'Europe demeure au cœur de l'affrontement Est-Ouest, et le Canada continue de contribuer activement à la défense militaire de l'Europe centrale. Le continent européen demeure un marché important pour toute une gamme de produits canadiens, même s'il n'a pas connu le même essor que la région du Pacifique. Les pays du tiers monde, et ceux d'Afrique en particulier, sont les principaux bénéficiaires de l'aide canadienne au développement, mais, par rapport aux pays industrialisés, ils n'offrent jusqu'ici que peu de débouchés pour les exportations

Nous avons été profondément marqués par l'internationalisation des droits de la personne. C'est une tendance qui aura des répercussions sur le Canada et sur le reste du monde. Étant donné la rapidité des communications modernes, les questions morales qui sont en jeu dans des régions éloignées ont une incidence presque immédiate sur les propres valeurs des Canadiens. En outre, comme les organismes internationaux pour la protection des droits de la personne se sont déjà intéressés à la situation au Canada, il y a tout lieu de croire que les normes internationales joueront un rôle dans la redéfinition des droits de la personne et des libertés démocratiques au Canada comme à l'étranger. (Ces questions sont discutées au chapitre VIII.)

## La prospérité économique

Le Canada doit rechercher la prospérité économique non seulement comme une fin en soi, mais aussi parce qu'il ne pourrait réaliser bon nombre de ses objectifs nationaux si elle faisait défaut. Le comité explique au chapitre VI comment le Canada peut accroître sa prospérité au moyen du commerce extérieur. Il a été frappé de constater une fois de plus combien la prospérité du Canada dépendait de l'économie internationale. En tant que nation commerçante, pays investisseur et pays d'accueil d'investissements étrangers, le Canada doit être attentif aux problèmes économiques et financiers des autres pays.

La crise internationale de l'endettement a permis aux Canadiens de se rendre compte de la multiplicité des liens qui les unissent aux pays en développement d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. M. John Halstead a insisté sur ce point :

Le Canada a intérêt à contribuer au développement économique et social, facteur de stabilité politique dans ces régions. Non seulement c'est un impératif moral, compte tenu de la misère humaine régnante, mais il y va également de notre intérêt, car la prospérité et la sécurité dans une région du monde ne peuvent être assumées aux dépens d'un endettement massif et de l'instabilité d'autres régions (30:11).

Nous irions jusqu'à dire que la crise économique qui afflige les pays du tiers monde ne concerne pas uniquement les pays les plus pauvres, mais toute la planète. C'est un problème où se trouvent liés péle-mêle la dette internationale, le système bancaire, les taux de change, le commerce, la montée du protectionnisme et les perspectives d'emploi. L'influence souvent inattendue que ces éléments peuvent avoir l'un sur l'autre rend l'économie internationale très instable. Les gouvernements ne peuvent pas agir comme bon leur semble, et les institutions internationales sont incapables de surmonter cette instabilité. Désireux d'assurer la prospérité économique, le Canada et le reste du monde font face à la désintégration partielle de l'ordre financier international. Voir au chapitre VII ce que le comité pense de cette question.

## Le milieu naturel

La protection de l'environnement commence chez soi. Depuis une vingtaine d'années, les Canadiens sont de plus en plus sensibilisés à l'importance de la nature et des ressources naturelles, et aux méfaits de la pollution de l'air et de l'eau. Le succès et l'ampleur du mouvement écologique s'expliquent par le fait que presque tous les citoyens veulent vivre dans un cadre aussi agréable et sain que possible. Lorsque l'environnement est menacé, le problème a souvent une origine locale. La protection et l'embellissement de l'environnement répondent habituellement à un besoin exprimé d'abord à l'échelle locale.

Il ne fait aucun doute qu'il existe un lien étroit entre la sécurité du Canada et la prévention de conflits, surtout nucléaires, entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Nous ne voyons pas l'utilité de faire une distinction entre la sécurité nationale et la sécurité internationale, car nous présumons que la menace sur le Canada est semblable à celle qui plane sur la stabilité et la paix mondiales. Comme l'ambassadeur canadien au désarmement, M. Douglas Roche, l'a dit au comité, il faut établir un climat favorable à l'instauration de la paix dans le monde, et «c'est un rôle absolument essentiel que doit jouer le Canada dans son propre intérêt, pour garantir sa propre sécurité (36:7)».

Si à peu près personne ne conteste l'objectif visé, tous ne s'entendent pas sur les moyens à prendre. Rares sont ceux qui ne croient pas que la dissuasion soit la meilleure façon de préserver la paix et la stabilité à l'âge du nucléaire. Mais nombreux sont ceux qui pensent que l'énorme amoncellement d'armes nucléaires dépasse de beaucoup le besoin réel de dissuasion. Aussi réclament-ils que le Canada insiste auprès des deux superpuissances pour qu'elles s'entendent sur une forte réduction de l'arsenal nucléaire et sur un arrêt immédiat de tous les essais d'arme nucléaire, pour ne citer que ces deux exemples. D'autres croient que le Canada peut très bien accomplir cette mission hors du cadre des alliances militaires. La majorité, toutefois, veut que le Canada reste membre des alliances conclues. Les tenants de cette position estiment que pour que la sécurité soit durable, il faut également défendre activement les valeurs démocratiques que nous partageons avec d'autres nations occidentales. Ils sont toutefois d'avis que le fait d'être membre de l'Alliance occidentale, ne devrait pas empêcher le Canada de prendre des mesures propres à accroître la sécurité et la stabilité du système international.

Les conflits qui perturbent des régions géographiquement éloignées du Canada soulèvent un autre problème. Nous ne croyons pas que le Canada soit aussi directement concerné qu'il ne l'est à l'échelle mondiale. Il est cependant toujours possible que des querelles régionales dégénèrent en un affrontement général. Le Canada doit également militer ouvertement en faveur de la disparition du terrorisme international qu'engendrent fréquemment les conflits régionaux. Désireux de maintenir la paix et la sécurité, le Canada cherche plutôt à limiter les différends et, si possible, à les régler de façon pacifique, et en général, à faire respecter la primauté du droit. Il est question au chapitre V des orientations générales que doit prendre le Canada pour atteindre ces objectifs.

## La justice et la démocratie

Un témoin, M. Edward Ratushny, a dit, à propos des droits de la personne : «Comment peuvent-ils ne pas s'intégrer à la politique étrangère du Canada? Ils font partie du contexte général, de la réalité, et il n'est pas possible de les mettre à part et de les ignorer (25:37)». Les Canadiens ont été habitués à voir un lien moral entre, d'une part, la défense des droits de la personne et des valeurs démocratiques au Canada et, d'autre part, la défense de ces droits et valeurs à l'étranger. Ce lien prend de plus en plus un caractère politique, en partie à cause des pressions exercées au pays même; il suffit de regarder le nombre de Canadiens qui ont défendu la cause d'Anatole Shcharansky. D'autre part, la communauté internationale est en train de se doter d'une multitude de normes, comme celles que contient l'Acte final d'Helsinki, qu'elle peut appliquer à la situation des droits de la personne dans un pays donné. Par ailleurs, la thèse selon laquelle cela constitue une ingérence inacceptable dans les affaires internes d'un Etat est de plus en plus contestée.



Même si les Canadiens arrivent à régler eux-mêmes leurs problèmes constitutionnels, il peut être difficile de faire comprendre à certains pays dont le régime politique est différent du nôtre qu'ils doivent être tolérants et même compréhensifs envers un Etat fédéral qui ne se comporte pas tout à fait comme les autres dans le domaine des affaires internationales.

## La souveraineté et l'indépendance

Nous nous sommes rendu compte que la souveraineté ne laissait personne insensible. Quant à l'indépendance, l'un des premiers spécialistes de la politique extérieure du Canada, M. Loring Christie, a dit qu'elle était un vestige d'une lointaine époque, lorsque l'indépendance n'était pas une notion aussi répandue qu'aujourd'hui. Comment peut-on alors faire de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance deux objectifs de la politique extérieure?

Par souveraineté, on entend en quelque sorte le pouvoir absolu que détient la population. Il s'agit d'une question de droit international que seuls les tribunaux sont habilités à trancher en cas de litige. Par indépendance, on entend plus généralement la liberté d'action. Si le Canada n'est pas toujours libre d'agir comme il l'entend, il reste que sa souveraineté n'est généralement pas menacée. Les responsables de l'orientation de la politique extérieure du Canada ne doivent cependant pas perdre de vue que la souveraineté du Canada peut être remise en cause à tout moment, par exemple par un pays qui conteste le droit du Canada de réglementer la navigation dans ses eaux intérieures. Si le Canada veut que les tribunaux reconnaissent ses droits souverains, il doit les exercer lorsque les circonstances l'exigent. La façon dont le gouvernement doit affirmer la souveraineté du Canada dans l'Arctique est examinée au chapitre X.

Le gouvernement canadien doit chercher à demeurer indépendant dans un contexte d'indépendance. Cette indépendance est, dans une large mesure, fort bien acceptée par les Canadiens et leur procure des avantages indéniables. Ainsi, les investissements étrangers, que nous abordons au chapitre VI, sont considérés par beaucoup comme créateurs d'emplois. D'autre part, le gouvernement canadien doit sans cesse maintenir un équilibre délicat entre les avantages de l'indépendance et l'importance qu'il accorde à des manifestations d'indépendance comme le contrôle du secteur énergétique ou l'existence de maisons d'édition canadiennes.

De leur côté, les Canadiens de tous âges, doivent eux aussi établir un équilibre entre indépendance et interdépendance. Or, la génération actuelle vit une époque fort différente de celle qu'a vécue la précédente. D'un côté, la révolution dans le domaine des communications rend le Canada plus vulnérable à l'envahissement culturel, surtout d'origine américaine. De l'autre, les Canadiens sont plus déterminés que jamais à préserver le caractère distinctif de leur culture et l'indépendance de leur pays. L'existence de ces forces contradictoires rend encore plus difficile la conduite de relations harmonieuses entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis. (Cette question est abordée au chapitre IX.)

Notre souveraineté, dont la défense nous incombe au premier chef, est renforcée par le respect que nous montrent les autres pays. L'indépendance du Canada doit aussi s'affirmer auprès des pays étrangers. Et pourtant, le Canada a besoin du reste du monde pour pouvoir exercer sa liberté d'action. L'importance des liens internationaux est d'autant plus grande que l'on cherche à protéger une société et une culture qui sont différentes de celles des Etats-Unis.



Pris ensemble et adaptés aux réalités d'aujourd'hui, ces objectifs forment un tout qui, à notre avis, donne à la politique extérieure du Canada une certaine orientation et une certaine continuité.

Nous ne devons évidemment pas oublier que ces objectifs ne sont pas absolus et que le gouvernement devra parfois en faire passer un avant l'autre. D'autre part, ce n'est pas parce qu'une chose nous apparaît dans l'intérêt du Canada qu'il faut immédiatement passer à l'action. Tout dépend de la façon dont le gouvernement se sert des capacités du Canada pour atteindre les objectifs auxquels il accorde le plus d'importance.

Chacun de ces objectifs a une dimension internationale importante : c'est ce qui nous frappe le plus à leur sujet. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de maintenir une certaine conformité entre les objectifs nationaux et internationaux du Canada. Les mesures que devra prendre le Canada pour défendre ses intérêts nationaux dépendent directement de l'évolution de la communauté internationale.

## L'unité nationale

L'unité nationale préoccupe les Canadiens au plus haut point. Cet objectif suprême du Canada est une condition préalable à tous les autres objectifs collectifs que les Canadiens pourraient décider de se fixer. La population canadienne se rend évidemment compte qu'il n'en tient qu'à elle de conserver la capacité et la volonté de rester unie. Celle-ci, à qui le monde sert de miroir, a toutefois récemment décidé de recourir à la politique extérieure pour réaliser l'unité nationale.

Nous réaffirmons avec enthousiasme l'importance d'avoir une politique extérieure qui reflète le caractère bilingue et biculturel du Canada. Le Canada doit projeter à l'étranger une image qui lui est propre. Il doit aussi donner l'occasion à ses deux peuples fondateurs de démontrer leurs talents et leurs ressources. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement canadien doit chercher à mettre en valeur sa mosaïque multiculturelle à l'étranger. Il convient toutefois de souligner que le Canada ne peut absolument pas tolérer que des communautés ethniques essaient de lui faire prendre parti dans les querelles intestines que connaît leur pays d'origine.

L'héritage bilingue et multiculturel du Canada est un atout, car il nous permet de comprendre tout naturellement presque tous les pays du monde. Cet héritage peut être particulièrement utile dans l'établissement de liens commerciaux. Par contre, il rend le Canada vulnérable aux actions des pays semeurs de discord. Le Canada doit se méfier des gouvernements étrangers qui, pour une raison ou une autre, pourraient vouloir nuire à l'unité nationale du Canada.

Les gouvernements provinciaux cherchent à servir les intérêts et les aspirations des Canadiens des différentes régions, et il est certainement dans l'intérêt du Canada que ces gouvernements jouent un rôle important dans les relations avec l'étranger. Il faut cependant admettre qu'il s'agit d'un défi de taille pour les dirigeants politiques que de permettre aux provinces de défendre leurs intérêts à l'étranger sans que la politique extérieure du Canada devienne un véritable cafouillis. L'ancien sous-ministre des Affaires intergouvernementales de l'Alberta, M. J. Peter Meekison, s'est pourtant dit convaincu que l'on pouvait y arriver. « À mon avis, a-t-il déclaré, le Canada ne saurait avoir qu'une seule politique extérieure, mais, bien souvent, cette politique pourrait être rehaussée par une participation provinciale (38:112). »

## Les objectifs de la politique extérieure

Tout comme les moyens d'un pays déterminent ce qu'il peut faire sur la scène internationale, de même des objectifs sont nécessaires pour faire des choix en matière de politique extérieure. Même si ces objectifs sont souvent énoncés en termes assez généraux, ils permettent de comparer diverses lignes de conduite et d'arriver à une décision. Ces objectifs sont également garants d'une certaine cohérence. Les pressions externes et internes qui s'exercent sur le gouvernement sont si nombreuses qu'il est facile de perdre de vue l'intérêt de la nation. D'autre part, comme il est de plus en plus nécessaire et difficile d'amener l'opinion publique à adhérer aux visées du gouvernement, il est impératif de formuler des objectifs pour les communiquer ensuite aux groupes d'intérêt et au grand public.

Six thèmes ont été énoncés en 1970 dans le document intitulé *Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens*, à savoir :

- stimuler la croissance économique;
- préserver la souveraineté et l'indépendance;
- travailler à la paix et à la sécurité;
- promouvoir la justice sociale;
- enrichir la qualité de la vie;
- maintenir l'harmonie du milieu naturel.

Quinze ans plus tard, six objectifs fondamentaux fort semblables ont été énoncés dans le livre vert, à savoir :

- l'unité nationale;
- la souveraineté et l'indépendance;
- la paix et la sécurité;
- la justice et la démocratie;
- la prospérité économique;
- l'intégrité du milieu naturel.



Cet examen des facteurs qui déterminent l'influence du Canada à l'étranger nous amène à conclure que, de façon générale, le Canada a des moyens considérables qui lui permettent de jouer un grand rôle dans les affaires internationales et d'assumer d'importantes responsabilités dans la recherche de solutions à beaucoup de problèmes internationaux. Bien sûr, sa capacité d'intervention varie en fonction des circonstances. Pour la plupart des questions internationales, le Canada peut maximiser son influence et l'utilisation des ressources dont il dispose en travaillant de concert avec d'autres États. Il jouit toutefois d'un pouvoir suffisant pour agir de façon unilatérale dans certains cas et jouer un rôle de chef de file dans l'établissement de coalitions internationales. Comme les moyens dont dispose le pays sont limités, le gouvernement doit s'efforcer de voir quel rôle positif le Canada peut jouer dans chaque cas et concentrer ses efforts là où il peut être le plus utile, au lieu de gaspiller des ressources en tentant d'intervenir dans des situations où il ne peut compter jouer un rôle très utile.



les orientations économiques. De même, n'ayant pas d'armes nucléaires, il lui est difficile d'avoir beaucoup de poids au sein du groupe de planification nucléaire de l'OTAN.

Dans d'autres domaines, par contre, le Canada exerce une influence considérable. Il est évident que le degré d'ascendant dont il jouit dépend des circonstances de chaque situation. Le pouvoir n'est pas une valeur aisément transférable d'un domaine à l'autre. M. Denis Stairs nous l'a bien fait remarquer au cours d'une discussion sur cette question :

[...] le pouvoir dans ces domaines varie énormément selon le secteur. Ainsi, en matière de production alimentaire et de distribution dans le monde, notre pays est certainement très important. Nous sommes également bien connus dans le domaine de l'aviation, des communications [...] (30:25).

L'influence du Canada varie non seulement selon les domaines, mais aussi selon les régimes. Dans les Antilles, il a beaucoup de poids pour plusieurs raisons : il entretenait depuis longtemps des relations commerciales avec cette région, son programme d'aide est loin d'être négligeable, il n'est pas trop éloigné et il a une puissance navale modeste. Au sein de la Francophonie, il peut exercer une influence en tant que pays industrialisé ayant un programme ambitieux d'aide au développement et il a la possibilité de faire contrepois à la France. Par contre, dans les conflits entre le Tchad et la Lybie, le Maroc et l'Algérie ou encore le Viet-Nam et le Kampuchea, l'influence potentielle du Canada est très limitée.

De toute évidence, beaucoup de nos témoins estiment qu'une diplomatie compétente et énergique permettrait au Canada de contribuer à régler les conflits régionaux aux quatre coins du monde grâce à l'effet de levier que procurent l'aide au développement et la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix. Ainsi, pour M. John Sigler, qui participait également à la discussion mentionnée plus haut, l'argument voulant que le Canada n'ait que des ressources limitées à mettre au service d'une telle activité constitue «une position de retranchement qui, reprise par d'autres, conduirait inévitablement au désastre (30:6)». Pour notre part, étant donné que les ressources du Canada sont limitées et que son influence varie selon les régions, nous trouvons important d'avoir, dans chaque cas, une idée précise des points forts de notre pays. Nous ne croyons pas qu'il soit raisonnable de faire totalement abstraction des limites du Canada en matière de ressources, de personnel et d'autres composantes du pouvoir. Le gouvernement devrait soigneusement évaluer tant la force des parties en cause dans un conflit que ses chances de contribuer à la résolution du conflit. Sinon, le Canada risque de perdre un de ses principaux atouts dans le règlement des conflits internationaux : sa crédibilité.

## Le multilatéralisme

Le Canada est appelé, selon les circonstances, à agir de façon unilatérale, bilatérale ou multilatérale. Cependant, pour la plupart des grandes questions internationales, c'est en s'unissant avec d'autres Etats qu'il peut maximiser son influence. La collaboration avec d'autres Etats s'avère nécessaire dans tous les domaines importants de l'activité internationale. Le Canada a besoin d'alliés, tant militaires qu'économiques. En effet, quand il s'agit de préserver la sécurité collective ou de résister aux offensives lancées contre le système international de commerce et de paiement dont dépend son bien-être économique, le Canada est obligé de collaborer avec les autres Etats du monde.

L'influence du Canada varie selon les moyens qu'il peut employer. Ainsi, n'étant pas au nombre des grandes puissances dans le domaine des finances internationales, le Canada n'est pas bien placé pour influencer leurs ententes sur les taux de change ou sur

## L'influence, quantité variable

M. John Halstead, qui a pris sa retraite après avoir occupé des postes élevés dans la hiérarchie diplomatique, a illustré ce point en rappelant la signature, au milieu des années 70, de l'engagement contractuel avec la Communauté européenne, qui n'a pas donné les résultats escomptés parce que le secteur privé n'a pas emboîté le pas. À notre avis, cette expérience montre bien qu'il importe de consulter suffisamment les personnes concernées quand on élabore différents aspects de la politique étrangère du Canada.

Dans certaines limites, par exemple, nous pouvons modifier la répartition de nos missions diplomatiques à l'étranger [...]. Nous pouvons mettre sur pied des accords-cadres [...]. Nous pouvons réaffecter notre budget d'aide au développement, etc. Mais très souvent ces instruments de politique étrangère produisent peu de résultats, me semble-t-il, à moins qu'ils ne reposent sur des relations non gouvernementales et des processus établis de longue date. Il est tentant de qualifier ces facteurs de «forces historiques» mais la plupart d'entre eux sont probablement des forces économiques. De toute manière, ils sont extrêmement puissants (30:13).

Pour que le Canada acquière véritablement de l'influence grâce à ses engagements, il faut naturellement que le gouvernement détermine exactement quels sont les intérêts et les préoccupations du secteur privé et qu'il n'aille pas à l'encontre des objectifs des particuliers et des organisations non-gouvernementales. M. Denis Stairs a fait une mise

au point à ce sujet :

## La consultation est essentielle

Certains ont affirmé, en donnant l'OTAN comme exemple, que l'influence que la participation du Canada lui procure ne justifie pas la perte d'indépendance qui peut s'ensuivre. À leur avis, le Canada devrait se retirer de l'alliance pour pouvoir prendre ses propres décisions. D'autres soulignent que l'OTAN ne constitue certainement pas un carcan pour la politique du Canada. En effet, les engagements contractuels énoncés dans le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sont de nature assez générale et laissent au gouvernement national le soin de décider des mesures à prendre en cas d'agression contre un des membres de l'alliance. La participation du Canada à l'OTAN consacre son obligation morale envers ses partenaires occidentaux, mais encore une fois, c'est au gouvernement de décider des mesures à prendre pour s'acquitter de cette obligation. Bien que la participation à l'OTAN nous procure des avantages considérables, nous admettons que la décision du gouvernement d'accepter certaines obligations puisse aller à l'encontre d'autres objectifs de sa politique extérieure. Malgré ces difficultés, la majorité des membres du comité estime que l'OTAN est un organisme extraordinairement efficace, dans le cadre duquel le Canada peut participer aux mesures de dissuasion tactique et stratégique, tout comme aux négociations entre les super-puissances sur le contrôle des armements et à l'établissement de relations politiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Juste part du fardeau. Cela vaut également pour les autres engagements internationaux du Canada, bien que la nature de son obligation varie.

### *L'influence fondée sur la compétence et l'aptitude*

appartenance à l'OTAN, mais bien parce que nous sommes un membre réputé de l'alliance (7-8)».

M. Peyton Lyon a fait remarquer au comité que les représentants officiels du Canada à l'étranger devraient «se promener avec un porte-documents rempli de bonnes idées (45:54)». Parfois, l'expérience du Canada lui permet de faire une contribution toute particulière. Tout en étant précieux, un tel apport peut permettre au Canada d'obtenir que les autres gouvernements accordent plus d'attention à ses vues ou de s'engager à des organisations intergouvernementales. Ainsi, la présence de scientifiques et d'ingénieurs canadiens parmi les pionniers de l'énergie atomique a valu au Canada d'être admis à divers organismes multilatéraux s'occupant de contrôle des armes nucléaires. De même, la compétence du Canada en matière de vérification des armements pourrait lui assurer une influence accrue si cette question devenait le principal obstacle au succès des négociations entre les superpuissances sur le contrôle des armements.

Il est étonnant de voir à quel point le degré de connaissance et de compétence qui entre dans la présentation des faits peut compenser l'absence de ressources matérielles dans nos rapports avec des Etats plus puissants. Le Canada ne peut toutefois se permettre de trop éparpiller ses ressources intellectuelles et techniques. Pour exploiter au maximum cette source d'influence, le gouvernement doit décider où déployer les compétences dont il dispose.

La tâche d'accroître le prestige de l'Etat en développant les compétences ne revient pas seulement au gouvernement. En effet, il y a de nombreux domaines (entreprise privée, sciences et technologie, droit, développement international) où les Canadiens peuvent partager leurs compétences et mettre ainsi certains talents au service d'activités internationales. On devrait d'ailleurs les y encourager le plus possible.

### *L'influence fondée sur les engagements politiques*

Une troisième source d'influence est l'appartenance à divers organismes chargés de régler les problèmes internationaux. Le fait d'appartenir à ces organismes permet, au moins, d'avoir accès à des renseignements utiles et de pouvoir influencer les autres gouvernements; assez souvent, il permet aussi de siéger aux assemblées ou d'importants décisions sont prises. Comme l'a fait remarquer la section de la capitale nationale de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales, c'est en sa qualité de membre de l'OTAN que le Canada participe à la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe. Avec les Etats-Unis, il est le seul pays non européen à y participer.

Ces négociations, auxquelles participent non seulement les membres de l'OTAN et ceux du Pacte de Varsovie, mais aussi les pays non alignés de l'Europe, sont pour le Canada une occasion importante d'exercer son influence dans des domaines comme les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance, les relations scientifiques et culturelles, la libre circulation des personnes et des idées et les droits de la personne (7-8).

L'envers de cette influence est une certaine obligation. Comme on le faisait remarquer dans le mémoire cité ci-dessus, l'influence du Canada au sein de l'OTAN dépend essentiellement du fait que les autres pays membres estiment qu'il assume sa



Certains des témoins craignent que le Canada ne perde de son utilité en s'alignant avec les États-Unis et les autres démocraties occidentales. D'autres, même s'ils s'opposaient à certains aspects de la politique américaine, prétendaient que, grâce à nos rapports étroits avec les États-Unis, nous étions davantage en mesure d'influencer leur politique. La majorité des membres du comité estime que le Canada ne peut demeurer impartial sur les questions fondamentales qui opposent l'Est et l'Ouest, et que la grande majorité des Canadiens sont aussi de cet avis. En optant pour le non-alignement, le Canada, loin de consacrer sa réputation de modération, la compromettrait à tout jamais. Car, aux yeux de bien des pays, y compris de beaucoup d'États non alignés, l'influence du Canada est encore plus grande du fait qu'il a accès aux assemblées délibérantes de l'Alliance occidentale et des États-Unis. Comme l'a fait remarquer l'*Atlantic Council of Canada* dans son mémoire, « si on nous demande de participer à des missions de maintien de la paix, c'est non pas en dépit de notre

on demeure convaincu que le Canada ne recherche pas son intérêt personnel. protagonistes, qui considèrent souvent que le Canada est désintéressé. Dans l'ensemble, sorte que ses efforts pour désamorcer les conflits ont été plus facilement acceptés par les plan tant géographique qu'émotif dans un certain nombre de conflits internationaux, de profondément ancrés. Depuis la guerre, le Canada a réussi à garder ses distances sur le d'anciennes rivalités et nous ne sommes pas non plus l'objet de ressentiments nous avons accédé à la pleine autonomie politique, nous n'avons pas à compter avec la suffisance. Étant donné que c'est seulement depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale que modérateur. Cela est dû en partie à notre histoire et ne nous permet pas de tomber dans

La communauté internationale fait souvent appel au Canada pour jouer un rôle source de prestige à l'étranger : sa participation aux forces du maintien de la paix, sa défense des droits de la personne et son appui inébranlable à l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sa réputation a également été renforcée par le travail effectué dans le monde par ses missionnaires, ses militaires, ses diplomates et ses gens d'affaires ainsi que par son aide au développement.

Le livre vert a signalé plusieurs aspects du rôle du Canada qui sont pour lui une source de prestige à l'étranger : sa participation aux forces du maintien de la paix, sa défense des droits de la personne et son appui inébranlable à l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sa réputation a également été renforcée par le travail effectué dans le monde par ses missionnaires, ses militaires, ses diplomates et ses gens d'affaires ainsi que par son aide au développement.

La perception qu'on a des Canadiens à l'étranger leur procure souvent un certain avantage. Un de nos témoins, M. Peyton Lyon, a confirmé la chose quand il nous a fait part des résultats de 200 entrevues effectuées à l'ONU, en 1982, auprès de membres du secrétariat et de diplomates représentant plus de cent délégations. Parmi les pays industrialisés, le Canada arrivait bon deuxième après la Suède, en fait d'influence, et il était légèrement en avance sur celle-ci en fait de respect. Les conclusions de cette étude attestent notre réputation de professionnalisme et d'intégrité, qualités qui méritent d'être cultivées.

### *L'influence fondée sur l'image et la réputation*

Il n'en reste pas moins que, jusqu'à un certain point, un État puissant peut gaspiller son influence et qu'un État plus faible peut augmenter la sienne. Accroître l'influence du Canada devrait toujours être un objectif essentiel de notre politique étrangère. Le Canada a eu recours à trois grands types d'influence en affaires internationales, généralement à profit, mais il pourrait peut-être en exploiter d'autres.

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## Les facteurs d'influence

Le pouvoir d'un Etat dépend d'un grand nombre de facteurs : sa population, sa situation géographique, son pouvoir militaire, sa force économique, les ressources dont il dispose, l'efficacité de ses institutions gouvernementales et la possibilité de mobiliser ses citoyens pour réaliser des objectifs communs. Nous avons senti que les avis variaient quelque peu sur le rang qu'occupe le Canada par rapport aux autres puissances du monde. Il ne fait aucun doute, selon nous, que le Canada se situe loin devant la vaste majorité des Etats et qu'on pourrait logiquement l'inclure au nombre des grandes puissances qui se situent juste au-dessous des superpuissances. Quel que soit son rang dans la hiérarchie internationale, l'important est de connaître le degré d'influence dont jouit le Canada dans le monde et de déterminer la meilleure façon d'exercer cette influence.

Le Canada a les moyens et la volonté de promouvoir la paix et le bien-être dans le monde. Son intérêt national exige une démarche positive sur la scène internationale, et le Canada est en mesure d'avoir une influence sur de nombreuses questions internationales. Du fait que de nombreux pays partagent cet avis, le Canada s'est vu demander de participer à de nombreuses négociations internationales, qu'il s'agisse des discussions multilatérales sur le contrôle des armements, de la Conférence sur la coopération économique internationale, qui réunit les gouvernements du Nord et du Sud, ou du sommet économique annuel des sept grandes puissances du monde industrialisé. Seul un petit nombre d'Etats ont autant d'influence, même si l'on a souvent tendance à l'oublier quand on le compare, comme on ne manque pas de le faire, à son puissant voisin du sud.

Le Canada a les moyens de faire œuvre utile quand il le désire. La société est unie et ses institutions politiques sont bien adaptées. La nécessité d'obtenir le consentement des gouvernements provinciaux pour tout ce qui relève de leur compétence n'est pas sans poser de problème, mais c'est une difficulté qui, jusqu'à maintenant, s'est avérée surmontable malgré certaines situations embarrassantes. Le fait que les querelles internes se soient apaisées dernièrement a sans aucun doute rehaussé l'efficacité du Canada sur le plan international.

L'importance relative du pouvoir du Canada dépend de la façon dont on le mesure. Notre pays n'ayant qu'un pouvoir militaire restreint, les Canadiens n'envisagent nullement de s'imposer par la contrainte. Cependant, ses forces professionnelles sont suffisantes, étant donné son pouvoir économique et sa situation géographique de plus en plus importante entre les deux superpuissances, pour qu'on lui reconnaisse un rôle légitime dans plusieurs domaines touchant la sécurité internationale, notamment dans le contrôle des armements.

Le pouvoir du Canada est surtout remarquable par sa dimension économique. Bien qu'il n'ait pas l'importance économique des Etats-Unis, du Japon ou de la communauté européenne, il dispose d'un surplus de biens et de services exportables susceptible d'en faire un partenaire commercial de poids et une importante source d'aide. Malgré quelques faiblesses, son économie est assez vigoureuse pour lui permettre de subventionner un large éventail d'activités nationales, comme l'éducation, les sciences et la technologie, le développement social, les arts, les loisirs et les sports, qui engendreraient tout naturellement des liens internationaux.

Le pouvoir d'un Etat est fonction, avant tout, des principaux atouts sur lesquels repose la conduite de ses relations extérieures. Les rapports entre Etats sont basés sur

## Les moyens du Canada

Il se dégage des témoignages que nous avons entendus que nous vivons dans un monde complexe, instable, en évolution constante. Nous sommes loin du monde relativement prévisible des années 50 et 60, où l'on semblait s'acheminer résolument vers de meilleures relations Est-Ouest, vers la décolonisation et vers la croissance économique. Nous sommes loin également du début des années 1970, où les espoirs se fondaient sur la détente et sur la création d'un nouvel ordre économique international. Les belles certitudes et les rassurantes maximes du passé ayant été ébranlées, les témoins ont exprimé une certaine appréhension à l'égard de l'avenir.

Un grand nombre des Canadiens que nous avons entendus ont surtout exprimé leur inquiétude face à la situation internationale actuelle et à l'état des relations entre les différents pays du monde. Dans certains domaines, l'ordre international leur paraissait gravement compromis, et l'internationalisme, en perte de vitesse. Bien qu'il leur semblât prématuré de parler de crise, le monde contemporain leur paraissait au mieux plus incertain et au pire plus dangereux qu'auparavant.

Les contraintes qu'impliquent les tensions du monde moderne pour un État du calibre international du Canada sont décrites dans un ouvrage publié récemment par Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* :

Les stratégies de la politique étrangère, même ceux qui sont au service des superpuissances, se heurtent invariablement à des circonstances indépendantes de leur volonté... Leurs décisions, surtout s'ils sont au service d'un petit État, sont forcément réactives, répondant aux rivalités entre les puissances dominantes, [...] aux menaces constantes à une paix durable [...]. La plupart des États qui n'ont ni le désir ni la possibilité de se servir des outils du pouvoir politique — la force, les sanctions non violentes, la contrainte — doivent compter sur la persuasion ou sur la diplomatie [...].

Pour que le Canada puisse jouer un rôle efficace dans ce monde difficile, il est important de voir précisément dans quelle mesure nous sommes capables de poursuivre nos objectifs à l'étranger. C'est pourquoi nous avons cru bon d'évaluer de façon réaliste les moyens dont dispose le Canada. En connaissant nos limites, nous risquons moins de succomber à la tentation de nous lancer dans des entreprises follement ambitieuses ou de pêcher par excès de prudence. Malgré l'imprécision des méthodes utilisées à cette fin, nous devons à tout prix chercher à mesurer nos capacités nationales si nous voulons connaître l'étendue et les limites de notre rôle international.



# PROVENANCE DES COMMUNICATIONS

	Organisations	Particuliers	Total
Colombie-Britannique	42	35	77
Alberta	11	22	33
Saskatchewan	12	17	29
Manitoba	10	13	23
Ontario (sauf Ottawa)	99	88	197
Ottawa	52	21	73
Québec	28	28	56
Nouveau-Brunswick	6	4	10
Nouvelle-Écosse	20	10	30
Ile-du-Prince-Édouard	1	2	3
Terre-Neuve	4	4	8
Yukon	0	1	1
Territoires du Nord-Ouest	3	0	3
Total	287	245	532



SUJET DES COMMUNICATIONS

Sujet	Organisations	Particuliers	Total
A. Généralités	7	27	34
• Déclarations d'ordre général sans recommandation	44	34	78
B. L'ordre international	3	5	8
• Les Nations Unies	1	2	3
• Le droit international	3	2	6
• Les questions écologiques	5	1	6
C. La paix et la sécurité	28	23	51
• Remarques générales	21	12	33
• Le désarmement	3	2	5
• Commentaires sur la politique de défense	1	3	4
—En faveur d'une augmentation des dépenses militaires	3	2	5
—En faveur d'une réduction des dépenses militaires	1	2	3
• Le maintien de la paix	0	1	1
• L'OTAN	2	2	4
• Le NORAD	6	2	8
D. Les relations économiques	7	4	11
• La compétitivité	1	4	5
• Les relations commerciales	7	4	11
E. Le développement international	30	16	46
• Remarques générales	2	1	3
• Rôle des organisations non gouvernementales	0	2	2
• La sensibilisation au développement	22	0	22
• Les étudiants internationaux	6	8	14
• Généralités	4	1	5
• L'URSS	31	26	57
• L'Amérique centrale	2	18	20
• L'Afrique du Sud — problème complexe	0	8	8
— problème interne	11	7	18
• Autres groupes, tels que les Tamils à Sri Lanka, Les Sikhs, les Baha'is, les Arméniens	9	3	12
• En faveur d'un ambassadeur des droits de la personne	0	8	8
F. Les droits de la personne	6	8	14
• Généralités	4	1	5
• L'URSS	31	26	57
• L'Amérique centrale	2	18	20
• L'Afrique du Sud — problème complexe	0	8	8
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• En faveur d'un ambassadeur des droits de la personne	0	8	8
G. Questions régionales	1	6	7
• Les Etats-Unis	4	2	6
• Le Moyen-Orient — généralités	2	0	2
— proisraélien	6	3	9
— propalestinien	1	1	2
• L'Amérique centrale	3	0	3
• Les Antilles	1	0	1
• L'Afrique (sauf l'Afrique du Sud)	1	3	4
• Les pays du Pacifique	0	2	2
H. Le Grand Nord	10	4	14
I. Divers	6	4	10

## Analyse des communications présentées au comité

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Les communications présentées par le public étaient essentiellement de deux sortes : des mémoires et des lettres. Les communications reçues au cours de la deuxième phase de l'enquête ont été classées en deux tableaux qui indiquent leur provenance et la répartition par sujet.

Le classement par sujet est quelque peu arbitraire à l'occasion. Les mémoires ou les lettres qui traitaient de plusieurs questions ont été rangées dans la catégorie «Généralités». Aucune communication n'apparait dans plusieurs catégories. En conséquence, le tableau ne donne pas toujours le nombre exact des mémoires reçus sur chaque sujet.

Les différents sujets sont regroupés en grands thèmes qui correspondent aux divers chapitres de notre rapport.

Le sens des responsabilités que l'on sent dans tant de témoignages est l'expression contemporaine — mais dans un contexte stratégique très différent — de l'intérêt que le Canada a toujours porté au reste du monde. C'est ce même intérêt qui, au cours des deux guerres mondiales, avait poussé un grand nombre de Canadiens et de Canadiennes à s'engager volontairement dans la lutte contre la tyrannie. Le Canada est sorti de la Seconde Guerre mondiale avec une économie plus forte, confiant en ses possibilités et déterminé à contribuer à la mise en place des structures politiques et économiques qui sont devenues les assises du monde de l'après-guerre. Cette attitude généreuse et optimiste face au monde a été encouragée par la prospérité relative du Canada et par le fait que le pays est peu susceptible d'être la cible principale d'une attaque.

Les témoins que nous avons entendus souhaitaient tout particulièrement voir l'ONU jouer un rôle plus important et plus efficace dans le monde. Selon le Congrès du travail du Canada, «la nécessité de renforcer l'Organisation des Nations Unies est plus vitale que jamais (36:15)». Comme l'a écrit une étudiante du niveau secondaire de Regina, M<sup>lle</sup> Corrie Stepan, «le Canada a tout intérêt à essayer de rebâtir l'ONU». À l'heure où un grand nombre d'autres pays, dont certains sont nos plus proches alliés, ont perdu foi en l'Organisation des Nations Unies, les Canadiens semblent continuer d'y voir le seul véritable espoir d'un monde mieux organisé, plus juste et plus sûr. De plus, ils estiment que le gouvernement devrait chercher à en accroître l'efficacité. Ils pensent que l'ONU demeure un pilier de l'ordre international dont on ne saurait se passer, en dépit de ses lacunes dont plusieurs témoins ont fait état en recommandant qu'on procède à des réformes.

Le fait que les témoins aient dit souhaiter que le Canada continue de participer aux missions internationales de maintien de la paix montre une fois encore que les Canadiens veulent faire leur part pour empêcher les conflits régionaux de dégénérer. Les témoins n'ignoraient pas que ce rôle de gardien de la paix n'est pas glorieux et qu'il donne rarement des résultats rapides et décisifs, mais ils le considéraient néanmoins comme un apport constructif et approprié dont les Canadiens auraient tout lieu de s'enorgueillir.

Il convient de remarquer que rares ont été les témoins qui ont pris un ton arrogant face aux autres pays. Les témoins n'ont pas plaidé pour le recours à la force au détriment d'autres pays, même hostiles. Néanmoins, ils ont vivement préconisé l'adoption de normes internationales sur les droits de la personne et ont constamment fait preuve du simple souci d'aider les autres, réaction bien naturelle chez ceux qui voient le monde comme une grande famille.

Ce souci spontané de contribuer personnellement au bien-être d'autrui est typique de la mentalité canadienne. Par le passé, cette impulsion a été canalisée surtout par les églises canadiennes, dont les milliers de missionnaires ont soigné les malades et instruit les jeunes d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. Les témoignages ont montré que la volonté de venir en aide aux pays étrangers est toujours aussi vive et que les besoins à cet égard sont plus pressants que jamais. Tout gouvernement canadien qui omettrait de tenir compte de cette mentalité et de ces aspirations dans sa politique étrangère le ferait à ses risques et périls. En négligeant la volonté de servir de sa population, il se priverait d'importantes ressources, réduisant ainsi le potentiel d'action du Canada dans le monde. Le gouvernement ne doit pas être sourd aux souhaits des Canadiens, même s'il doit tenir compte de façon intelligente et innovatrice des contraintes que suppose le rôle international que joue notre pays. Passons maintenant à l'étude des atouts et des lacunes du Canada sur le plan international.

augmentation de l'aide canadienne et qui considère que le «pourcentage de 0,6 p. 100 de notre produit national brut est trop bas (32:41)». Il a été recommandé d'atteindre l'objectif de 0,7 p. 100 du PNB plus tôt que ne l'envisage le gouvernement. Parmi ceux qui ont dit souhaiter que le Canada joue un rôle plus actif dans le développement international, certains estimaient qu'il fallait d'abord mieux financer les activités des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) dans les pays du tiers monde. Selon eux, la participation des citoyens présente de nombreux avantages. Le porte-parole du CUSO de Saskatoon a particulièrement bien exprimé ce point de vue.

D'après l'expérience de CUSO, les projets locaux de petite envergure conçus par les utilisateurs sont les plus efficaces à long terme [...] À la lumière de notre expérience avec les ONG, nous savons qu'elles possèdent les capacités et l'expérience nécessaires pour administrer de petits projets. Or ceux-ci constituent l'une des rares façons d'aider les plus nécessiteux. En outre, les petits projets risquent moins de créer une dépendance à cause des petites sommes en cause. De plus, parce que les ONG sont dans les localités, il y a de meilleures chances de créer une association de partenaires égaux au profit des groupes canadiens et étrangers. (40:32 et 34).

Abstraction faite du souci qu'ont de nombreux témoins de rendre le programme d'aide du Canada le plus généreux possible envers les pays pauvres, le comité a constaté que les Canadiens se rendaient de plus en plus compte que les relations entre pays développés et pays en développement étaient maintenant au cœur des questions économiques internationales. Au sujet des relations Nord-Sud, les témoins ont mis en relief la gravité des problèmes d'endettement de nombreux pays du tiers monde et l'importance de favoriser la relance de leur économie et leur développement. Ils ont jugé essentiel d'accroître les débouchés pour les exportations du tiers monde dans les pays industrialisés si l'on voulait un jour résoudre ce problème extrêmement épineux.

## Le rôle du Canada : agir et faire preuve de responsabilité

Les Canadiens qui ont pris la parole devant le comité se sont montrés rarement cyniques ou égocentriques. Malgré l'inquiétude que leur causait la situation internationale en matière de sécurité, ils demeuraient optimistes. Par la coopération internationale, ils croyaient pouvoir contribuer à l'avènement d'un monde mieux ordonné et plus équitable. Visant ce vaste objectif, ils souhaitaient que le Canada agisse de manière responsable et active et étaient disposés à contribuer en plus grand nombre que jamais à sa réalisation.

En règle générale, les témoins ont abordé la situation mondiale avec un idéalisme tempéré de réalisme. Ils ont tenu compte du fait que les forces militaires soviétiques continuaient de dominer les pays de l'Europe de l'Est et qu'à trois reprises depuis la guerre, en Hongrie, en Tchécoslovaquie et en Pologne, elles avaient écrasé les efforts des populations locales qui aspiraient à un changement de régime. Ils ont reproché à l'Union soviétique même de ne pas respecter suffisamment les droits de la personne, ce qui contrevenait aux dispositions de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Ils ont déploré la persistance de l'occupation soviétique en Afghanistan, de même que la violence et les morts qui lui sont attribuables. Ils ont appuyé la participation du Canada à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord et l'affectation des forces canadiennes au commandement de l'ONU. Parallèlement, toutefois, ils ont fermement soutenu que le gouvernement canadien devait réclamer avec insistance le contrôle des armements pour réduire les risques de conflit nucléaire.



contre-réaction et d'avoir en réalité des effets contraires à ceux escomptés. M. John Holmes a fait cette mise en garde :

Nous ne pouvons pas tout simplement ordonner aux autres pays de bien se tenir [...]. Nous devons les cajoler, les convaincre, recourir à toutes sortes de tactiques et bien souvent, éviter de leur faire perdre la face (25:45).

Nous avons été particulièrement frappés de voir combien de témoins étaient convaincus que le Canada devait généreusement combattre la pauvreté et le sous-développement à l'étranger. Ainsi, selon le Conseil de la Saskatchewan pour la coopération internationale, «les pays du globe sont si dépendants les uns des autres qu'il serait irréaliste de croire que le Canada peut devenir une oasis de prospérité dans un monde où règne la pauvreté (40:22 et 23)».

Un message semblable nous a été transmis à Halifax par le Comité interprofessionsnel pour l'éducation en matière de développement mondial :

Le Canada a dans certains cas joué un rôle utile en matière de médiation, de négociation et de maintien de la paix. Par conséquent, nous avons réussi à nous rendre de plus en plus crédibles aux yeux d'autres pays, notamment des pays en développement. Même si le Canada ne se situe pas complètement à l'extérieur des vecteurs de force Est-Ouest, il a défendu une perspective Nord-Sud du développement et des relations internationales. Nous devrions continuer dans ce sens tout en tentant d'aider les gens les plus démunis à s'épanouir avec fierté dans le cadre de leur propre culture, à développer leur dignité humaine dans leur politique intérieure et à prendre en main leurs propres ressources et leur propre développement économique (33:85).

Rien d'étonnant donc à ce que l'aide au développement soit considérée comme un champ d'action privilégié. De nombreux témoins, bouleversés par les privations et les souffrances des gens d'autres pays et conscients de la prospérité et du bien-être dont jouissent les Canadiens en comparaison, se sont montrés disposés à contribuer à ces efforts d'entraide internationale.

Quinze enfants de l'École du dimanche de l'Eglise Unie de Fort Garry à Winnipeg, accompagnés de leur professeur, ont tenu à exprimer leurs sentiments au comité. Voici ce qu'a dit la jeune Tracy Kozar :

[...] nous avons découvert en quoi consistait l'aide internationale. Nous sommes préoccupés par le fait que les intérêts commerciaux canadiens sont plus importants, dans le cadre de nos programmes d'aide, que les besoins du tiers monde. Cela étant, nous faisons aujourd'hui appel à vous pour vous demander, tout d'abord, de mettre la priorité, dans nos programmes d'aide bilatérale, sur les projets agricoles de petite échelle, qui favorisent l'établissement d'un climat de confiance, l'acquisition de techniques et l'approvisionnement en matériel qui sont nécessaires pour combattre la faim (62:56 et 57).

Et sa compagne Kristin Martin a ajouté :

Deuxièmement, nous vous demandons de vous engager, étape par étape mais de façon déterminée, sur la voie de l'unification des programmes d'aide bilatérale. L'aide à l'étranger devrait profiter à ceux à qui elle s'adresse : les pauvres du tiers monde (62:57).

On prônait dans beaucoup de mémoires l'adoption par le Canada d'une politique d'aide généreuse. En particulier, de nombreux témoins ont demandé au gouvernement d'augmenter le montant de son aide. Mentionnons entre autres le plaidoyer de la Commission d'action sociale du diocèse de Charlottetown, qui a réclamé une

vert de ne mentionner les droits de la personne qu'en passant. La fondation a estimé

que :  
les droits de la personne [devraient être], de façon visible, un des grands principes co-déterminants de la politique étrangère canadienne, sinon son âme et sa substance (47:69).

Quelques témoins se sont dits en faveur de la nomination d'un ou plusieurs agents respect des droits de la personne à l'étranger. D'autres ont demandé qu'un comité parlementaire examine la façon dont les droits de la personne sont respectés dans le monde.

Beaucoup plus souvent, cependant, les témoins qui s'intéressaient aux droits de la personne ont demandé que le Canada adopte une politique précise concernant l'Afrique du Sud et l'Amérique centrale. Dans les deux cas, ils préconisaient une intervention du Canada surtout parce que les gouvernements en cause violaient les droits de la personne de façon systématique et flagrante. En ce qui a trait à l'Afrique du Sud, une assez grande minorité des témoins soutenaient que la question de l'Afrique du Sud était une affaire interne et que le Canada ne devrait pas s'en mêler. Par contre, la plupart des témoins sur l'Amérique centrale présentaient des caractéristiques communes; en effet, le gouvernement canadien y joue un rôle plus important; beaucoup réclamaient entre autres l'ouverture d'une ambassade au Nicaragua. Quelques témoins ont dit s'inquiéter de la politique du gouvernement nicaraguayen et de son attitude envers les Indiens Miskito.

Nous nous sommes réjouis de voir que la population demandait de plus en plus que la politique extérieure du Canada englobe la question des droits de la personne, tendance qui est probablement durable. À notre avis, cette évolution des mentalités s'inscrit dans un mouvement mondial de sensibilisation qui s'est traduit par l'adoption de l'Acte final d'Helsinki à la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, en 1975. Chez nous, l'enchâssement dans la constitution de la Charte des droits et libertés a contribué à sensibiliser encore plus la population à cette question.

Les discussions avec les témoins et les conférenciers ont fait ressortir des différences d'opinion quant à la meilleure façon de promouvoir le respect des droits de la personne dans d'autres pays. En ce qui a trait à l'Afrique du Sud, la majorité des témoins ont souhaité que le Canada impose diverses sanctions pouvant aller jusqu'à la rupture des relations diplomatiques et l'interruption des échanges commerciaux et culturels avec ce pays. La plupart d'entre eux partageaient sur ce point l'opinion de M<sup>me</sup> Linda Freeman, qui a déclaré : «La meilleure politique [...] est caractérisée par des pressions occidentales sûres et coordonnées, exercées de façon progressive. Evidemment, le Canada ne peut pas faire bande à part; il doit [...] agir des maintenant, ne pas attendre (24:14)». Quelques témoins se sont dits particulièrement troublés par la situation des droits de la personne en Union soviétique et, entre autres, par le fait qu'on empêchait les juifs soviétiques d'émigrer et qu'on emprisonnait des militants pacifistes. De façon plus globale, un bon nombre de témoins ont réclame que le Canada prive de ses échanges commerciaux, de ses investissements et de son aide les pays qui bafouent les droits de leurs citoyens. Ainsi, M. Edward Ratushny, de l'école de droit de l'Université d'Ottawa, a déclaré : «Je ne vois pas comment nous pouvons séparer la situation des droits de la personne dans ces pays de leur droit à bénéficier de notre aide extérieure (25:40)». Quelques témoins ont insisté davantage sur la persuasion, estimant que le problème des violations des droits de la personne pouvait être exacerbé par la pauvreté et que la fierté nationale face à la critique étrangère risquait de causer une

plupart d'entre eux s'inquiétaient surtout de l'influence des Etats-Unis et ce, dans plusieurs domaines.

La remise en question, par les Etats-Unis, des prétentions du Canada sur le Passage du Nord-Ouest a beaucoup retenu l'attention pendant nos audiences, celles-ci ayant eu lieu peu après le voyage du *Polar Sea*. Personne n'a prétendu que les Etats-Unis revendiquaient le passage pour eux-mêmes, mais beaucoup de témoins ont estimé que les Américains portaient atteinte à la souveraineté canadienne en affirmant qu'il s'agissait d'un droit international.

La défense a été un autre domaine de préoccupation. La majorité des témoins ont reconnu que la nécessité de protéger la force de dissuasion, basée aux Etats-Unis, contre des attaques qui passeraient par le pôle Nord et survoleraient le Canada, posait des problèmes. Cependant, les solutions proposées par les témoins ont été très variées. Certains témoins ont affirmé que la coopération avec les Etats-Unis en matière de défense aérienne du Nord contribuait à la défense de l'alliance occidentale, tout en permettant au Canada de contrôler et de limiter les activités des Etats-Unis sur le territoire canadien, et plus particulièrement dans le Nord. Comme l'a soutenu le Groupe de travail de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales (section de la Capitale nationale), en ce qui concerne « l'importance stratégique de l'Arctique, [...] si le Canada n'adopte pas ces mesures de sécurité, les Etats-Unis agiront à leur guise (5) ». Par ailleurs, d'autres témoins, craignant particulièrement une guerre nucléaire entre l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis, ont affirmé que le Canada devrait se retirer du NORAD, soit pour échapper à un conflit possible, soit pour manifester sa désapprobation à l'une des superpuissances ou aux deux.

Rares ont été les tenants du retrait du NORAD qui ont parlé du fait que, si le Canada devait assurer seul la protection de son territoire, il serait alors obligé de mettre sur pied son propre système d'alerte et d'interception, suffisant pour convaincre les Etats-Unis que sa longue frontière du nord (et le trajet le plus court à partir de l'Union soviétique) était bien protégée contre une attaque aérienne.

En ce qui a trait à la souveraineté du Canada, les autres problèmes soulevés avaient surtout trait aux échanges commerciaux. Plusieurs témoins ont dit que l'accroissement de nos relations économiques avec les Etats-Unis pourrait un jour entraîner l'intégration économique et finalement l'absorption politique du Canada, quel que soit le résultat des négociations sur la libéralisation des échanges. D'autres témoins ont concentré leurs observations sur les dangers que court la culture canadienne. Ils ont dit craindre que la télévision, la radio, les livres et les films américains, en inondant le Canada, ne suppriment un jour toute manifestation d'une culture canadienne distincte. Faisant dans une certaine mesure contrepoids à ces sombres hypothèses, certains témoins ont eu une attitude plus optimiste, notamment le groupe de travail de l'Institut canadien des affaires internationales, selon lequel « depuis vingt ans le Canada est parvenu à une plus grande unité, s'est donné une identité et a pris confiance en lui-même (2) ».

### *La promotion des droits de la personne et le développement*

Beaucoup de témoins voulaient que la politique extérieure du Canada mette davantage l'accent sur le respect des droits de la personne. Plusieurs tenants de ce principe, comme la Fondation canadienne des droits de l'homme, ont reproché au livre



À maintes reprises pendant les audiences, en parlant d'un secteur de politique donné, des témoins ont néanmoins dit craindre pour l'indépendance du Canada. La

Aucun de nos témoins n'a dit craindre le moins du monde une attaque du Canada par les États-Unis, appréhension pourtant fréquente dans beaucoup de petits États d'autres régions du monde. Bien que l'expérience nous incite à nous méfier des mesures que prend le gouvernement des États-Unis pour défendre ses intérêts, les témoins ont montré que les Canadiens aimaient et admiraient les Américains et prévoyaient continuer de coopérer et de commercer avec eux.

À en croire les témoignages, il semble que, même si bon nombre de Canadiens estiment qu'il faut mettre un frein aux rapports du Canada avec les États-Unis, la majorité d'entre eux veulent continuer à profiter de cette relation. M. Hyman Solomon a dit au comité : « [...] nous sommes pris dans leur toile d'araignée. Il ne sera pas possible de nous en dégager, et nous n'avons d'ailleurs pas l'intention de le faire (28:17) ».

### *Les conséquences de la proximité des États-Unis*

Face à cette situation, les témoins ont réagi très différemment. Ceux que la dépendance du Canada à l'égard du marché américain inquiète ont proposé de diversifier les débouchés en redoublant d'efforts pour vendre plus de produits canadiens dans d'autres régions du monde ou de mettre au point une « stratégie industrielle ». En revanche, d'autres ne partageaient pas cet avis et estimaient que la progression soutenue de la proportion des exportations canadiennes destinées aux États-Unis était tout à fait normale. Ils ont affirmé qu'elle s'inscrivait dans un mouvement mondial d'intégration économique et régionale résultant de la réduction des obstacles au commerce, ainsi que des progrès accomplis dans le domaine des transports et des possibilités de spécialisation qu'ils ont fait naître. Selon ces derniers, le gouvernement a raison de tenter d'empêcher les forces protectionnistes américaines d'entraver l'accès du Canada à son plus important marché étranger, et de s'efforcer même d'améliorer cet accès.

En règle générale, les témoins étaient conscients de la rapidité avec laquelle les échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et les États-Unis avaient augmenté en pourcentage des exportations totales depuis deux générations. La proportion est en effet passée de 31 p. 100 en 1939 à 58 p. 100 en 1962, puis à 78 p. 100 en 1985. Les témoins ont presque tous reconnu que cette évolution s'était produite en dépit de deux tentatives infructueuses du gouvernement d'accroître nos échanges avec une ou plusieurs autres régions du monde.

Le comité a remarqué que certains témoins partageaient une préoccupation générale : le Canada entre dans une époque où il ne lui sera plus possible de compter sur ses propres ressources pour assurer sa prospérité. Tout au long de son histoire, le Canada a exploité ses abondantes ressources naturelles pour stimuler la croissance économique et l'emploi. De nos jours cependant, les producteurs canadiens de matières premières doivent écouler leurs produits à des prix en baisse à cause d'un excédent des stocks mondiaux, de la faible demande, et de la concurrence des autres producteurs. De plus, de nombreuses ressources du Canada diminuent en qualité et deviennent de plus en plus coûteuses à exploiter ou à récolter. L'optimisme du début des années 70, motivé par une forte demande et par la perspective d'une série de « grands projets » de mise en valeur de ressources jusqu'alors inaccessibles, a disparu.



Les témoins et les auteurs de mémoires qui ont effectivement traité des perspectives commerciales et de l'état de l'économie canadienne ont tous souligné le caractère extrêmement compétitif de l'économie mondiale. Selon le Conseil d'entreprises sur les questions d'intérêt national, les deux objectifs que le Canada doit poursuivre dans le domaine de la politique économique internationale consistent «à accroître [sa] compétitivité et à renforcer le système économique multilatéral (44:5)». Le conseil a toutefois ajouté que

le développement [des] marchés extérieurs et l'amélioration du système commercial international ne profiteront guère au Canada si nos coûts de production restent supérieurs à ceux de nos principaux concurrents (44:6).

Même les témoins qui ont parlé des perspectives qu'offrent le Japon et certains pays du Pacifique dont l'économie a progressé rapidement (créant ainsi une demande pour les importations) ont pris soin de faire remarquer que d'autres pays exportateurs se livraient eux aussi à une vive concurrence pour dominer ces marchés. Ils ont été unanimes à dire que le monde était devenu un marché de vendeurs et que, pour réussir, il fallait empêcher les prix d'augmenter, maintenir la qualité et respecter les délais. Ils ont cependant insisté sur l'importance d'enseigner aux Canadiens certaines des principales langues et cultures des pays du Pacifique, afin qu'ils puissent mieux vendre les produits canadiens dans ces pays.

Dans leur mémoire, de nombreuses personnes ont parlé de l'intensification du protectionnisme dans le monde entier, situation qui leur apparaissait menaçante du fait de la grande dépendance du Canada envers les marchés d'exportation. Nous avons toutefois été frappés de constater que nul n'a proposé, durant la deuxième étape des travaux, que le Canada prenne lui aussi des mesures protectionnistes à l'égard du commerce des marchandises. Au contraire, ceux qui se sont prononcés sur la question ont soutenu que le Canada devrait déployer des efforts vigoureux pour rendre le système commercial multilatéral plus libre et plus ouvert. Ce consensus semble refléter la conviction que le marché canadien est trop petit en lui-même et que le Canada prospère lorsque le commerce mondial est en expansion. Cependant, un grand nombre de témoins ont placé les biens culturels dans une catégorie à part. Reconnaissant que beaucoup d'Américains ne saisissaient pas bien les différences à ce sujet, ils ont estimé qu'une protection se justifiait pour préserver l'identité culturelle du Canada.

Deux questions d'actualité concernant le commerce mondial ont bien montré à quel point la prospérité du Canada dépendait de plus en plus de facteurs indépendants de notre volonté. En effet, la deuxième étape des travaux du comité a coïncidé avec le déroulement à l'étranger d'événements inquiétants touchant deux produits particulièrement importants pour le Canada : le pétrole et le blé. Les perspectives d'avenir de ces deux produits ont été débattues lors de deux réunions-débats organisées par le comité. L'effondrement du cartel de l'OPEP s'est soldé par une très forte baisse du cours mondial du pétrole. Cette baisse procurera peut-être certains avantages aux consommateurs et aux fabricants canadiens, mais elle commence déjà à avoir des effets néfastes sur l'économie des provinces productrices de pétrole et de gaz de l'Ouest du Canada et ralentira l'exploitation des gisements de pétrole et de gaz situés au large de la côte est. D'autre part, la bataille des subventions à l'exportation, à laquelle se livrent les États-Unis et la Communauté européenne, est tout aussi menaçante pour les producteurs canadiens de céréales. On prévoit que le nouveau projet de loi agricole adopté par le Congrès américain en décembre dernier aura pour effet de rendre le prix mondial du blé inférieur aux coûts de production de la plupart des agriculteurs canadiens. Si le gouvernement canadien n'intervient pas, la part du Canada dans le marché international du blé pourrait diminuer de beaucoup et le nombre de faillites d'exploitations agricoles augmentera.

Le message transmis dans la plupart des témoignages sur ce sujet se résume ainsi : l'économie mondiale est à un carrefour. On nous a dit que la transformation qu'elle subissait à l'heure actuelle pourrait s'avérer comparable à la Révolution industrielle d'une époque antérieure. De nouveaux événements et procédés modifient ou supplantent les forces économiques traditionnelles qui ont façonné la période de l'après-guerre. Dans cette nouvelle conjoncture économique internationale, comme M. Gerald Helleiner l'a dit au comité,

la première priorité pour un pays comme le Canada, qui dépend dans une si large mesure de la stabilité et de la prévisibilité du système économique international, doit assurément être la stabilité et l'ordre du système international. Et ce non pas uniquement dans la seule sphère commerciale, bien que le commerce soit de toute façon inextricablement lié aux questions financières, à l'argent, à la finance, au système de *Bretton Woods* et à sa capacité de nous faire braver la prochaine récession ou, si vous voulez, de nous amener jusqu'à l'an 2000 sans que nous cassions la figure. Ça devrait être la toute première priorité de la politique étrangère canadienne (22:42 et 43).

La caractéristique la plus remarquable des vingt-cinq dernières années a été l'interdépendance grandissante de l'économie mondiale qui a des conséquences importantes pour la politique économique étrangère du Canada. Il n'y a plus de nette démarcation entre la politique nationale et la politique internationale. Des témoins nous ont dit qu'il faudrait fixer les objectifs et les priorités en tenant compte des obligations internationales du Canada et des contraintes imposées par la conjoncture économique mondiale. Les politiques nationales en matière de fiscalité, d'agriculture, d'expansion régionale ou d'investissement peuvent avoir une influence tout aussi grande sur le commerce international que les tarifs douaniers ou les quotas. De plus, les mesures prises par d'autres gouvernements pour compenser les répercussions extérieures de politiques nationales sont souvent perçues comme des atteintes à la souveraineté et deviennent donc rapidement politisées. Les témoins ont donné en exemple le débat autour du Programme énergétique national et les efforts déployés pour libéraliser le commerce international des produits agricoles.

Le livre vert sur les relations extérieures du Canada se caractérise notamment par l'importance qu'on y accorde à la compétitivité de l'économie canadienne. Son titre, *Compétitivité et sécurité : Orientations pour les relations extérieures du Canada*, en témoigne. Malgré l'accent mis sur ce sujet, il a rarement été question de l'état de l'économie et de ses répercussions sur les relations extérieures du Canada dans les mémoires soumis au comité durant la deuxième étape de ses travaux. Pendant la première étape, le comité avait reçu de nombreux mémoires consacrés aux négociations canado-américaines visant une libéralisation des échanges; les auteurs de certains mémoires ont sans doute estimé avoir alors fait le tour de la question.

La plupart de ceux qui ont traité dans leur mémoire de la politique commerciale et de la place du Canada dans l'économie internationale ont limité leurs propos à ces deux questions, comme si les relations commerciales et les relations extérieures étaient deux choses tout à fait distinctes. Bien qu'un certain nombre de témoins aient reproché aux auteurs du livre vert de n'avoir pas donné assez d'importance à la poursuite par le Canada d'une politique extérieure sensée, active et idéaliste, d'autres ont loué l'intégration du commerce et de la politique extérieure et ont soutenu qu'on avait eu raison de faire ressortir l'importance de la compétitivité de l'économie canadienne sur les marchés mondiaux.

Les points de vue que nous avons entendus n'étaient pas aussi nettement tranchés qu'il y a cinq ans. Par exemple un nombre surprenant de pacifistes étaient sceptiques au sujet de l'OTAN que carrement opposés à ce traité; pour leur part, les membres du Mouvement canadien pour une fédération mondiale se sont dits très préoccupés par l'ordre mondial, mais ne semblaient pas souhaiter particulièrement le désarmement tant que de nouvelles structures internationales n'auraient pas été mises en place. L'élément le plus frappant, dans les témoignages que nous avons reçus, ce n'est pas tant leurs divergences que l'inquiétude généralisée des Canadiens au sujet de la situation. Les remèdes proposés variaient selon l'opinion des témoins, mais la réaction de ces derniers était invariablement constructive et positive, jamais passive ni défaitiste.

La constante qui semble se dégager de la plupart des témoignages, c'est que le Canada devrait tenter par tous les moyens de préserver sa souveraineté et son indépendance, malgré les pressions qui résulteront sans doute de la mise au point et du déploiement de nouvelles armes stratégiques. Une forte proportion des témoins ont affirmé que le Canada devrait se tenir à l'écart de l'IDS, au risque d'envenimer ses relations avec les Etats-Unis. Bon nombre d'entre eux, tout en reconnaissant la possibilité d'un lien futur entre le NORAD et l'IDS, estimaient que le Canada devrait continuer à participer au NORAD tant que les armes résultant de l'IDS n'auraient pas été déployées. Beaucoup doutaient toutefois que ce déploiement ait lieu un jour. D'autres, qui se demandaient ce qui se passerait si les Etats-Unis accélèrent leur programme ont prétendu que l'accord du NORAD n'aurait dû être renouvelé que pour deux ans et ont demandé qu'on y réintroduise la clause sur les MAB. D'après eux, le Canada devrait également rester membre de l'OTAN, afin de préserver ses liens avec les autres puissances moyennes et de contribuer à la dissuasion, et se servir des mécanismes de consultation de l'OTAN pour pousser l'Occident à redoubler d'efforts dans le domaine du contrôle des armements et du désarmement. Il devrait aussi faire avancer davantage la cause du désarmement aux Nations Unies, à la Conférence sur le désarmement de Genève et ailleurs, et mettre tout en oeuvre pour promouvoir la stabilité mondiale. Il devrait continuer à faire tout ce qu'il peut pour favoriser la résolution des conflits régionaux, par exemple au Moyen-Orient, à titre de médiateur ou autrement, et pour combattre des fléaux comme le terrorisme international.

Le Canada a une longue expérience des opérations régionales de maintien de la paix. Un certain nombre de témoins en ont parlé et ont recommandé que le Canada s'efforce d'offrir des services de formation ou d'envoyer des contingents militaires lorsque la situation s'y prête. Bien que ce rôle ne soit pas très prestigieux et qu'il produise rarement des résultats rapides et décisifs, les opérations de maintien de la paix semblent être considérées comme un moyen approprié et constructif pour le Canada de contribuer à maintenir la paix dans le monde.

En gros, la plupart des témoins ont demandé que le Canada assume ses responsabilités internationales et qu'il cherche de nouveaux moyens de contribuer à la résolution des conflits en dehors de ses alliances traditionnelles ou de cadres semblables. La question de la participation à l'OTAN n'a pas soulevé en elle-même un intérêt majeur. Les témoins voulaient que le Canada tire le meilleur parti possible de sa participation à cette organisation ou, du moins, qu'il évitât de s'attarder inutilement à cette question qu'ils jugeaient secondaire, le plus important pour eux étant d'intensifier les efforts de notre pays pour assurer la stabilité mondiale et pour promouvoir la paix et le désarmement.



Dans le premier groupe, plusieurs témoins préconisaient une intensification de nos efforts de défense, allant jusqu'à demander de doubler le budget du Canada dans ce domaine, afin d'améliorer nos moyens de dissuasion et de permettre au Canada de jouer un plus grand rôle sur la scène internationale. Le président de l'Institut canadien d'études stratégiques, M. George Bell, a dit estimer que le Canada, en plus de ses engagements actuels, devrait assumer un rôle beaucoup plus important dans la protection des lignes de communications maritimes du Pacifique. M. Douglas Ross, professeur à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique, a recommandé pour sa part une importante augmentation des forces canadiennes en Europe et a suggéré qu'on envisage de consacrer davantage de moyens à la défense aérienne, mais en dehors du NORAD. Le *Council of Canadians* a lui aussi suggéré d'intensifier nos efforts de défense, tant en Amérique du Nord qu'en Europe, pour éviter qu'il faille que les États-Unis renforcent leur présence au Canada, tout en donnant à notre pays une place plus importante au sein de l'OTAN et, par conséquent, une meilleure chance de promouvoir la paix et la sécurité de concert avec d'autres puissances moyennes.

D'autres témoins, qui se sont dits généralement favorables au maintien des alliances actuelles du Canada, ont surtout insisté sur l'urgence du contrôle des armements et du désarmement. Ils ont admis que le Canada devrait respecter ses engagements en matière de défense, sous leur forme actuelle ou après renégociation avec ses alliés, mais ont ajouté qu'il devrait en même temps militer activement en faveur de la paix. Ils étaient favorables à l'OTAN ou, du moins, reconnaissaient que le Canada devrait en rester membre dans l'immédiat, mais certains se sont dits préoccupés par la participation de notre pays au NORAD, surtout ceux qui croyaient que cette participation pourrait obliger le Canada à prendre part à l'IDS.

Ce point de vue était partagé notamment par d'anciens ambassadeurs, par des officiers de marine à la retraite, par des universitaires, par des représentants du Congrès du travail du Canada, par d'anciens représentants des Nations Unies et par divers représentants du mouvement pacifiste, comme les Vétérans pour le désarmement nucléaire. L'opinion de ces témoins, parmi lesquels certains souhaitaient l'élaboration d'une prise de position ferme et autonome du Canada sur le contrôle des armements, se situait dans le même courant de pensée que celle de deux représentants du gouvernement qui ont comparu devant le comité, M. Stephen Lewis, ambassadeur du Canada aux Nations Unies, et M. Douglas Roche, notre ambassadeur pour le désarmement.

Les témoins du deuxième groupe penchaient davantage vers le retrait des engagements vis-à-vis de l'alliance. Certains prônaient un désarmement unilatéral. Ils se sont dits extrêmement inquiets de ce qu'ils considéraient comme une prolifération incontrôlée des armements et du risque d'extinction de l'humanité par suite d'une guerre nucléaire. La plupart doutaient de l'utilité de l'OTAN, se méfiaient des États-Unis et prônaient une croisade pour objectif le démantèlement des arsenaux nucléaires et la réorientation des ressources mondiales vers le développement. Ainsi, le Dr John Ross, de *Physicians for Social Responsibility*, a affirmé à Saint-Jean (Terre-Neuve) que la guerre nucléaire risquait de mener à l'extinction de l'espèce humaine et a recommandé de mobiliser la richesse du monde non plus pour les armements, mais pour l'aide au développement. D'autres témoins ont pris la parole simplement à titre de parents inquiets pour l'avenir de leurs enfants. M. Gwynne Dyer partageait évidemment bon nombre de ces préoccupations. Ayant déjà dit, à d'autres occasions, que nous vivions maintenant l'été indien de l'histoire de la terre et que l'humanité devait changer si elle voulait survivre, il a mis en doute l'utilité du maintien du Canada au sein du NORAD et de l'OTAN, et a affirmé qu'il serait peut-être préférable d'adopter une neutralité semblable à celle de la Finlande.



nombreux Canadiens sont troublés par la politique étrangère de M. Reagan. L'IDS a révolutionné le débat stratégique d'une façon qui a créé beaucoup d'émoi, et l'attitude du président Reagan lui-même, qui s'est parfois montré prêt à recourir à la force militaire partout dans le monde, s'accorde mal avec la conception canadienne du comportement international. De récents événements n'ont fait qu'aviver les inquiétudes des Canadiens que préoccupe la politique des Etats-Unis dans des régions telles que l'Amérique centrale et le Moyen-Orient.

Ce que de nombreux Canadiens nous ont dit, c'est qu'ils se font de plus en plus de souci pour la sécurité de leur pays, directement remise en cause par le nouvel équilibre stratégique mondial. Le territoire canadien n'a plus un rôle mineur comme il y a dix ans, quand la principale tâche militaire du Canada sur le continent consistait à se protéger contre des bombardiers soviétiques désuets et de moins en moins nombreux, qui ne semblaient avoir qu'une importance secondaire. Aujourd'hui, en effet, à côté des missiles balistiques de grande précision lancés par sous-marin, les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique mettent au point des bombardiers à long rayon d'action et des missiles de croisière, de sorte qu'il pourrait bientôt y avoir un grand nombre d'armes susceptibles de survoler le territoire canadien en cas de conflit de grande envergure. Par conséquent, les Canadiens doivent réévaluer les effets possibles d'une attaque par missiles ou de ses retombées radioactives sur notre pays; il leur faut s'intéresser de plus près aux mesures de protection proposées, comme l'implantation sur le territoire canadien de systèmes d'alerte avancée et de moyens de défense contre les bombardiers et les missiles de l'Arctique.

De nombreux témoins ont soutenu que la situation stratégique du Canada pourrait bien poser de plus en plus de problèmes si l'initiative de défense stratégique du président Reagan était menée à bien. Comme l'a fait remarquer le directeur exécutif du Centre canadien pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, M. John Lamb :

[...] les réalités nouvelles et concrètes de la planification stratégique exerceront des pressions plus fortes sur le Canada [...] Le changement auquel je pense, bien sûr, c'est le fait que le territoire canadien devient à nouveau un élément-clé de la planification stratégique de l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des Etats-Unis (37:6).

Selon M. Lamb, le dispositif de défense de l'Amérique du Nord contre les missiles balistiques, tel qu'il est prévu dans l'IDS, doit s'accompagner d'une défense aérienne efficace qui nécessitera l'utilisation du territoire canadien. Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale de la Chambre des communes s'est fait l'écho d'inquiétudes semblables exprimées lors de ses audiences consacrées récemment à la question du NORAD :

On craint que le Canada ne doive augmenter considérablement ses systèmes de défense aérienne advenant le déploiement de systèmes de défense efficaces contre les missiles balistiques, et qu'on lui demande d'installer des systèmes BMD sur son territoire parce que ces armes ne peuvent être efficaces que si elles sont placées à proximité de l'Union soviétique, les Etats-Unis, eux, étant trop éloignés (*NORAD 1986*, p. 79).

Bien que la plupart des témoins se soient montrés inquiets au sujet de la sécurité, les solutions qu'ils ont proposées étaient très diverses. En gros, nos témoins appartaient à deux grandes écoles de pensée : la première, qui représentait la majorité, préconisait une action dans le cadre des alliances conclues par le Canada, alors que l'autre ne faisait pas confiance aux alliés actuels du Canada et recommandait plutôt de mettre l'accent sur la paix et le développement.

mémoires que nous avons reçus allaient de la lettre manuscrite d'une demi-page à l'exposé de quarante pages en provenance du *Interchurch Committee on Corporate Responsibility on South Africa* ou de l'Institut canadien d'études stratégiques. Les témoignages que nous avons entendus étaient tout aussi variés, allant de la déclaration enflammée de cinq minutes jusqu'à la réunion-débat de deux heures. Rarement avons-nous pu conclure à l'existence d'un consensus, les interventions traduisant souvent des points de vue radicalement opposés.

Après avoir traversé le pays à deux reprises et avoir tenu des audiences dans toutes les provinces et tous les territoires, nous nous sommes rendu compte à quel point les préoccupations des Canadiens étaient influencées par des considérations régionales, voire locales. Ainsi, au cours des audiences que nous avons tenues à Terre-Neuve, des témoins se sont plaints des vols d'entraînement à basse altitude et à grande vitesse qu'effectuaient les avions militaires basés à Goose Bay. Ils s'opposaient à ce que la base devienne un jour un centre de formation de l'OTAN, possibilité qui trouvait d'ardents défenseurs dans la même collectivité. Au Québec, des témoins étaient préoccupés parce que l'agence américaine de protection de l'environnement avait l'intention d'interdire toute importation d'amiante à l'avenir. Les Manitobains s'inquiétaient, pour leur part, du fait que les États-Unis s'approprièrent le barrage Garrison. Tant les Québécois que les Manitobains craignaient que les États-Unis décident d'enfouir des déchets nucléaires à proximité de la frontière sud de leur province. Dans l'ouest du Canada, on s'inquiétait de la chute des cours mondiaux du pétrole, tandis que, dans les provinces de l'Atlantique, la grande préoccupation au moment de nos audiences était de savoir si les États-Unis allaient continuer à imposer un droit compensatoire sur les exportations de poisson. Au Yukon, la question de la délimitation de la frontière maritime entre ce territoire et l'Alaska occupait beaucoup les esprits, tout comme en Colombie-Britannique, où la délimitation de la frontière maritime avec l'Alaska et l'État de Washington posait des problèmes analogues. Dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, une bonne partie des habitants s'inquiétaient d'un arrêt possible des importations de certaines fourrures, surtout en Europe, éventualité tout aussi menaçante pour l'économie locale que l'avait été la décision de la Communauté économique européenne d'interdire la vente de fourrures de bêtes phoques, décision qui avait suscité une vive controverse à Terre-Neuve et dans l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard.

Après avoir examiné attentivement cet important éventail d'opinions et après mûre réflexion, nous avons retenu cinq grands domaines de préoccupation qui semblent sous-tendre et caractériser une bonne partie des témoignages, mémoires et lettres.

### *Un intérêt marqué pour les questions de sécurité internationale*

En cette époque troublée, presque tous les Canadiens se préoccupent profondément de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Ils s'inquiètent des tensions Est-Ouest, de la prolifération des armes nucléaires, du terrorisme international et des autres manifestations d'amertume et d'hostilité qui abondent aujourd'hui dans le monde.

Les politiques des superpuissances sont une grande source d'incertitude. L'accession au pouvoir de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a donné à certains de nos témoins l'espoir d'une amélioration éventuelle de la politique nationale et de la politique étrangère soviétiques. Cependant, les dépenses militaires n'ont pas diminué et ce n'est que tout récemment que la possibilité d'un règlement du problème de l'Afghanistan et d'une réduction des dépenses militaires n'est apparu à l'horizon. Même si Ronald Reagan a suggéré, l'année passée, de réduire fortement les arsenaux nucléaires, de

essentiel de disposer de moyens satisfaisants à cet égard pour que les Canadiens puissent percevoir clairement les dimensions internationales de leurs propres intérêts; sans quoi, ni les citoyens ni les dirigeants du pays ne peuvent agir efficacement sur la scène internationale.

Cet intérêt accru de la part du public a d'importantes répercussions sur la politique étrangère du Canada. Plus des trois quarts des mémoires et lettres que nous avons reçus du public concernaient trois grandes questions : les droits de la personne en Afrique du Sud et en Amérique centrale, la paix et le contrôle des armements, et l'aide au développement. (Voir l'Appendice A à la fin de ce chapitre.) Quel que soit l'intérêt qu'aient suscité jusqu'ici ces grandes questions, le gouvernement devra prendre bonne note de cette évolution qui les place maintenant à l'ordre du jour.

Le comité a par ailleurs été étonné de ne recevoir qu'un seul mémoire sur les relations du Canada avec l'Europe de l'Ouest, aucun sur le Commonwealth ou la Francophonie, et très peu sur nos relations avec l'Amérique du Sud, l'Asie du Sud, la Chine ou l'Europe de l'Est. Interrogés à ce sujet, les spécialistes de chacun de ces secteurs nous ont répondu que la politique canadienne actuelle à l'égard de ces régions répondait de façon générale à leurs attentes. C'est ce qui explique, nous ont-ils dit, qu'ils n'aient pas senti le besoin de nous exposer leurs vues.

Ainsi, l'absence d'observations ou de critiques ne doit pas être prise pour de l'indifférence ou du mécontentement. Il faut simplement en conclure que les aspects de la politique dont personne ne nous a parlé recueillaient l'assentiment général ou, à tout le moins, qu'aucun élément de la population ne s'en inquiète outre mesure. De même, le fait que certains aspects de la politique extérieure suscitent de nombreuses observations et critiques ne veut pas forcément dire que la majorité des Canadiens souhaitent un changement de politique, mais témoigne plutôt des inquiétudes d'un nombre important de citoyens. Le gouvernement devrait néanmoins y voir matière à réflexion.

À l'ère de la démocratie participative, un gouvernement doit savoir ce que pense la population. Il nous semble que sur certains points le public est devenu une source importante de renseignements et même de conseils sur l'orientation de la politique. En revanche, pour les aspects de la politique extérieure qui ne semblent pas susciter un grand intérêt de la part de la population, le gouvernement devra peut-être agir sans trop connaître l'attitude du public. À la longue, cependant, l'élaboration de la politique étrangère en vase clos à Ottawa comporte des risques politiques.

## Principales préoccupations des Canadiens

Les témoignages et les mémoires que nous avons reçus étaient aussi variés que le sont les Canadiens eux-mêmes. Certains exprimaient des préoccupations bien précises, tandis que d'autres avaient un caractère général et théorique. Une partie des mémoires représentait manifestement un consensus, élaboré soigneusement et graduellement après maintes discussions et non sans compromis. D'autres étaient tout aussi manifestement des commentaires spontanés et très personnels, rédigés et postés quelques heures à peine après la publication de notre annonce. Certaines organisations ayant de nombreuses sections dans les diverses régions du pays semblaient encourager ces dernières à présenter des mémoires séparément, allant même jusqu'à les guider dans certains cas, tandis que d'autres groupes ont présenté un mémoire collectif au nom de l'ensemble de leurs membres. Les membres du comité ont fait l'objet d'une campagne nationale d'envoi de cartes postales au sujet de l'Amérique centrale. Les



d'un public actif et intéressé qui, stimulé par les médias, réagit aux événements internationaux indépendamment de la politique du gouvernement. La meilleure illustration de ce phénomène, c'est que le débat sur la politique étrangère aux États-Unis a une influence considérable sur ce que les Canadiens pensent qu'elle devrait être chez eux. Les Canadiens passent beaucoup de temps à suivre les activités des Américains dans le monde et à y réagir. Il ne faut pas chercher bien loin les raisons de cet intérêt. Les États-Unis sont une superpuissance, l'un des principaux acteurs sur la scène mondiale et le chef de file de l'alliance occidentale; ils sont donc forcément point de mire de l'attention internationale. En outre, comme le débat sur la politique étrangère est très ouvert aux États-Unis et que, grâce aux médias, il meuble les soirées des Canadiens anglophones, il nous invite à une participation indirecte en tant que voisins intéressés.

La participation est, en fait, bien plus qu'indirecte. En effet, certaines des doléances faites à Ottawa en matière de politique étrangère visent en réalité le gouvernement de Washington, par l'intermédiaire de celui d'Ottawa. Ainsi, le vif intérêt que de nombreux Canadiens portent à la situation en Amérique centrale va bien au-delà du rôle que joue directement le Canada dans cette région. En fait, ceux-ci veulent surtout que le gouvernement canadien incite ouvertement et directement le gouvernement américain à modifier sa politique. La réticence de nos gouvernements successifs à jouer ce rôle a été une source de déception amère pour les Canadiens qui s'intéressent de près à la situation en Amérique centrale.

Cet intérêt particulier que les Canadiens portent à Washington tranche avec leur attitude envers Moscou. Bien que les Canadiens compatissent au sort du peuple afghan entre les mains de l'occupant russe, ils se sentent étrangers au débat national en Union soviétique et considèrent la question strictement comme un problème de relations extérieures.

Le comité s'est intéressé de près à la façon dont les médias façonnent l'opinion que les Canadiens se font des affaires internationales. En fait, il a consacré deux réunions-débats exclusivement à ce thème. Le paradoxe qu'ont révélé ces débats, c'est qu'au moment même où la population canadienne commence à s'intéresser beaucoup plus à la situation internationale, le Canada doit compter de plus en plus sur les médias de communication étrangers, tout comme le font les autres pays qui ne sont pas représentés au sein des grandes agences de presse qui se disputent actuellement le marché mondial des communications. Et surtout, selon leurs représentants, les journaux et les réseaux de radio et de télévision canadiens sont loin d'être organisés pour couvrir l'actualité internationale. Ainsi, il n'y a aucun correspondant de la télévision canadienne en poste en Amérique centrale, en Amérique du Sud, en Afrique ni au Moyen-Orient, et le coût croissant de la réalisation des reportages et de leur transmission par satellite risque d'aggraver encore cet état de choses. Il faut certes souligner le travail de certaines agences de presse canadiennes qui ont des bureaux à l'étranger, et qui en ont même récemment augmenté le nombre, mais il reste que les Canadiens doivent se procurer beaucoup trop d'informations internationales auprès d'agences étrangères. Par voie de conséquence, l'information et les analyses qu'on leur transmet sont présentées sous un angle différent de celui qu'aurait adopté des journalistes et des analystes canadiens.

Ce problème revêt une importance vitale car il influe sur la façon dont les Canadiens et leur gouvernement perçoivent les événements internationaux, de même que sur les positions adoptées par le Canada sur la scène mondiale. Nous croyons que nous devons attirer l'attention de la population sur l'insuffisance des dispositions existant à l'échelle nationale pour la couverture des nouvelles internationales. Or, il est



Le caractère multiculturel du Canada a également contribué à façonner sa politique extérieure. Ainsi, les problèmes qui sont survenus dans les pays d'Europe de l'Est depuis l'occupation soviétique ont suscité une vive inquiétude parmi les Canadiens originaires de ces pays; ils ont pressé le gouvernement de faciliter la réunification des familles et de faire pression pour que les libertés soient respectées dans ces pays. Par suite des vagues d'immigration en provenance d'Asie, d'Afrique et des Antilles que nous avons connues depuis vingt ans, il s'est créé au Canada des collectivités qui s'intéressent profondément aux problèmes de pays qui, jusque-là, n'avaient guère retenu l'attention des gouvernements canadiens. Nous avons été à même de le constater dans les témoignages que nous avons entendus au sujet des problèmes des Sikhs en Inde, des Bahais en Iran, des Arméniens en Turquie et du conflit opposant les Cinghalais et les Tamils à Sri Lanka. Bien que le Canada n'ait jamais eu les liens coloniaux qui ont influencé bon nombre des pays d'Europe de l'Ouest, l'immigration a considérablement élargi l'esprit des Canadiens et les a rendus plus conscients des souffrances des habitants d'autres pays.

De plus, notre politique nationale s'est inévitablement internationalisée par suite de l'interdépendance croissante des différentes économies du monde. Certes, la politique financière et monétaire relève toujours de la Banque du Canada et du ministère des Finances, mais elle est aussi influencée par ce qui se passe à la nouvelle Bourse des devises de Chicago. La filière pétrolière s'étend maintenant depuis le *Petroleum Club* de Calgary jusqu'aux grattes-ciel de Houston et aux palais de l'Arabie saoudite. Facteur tout aussi important, l'impératif moral qui incite les gens à se réunir dans les salles paroissiales pour lutter contre l'injustice au Canada les amène aussi à se préoccuper du sort de la population de l'Amérique centrale et de l'Afrique du Sud.

Au fur et à mesure que la politique intérieure s'est internationalisée, la question de la politique étrangère a été remise sur le tapis. Les affaires qui autrefois étaient traitées strictement sur le plan privé et commercial ont pris un caractère public et politique. La tradition bien établie voulant que les affaires extérieures soient la prérogative de la Couronne (c'est-à-dire, au Canada, des ministres et des hauts fonctionnaires) est aujourd'hui mise à rude épreuve par les défenseurs de la démocratie participative. Les Canadiens ne se contentent plus de faire connaître leurs vues sur la politique étrangère du pays; ils tiennent à participer aux décisions.

La sensibilisation aux réalités internationales, l'interdépendance et la participation sont autant de facteurs qui transforment la nature même de la politique étrangère, et ce, avec une rapidité particulièrement évidente au Canada. Nos audiences nous ont permis de constater à quel point les relations internationales ont été sous-traitées à la mainmise du gouvernement. Par exemple, les efforts déployés par deux de nos gouvernements, depuis la guerre, pour accroître la part des exportations canadiennes destinées à d'autres pays que les États-Unis ont été neutralisés par la réussite commerciale des entreprises canadiennes sur le marché américain. De même, le missionnaire canadien à Haïti qui a décidé de fermer son école pour protester contre l'ingérence du gouvernement a peut-être contribué à la chute du régime de Jean-Claude Duvalier. Les centaines d'organisations bénévoles qui s'occupent de développement dans le tiers monde forment avec l'Agence canadienne de développement international une alliance, qui n'est pas toujours sans friction. Les activités de ces organisations dans des dizaines de pays en développement font dorénavant partie intégrante de la présence du Canada à l'étranger.

Notre politique étrangère a toujours été façonnée par des facteurs et des événements qui dépassaient nos frontières nationales et qui échappaient souvent à la volonté du gouvernement. Elle a pris une nouvelle dimension en raison de l'existence

## Les Canadiens et la politique étrangère

Nous tenons, en guise d'entrée en matière, à contester le mythe de l'insularité canadienne. Sur la foi d'une enquête internationale de Radio-Canada auprès des télespectateurs, M. Mark Starowicz, réalisateur du *Journal* au réseau anglais de Radio-Canada, qui a participé à la réunion-débat sur les médias et la politique étrangère, nous a dit : « Les Canadiens s'intéressent aux affaires internationales. Ils s'y intéressent plus que la plupart de gens dans les autres pays du monde (20:7)\* ». Des questions comme la guerre et la paix, le commerce, le développement et les droits de la personne ne sont plus l'apanage d'une petite élite; elles intéressent les Canadiens au plus profond de leur être.

Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de se rappeler l'importance et l'intensité du débat qu'a suscité la question du désarmement, de même que l'extraordinaire solidarité dont les Canadiens ont fait preuve envers les réfugiés indochinois et les victimes de la famine en Afrique. Les travaux du comité ont révélé que la politique étrangère trouve chez nous un public plus nombreux, mieux organisé et bien plus actif que jamais. Des centaines de Canadiens ont pris la peine de nous soumettre des mémoires. Lors des audiences qui se sont tenues dans les différentes régions du pays, nous n'avons pu rencontrer qu'un faible pourcentage des nombreux Canadiens qui nous avaient écrit.

Comment expliquer cet intérêt croissant? La réponse tient en partie à l'évolution de notre société. Les Canadiens sont aujourd'hui mieux instruits que leurs parents et voyagent bien plus qu'eux. Des milliers de Canadiens ont servi leur pays à l'étranger, soit dans les forces armées, soit dans le cadre de l'aide au tiers monde. Le monde des affaires a maintenant des liens internationaux bien établis et exerce ses activités sur tous les continents. Les étudiants canadiens à l'étranger et les étudiants étrangers au Canada ont élargi leurs propres horizons, de même que celui d'autres personnes. À cette expérience directe s'ajoutent toutes les images que la télévision va chercher aux quatre coins du globe et nous apporte à domicile. Tous ces facteurs ont modifié radicalement, quoique progressivement, notre perception des affaires internationales qui ne nous apparaissent plus aussi « étrangères ». Le monde entier est dorénavant à notre portée.

\* Dans tout le rapport, les renvois aux témoignages sont indiqués de la façon suivante : le chiffre précédant les deux points correspond au numéro du fascicule des *Procès-verbaux et témoignages* du comité. Le chiffre qui suit les deux points est le numéro de la page du fascicule. Ainsi, 20:7 renvoie à la page 7 du fascicule n° 20. Quand un seul chiffre est indiqué, il s'agit du numéro de page du mémoire du témoin.

Devant la grande variété de questions que nous étions chargés d'étudier et le peu de temps dont nous disposions, nous avons décidé de nous attacher surtout à formuler les principes et les objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada. Nous nous sommes efforcés de donner notre avis sur la plupart des grandes questions soulevées par les témoins, et nous avons fait des propositions précises lorsque cela nous semblait à propos ou lorsqu'on nous soumettait une idée particulièrement intéressante. Faute de temps et d'espace, il nous a été matériellement impossible de prendre position sur tous les points soulevés par les témoins. Notre étude a porté sur les grands thèmes plutôt que sur des questions d'ordre régional. Comme, de par sa nature même, la politique étrangère doit constamment s'adapter aux situations, une étude de ce genre ne peut tout simplement pas établir d'orientation précise dans tous les domaines.

Nous avons rédigé ce rapport en tenant compte des ressources disponibles et en essayant d'en tirer le maximum. Nous aurions pu recommander de dépenser davantage de fonds publics, mais il nous a paru irresponsable d'aller à l'encontre des obligations financières contractées par le gouvernement. La parcimonie n'a toutefois pas été un prétexte à ne rien faire. Au contraire, nous avons cherché des moyens d'améliorer l'efficacité du gouvernement. C'est précisément dans cet esprit que nous recommandons de créer à l'étranger des centres régionaux de ressources et de soutien au service des missions d'une région donnée (au chapitre III), de resserrer la coopération fédérale-provinciale en vue d'accroître les exportations (au chapitre VI), et d'entreprendre une étude des besoins à longue échéance en matière de défense afin de combler l'écart entre les engagements du Canada et ses possibilités (au chapitre V). C'est le même souci d'efficacité qui nous a poussés à suggérer, sur le plan multilatéral, que l'on rationalise les institutions internationales (chapitre IV) et que l'on encourage la coopération entre les pays qui fournissent une aide aux pays en développement (chapitre VII).

Le plan adopté pour le rapport est le suivant : nous rendons compte tout d'abord des sondages effectués auprès des Canadiens (Chapitre I, Les Canadiens et la politique étrangère). Puis nous analysons les moyens et les ressources dont disposent les Canadiens pour atteindre leurs objectifs internationaux (Chapitre II, Les moyens du Canada). Vient ensuite huit chapitres contenant des recommandations, chacun portant sur un domaine important. Dans le dernier chapitre (Pour un internationalisme constructif), nous définissons la dynamique positive que nous voudrions voir dans la politique étrangère du Canada.

Les comités permanents du Parlement, qui peuvent désormais choisir le sujet de leurs études, devront continuer à analyser régulièrement les différents aspects des relations extérieures du Canada. Nous avons d'ailleurs fait allusion aux constatations de plusieurs enquêtes effectuées par des comités du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes. Nous les avons trouvées fort utiles et nos audiences nous ont convaincus qu'il était important que le Parlement joue un rôle plus actif. Le dialogue entre les gouvernements, le Parlement et les citoyens doit être permanent et non épisodique. Des études sporadiques sur la politique étrangère en général ou sur des aspects particuliers de celle-ci ne sauraient remplacer un véritable dialogue. Les réformes auxquelles on a procédé récemment devraient permettre au Parlement, et surtout à ses comités, de favoriser davantage ce dialogue. Il appartient dorénavant aux comités du Parlement de prouver qu'ils peuvent jouer un rôle de premier plan dans le débat sur la politique et être une bonne source de conseils pour le gouvernement.



mémoires. Le comité s'est également réservé suffisamment de temps, à la fin de chaque journée d'audience, pour entendre de brèves déclarations faites par des citoyens qui étaient venus assister aux audiences et qui voulaient prendre la parole. Au total, pendant les six mois qu'ont duré les audiences publiques, nous avons organisé 30 réunions-débats et entendu 161 exposés présentés par des organismes ou des particuliers, ainsi que 131 brèves déclarations.

Afin d'encourager le public à participer le plus possible à notre étude, nous avons également accordé beaucoup d'importance aux médias, avant notre arrivée dans chaque ville et pendant notre séjour. Nous avons tenu des conférences de presse, les membres du comité ont donné des interviews et nous avons encouragé les journalistes à discuter avec les témoins qui étaient venus nous donner leur point de vue.

Devant l'ampleur du sujet, il nous a fallu faire un choix. Il nous était impossible de discuter, même superficiellement, tout l'éventail de questions qui entraient dans notre mandat. Nous n'avons pas parlé des négociations destinées à accroître nos échanges commerciaux avec les Etats-Unis, ni de l'initiative de défense stratégique car nous les avons traitées dans notre rapport provisoire. Comme nous savions que le comité permanent des affaires extérieures et du commerce international entreprenait un examen approfondi de l'aide officielle au développement, nous nous sommes concentrés sur l'orientation globale de la politique canadienne de développement et avons décidé de soumettre au comité permanent les questions qui, à notre avis, méritaient d'être examinées plus en détail. D'autre part, comme un livre blanc sur la politique de défense est en cours de rédaction, nous nous sommes contentés de faire un survol des questions relatives à la défense. Finalement, nous n'avons pas pu effectuer une analyse du coût et des avantages des procédés administratifs, car il nous aurait fallu examiner en détail le fonctionnement du ministère des Affaires extérieures, les ambassades à l'étranger ainsi que les rapports avec les autres ministères et organismes qui s'occupent de questions de défense, d'aide à l'étranger et d'immigration.

Etant donné le peu de temps dont nous disposions — six mois pour les audiences publiques — nous avons décidé de prêter l'oreille aux citoyens plutôt qu'aux fonctionnaires. En outre, notre ordre de renvoi ne nous permettait pas de nous rendre à l'étranger. Nous sommes heureux que tant de Canadiens aient répondu à l'appel du comité et nous espérons que notre rapport reflète leur opinion.

Bien que nous n'ayons pas passé en revue l'administration du ministère des Affaires extérieures, nous avons eu l'occasion de constater combien il était important d'avoir des fonctionnaires de haut calibre, capables de participer à l'élaboration de la politique étrangère du Canada et de la mettre à exécution. Nous sommes convaincus que le Canada est bien représenté par les fonctionnaires qui ont choisi la carrière diplomatique. Nous nous devons de signaler que cette carrière présente davantage de risques qu'auparavant du fait de la recrudescence des attentats terroristes contre le personnel des missions diplomatiques. De plus, nous avons été impressionnés par les nombreuses obligations qui incombent à la famille de notre personnel diplomatique. Des cours de langue, par exemple, devraient être offerts tant à nos représentants officiels qu'à leur conjoint puisque ces personnes représentent également le Canada. Nous prions instamment le gouvernement de conclure avec les pays étrangers des ententes de réciprocité qui permettront aux conjoints de nos diplomates de travailler dans ces pays si tel est leur désir. À ce propos, le gouvernement doit reconnaître qu'un corps diplomatique hautement qualifié est un atout précieux dans la main du Canada lorsqu'il lui faut s'affirmer sur la scène internationale.



ment sollicité les opinions les plus diverses possible en organisant des audiences aux quatre coins du pays et en invitant les Canadiens de toutes les provinces et des deux territoires à nous dire ce qu'ils pensaient de la politique étrangère canadienne. En fait, on peut considérer toute la démarche du comité mixte spécial comme un exercice de participation démocratique.

Le travail du comité s'est effectué en deux étapes. La première a débuté le jour où le Parlement a suspendu ses activités pour l'été, le 28 juin 1985. Le Parlement nous avait demandé de déposer, au plus tard le 23 août, un rapport provisoire qui réponde à deux questions précises : Était-il souhaitable d'entamer des entretiens poussés avec les États-Unis en vue de signer de nouveaux accords commerciaux globaux, et convenait-il de participer à la phase de recherche de l'Initiative de défense stratégique (IDS), comme les États-Unis nous y conviaient? Cette première tâche du comité, entreprise en plein été, alors qu'il n'y avait manifestement pas de temps à perdre, a été menée à bien dans les délais prévus, malgré un véritable raz-de-marée de documents qu'il fallut étudier immédiatement. Près de 700 particuliers et organismes nous avaient en effet fait parvenir un mémoire, et bien plus de 300 témoins avaient comparu aux audiences publiques qui avaient eu lieu à Halifax, Ottawa, Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary et Winnipeg.

À l'automne, nous avons entamé le gros du travail, à savoir l'examen d'ensemble des relations extérieures du Canada. Même si notre souci premier était d'élaborer un cadre pour l'application de la politique extérieure du Canada, nous avons décidé de ne pas nous en tenir là et de relever toute proposition précise et concrète qui pourrait faire l'objet d'une recommandation.

En octobre, des annonces ont été publiées dans 157 quotidiens et hebdomadaires de toutes les régions du pays. Elles décrivaient le programme de travail du comité et invitaient le public à lui soumettre des mémoires avant le 29 novembre. Ces mémoires nous ont été extrêmement utiles. En fait, nous avons continué à en recevoir pendant que nous rédigeons notre rapport. Le 7 mai 1986, nous avions reçu des mémoires provenant de 287 organismes et de 245 particuliers. Nous les avons tous lus et avons étudié leurs recommandations. On trouvera à l'Annexe A, à la fin du chapitre I, des tableaux qui indiquent les sujets abordés dans ces mémoires ainsi que leur provenance.

Pendant que les Canadiens rédigeaient des mémoires, au cours de l'automne, le comité a organisé une série de réunions-débats consacrées à divers sujets, avec la participation de spécialistes de renom. On y a discuté, par exemple, de l'influence des médias sur la façon dont les citoyens perçoivent la politique étrangère, du contrôle des armements, des problèmes causés par la dette internationale et de la politique étrangère canadienne dans l'Arctique. C'était la première fois qu'un comité du Parlement canadien utilisait cette technique. En fait, nous avons trouvé cette méthode tellement efficace pour mettre en lumière des points de vue différents et faire ressortir les diverses options qui s'offraient au Canada que nous avons décidé d'y recourir aussi quand le comité s'est rendu dans toutes les régions du pays au cours de l'hiver. Ainsi, dans toutes les villes où nous avons tenu des audiences, nous avons également organisé une réunion-débat sur un thème intéressant particulièrement la région. C'est ainsi qu'à Halifax il a été question de la gestion de l'océan, alors qu'à Edmonton la discussion a porté sur les perspectives internationales dans le domaine de l'énergie.

De janvier à fin avril, le comité a voyagé à travers le Canada. Nous nous sommes successivement rendus dans chaque province et territoire, en changeant de province tous les quinze jours. En dehors des réunions-débats, nous avons entendu l'exposé de divers particuliers et organismes choisis parmi ceux qui nous avaient fait parvenir des

## La tâche du comité

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada a été créé en juin 1985 pour «soumettre [...] des recommandations sur les objectifs et la conduite des relations extérieures du Canada». Le Parlement, qui nous avait d'abord donné jusqu'au 31 mai 1986 pour terminer notre rapport, nous a accordé une prolongation jusqu'au 25 juin. Ce fut une tâche considérable qui a exigé de tous les membres du comité beaucoup de travail et de dévouement.

C'est dans le discours du trône, qui ouvrait la première session de la trente-troisième législature, que le gouvernement a annoncé pour la première fois son intention de demander au Sénat et à la Chambre des communes de créer un comité mixte spécial pour consulter les Canadiens sur tout ce qui touche aux relations extérieures du Canada. Environ six mois plus tard, le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures franchissait l'étape suivante en publiant le livre vert du gouvernement intitulé *Compétitivité et Sécurité : Orientations pour les relations extérieures du Canada*. Ce livre vert prenait position sur un certain nombre de points, alors que dans d'autres domaines il se contentait de poser des questions. Dans les deux cas, le but était cependant de donner une orientation précise à l'étude que devait entreprendre le comité. Dans l'avant-propos du livre vert, le très honorable Joe Clark ne laissait aucun doute là-dessus, puisqu'il précisait que ce document était destiné à faciliter notre étude et encourageait «tous les Canadiens qui s'intéressent à l'avenir de leur pays et à la contribution que le Canada peut apporter à l'édification d'un monde plus sûr, plus prospère et plus humain à participer aux audiences [...] et à faire connaître leur point de vue».

L'étude des relations extérieures du Canada que le comité mixte spécial a effectuée au cours des dix derniers mois constitue une première dans notre pays, et il est difficile de lui trouver des précédents ailleurs dans le monde. En fait, la seule étude comparable à laquelle s'est livré le gouvernement est celle qui a précédé la publication de six petites brochures, en 1970, sous le titre *Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens*. Il s'agissait là d'une entreprise également ambitieuse, mais qui différait sur deux points importants : d'une part, elle était l'œuvre de fonctionnaires plutôt que d'un comité parlementaire; d'autre part, il lui manquait un élément essentiel : la participation du public grâce à laquelle les travaux de notre comité ont été si fructueux et si différents. C'est la première fois, dans l'histoire du Canada, qu'un comité parlementaire se voit offrir la possibilité — combien stimulante — de passer en revue l'ensemble de nos relations extérieures. Notre étude s'est déroulée en plein jour et nous avons délibéré-

Dans ce monde où tout va si vite et où les situations changent du jour au lendemain, le gouvernement est souvent amené à modifier sa politique. Avec le temps, certaines remarques et certaines recommandations perdront naturellement de leur a-propos. Nous invitons donc le lecteur à ne pas perdre de vue cette réalité.

Ce rapport, ainsi que le rapport provisoire déposé par le comité le 23 août 1985 sont le fruit de onze mois de travail intensif des nombreux députés et sénateurs qui ont participé aux travaux du Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada. Nous décrivons le programme de travail du comité dans l'avant-propos du rapport. Il nous reste donc à exprimer nos remerciements aux membres des deux Chambres, de tous les partis; sans leur travail acharné et le respect mutuel dont ils ont fait preuve, ce rapport n'aurait pu être ce qu'il est.

La tâche du comité était énorme. Outre qu'il s'agissait d'une entreprise de grande envergure, il a fallu de nombreux débats entre les membres du comité et la volonté d'arriver à un consensus pour s'entendre sur un texte commun. La chose n'est jamais facile dans le contexte politique du Parlement. Bien que les divers partis politiques s'entendent sur les grandes lignes de la politique étrangère du Canada depuis la dernière guerre, ils diffèrent d'opinion sur certains de ses aspects. Pour cette raison, la recherche d'un consensus a obligé tous les membres du comité à faire des compromis. Dans les rares cas où il a été impossible d'établir une position commune et où les divergences de vues étaient importantes, nous avons décidé de faire état de ces divergences et de les décrire brièvement.

Le document qui en résulte exprime donc vraiment le point de vue de l'ensemble du comité et non l'opinion de chacun de ses membres.

Les membres du comité ne sont cependant pas les seuls à avoir beaucoup travaillé. Nous tenons à féliciter le personnel du comité pour l'excellence de ses services. Les cinq coreflectifs qui ont servi le comité pendant de périodes variées (M. Paul Belisle, M<sup>lle</sup> Paulette Nadeau et M<sup>lle</sup> Doreen Lebrun pour le Sénat; M<sup>lle</sup> Jean Macpherson et M. Donald Reid pour la Chambre des communes) ont non seulement fait preuve d'un professionnalisme et d'une compétence remarquables sur tous les plans, mais ils ont travaillé de longues heures, semaine après semaine, avec bonne humeur et sans acrimonie. Les employés de bureau qui les ont secondés et l'équipe de recherche professionnelle qui a travaillé sans relâche sous la direction de M. Peter Dobell, du Centre parlementaire, avec le directeur d'étude, M. Gerald Wright, et M. Bill Neil, de la Bibliothèque du Parlement, ont tous contribué à la réalisation de ce rapport qui couronne près d'un an d'efforts. Nous tenons à exprimer notre reconnaissance à chacun. Nous ne saurions terminer sans mentionner le travail méticuleux, rapide et professionnel effectué — souvent dans des délais extrêmement courts — par le Service de traduction du Secrétariat d'Etat sous la direction de M. Dominique Soudet, ainsi que par nos réviseurs, Kathryn Randle et Georges Royer qui ont tout fait pour que notre rapport soit bien rédigé dans les deux langues officielles.

Nous tenons également à exprimer notre profonde gratitude aux nombreux témoins qui ont comparu devant nous et aux personnes qui nous ont écrit, qui ont suivi de près les délibérations du comité et qui continuent de nous faire part de leur opinion, et de nous prodiguer leurs conseils.

Si nous sommes maintenant en mesure de déposer ce rapport au Parlement, c'est grâce à la contribution de toutes ces personnes. Nous espérons que nos collègues du Parlement, le gouvernement du Canada auquel nous soumettons de nombreuses recommandations et les Canadiens dont la participation nous a grandement aidés trouveront ici matière à réflexion sur un sujet extrêmement vaste dont l'importance pour le Canada ne cessera d'augmenter.




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


Le coprésident Tom Hockin (P.C.—London-Ouest) répond à une question posée lors de la conférence de presse qui a suivi la publication du rapport intermédiaire du comité. Sont présents (de gauche à droite): Pauline Jewett (N.P.D.—New Westminster-Cogitlam), Jacques Flynn (Québec), Tom Hockin et l'hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Lib.—Winnipeg-Fort Garry).



Les membres du comité: en haut, de gauche à droite, André Harvey (P.C.—Chicoutimi), Bob Porter (P.C.—Medicine Hat), Reginald Stackhouse (P.C.—Scarborough-Ouest), en bas, de gauche à droite, Bud Jardine (P.C.—Northumberland-Miramichi), Bill Kempling (P.C.—Burlington) et Patrick Crofton (P.C.—Esquimalt-Saanich).





Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada a tenu des audiences dans toutes les provinces et les territoires. Ici un témoin s'adresse au Comité à Vancouver.



Monsieur Lloyd Axworthy (Libéral—Fort Garry) et le sénateur Richard Doyle (Ontario) parlent avec des enfants de l'Ecole du dimanche de l'Eglise Unie de Fort Garry à Winnipeg. Les enfants ont abordé plusieurs sujets soulevés dans le livre vert.



Un témoin de Québec, M. Claude Morin, s'entretenait avec les coprésidents Tom Hockin (P.C.—London-Ouest) et le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard (Nouveau-Brunswick), auxquels se sont joints les députés Suzanne Duplessis (P.C.—Louis-Hébert) et Steven Langdon (N.P.D.—Essex-Windsor).

*Le Greffier du Sénat*

*ATTESTÉ*

Qu'un message soit transmis à la Chambre des communes pour l'informer que le Sénat s'unit à Elle aux fins précitées.

*ORDONNE*: Que, nonobstant l'ordre adopté par le Sénat le jeudi 27 juin 1985, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit habilité à présenter son rapport final au plus tard le mercredi 25 juin 1986; et

Le mardi 27 mai 1986

*Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*

*ATTESTÉ*

Qu'un message soit envoyé au Sénat lui demandant de se joindre à cette Chambre aux fins ci-dessus.

*IL EST ORDONNÉ*, — Que, nonobstant l'ordre adopté par la Chambre le mercredi 12 juin 1985, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit habilité à présenter son rapport final au plus tard le mercredi 25 juin 1986; et

Le mardi 27 mai 1986

**ORDONNE:** Qu'un message soit transmis à la Chambre des communes pour l'informer que le Sénat se joint à la Chambre des communes pour former un Comité mixte spécial pour étudier les relations extérieures du Canada;

Que le document intitulé «Compétitivité et sécurité: Orientations pour les relations extérieures du Canada», déposé au Sénat le 15 mai 1985 (Document parlementaire n° 331-383), soit déferé au comité;

Que le Comité effectue une étude et présente un rapport sur les questions soulevées dans le document susmentionné, et soumette dans son rapport des recommandations sur les objectifs et la conduite des relations extérieures du Canada;

Que cinq membres du Sénat qui seront désignés à une date ultérieure représentent le Sénat audit comité;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à siéger pendant les séances et les ajournements du Sénat;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à faire rapport à l'occasion, à convoquer des personnes et à exiger la production de documents et dossiers, et à faire imprimer à l'occasion les documents et les témoignages dont il pourra ordonner l'impression;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à retenir les services d'experts et d'employés professionnels, techniques et de bureau;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à voyager au Canada et, lorsqu'il le jugera nécessaire, à se faire accompagner du personnel requis;

Que le quorum du Comité soit fixé à sept membres lorsque le comité doit voter, adopter une résolution ou prendre d'autres décisions, à condition que les deux Chambres soient représentées, et que les coprésidents soient autorisés à tenir des séances, à entendre des témoignages et à en autoriser l'impression lorsque quatre membres du Comité sont présents, à condition que les deux Chambres soient représentées;

Que le Comité présente, au plus tard le 23 août 1985, un rapport intérimaire au sujet de la participation canadienne à la recherche sur l'initiative de défense stratégique et du commerce bilatéral avec les États-Unis;

Que, nonobstant les pratiques habituelles de cette Chambre, si celle-ci ne siège pas lorsque le Comité aura terminé un rapport intérimaire ou son rapport final, le Comité fasse rapport de ses constatations en déposant son rapport auprès du Greffier du Sénat et que ledit rapport soit réputé avoir été déposé sur le Bureau; et

Que le Comité présente son rapport final au plus tard le 31 mai 1986.

**ATTESTE**

*Le Greffier du Sénat*

Le mercredi 12 juin 1985

*IL EST ORDONNÉ*, — Qu'un Comité mixte spécial du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes soit institué pour étudier les relations extérieures du Canada;

Que le document intitulé «Compétitivité et sécurité: Orientations pour les relations extérieures du Canada», déposé le 14 mai 1985 (Document parlementaire no 331-4/10), soit déposé au Comité;

Que le Comité effectue une étude et présente un rapport sur les questions soulevées dans le document susmentionné, et soumettre dans son rapport des recommandations sur les objectifs et la conduite des relations extérieures du Canada;

Que les 12 députés dont les noms suivent et qui représenteront la Chambre audit comité soient MM. Axworthy, Chrétien, Crofton, M<sup>me</sup> Duplessis, MM. Harvey, Hockin, Jardine, M<sup>lle</sup> Jewett, MM. Kempling, Langdon, Porter et Stackhouse;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à siéger pendant que la Chambre siège et qu'elle est ajournée;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à faire rapport à l'occasion, à convoquer des personnes et exiger la production de documents et dossiers, et à faire imprimer à l'occasion les documents et les témoignages dont il pourra ordonner l'impression;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à retenir les services d'experts et d'employés professionnels, techniques et de bureau;

Que le Comité soit autorisé à voyager au Canada et, lorsqu'il le jugera nécessaire, à se faire accompagner du personnel requis;

Que le quorum du Comité soit fixé à sept membres lorsque le Comité doit voter, adopter une résolution ou prendre d'autres décisions, à condition que les deux chambres soient représentées, et que les coprésidents soient autorisés à tenir des séances, à entendre des témoignages et à en autoriser l'impression lorsque 4 membres du Comité sont présents, à condition que les deux chambres soient représentées;

Que le Comité présente, au plus tard le 23 août 1985, un rapport intermédiaire au sujet de la participation canadienne à la recherche sur l'initiative de défense stratégique et du commerce bilatéral avec les États-Unis;

Que, nonobstant les pratiques habituelles de la Chambre, si celle-ci ne siège pas lorsque le Comité aura terminé un rapport intermédiaire ou son rapport final, le Comité fasse rapport de ses constatations en déposant son rapport auprès du Greffier de la Chambre et que ledit rapport soit réputé avoir été déposé sur le Bureau;

Que le Comité présente son rapport final au plus tard le 31 mai 1986; et

Qu'un message soit envoyé au Sénat l'invitant à se joindre à la Chambre aux fins susmentionnées et à désigner, si cela lui paraît souhaitable, de ses membres pour faire partie de ce Comité mixte spécial.

*ATTESTÉ*

*Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*



**Autres sénateurs ayant participé aux travaux du comité :**

C. William Doody  
Douglas D. Everett  
Heath Macquarrie

**Autres députés ayant participé aux travaux du comité :**


Bill Blaikie  
Aurèle Gervais  
Dan Heap  
Ken James  
John Parry  
Clément Côté  
John Reimer



Rahmiel S. Grafshein, sénateur  
Libéral  
Ontario



André Harvey, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Chicoutimi (Québec)



W.R. Bud Jardine, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Northumberland — Miramichi  
(Nouveau-Brunswick)



Pauline Jewett, députée  
Néo-démocrate  
New Westminster — Coquitlam  
(Colombie-Britannique)



Bill Kempling, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Burlington (Ontario)



Steven W. Langdon, député  
Néo-démocrate  
Essex — Windsor (Ontario)



Jim Manly, député  
Neo-démocrate  
Cowichan — Malahat — The Islands  
(Colombie-Britannique)



Bob Porter, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Medicine Hat (Alberta)



Reginald Stackhouse, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Scarborough-Ouest (Ontario)



Peter Stollery, sénateur  
Libéral  
Ontario


# Membres du Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada



Tom Hockin, député  
COPRÉSIDENT  
Progressiste conservateur  
London-Ouest (Ontario)



Jean-Maurice Simard, sénateur  
COPRÉSIDENT  
Progressiste conservateur  
Nouveau-Brunswick




Lloyd Axworthy, c.p., député  
Libéral  
Winnipeg — Fort Garry (Manitoba)



Jim Caldwell, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Essex — Kent (Ontario)



Jean Chrétien, c.p., député  
Libéral  
Saint-Maurice (Québec)



Patrick Crofton, député  
Progressiste conservateur  
Esquimalt — Saanich  
(Colombie-Britannique)



Richard Doyle, sénateur  
Progressiste conservateur  
Ontario



Suzanne Duplessis, députée  
Progressiste conservateur  
Louis-Hébert (Québec)



Jacques Flynn, c.p., sénateur  
Progressiste conservateur  
Rougemont (Québec)



Philippe D. Gigantès, sénateur  
Libéral  
Québec

Le Comité spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada à l'honneur de présenter son

## RAPPORT FINAL

Conformément à ses Ordres de renvoi du Sénat en date du 27 juin 1985 et du 27 mai 1986, et de ses Ordres de renvoi de la Chambre des communes en date du 12 juin 1985 et du 27 mai 1986, votre Comité a étudié les questions soulevées dans le document intitulé *Compétitivité et sécurité : Orientations pour les relations extérieures du Canada* et présente au Sénat et à la Chambre des communes ses recommandations sur les objectifs et la conduite des relations extérieures du Canada.



REMARQUE : Les fascicules n°s 19 à 62 des *Procès-verbaux et témoignages* du comité, et le n° 63 qui contient ce rapport, rendent compte des travaux du comité.



Publié en conformité de l'autorité du Sénat et du Président de la Chambre des communes par l'imprimeur de la Reine pour le Canada

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# **Indépendance et Internationalisme**

**Rapport  
du Comité mixte spécial  
du Sénat  
et  
de la Chambre des communes  
sur les relations extérieures du Canada**

**Juin 1986**

**Coprésidents :  
Jean-Maurice Simard, sénateur  
Tom Hockin, député**

*Les cögreffiers du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun  
Donald G. Reid

A 11h55, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité exprime ses remerciements aux coprésidents pour avoir guidé ses délibérations.

—les présentes directives demeurent en vigueur pendant les trente jours qui suivent le dépôt du rapport, après quoi les exemplaires restants relèveront de la gestion des cögreffiers ou de leurs successeurs à la direction des comités respective de chaque chambre du Parlement.

—à 1000 exemplaires au plus à la Tribune de la presse du Parlement et aux autres journalistes;

—deux cent cinquante exemplaires à distribuer par les cögreffiers à titre gratuit, à ceux qui en font la demande;

—dix exemplaires au plus pour chaque organisme ministériel ou organisme gouvernemental, sauf autorisation contraire de l'un des deux coprésidents;

—500 exemplaires au plus à la Tribune de la presse du Parlement et aux autres journalistes;

DÉCIDE, — Que conformément aux vœux exprimés par le coprésident (Chambre des communes), la motion du 5 mai 1986 portant paiement par le Comité des frais de représentation engagés par le président à London (Ontario), le mardi 8 avril 1986, est abrogée.

ORDONNE, — Que la motion du mardi 3 juin 1986 relative à l'insertion de la photographie de membres du Comité, soit abrogée; et

— Que les coprésidents présentent le rapport à leur Chambre respective du Parlement le 25 juin 1986 au plus tard ou, si elle ne siège pas, à son greffier.

DÉCIDE, — Que le Comité exprime ses remerciements chaleureux aux témoins qui ont comparu, à ceux qui ont soumis des mémoires, et au personnel du Comité pour sa compétence et son dévouement pour la tâche du Comité.

ORDONNE, — Qu'à l'expiration du mandat du Comité, ses documents soient confiés à la garde de la Direction des comités et de la législation privée de la Chambre des communes;

Que la consultation de la transcription des délibérations à huis clos du Comité ainsi que des avant-projets de ses rapports soit limitée aux catégories suivantes de personnes qui répondent aux conditions ci-après, jusqu'au 25 juin 1986:

- a) chercheurs universitaires qui produisent la preuve de leur association avec une université canadienne reconnue, au greffier de la Direction des comités et de la législation privée, qui reçoivent de sa part une autorisation écrite pour consulter les documents qui y sont prévus, et qui s'engagent par écrit à ne pas les publier;
- b) sénateurs et députés ou anciens sénateurs et anciens députés, qui s'engagent à ne publier, directement ou par personne interposée, aucun des documents visés, pendant la période d'embargo;
- c) autres personnes autorisées par lettre du président du Sénat ou de la Chambre des communes à consulter ces documents et qui s'engagent à se conformer aux restrictions prévues à l'alinéa a) ci-dessus en matière de publication.

ORDONNE, — Que les cogreffiers soient chargés de distribuer, selon les critères suivants, les exemplaires du rapport commandés par le Comité:

- un exemplaire à chaque témoin qui a comparu devant le Comité;
- un exemplaire à chaque organisation ou personne qui a présenté un mémoire avant le 7 mai 1986;
- cinq exemplaires supplémentaires au plus, selon le jugement discrétionnaire des cogreffiers, aux organisations qui ont soumis un mémoire ou ont comparu devant le Comité;
- quatre-vingts exemplaires au plus à chaque membre du Comité;



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Jim Caldwell, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, John Reimer, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Autre député présent:* Clément M. Côté.

*Aussi présents:* Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); Margot Maguire, Humphreys Public Affairs Group.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité étudie les éléments secondaires de son rapport final, ainsi que diverses questions relatives à l'adoption, à l'impresion et à la présentation de ce rapport.

Il est convenu, — Que la section réservée aux remerciements fera partie du rapport.

Il est convenu, — Que le réviseur, avec le concours du personnel de recherche, est autorisé à réviser le résumé des recommandations et conclusions du Comité, qui suit le chapitre 11, et, sous réserve de révision par les cogreffiers, à planifier le regroupement, la disposition et la présentation des éléments, conformément aux critères suivants:

— toutes les recommandations et conclusions figurant en caractères gras dans le texte doivent être conservées;

— aucune recommandation ou conclusion supplémentaire ne peut être ajoutée, ni aucun autre texte présenté en caractères gras dans le rapport;

— les recommandations et conclusions existantes peuvent être développées, uniquement pour clarifier les références et préciser le sujet afin de dissiper toute confusion possible;

— les recommandations et conclusions peuvent être regroupées en sections thématiques, dont les sous-titres feront ressortir les thèmes du rapport;

— des préambules, ne dépassant pas un paragraphe en longueur, peuvent être ajoutés à titre de transition ou d'explication pour introduire les sections thématiques.

Il est convenu, — Que le sommaire des recommandations et conclusions fera partie du rapport.

ORDONNÉ, — Que des photographies illustrant la participation des membres actifs du Comité aux audiences de ce dernier, soient incluses dans les pages préliminaires du rapport.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Clément Côté, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Autre député présent:* Jim Caldwell.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); David Humphreys, coordonnateur des médias; Margot Maguire, chargée des médias; Sue Bigelow, Bruce Campbell, Kim Nossal, délégués du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement. Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 5 (précédemment chapitre 6) de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, — Que le chapitre 5 (précédemment chapitre 6), sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport. Par consentement unanime, le chapitre 6 (précédemment chapitre 5) dont il a été convenu qu'il ferait partie du rapport, est revu et modifié.

Il est convenu, — Que le chapitre 6 (précédemment chapitre 5), sous sa forme modifiée de nouveau, fera partie du rapport.

Il est convenu, — Que le chapitre 8, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport. À 18 h 32, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos, aujourd'hui à 9 h 22, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Aurèle Gervais, Tom Hockin, Clément Côté, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); Georges Royer, réviseur (langue française); Chris Walker, membre du personnel; Luc Rainville, membre du personnel.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 5 (précédemment chapitre 6) de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

À 12 h 44, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 19 h 40, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Jim Caldwell, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité examine diverses questions relatives aux éléments de son rapport et prend des décisions sur l'inclusion, l'intitulé et l'organisation de ces éléments.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 9 de l'ébauche révisée définitive.

Il est convenu, —Que le chapitre, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport.

Il est convenu, —Que l'ordre des chapitres 5 et 6 du rapport révisé définitif sera interverti.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée définitive du rapport.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 5 (devenu le chapitre 6) de l'ébauche révisée définitive du rapport.

Il est convenu, —Que le chapitre 6, précédemment chapitre 5, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport.

À 22 h 30, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 33, sous la présidence de Bill Kempling (président suppléant).

#### *Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard, Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Bob Millier, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité étudie le chapitre 10 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que le chapitre 10, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport.

Le Comité étudie le chapitre 11 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que le chapitre 11, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée définitive.

Le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 9 de l'ébauche révisée définitive.

A 16 h 46, le coprésident, Tom Hockin, assume la présidence.

Il est convenu, —Que le rapport du Comité au Parlement sur la phase II de son enquête sera intitulé «Indépendance et internationalisme» et que ce titre figurera sur la couverture et la page de garde du rapport.

A 17 h 52, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 44, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud

Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Il est convenu, —Que la motion du mardi 27 mai 1986 relative à l'adoption du rapport soit abrogée et que le calendrier suivant des séances et des travaux soit approuvé en vue de l'adoption du rapport dans les délais qui y sont prévus:

Mardi 3 juin, après-midi — étudier le chapitre 7

— commencer l'étude du chapitre 8

Mercredi 4 juin, après-midi — terminer l'étude du chapitre 8

— étudier les chapitres 10 et 11

Mercredi 4 juin, soir — étudier le chapitre 9

— étudier le chapitre 5

Mardi 10 juin, matin — commencer l'étude du chapitre 6

Mardi 10 juin, après-midi — terminer l'étude du chapitre 6

Mardi 10 juin, soir — toutes questions non encore réglées

IL EST ORDONNÉ, —Que nonobstant la motion du jeudi 24 avril 1986 relative à l'impression du rapport du Comité, les cogreffiers ne préparent et n'insèrent dans les pages préliminaires du rapport que la photographie des membres, qui ont participé aux réunions du Comité pendant l'étude des ébauches dudit rapport.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 7 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que le chapitre 7, sous sa forme modifiée, fera partie du rapport.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

À 17 h 40, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'au mercredi 4 juin 1986, à 15 h 30.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 37, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); Judy Lawrence, déléguée du personnel, Parti progressiste conservateur; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1 et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité l'étude du chapitre 5 procède à de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

À 11 heures, le Comité interrompt les travaux.

À 12 h 10, le Comité reprend les travaux.

À 12 h 11, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 57, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

#### *Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); Judy Lawrence, déléguée du personnel, Parti progressiste conservateur; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1 et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 7 et procède à l'examen du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

À 18 h 41, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 38, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; et Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du texte révisé définitif de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que les chapitres 3 et 4, sous leur forme modifiée, feront partie du rapport.

Par consentement unanime, le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 7 de l'ébauche révisée définitive de son rapport au Parlement.

À 17 h 13, le Comité interrompt les travaux.

À 17 h 50, le Comité reprend les travaux.

Il est convenu, —Que les cinq paragraphes qui introduisent le résumé des recommandations et des conclusions, sous leur forme modifiée, feront partie du rapport.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 7 de l'ébauche révisée définitive.

À 19 h 02, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 50, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

#### *Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; et Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1986, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité procède à l'étude du texte révisé définitif de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que l'avant-propos, le chapitre 1, l'annexe du chapitre 1, et le chapitre 2, sous leur forme modifiée, feront partie du rapport.

À 12 h 37, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre à 15 h 30.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 40, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, tels que modifiés par des ordres du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes en date du 27 mai 1986. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1, et du mardi 27 mai 1986, fascicule n° 63*).

Le Comité étudie les chapitres 10 et 11 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement. À 18 h 09, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 19 h 51, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jeremiah S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kemppling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Lecture de l'ordre suivant de la Chambre des communes est donnée en ces termes:

*IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que, nonobstant l'ordre adopté par la Chambre le mercredi 12 juin 1985, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit habilité à présenter son rapport final au plus tard le mercredi 25 juin 1986; et*

Qu'un message soit envoyé au Sénat lui demandant de se joindre à cette Chambre aux fins ci-dessus.

Et lecture de l'ordre suivant du Sénat est donnée en ces termes:

*IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que, nonobstant l'ordre adopté par le Sénat le jeudi 27 juin 1985, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit habilité à présenter son rapport final au plus tard le mercredi 25 juin 1986; et*

Qu'un message soit transmis à la Chambre des communes pour l'informer que le Sénat s'unit à Elle aux fins précitées.

*IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que les coprésidents soient habilités à prolonger les contrats en vigueur intervenus avec le personnel du Comité jusqu'à toute date antérieure au 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1986, à leur discrétion et sur l'avis des copreffiers, à condition qu'en aucun cas, cette prolongation ne grève le budget total du Comité.*

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 9 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement. À 21 h 49, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le copreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 54, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Jeremiah S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 9 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

À 18 h 02, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 19 h 30.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 41 sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmie S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, coryffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 6 et procède à l'examen du chapitre 8 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, —Que le Comité terminera l'examen de son projet de rapport et adopte son rapport le mercredi 4 juin 1986 au plus tard.

À 12 h 35, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 15 h 30.

*Le coryffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 19 h 43, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bob Porter.

*Aussi présents:* Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 6 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement. À 22 h 29, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le coggreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 11 h 18, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Philippe D. Gigantès.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 6 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement. À 13 h 03, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 19 h 57 sous la présidence de Patrick Crofton (président suppléant).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Philippe D. Gigantes.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kemppling.

*Aussi présents:* Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Roger Hill, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 6 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

À 20 h 20, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président, faute de quorum.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs C. William Doody, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Roger Hill, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Sue Bigelow, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kim Pollock, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 6 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement, laquelle avait été réservée.

La séance est suspendue à 16 h 45.

La séance reprend à 17 h 20.

À 18 heures, le Comité interromp les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 19 h 30.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 20 h 15, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Jeremiah S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kemppling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du chapitre 5 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement. À 22 h 35, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jérémie S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, Bill Kempling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; David Humphreys, Margot Maguire, experts-conseils en matière de relations avec la presse, Humphreys Public Affairs Group.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

*IL EST ORDONNÉ,*—Que les cogreffiers soient chargés de préparer, de vérifier et d'envoyer aux Services d'imprimerie du gouvernement canadien les annexes suivantes du rapport, conformément à la procédure en la matière:

(1) Liste des audiences publiques sur la phase II de l'enquête du Comité;

(2) Liste des témoins qui ont comparu aux audiences du Comité durant la phase II;

(3) Liste des personnes qui ont envoyé leurs mémoires.

*IL EST ORDONNÉ,*—Que Humphreys Public Affairs Group reçoive instruction de préparer une pochette de renseignements à partir du rapport du Comité sur la phase II de son enquête, une fois que ce rapport aura été adopté, et que les coprésidents soient habilités à approuver le contenu de ladite pochette, avec le concours du représentant de chaque parti, avant sa formulation définitive destinée à être rendue publique à la suite du dépôt du rapport.

Le Comité procède à l'étude du chapitre 5 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement, laquelle avait été réservée.

À 18 h 04, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 19 h 30.



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 55, sous la présidence de Bill Kemppling (président suppléant).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantes, Jeremiah S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Bill Kemppling, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement, Chris Walker, attaché de recherche du Comité; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur

Le Comité reprend l'étude son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

Par consentement unanime des membres présents, le Comité procède à l'examen du chapitre 7. À 10 h 46, le coprésident, Tom Hockin, assume la présidence.

À 12 h 35, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 15 h 30.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 20 heures, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentants le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Jim Manly, Bob Porter.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, coryffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Greg Wirick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kim Pollock, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité examine les chapitres 2, 3 et 4 de l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

À 21 h 36, le Comité interrompt les travaux.

À 21 h 40, le Comité reprend les travaux.

À 23 h 10, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le coryffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 44, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kempling, Jim Manly, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Greg Wirick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Margot Maguire, chargée des médias, Humphreys Public Affairs Group; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kim Pollock, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité met en délibération une ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement.

L'ébauche révisée de l'avant-propos fait l'objet d'un examen.

Il est convenu, —Que le Comité mettra en délibération l'ébauche révisée de son rapport au Parlement, sous la forme qu'ont distribuée les cogreffiers du Comité, qu'il en examinera séparément l'avant-propos, chaque chapitre et les annexes; et que les coprésidents sont investis du pouvoir discrétionnaire de surseoir au vote relatif à chaque motion.

Il est convenu, —Qu'en vertu de l'autorité que lui confère son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, le Comité majore d'un montant n'excédant pas 18 000\$, le contrat de prestation de services intervenu avec le Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur, pour assurer la continuité des travaux de préparation et de révision du rapport; qu'à cet effet, des crédits seront transférés du solde du budget des déplacements, jusqu'à concurrence de 18 000\$.

IL EST ORDONNÉ, —Qu'un dessin convenant à la couverture du rapport du Comité au Parlement soit commandé par Humphreys Public Affairs Group, le coût du dessin et des travaux de composition, y compris le rassemblement des photographies idoines et le paiement des redevances y afférentes, soit imputé au budget prévu pour le rapport du Comité; et que les coprésidents soient habilités à approuver le dessin avec le concours du principal porte-parole de chaque parti.

Le Comité examine le chapitre 1 de l'ébauche révisée du rapport.

À 18 heures, le Comité interromp les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 19 h 45.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 53, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*Autre député présent:* Jim Fulton.

*Aussi présents:* Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 17 h 45, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 33, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès et Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kim Pollock, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 12 h 33, Le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 15 h 30.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 19 h 18, sous la présidence du sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Richard J. Doyle, Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.  
*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kemppling.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Judy Lawrence, déléguée du personnel, Parti progressiste conservateur; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1.*)

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 21 h 42, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 23 sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Kim Pollock, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

Il est convenu, — Qu'en vertu de l'autorité que lui confère son ordre de renvoi en date du jeudi 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et en date du mercredi 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes, le Comité retiendra les services de M. Georges Royer à titre de réviseur (langue française) du rapport du Comité sur la phase II de son enquête, conformément aux stipulations contractuelles à négocier par le coprésident.

À 12 h 12, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 20 heures, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jerahmiel S. Grafstein.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven Langdon.

*Aussi présents:* Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Greg Wirick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Barbara Arneil, déléguée du personnel, Parti libéral; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 22 h 33, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le coryffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cointervenant du Comité; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Grey Wirick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bob Miller, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Barbara Arneil, députée du personnel, Parti libéral; Kim Pollock, députée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Bruce Campbell, député du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 17 heures, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 19 h 45.

*Le cointervenant du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos, aujourd'hui à 15 h 48, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Roger Hill, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Greg Wirick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 17 h 48, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le co-référent du Comité*  
Donald G. Reid

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 30, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Jean-Maurice Simard, Heath Macquarrie.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W. R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven W. Langdon, Bob Porter, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 12 h 40, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 35, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Lloyd Axworthy, Patrick Crofton, Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Bill Kemppling.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Roger Hill, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

**IL EST ORDONNÉ,**—Que les dépenses engagées par le coprésident pour le dîner offert le mardi 8 avril 1986, à London (Ontario), en l'honneur des membres du Comité et d'autres invités soient supportées par le Comité à titre de frais de représentation, après attestation, par le cogreffier (Chambre des communes), de la liste des convives.

À 17 h 45, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.



Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 45, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantès, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Greg Witrick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Luc Rainville, attaché de recherche; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); David Humphreys, coordonnateur des médias; Margot Maguire, chargée des médias; Barbara Arneil, déléguée du personnel, Parti libéral; Jackie McIntyre, déléguée du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Chris Walker, attaché de recherche.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 16 h 25, le sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard assume la présidence.

À 16 h 50, le Comité interrompt les travaux.

À 16 h 59, le Comité reprend les travaux.

À 17 heures, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Doreen Lebrun

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 9 h 21, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Philippe D. Gigantes, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, W.R. Bud Jardine, Pauline Jewett, Steven Langdon, Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Donald G. Reid, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Greg Witick, attaché de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Luc Rainville, attaché de recherche; Chris Walker, attaché de recherche; Bruce Campbell, délégué du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise).

Le Comité poursuit les travaux prévus à son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et à son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 12 h 45, le Comité interrompt les travaux pour les reprendre aujourd'hui à 15 h 30.

LE MERCREDI 30 AVRIL 1986

(114)

Le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada se réunit à huis clos aujourd'hui à 15 h 44, sous la présidence de Tom Hockin (coprésident).

*Membres du Comité présents:*

*Représentant le Sénat:* Les sénateurs Jerahmiel S. Grafstein, Jean-Maurice Simard.

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:* Suzanne Duplessis, André Harvey, Tom Hockin, Pauline Jewett et Reginald Stackhouse.

*Aussi présents:* Doreen Lebrun, cogreffier du Comité; Gerald Wright, directeur de l'étude; Peter Dobell, directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Bill Neil, attaché de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Roger Hill, Bob Miller, Carol Seaborn, Gregory Wirick, attachés de recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur; Kathryn Randle, réviseur (langue anglaise); Christiane Kaisin, réviseur (langue française); Margot Maguire, chargée des médias; Peggy Dillman, Luc Rainville, attaché de recherche; Chris Walker, attaché de recherche; Susan Bigelow, Bruce Campbell, députés du personnel, Nouveau parti démocratique; Judy Lawrence, députée du personnel, Parti progressiste conservateur.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi en date du 27 juin 1985, émanant du Sénat, et de son ordre de renvoi en date du 12 juin 1985, émanant de la Chambre des communes. (*Voir Procès-verbaux et témoignages du vendredi 28 juin 1985, fascicule n° 1*).

Le Comité procède à l'étude d'une ébauche de son rapport au Parlement.

À 18 h 10, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*Le cogreffier du Comité,*  
Donald G. Reid

## ORDRES DE RENVOI

DU SÉNAT

MOTION

PAR l'honorable sénateur Doody, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Phillips.

Avec la permission du Sénat et notwithstanding l'article 45(1)e) du Règlement,

QUE notwithstanding l'ordre adopté par le Sénat le mardi 27 mai 1986, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit habilité à présenter son rapport au plus tard le jeudi 26 juin 1986; et

Qu'un message soit transmis à la Chambre des communes pour l'informer que le Sénat s'unit à elle aux fins précitées.

DÉPOSÉ au Sénat

le 19 juin 1986

*Greffier adjoint*

DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

LE JEUDI 19 JUIN 1986

*IL EST ORDONNÉ*,—Que, notwithstanding l'ordre de la Chambre adopté le mardi 27 mai 1986, le Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada soit autorisé à présenter son rapport au plus tard le jeudi 26 juin 1986; et

Qu'un message soit envoyé au Sénat pour l'enjoindre de s'unit à la Chambre pour les fins susmentionnées.

ATTESTÉ

*pour Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*  
MICHAEL B. KIRBY



## ERRATUM

### Fascicule n° 55

À la page 55:71, dans les versions anglaise et française:  
Au troisième paragraphe des commentaires du coprésident suppléant (*le sénateur Stollery*), "M. Saleh" devrait se lire "M. Hadawi"; et

L'en-tête "M. Rashad Saleh (président, Fédération canado-arabe)" devrait se lire "M. Sami Hadawi (membre de la Fédération canado-arabe)".

Aux pages 55:72 et 55:79, dans les versions anglaise et française:

L'en-tête "M. Saleh" devrait se lire "M. Hadawi".

À la page 55:75, dans les versions anglaise et française:  
L'en-tête "M. Sami Hadawi (membre de la Fédération canado-arabe)" devrait se lire "M. Hadawi".

À la page 55:78, dans les versions anglaise et française:

Le deuxième en-tête "M. Saleh" devrait se lire "M. Hadawi".

Fascicule n° 63: *Rapport du Comité mixte spécial sur les relations extérieures du Canada*

À la page 37, de la version anglaise:

Les mots "Cabinet Committee on External Affairs," à la quarante-cinquième ligne doivent être supprimés et les mots "Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy" doivent être insérés à l'endroit approprié.

À la page 40, de la version française:

Les mots "Comité du Cabinet chargé des affaires extérieures" à la douzième ligne doivent être supprimés et les mots "Comité du Cabinet chargé de la politique étrangère et de la défense" doivent être insérés à l'endroit approprié.

Aux pages 93 et 94, de la version française:

Les mots "Fonds monétaire international" à la quarante-septième ligne de la page 93 et à la première ligne de la page 94 doivent être supprimés et les mots "Banque mondiale" doivent être insérés à l'endroit approprié.

Nota: Ce rapport, ci-inclus dans le fascicule 63, a également été publié sous couverture spéciale, suite au dépôt du rapport au Parlement.

Le mardi 10 juin 1986:	Aurèle Gervais remplacé Suzanne Duplessis; Robert A. Corbett remplacé André Harvey; Scott Fennell remplacé Bob Porter; Don Ravis remplacé W. R. Bud Jardine; Clément Côté remplacé Don Ravis.
Le jeudi 12 juin 1986:	Suzanne Duplessis remplacé Aurèle Gervais; André Harvey remplacé Robert A. Corbett; Bob Porter remplacé Scott Fennell; W. R. Bud Jardine remplacé Clément Côté; Jim Caldwell remplacé Patrick Crofton; John Reimer remplacé Suzanne Duplessis.
Le jeudi 19 juin 1986:	Patrick Crofton remplacé Jim Caldwell; Suzanne Duplessis remplacé John Reimer.
Conformément à l'article 66(4) du Règlement du Sénat	
Le mardi 29 avril 1986:	Philippe D. Gigantès remplacé Douglas Everett.
Le mardi 6 mai 1986:	Heath Macquarrie remplacé Richard J. Doyle.
Le mercredi 7 mai 1986:	Richard J. Doyle remplacé Heath Macquarrie.
Le mardi 20 mai 1986:	C. William Doody remplacé Richard J. Doyle.
Le vendredi 23 mai 1986:	Richard J. Doyle remplacé C. William Doody.
On Tuesday, June 10, 1986:	Aurèle Gervais replaced Suzanne Duplessis; Robert A. Corbett replaced André Harvey; Scott Fennell replaced Bob Porter; Don Ravis replaced W. R. Bud Jardine; Clément Côté replaced Don Ravis.
On Thursday, June 12, 1986:	Suzanne Duplessis replaced Aurèle Gervais; André Harvey replaced Robert A. Corbett; Bob Porter replaced Scott Fennell; W. R. Bud Jardine replaced Clément Côté; Jim Caldwell replaced Patrick Crofton; John Reimer replaced Suzanne Duplessis.
On Thursday, June 19, 1986:	Patrick Crofton replaced Jim Caldwell; Suzanne Duplessis replaced John Reimer.
Pursuant to Rule 66(4) of the Senate	
On Tuesday, April 29, 1986:	Philippe D. Gigantès replaced Douglas Everett.
On Tuesday, May 6, 1986:	Heath Macquarrie replaced Richard J. Doyle.
On Wednesday, May 7, 1986:	Richard J. Doyle replaced Heath Macquarrie.
On Tuesday, May 20, 1986:	C. William Doody replaced Richard J. Doyle.
On Friday, May 23, 1986:	Richard J. Doyle replaced C. William Doody.

COMITÉ MIXTE SPÉCIAL DU SÉNAT ET  
DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES SUR LES  
RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU CANADA

SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE  
SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
ON CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Coprésidents:*

Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, député

*Représentant le Sénat:*

Joint-Chairmen:  
Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, M.P.

*Representing the Senate:*

Les sénateurs—Senators

Richard J. Doyle Jerahmiel S. Grafstein Jean-Maurice Simard Peter Stollery — 5

Philippe D. Gigantes

*Représentant la Chambre des communes:*

*Representing the House of Commons:*

Les députés—Members

Lloyd Axworthy André Harvey W. R. Bud Jardine  
Patrick Crofton Tom Hockin Donald Johnston  
Suzanne Duplessis Pauline Jewett Bill Kemppling  
Reginald Stackhouse

(Quorum 7)

*Les coprésidents du Comité*

Doreen Lebrun

Donald G. Reid

*Joint Clerks of the Committee*

Conformément à l'article 94 du Règlement de la Chambre des Pursuant to Standing Order 94 of the House of Commons communes

Le lundi 28 avril 1986:

Pauline Jewett remplacé Bill Blaikie.

Le mardi 29 avril 1986:

Suzanne Duplessis remplacé Aurèle Gervais.

Le mercredi 14 mai 1986:

Jim Manly remplacé Steven Langdon.

Le jeudi 15 mai 1986:

Steven Langdon remplacé Jim Manly.

Le mercredi 4 juin 1986:

Ken James remplacé André Harvey;

Jim Caldwell remplacé Reginald Stackhouse.

Le jeudi 5 juin 1986:

André Harvey remplacé Ken James;

Reginald Stackhouse remplacé Jim Caldwell.

Reginald Stackhouse remplacé Jim Caldwell.

On Thursday, June 5, 1986:

André Harvey remplacé Ken James;

Jim Caldwell remplacé Reginald Stackhouse.

On Wednesday, June 4, 1986:

Ken James remplacé André Harvey;

On Thursday, May 15, 1986:

On Wednesday, May 14, 1986:

On Tuesday, April 29, 1986:

On Monday, April 28, 1986:

SÉNAT

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 63

Du MERCREDI 30 avril 1986  
Au JEUDI 26 juin 1986

Coprésidents:

Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, député

SENATE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 63

From WEDNESDAY, April 30, 1986  
To THURSDAY, June 26, 1986

Joint Chairmen:

Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard  
Tom Hockin, M.P.

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages  
du Comité mixte spécial du Sénat  
et de la Chambre des communes sur les*  
*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence  
of the Special Joint Committee of the  
Senate and of the House of Commons on*

## Relations extérieures du Canada

## Canada's International Relations

CONCERNANT:

Ordre de renvoi relatif aux Relations extérieures  
du Canada

Y COMPRIS:

Le rapport final au Parlement

INCLUDING:

The Final Report to Parliament

Première session de la

trente-troisième législature, 1985-1986

First Session of the

Thirty-third Parliament, 1985-1986





# Relations extérieures du Canada

## Canada's International Relations

SÉNAT	CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
Fascicule n° 63	
Du MERCREDI 30 avril 1986	From WEDNESDAY, April 30, 1986
Au JEUDI 26 juin 1986	To THURSDAY, June 26, 1986
Coprésidents:	Joint Chairmen:
Sénateur Jean-Maurice Simard	Senator Jean-Maurice Simard
Tom Hockin, député	Tom Hockin, M.P.
<i>Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Comité mixte spécial du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes sur les</i>	<i>Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on</i>

CONCERNANT:	RESPECTING:
Ordre de renvoi relatif aux Relations extérieures du Canada	Order of Reference pertaining to Canada's International Relations
Y COMPRIS:	INCLUDING:
Le rapport final au Parlement	The Final Report to Parliament

Première session de la trente-troisième législature, 1985-1986	First Session of the Thirty-third Parliament, 1985-1986
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CANADA

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SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON

# Canada's International Relations

SENATE  
AND  
HOUSE OF COMMONS

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Issues 1-63

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1985-1986

•

1st Session

•

33rd Parliament

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Joint Chairmen: Senator Jean-Maurice Simard  
Mr. Tom Hockin, M.P.



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## GUIDE TO THE USERS

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This Index is a subject-based and cross-referenced index which provides subject analysis as well as corresponding entries under the names of individual Members of Parliament.

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subject entry	Steel industry, <b>15:9</b>

Main subject	<b>Steel industry</b>
sub-heading	Exports, <b>15:9</b>

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The index is extensively cross-referenced to account for organization of subject detail and varying terminology. Cross-references to a first sub-heading are denoted by a long dash “—”.

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### OFFICIAL REPORT

FIRST SESSION—THIRTY-THIRD PARLIAMENT

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*Abbreviations:* A. = Appendices. Amdt. = amendment. M. = motion. S.O. = standing order.

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